


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GERMANY

GERMANY

The Welding of a World Power

By

Wolf von Schierbrand

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GERMANY

CHAPTER I

GERMANY AS A WORLD POWER

WHEN Bismarck retired, twelve years ago, Germany was no world power. She was a country which, in a military sense, was considered preëminent in Europe, and which, by reason of the tripartite agreement between her, Austria and Italy, filled a leading position, in a political sense, on the Continent. But a world power she was not. The very word had not then been coined. It was before the series of startling events that have since transformed the whole situation in the far East and brought Japan and China into the family of nations as potent factors. It was before the Spanish-American War, which in two hemispheres projected the United States into the midst of the political arena. There have seldom been ten years in the world's history which have wrought such radical changes, changes of such far-reaching importance, as those since 1892. The world at large has as yet scarcely gained the right focus for viewing those momentous happenings. Next to this country it is Germany that has most largely profited from the new situation.

It was the Kaiser who was the first in Germany to speak of his nation as a world power. It was in one of the most felicitous speeches he ever made—on the launching of a gigantic ocean greyhound—that he used the term. He did not define his meaning of the word, but he was generally understood. What he meant was that Germany, transformed into one of the three leading exporting and naval powers, expanding as a shipping and colonial nation, and rapidly growing as an industrial and manufacturing centre, must needs enlarge her mental horizon, and reckon not only with her Continental neighbours, not only with Europe, but with the whole globe as a competitor, customer, friend or foe. She must extend her political and commercial

influence all over the world, and must have ships on every sea as well as merchants in every port. As the Kaiser expressed the same idea, on a later occasion, in graphic though somewhat boastful language: "Nothing must be done anywhere on the globe without the sanction of Germany's ruler."

This, in a nutshell, is his conception of Germany as a world power. It found, of course, no unanimous assent, either in Germany or in other countries. There were many in Germany then as there are many now who deemed his aims too extravagant and the means of their realization—comprising, above all, a big navy and a bolder and more assertive foreign policy—not in accord with the empire's best interests. The whole Liberal party in Germany and a number of leaders among the government supporters are opposed to him on this point. But the Kaiser, as is well understood by all who know the Germany of to-day, is masterful. He contrives to impose his will and his ambitions on the nation he rules, and that part of it which is dominant in politics has been in the main won over to his ideas. Thus, for weal or woe, Germany has embarked on the troubled seas of the new policy outlined by him, then and since, in a number of forceful and picturesque speeches.

The first outcome of the Kaiser's world policy was Germany's share in the winding-up of the Chino-Japanese War, when she joined Russia and France in wresting out of Japan's grasp the prize won by the sword. It is a question whether that was a wise step for Germany to take. For one thing, it drove Japan into England's arms, and made that pushing Eastern nation hostile to Germany. This is a fact which is of great importance to a power having serious and growing interests in far Asia. Next, Germany played her part in the Turco-Greek War, particularly in its settlement; and she played her part well, obtaining afterwards from Turkey the big railway concession in the Euphrates Valley and other benefits. In the Cretan trouble she purposely refrained from doing more than was necessary to maintain her prestige; but she did a great deal more than Bismarck would have done under similar circumstances. She again used her opportunities well during and shortly after the Spanish-American War, when she seized upon Kiaochou, thus securing for herself a point of leverage in China. She then acquired, by

right of purchase, the Carolines, and, by amicable settlement with this country and England, the main portion of the Samoan Isles. She has not been successful—except in one instance, at the mouth of the Indian Ocean, by an understanding with Turkey—in her strenuous efforts to acquire coaling stations at convenient points along the main road to far Asia, though her need in that respect is both palpable and urgent. In Africa her latent designs to extend her sphere of influence have not recently been favoured by opportunity. Her domains there are, for the most part, arid and susceptible of but small development, or, as in the case of Togo and the Cameroons, unfit for European habitation by reason of a murderous climate. Her intention of buying from Spain the important island of Fernando Po, thus making her Cameroons possession twice as valuable, has for the time miscarried. Nothing at all to Germany's advantage has resulted from England's Boer war, although she fully expected something. In China, too, the implied monopoly of commercially exploiting the province of Shantung—one of the best Chinese provinces for mineral and railroad development—which was granted to Germany in her agreement with China ceding Kiaochou, has come to naught. Both this country and England have vigorously opposed German pretensions in this respect, on the principle of the "open door," and have thus deprived Germany of the chance of extensively fructifying her bargain with China and treating Shantung as her exclusive domain. These and other reasons tend to keep Germany in her Chinese policy on the side of France and Russia, the two countries which, for strong reasons of their own, favour the policy of recognizing a chain of "separate interest spheres" with a view to the eventual dismemberment of the huge empire.

From the above statement it is plain that Germany, during her brief career as a world power, has had a fair measure of success, as well as some reverses. The opportunities that came to her were boldly and adroitly used. But the question nevertheless arises: "Will Germany for any length of time be able to maintain herself as a world power?" And further, will she be able to contend successfully in the fierce struggle for naval, colonial and commercial expansion, without allies or at least strong friends? The question may well be asked, for during

the long troubles in China, Germany became for the first time painfully aware that in her world policy she stood without friends. Again and again, at crucial moments of that long occupation of Chinese territory, it was brought home to Germany, though she it was of all the powers interested in that punitive campaign that had been most terribly affronted, that her interests ran parallel to none other. It was only with the utmost diplomatic effort that she succeeded in obtaining a sort of *amende honorable* from China.

What, then, are Germany's points of weakness and strength as a world power? To know that is virtually an answer to the foregoing two questions.

It requires commercial, naval and military preëminence to be and remain a world power. In some cases, due to exceptionally favourable geographical conditions, military supremacy may be, to a certain extent, dispensed with. This is true of both England and the United States, and it is a generally acknowledged fact that does not seem to require elaborate explanation. But for Germany to maintain herself as a world power there is no exception to the rule. Situated as she is in the very heart of Europe, surrounded on every side by powerful and ambitious nations, military supremacy is indispensable.

In this respect she does not disappoint her friends. Germany still stands foremost in military power. The enormous prestige she won in 1870-71 holds good. She has not supinely rested on her laurels all these thirty years. Her army is to-day in every respect far superior to that with which she vanquished the French. Enormous improvements have been made in the commissariat, in the physical training of her soldiers, in their *morale* even; and her telegraph, telephone, railway construction and *aéronautic* departments are considered the best extant. The general staff of her army is the unapproached model for the whole world. There has also been a great increase in numbers. The peace establishment of Germany's army is to-day larger than the vast host of 600,000 men, a number up to that time unprecedented, which Napoleon I led to the conquest of Russia in 1812. And her armies on a war footing amount to a grand total of 5,788,000 men and 250,000 officers. With these figures she has left France far in the rear, and exceeds even Russia's

nominal total by 600,000. It is safe to say that Germany alone, from the purely military viewpoint, is to-day more than a match for the combined forces of France and Russia, taking, of course, into due account the much greater actual efficiency of the German army when compared with those of her two principal military rivals. In the history of the world there has never been any such surpassingly powerful fighting machine as the German army of to-day.

As to the next point, namely, naval power, Germany is, however, neither in prestige—which, in fact, is totally lacking in her case—nor in actual strength on a par with England or France. In fact, for the time being she stands but fourth in the list, Russia at least nominally exceeding her in the number of vessels. So far Germany has not had a chance such as, for instance, this country had a few years ago, to demonstrate her actual naval fighting strength; the only naval skirmish in the Franco-German War, in West Indian waters, having amounted to little.

There are, however, a number of facts which, in the absence of any practical test on a large scale, tend to show partly what the German navy at this time really amounts to, and partly what it will mean in the near future. As to the first point, the unanimous opinion of those naval experts, no matter of what nationality, who have had a chance to examine carefully the workings of the German navy, is to the effect that in general efficiency, in discipline and in spirit the men and officers have no superiors, and that the ships, as fighting machines for harbour and coast defense and for battle on the open seas, are first-class. To mention, out of the mass of this favourable opinion, just two cases, both American, I shall here cite Admiral Evans and Commander Beehler, the United States naval attaché in Berlin. Both deem the German navy, in all essential points excepting size, equal to the English and superior to the French. That German characteristic, thoroughness, has been brought to bear upon the German navy, both as to men and ships, with wonderful results. The men are trained to a degree unknown in any other navy, not excepting the American. The practice, inaugurated by the Kaiser since his accession, of annually holding big naval manoeuvres in all respects closely resembling actual

naval warfare, has been of immense benefit in this respect, and their considerable cost has been a wise expenditure.

That is the verdict of competent judges as to the German navy of to-day. But the real German navy—*i.e.*, that now in process of formation, will be a vastly different and more formidable affair. A plan of enlargement was adopted by the Reichstag, two years ago, at the urgent solicitation of the Kaiser, and has thus become an organic law of the Empire, not subject to fluctuations of public opinion. The enormous sums needed for the purpose, amounting in all to over \$250,000,000, have been appropriated, in annual instalments, by the same national parliament. The scheme provides for the more than doubling of the present German navy, and for the remodelling and modernizing of about a score of the old vessels—those of the so-called “Sachsen” and “Oldenburg” classes or types. The transformation is to be completed, according to the wording of the law, by 1915; but it is an open secret that the rate of construction has been much accelerated, so that the year 1910 will probably see the young naval giant in readiness. When completed, the German navy will consist of thirty-seven battle-ships—the number at present is fifteen—comprising twenty-seven of the largest and most powerful type, eight of the second size, and two smaller ones; twenty-six armoured cruisers, ten large and sixteen smaller ones; thirty-two sea-going gunboats, averaging 350 tons each; and fourteen big armoured vessels for coast and harbor defense. The total equipment will be 109 fighting vessels, manned by 55,000 seamen and marines, with 74,000 naval reserves, and, for batteries, 586 heavy guns and 2,836 secondary and machine guns. This navy will be equal in the three points mentioned—namely, number and tonnage of vessels, men and guns—to the present French navy, with the enormous advantage, however, of being new, up to date, and equipped with all the most recent improvements. Germany would then be, unless France should follow in her footsteps, of which there does not seem to be any likelihood at present, the second sea-power in the world.

Her merchant marine consists now of 4,108 vessels, with a total of 2,826,400 tons, and crews aggregating 50,556 men. One-third of these vessels are steamships. This shows an increase of fifty per cent. during the last decade, and puts Germany, so far

as the ocean traffic goes, in the second place; though, if we include our lake shipping, the American merchant marine would be far ahead of Germany.

In population Germany is gaining rapidly as well. The official census of December, 1900, gives her 56,345,014, a gain of over four millions since 1895, or eight per cent. within five years.

As the last, and most important, of Germany's qualifications as a world power, her commerce must be mentioned. The figures I quote are from German official statistics. According to them, she imported during 1900 a total of 49,491,400 tons, valued at 6,043,000,000 marks. She exported 36,318,100 tons, worth 4,752,600,000 marks. Of her imports the United States furnished 1,020,000,000 marks' worth, while of her exports 912,000,000 marks' worth went to England. These two countries do most business with her, American imports furnishing over one-sixth of the total and English exports about one-fifth. Since 1891, when German imports amounted to 4,403,000,000 marks, this branch of her foreign trade has increased over 25 per cent., while the exports, which in 1891 were 3,339,000,000, have since risen by about 30 per cent. Her transmarine export trade has grown at an even greater ratio. It amounted in 1900 to 2,634,000,000 marks, or over 56 per cent. of the total, being an increase of about 40 per cent. since 1891. The bulk of her transmarine exportations being finished products, this is, therefore, the most profitable section of her trade. Even the severe financial depression that set in about eighteen months ago, and whose effects are still noticeable, has not been able to check the commercial growth of Germany; for the advance figures for her total exports and imports during 1901, although but approximate, show but a slight falling off against the preceding year.

Summarizing, then, Germany's claims to consideration as a world power, it is seen that her military supremacy is undeniable. She has, as shown above, an efficient navy, which she is now transforming into the second largest in the world, and which, to confine myself strictly to the present, is about thirty per cent. stronger than the American navy. Her commerce is steadily growing, and is the second largest in imports and exports, though by no means in domestic trade, in which point

this country leads the world. Germany has also some traits in her national character which constitute undeniable advantages. Her people, as traders, bring into play a more thorough education than either the English or the Americans possess. Her mercantile colleges fit out young and intelligent men with all the mental equipment they need—not only languages, but a reliable knowledge of foreign countries, men, and methods. The custom, so largely prevailing for many years past in large German exporting houses, of sending out young relatives or clerks to countries that are their main customers, to study the field on the spot for a term of years—often, too, settling them there permanently as their representatives—is a wise one. It enables the home firm to be correctly, closely and quickly informed of everything that will be of use to it.

Then, too, German patience, frugality and adaptability are of great use to Germany in her transmarine trade relations. Where the Englishman often persists in methods no longer successful in certain countries, and where the American wants big and quick profits, the German, by the exercise of the above qualities, frequently carries off the prize. The German exporter studies to please his foreign customer, sinking his own tastes and predilections in favour of those of the distant purchaser. Again, he accommodates himself to the often rather unsatisfactory modes of payment obtaining in many foreign lands, giving long credits, etc. Of course, his linguistic knowledge likewise plays an important part in giving him a better status with the natives. This is particularly true in the case of Spanish-speaking countries.

All these are points of strength. Germany's points of weakness, however, also fill a considerable list. First, politically considered, Germany's foreign policy is now in a bad way. The Dreibund is visibly crumbling. It is absolutely necessary for Germany to make friends with either the United States or England, or both. Let this be understood plainly. Germany, without such a close and friendly understanding, will be, in the long run, powerless. Her rôle as a world power will be over and done with. The reasons are clear to anybody who will take the trouble to see patent facts. Germany is losing Austria and Italy as hard-and-fast allies. No one who has watched political

events during the last ten years doubts that. She is thus practically isolated. And Germany cannot, like England, afford a term of "splendid isolation." The contingency of which Bismarck spoke in his Memoirs, and which, according to that book, was his "nightmare," has arrived. A repetition of the old Triple Alliance, composed of Austria, France and Russia, has become a strong possibility. By that it is not meant that such an alliance is likely to come immediately. In fact, the present Austrian monarch is too loyal to lend his aid in forming such a political combination, unless vital interests of his monarchy should be at stake; but he is aged, and it is certain that his successor has never shown any German sympathies, and that he is strongly influenced by his Czech wife. Accordingly, later on a radical change may be expected in Austro-Hungary's foreign policy; and the old Kaunitz alliance, which once came near wiping out Prussia's political existence, may be revived. Bismarck gave expression to this conviction on several occasions during the last years of his life, and he also, as mentioned above, recorded it in his Memoirs.*

Even if the Dreibund were not in a state of decay, but still in its pristine vigour, that would not help Germany in her position as a world power. Austria's interests are purely Continental, and her foreign commerce is insignificant. Her navy is not worth serious consideration. Italy, beside being financially, as well as in size and population, the weakest of the great powers, is absolutely in no position to further Germany's ambitions in other parts of the world. Of late years, too, she has committed herself to a policy of retrenchment, and in pursuance of it both her army and navy have been reduced. She is building few new ships. Since her Abyssinian reverses, Italy's foreign policy has become wholly defensive, and merely directed to the maintenance of the *status quo*. For her freedom to plough the seas and maintain her trade, she relies on her recent friendly understanding with France, and for the preservation of present conditions in the Mediterranean, on her old-time friendship with England.

Thus her two allies are both unable and unwilling to embark with Germany on her policy as a world power. This has been

* Part II, p. 229, etc.

proclaimed of late in positive language in the three Parliaments by the leading statesmen of the old Dreibund powers. Now, to whom else can Germany turn in her absolute need of obtaining guarantees against a possible interruption of her expansive commercial and colonial policy?

To Russia and France? Certainly not. Those two powers must be left out of such a reckoning. For while it is quite within Germany's ability to enter into a definite understanding with either or both of them, at a given time and for a given purpose—as she did, for instance, with Russia and France toward the close of the Chino-Japanese War, and with France in Africa, where Germans and French, for the first time in several centuries, were fighting shoulder to shoulder to checkmate a British advance—it is quite out of the question that an agreement of a general nature can be made between Germany on the one side and Russia and France on the other. Still less is it possible for Germany to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with these two powers, even as to interests in Asia or Africa. Leaving aside the fact that Russia and France are together strong enough to carry out, in most cases, their colonial, political and commercial schemes in those continents as well as in Europe, and therefore want no third power to share in their course of action and to influence it, it must never be forgotten that the Dual Alliance was originally based on a common enmity toward Germany, and that Russia knows full well that to try to admit Germany to the benefits of this agreement would eventually mean to drive away France. Admitting that the reasons for France's unwillingness in this respect are largely sentimental, and that to-day sentiment is rarely the ruling factor in statecraft, still the sentiment impelling France on her road, side by side with Russia, is very strong. By systematic training during the past thirty years the so-called "*revanche* idea" has become a part of the French nature and of the national creed—in fact, the very first paragraph in it.

But there are other reasons militating against an intimate understanding between Germany and these two countries. Germany's main object in Asia is the extension of her export traffic and the acquiring of points of vantage along the coasts—coaling stations for her navy, a number of *pieds à terre* for her

troops and radiating points for her commerce. There is hardly a point, however, where, in carrying out her designs, she would not run counter to important French or Russian interests. There are but a few such points left, excepting some belonging to Portugal, that are not in possession of either Russia and France, England or the United States. Russia and France have vast Asiatic possessions with which they do not want Germany to interfere, and which they desire to monopolize commercially. This policy of exclusive commercial exploitation, unwise though it may be for countries strong in industry and commerce, is probably the only one for Russia to pursue; and though the wisdom of it is less apparent in the case of France, it is the one which the latter country has traditionally held as a part of her colonial policy.

There is no other important power with which Germany could unite in an endeavour to extend and maintain her world policy as against that of Russia and France, on the one side, and England and the United States, on the other. I group England and the United States together, for there is no use in denying the fact that the overwhelming public opinion of both countries wishes such a grouping, and even takes it for granted. True, there is no formal alliance between the two English-speaking powers, nor could there well be under existing political conditions. But there is something stronger than that—a powerful and steady national sentiment on both sides, whose current runs in the direction of mutually safeguarding vital interests.

Wherever the living forces that eventually shape the politics of the world are closely and calmly studied, it must be recognized that Germany is too weak—or, shall I say, not powerful enough—to undertake and pursue unaided her policy as a world power. England alone would be powerful enough to drive her off the seas at any time that the vital interests of England and Germany seriously clashed. England and the United States together could accomplish that task with less trouble and expense. England and the United States with their colonies form the most important item in Germany's foreign commerce—about one-third of the total. Germany could not for a moment stand as a world power against the combined will of England and the United States. These two powers, in fact, would be, as foes,

the most dangerous of all to Germany's life interests. It is Germany's wisest course—nay, more, her only possible course—to bind these two countries to herself by ties of strong friendship. I shall not speak here of the strong sentimental reasons which ought to impel Germany in this direction, although these are, and ought to be, potent factors. But judging the situation solely from the viewpoint of enlightened self-interest, it is the only solution for her if she means to continue her world policy. And if there is anything that may be declared with safety about the Kaiser's future course of action, it is that he *does mean to* persevere in it. However, it is an open secret that the Kaiser has for some time clearly perceived that a close understanding with England and the United States is Germany's safest policy, and that he has been shaping his course accordingly. But the fact, nevertheless, remains that as yet no such intimate friendship has been contracted with those two powers—certainly not with England.

This present isolation forms, then, the chief weakness of the young empire from the political point of view.

Germany's commercial weakness lies partly in the fact that both her natural resources and her financial powers are inferior to those of England and the United States, and to a certain degree even to those of France. Germany's *per capita* wealth is much lower than that of the three countries named. She is economical and cautious, but she has also the faults of these virtues—a serious matter when contending for the commercial supremacy of the world. In addition, her trade conditions are no longer stable, but fluctuate greatly, as export trade must and will. Her chief staples for manufacturing—coal and iron—are not as advantageously located as those of her two main competitors. As compared particularly with this country, the German nation does not possess that quick perception, that boldness and originality of methods and execution, which, since Americans seriously set out on their career as great exporters, have been universally recognized as among their chief points of strength. Nor is inventiveness a leading German characteristic, as it is an American one.

Germany's geographical position, too, is a decided element of weakness. As regards sea trade with the main European coun-

tries, she is not so advantageously situated as England. She lies "cooped up" far to the northeast; and to gain the open water tradeways she has first to skirt for days a dangerous coast, both in the Baltic and the North Sea, where her vessels, in time of war, are especially liable to seizure and search. It costs a great deal more to move a ton of goods by sea from German harbours than from English, French, or even Spanish ports. Germany is not so near to the Atlantic as her chief rivals. As to the Pacific—conceded to be an avenue of trade which in the near future will become of almost equal importance with the Atlantic—Germany is again placed at a distinct disadvantage. The projected Isthmic Canal will intensify this. The difference of distance, as between German harbours and the principal Atlantic ports of this country, to China, Japan and some other points in the Pacific, will amount to between 3,000 and 4,500 miles, once that canal has been completed. This will hereafter render German competition in the carrying trade to that quarter of the globe more and more difficult.

There is one other important obstacle in Germany's way as a world power. That is, however, of a domestic character, and its name is the Agrarian party. To humour this party, the present German Cabinet has submitted to the Reichstag a tariff bill framed chiefly with a view to satisfying that party's demands for a tariff enabling the German agriculturist to compete with imports of American foodstuffs on better terms than those now obtaining. If the bill becomes a law, now or later, it will go far to weaken Germany's position as a world power, for it will increase the price of the necessities of life for the labouring population, and hence must lead to an increase of wages, which in turn will heighten the cost of German articles of export. This, put in a few words, is the gist of the matter; and it will be of great interest to the rest of the world to watch the outcome of this struggle in Germany between the mediæval forces of her landed and titled proprietor class and the modern forces of her commerce and industry. For the final result will either greatly handicap Germany in her race with other nations or else remove a serious obstacle from her path.

Striking a sort of general balance, therefore, in the matter of Germany's weakness and strength as a world power, there seem

to be, just at this juncture in the world's affairs, more points that tell against her than for her. Her old-time military preëminence, while it renders her position secure at home, as against the Continental powers of Europe, cannot win for her that amount of strategical advantage and safety on the ocean and on foreign coasts which, as an exporting world power, she absolutely needs to safeguard her against the vicissitudes of the future. Her navy, required to back up her sea trade, will be, for the next ten years, in a transition stage. If left undisturbed to work out this transformation, and if the other leading naval powers do not imitate her example, she will in 1910 or thereabouts be a sea power only less formidable than England, and equal or superior to France. But England, it must be remembered, stands committed to the professed policy of maintaining a naval superiority on the basis of being able to cope at any time with a possible naval combination between France, Russia and Germany. Germany's serviceable Baltic Canal, enabling her navy to concentrate, at any time and within a couple of days, in either the German Ocean or the Baltic, has given the young empire, on the other hand, a great tactical advantage over both Russia and France, the configuration of whose coasts does not permit of such concentration, and even to some extent over England, whose vast coast development and widely scattered colonial interests admit of no such massing of all her naval resources.

But even if left to reap the fruits of her wise and far-sighted naval policy, Germany would not be strong enough to stand, so to speak, on her own naval bottom. The necessity remains for her to make sure in time of at least one other strong naval power as a friend.

CHAPTER II

THE KAISER AS HE IS

No monarch of modern times has been so misunderstood as the German Emperor, and about none has public opinion the world over so wavered. In an age full of virile, powerful men who in different spheres of human effort are achieving miracles, the Emperor stands out boldly—surely a strong proof that the man amounts to something. The world over, his name has appeared daily, now as a menace, now as that of a strong-armed friend. No features are more widely known than the firmly set jaw and upturned mustaches of the Kaiser. And yet no one knew the German Emperor himself, nor could any one tell what he would do next. His own people have ceased to wonder, and accept his will as eternal law, and the other Europeans have become accustomed to believe that however mad he seems there is always method in his acts. His picturesqueness, a penchant for saying and doing the dramatic thing, his frank strenuousness, all the sides of the man which gave him an appearance of attitudinizing are seen to be natural. When Bismarck had been dismissed, when the civilized world stood aghast, and *Punch* came out with a cartoon showing the German ship of state in troubled waters and the weatherbeaten old helmsman turned away from the wheel, with the words below, "What next?"—then it was that the Emperor wrote to the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, his great-uncle, "As to the rest, the same course will be steered and God with us." This showed a self-confidence which at that time struck many in and out of Germany as little short of foolhardiness, if not sacrilege.

Since then comment and wonder at his doings, his sayings and his aims have never ceased, and at no time has he been anything else than an intensely picturesque personage, a man who has continually given both friends and foes something to think about, to wax indignant over or to praise with enthusiasm. One

day he has been declared a transcendent genius by some who pointed to a real or imaginary success scored by him on the chess-board of international statecraft; the next day men have compared him to a vamping fool or to a blatant advertising agent, when lo! this kaleidoscopic character would appear in yet another light. Thus the public judgment of him has never crystallized, and it is to-day in as unsettled a condition as ever. He has held a larger share of public attention in England and in America than any German ruler since the days of Frederick the Great; and it is quite safe to say that he has fairly hypnotized the Gallic mind. Thus, then, at home and abroad the Kaiser compels and invites criticism and comment; and proof of the difficulty of judging him fairly is given by the fact that there is as much diversity of opinion regarding him among the persons of his immediate entourage as there is outside of that circle.

His is an unusually complex mind. He himself proclaimed on a memorable occasion "I am an 'up-to-date' man"; and in many respects this is true. More than any other living monarch he shows appreciation of and interest in the ever-increasing victories of applied science in the material world. New and startling inventions and discoveries and improvements, in medicine, in electrotechnics, in shipbuilding, in telegraphy, in the postal service, receive his instant and enthusiastic appreciation and help, and he spares neither time, pains nor influence to appropriate them for the nation whose head he is. "*Die Welt steht im Zeichen des Verkehrs*" (*i.e.*, this is an era of rapid transit) was another oft-quoted saying of his. Perhaps the most significant motto, however, was the one which he adopted while still a boy, during the days he went to the public school in Cassel—his "*Rast' ich, so rost' ich*" ("If I rest I rust"), which gives the keynote to his restless energy—a restlessness so much at variance with the typical German character as to have started those never-ending rumours of his mental unsoundness. That he is of a highly nervous temperament is undeniable, and besides the exalted conception he holds of his duties as a ruler and a Hohenzollern, this nervous concentration is largely responsible for his incessant activity. "*Toujours en vedette*" is another motto often quoted by the Emperor in conversation. It is not only the army and navy and the foreign policy of Germany that he

steadily and powerfully influences and shapes, but also the arts and the sciences, the commerce and the industry, the press and the pulpit of the empire. Nothing in the world escapes him. With an alertness and intuitive foresight truly wonderful he seizes upon every advanced step taken anywhere, and if possible he utilizes all new knowledge. He clearly recognizes the force of public sentiment, of that elusive element in politics which Bismarck, the teacher of his early manhood, termed the *imponderabilia* of statecraft. Witness his despatch to Kruger after the Jameson raid, or *per contra*, the telegram to Kipling during the latter's illness, and the audience he granted to Cecil Rhodes.

But, while in all these respects he is, in very truth, a thoroughly modern man, he is as pronounced a reactionary, a man of the past, in other essentials. With one foot he stands in the eighteenth century, in the century of Louis XV and absolutism; and with the other he touches the twentieth century, the century of electricity and of an untrammelled press. In his political creed he is his grandfather's son, not his father's. He is an autocrat by belief, by training, by temperament, and not a constitutional monarch. He wishes to rule as well as to govern. He believes neither in a free people nor a free press. He scorns the good old democratic motto, *Laissez faire, laissez aller*; and he believes in the theory and the practice of his ancestor Frederick William I, viz., to beat his people into happiness and prosperity. He profoundly believes in the divine right of kings and in the providential character of his own mission. He believes, with Charles I, that a monarch can do no wrong, and that he, with all the other rulers by inheritance and divine right, is fashioned of a different and better clay than his subjects. He believes in paternalism and enlightened despotism, and not in parliamentary rule, nor in constitutional barriers to his own will. And he believes in all these so thoroughly and firmly that ever since his accession to the throne he has, on many public occasions, given full expression to these beliefs, notwithstanding the fact that the press and the enlightened public opinion of the world, to which in other respects he pays assiduous attention, has condemned, and continues to condemn, such utterances, which from the mouth of an enlightened nation's chief sound doubly monstrous and antiquated.

To quote a few such sayings of the Kaiser's, I will mention his *Suprema lex regis voluntas*, which he wrote into the Golden Book of Munich during a visit there; his "One only is Master within the empire, and I will tolerate no other," which he proclaimed in the presence of the Rhenish Provincial Chamber; his "My course is the right one, and I shall continue to steer it," which he remarked on February 24, 1892; and in still a stronger form "There is but one law, and that is My law," which he told the recruits in 1893; and his *Sic volo, sic jubeo*, which he wrote in strongly marked characters under his own portrait, when presenting it to the conference hall in the Ministry of Public Worship in Berlin. These are a few well-authenticated expressions by the Kaiser of the many of similar import that could be cited. They all breathe the same spirit—the spirit of autocracy.

A very interesting parallel might be drawn between the present Kaiser and his great-uncle on the paternal side, King Frederick William IV, that unfortunate but brilliantly endowed monarch, who finally died a lingering death from softening of the brain. He loved literature, the arts and sciences, and he did much to foster them and to draw men of renown to his court. Theoretically, he loved enlightenment in the political life of his people; but in his heart he remained a hide-bound absolutist, who scorned, in 1848, after the political revolution had temporarily been successful throughout Germany and Austria, the Imperial Crown, offered to him solemnly by the spokesmen and elected representatives of the whole nation, simply because this offer was a popular and not a dynastic one. He decried the Prussian constitution after it had been forced upon him, as a "piece of paper which would come between himself and his people"; but, after the popular uprising in Berlin had been successful, and the fighting in the streets had led to the withdrawal of all the troops from the Prussian capital, this wonderful monarch went with bared head behind the coffins of those carried to burial who had been shot down behind barricades by the regular troops at his own orders. He was an odd character, this great-uncle of the Kaiser, and there are many points of striking resemblance between the two; but, after all, the Kaiser is essentially a man of action, while Frederick William IV was a man of brilliant thought, but of halting and timid

action. As to the mental state of the Kaiser, he is, of course, perfectly sane, and all the contradictory features in him may be accounted for by the complexity of his nature and by his impulsive temperament, which often carries him on the spur of the moment further than he would go in cooler moments. Sometimes, too, intoxicants acting on a high-strung and naturally nervous constitution may be responsible for many of the extreme and apparently irrational things that he has said. I have heard now and then, during my residence in Berlin, from the lips of honorable and truthful army officers, remarks of this kind which the Kaiser had made at or after an officers' banquet, which sounded perfectly insane, but which were readily accounted for by the fact that he was flushed with wine.

Another peculiar bent of his mind concerns the Socialists. He has an unreasoning fear and hatred of them. It must be remembered that in Germany the Socialists are the great bulk of the mechanics and the best of the whole labouring population, and that they are quiet, law-abiding, peaceable folk; that their political programme to-day is in the main nothing worse than that of a radical reform party, and that there is a large proportion of them who are even royalists. These Socialists polled at the last general election some 2,170,000 votes, which is about twice the voting strength of any other political party in the empire. Yet so unreasoning and unreasonable is the antipathy of the Kaiser to this large fraction of the nation that he referred to them in a throne speech as a "horde of men unworthy to bear the name of Germans." He has, on many other occasions, insulted these men and their families in the grossest and most unjust manner, and he has frequently provoked them in a most despicable way. He has harangued regiments, telling them that it would be their duty, if there ever was another popular uprising, to shoot down the rioters, even if their own mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters were among them. And his courts then sentence some of these same Socialists, when they have said something not quite to the Kaiser's liking, to terms in prison during which many have died. This hatred is constantly whetted and heightened by irresponsible advisers and cronies, and it forms one of the chief hindrances in Germany to a more liberal political era. For the Kaiser needs only

to be told that some projected measure is likely to strengthen the Socialist party to condemn that measure. At the root of the paramount influence of that old fossil of mediæval times, the so-called Conservative party in Prussia, lies nothing more nor less than the Kaiser's fear of a popular uprising under Socialist leadership. For Germany this is most deplorable, since it hinders all political progress, and has weakened liberal political aspirations and movements enormously.

Intimately allied with his incessant fear of the Socialist party is the Kaiser's blind confidence in his army. Yet at least thirty per cent. of the army is composed of the sons of Socialists, themselves usually already confirmed in that faith. Of the petty officers, too, many are Socialists, or sympathizers with them. There is little doubt that if another political or social revolution should occur in Germany—the chance of such a thing is very small—the army would not play the part of a blind instrument in drowning such an uprising in a deluge of blood. The officers of the army to-day are different from the officers of fifteen years ago. Formerly the great majority of them came from the ranks of the nobility. Now about seventy per cent. are the sons of plain, though well-to-do, citizens. The Kaiser for a time tried to stem this rising influx of what he considered “undesirable elements,” but he had to yield in the end, for with the increasing poverty of the ruling castes, and with the army doubled in size since 1870, there is no remedy.

The Emperor has a strong dislike of the press. It is mainly owing to his own influence that that very modest measure of comparative liberty which the German press enjoyed under his grandfather and his father has been curtailed, until even the semblance of it has almost disappeared. The principal reason for the Emperor's antipathy to the press is his personal experience, especially during the first five years of his reign, when public opinion was considerably prejudiced against him. It so happens that the Kaiser is inordinately vain, and extremely susceptible to criticism, and impatient of it. He fears and hates particularly the English and the American press because it exerts an enormous influence upon the opinion of the world, his own country included, and is outspoken and energetic. The French papers he cares little about, because their political

opinions on any non-French topics or persons are held of little account outside of France. Besides, no German emperor has the right to expect anything but abuse from his hereditary foe. The German press is securely and effectually muzzled, and the few editors or correspondents who now and then kick over the traces are silenced. The rest of the European press does not count for much, but the English and the American press, powerful, wealthy, enterprising and fearless, has always been a great thorn in his side. He minds the English leading papers more than the American, for obvious reasons. But of late, since the United States has developed an unexpected military, naval and political strength and commercial supremacy, he devotes much greater attention to its press than he formerly did.

How does the Kaiser regard the United States? He is neither an especial friend of this nation nor is he its inveterate foe, which, since the spring of 1898, a large portion of the American press has represented him and a large part of the American people believed him to be. He learned from Bismarck a lesson or two—this among others, that a statesman must reckon with concrete facts, however unpalatable. The war with Spain showed the United States much stronger than the Kaiser or anybody else in Europe had any idea of. Moreover, the dominant party in the United States stands committed to a policy of expansion, political and commercial; this fact was fully and at an early date recognized by the Emperor, and he has since shaped his own policy accordingly. He now earnestly seeks a *rapprochement*. His sending his brother over here was but the latest and most striking proof. Yet it is quite natural that he should not like the American. A man of his political views, believing in a government by divine right, in a strong government based on the army and on the inherited prerogative of the privileged castes to rule, cannot sincerely like a government which is of the people, by the people and for the people. The Kaiser and the upper and ruling classes in Germany look upon the United States as little better than a "mob government."

I collected, during my stay in Berlin, a few authentic utterances made by the Kaiser about this country. To the late General Runyon, then United States ambassador in Berlin, he once said: "Such a pushing people as the Americans will

sooner or later clash with others, but let us hope never with Germany."

To Ambassador White he said: "America is a country of contrasts—piercing lights and deep shadows." And on another occasion: "I know there are many things my Germans might learn from the American people, above all, their optimism, their almost naïve enthusiasm, and unquenchable energy."

To the late ex-President Harrison he said in the course of an hour's conversation: "Your whole country is an experiment—an intensely interesting one, I admit, but still an experiment. Whether it will stand the storms of time as the older monarchies of Europe have done remains still to be seen."

To the same: "One of the doubtful features of American life is its lack of national cohesion and homogeneity—you're a conglomerate, a bubbling caldron."

To the same: "Such seething party politics as yours are not conducive to a calm, well-balanced public opinion."

These remarks are interesting enough, some of them, but taken altogether they hardly show enthusiasm for democratic institutions. The Kaiser, indeed, has affection and cordial good wishes for only one other nation than his own, and that is the English. His English blood, the strong English influences and family ties felt all his life, and his many visits to England easily account for this interest. He once said in speaking of the English: "Blood is thicker than water." But the English free press he does not like, as witness two sayings of his to Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador in Berlin: "An unbridled press is a curse for any nation—liberty does not mean license," and on another occasion: "Scribblers and libelers are not journalists."

To Count Szoegenyi, the Austrian ambassador, he expressed some harsh criticism of parliamentarism. He spoke of the recent violent scenes in the Reichsrath in Vienna as "Parliamentarism run to seed," and again, "Parliamentarism is a double-edged sword which nowadays seems to do more harm than good."

On another occasion he said to the same: "It's not talk-talk-talk, but do-do-do that legislative bodies ought to be chiefly engaged in."

And to Count Osten-Sacken, the Russian ambassador, he said: "After all, it's the monarch alone who gives stability to a nation's politics." And on another occasion: "Monarchy like ours in Prussia is, in critical times, the nation's sole salvation."

CHAPTER III

THE KAISER'S PERSONAL INFLUENCE

IT is an attractive task to lay bare the various sources of the extraordinary influence exerted by the German Emperor upon the public life of the nation he rules. The world knows this influence to be very strong, but relatively little is generally understood as to whence it is derived. When one compares the actual power wielded by the present Emperor with that possessed by his grandfather, one is struck with the fact that though William I, as the founder of the united empire and as the successful leader in two great wars, naturally enjoyed a much greater prestige than did his grandson at the outset of his reign, yet he never attained to that measure of paramount authority which William II may justly claim to-day. The undeniably greater ability of the latter does not alone explain this, nor does the disparity in character between the two rulers. There are other forces at work.

The constitution of the empire, on which the lawful power and prerogatives of the head of the nation exclusively rest, does not confer on him a great abundance of either—hardly as much, in fact, as the constitution of this country delegates to the President. It divides the power of the empire as such between the Kaiser, the Bundesrath or Federal Council, and the Reichstag or National Parliament. It makes the Kaiser chief commander of the military and naval forces; it invests him with the right of representing the empire on all occasions in its dealings with foreign countries and their ambassadors and ministers, and of declaring war and concluding peace. But it grants the Kaiser no veto power to block unwise or unwelcome legislation, such as the President of the United States possesses; neither does it give him the duty or power to interfere in the internal affairs of any of the German States save the one whose monarch he is, making him in every respect, excepting those specified above, merely *primus*

inter pares. The Bundesrath and the Reichstag are jointly entrusted with the right of legislating for the empire, of framing, altering and passing bills which after approval by both bodies become laws, although the Imperial Government may, and generally does, prepare and submit such bills, and these, of course, may more or less accurately reflect the personal wishes of the Kaiser. But it is at all times within the province of these two bodies to thwart the Kaiser in the matter of legislation.

The Bundesrath, particularly, is an organization whose functions are, on the whole, as defined by the constitution, nearly if not quite as important as those of the Kaiser. Its fifty-eight members are appointed by the governments of the twenty-six sovereign States which together compose the Empire; and its powers are not only legislative, like those of the Reichstag, but within certain limits supervisory and administrative as well. It also belongs exclusively to the Bundesrath to devise and set in force the rules and regulations for the execution of all laws. Prussia is represented within the Bundesrath by but seventeen out of the fifty-eight members, so that the Kaiser, even as King of Prussia, apparently cannot sway the deliberations and decisions of this body.

The other branch of the legislative organization of the empire, the Reichstag, is composed of three hundred and ninety-seven members, elected by general franchise, and representing, of course, every shade of political opinion, from the Socialist creed to the most reactionary shade of belief held by the so-called Junker party. The splitting-up of political thought in Germany into almost a score of parties and factions would in itself prevent the complete ascendancy of the Imperial will within this body, and, as a matter of fact, the Imperial Government is obliged to win over a majority of votes for every measure it desires passed. This is what Bismarck called "*Politik machen von Fall zu Fall*," and about which he continually complained.

Thus, then, in theory, the power of the Kaiser to guide the legislation and administration of the Empire is seriously curtailed and, to some extent, even handicapped. But in practice this is true in a much less degree. As to the Bundesrath, though the seventeen Prussian votes directly controlled by the Kaiser are less than one-third of the total, there are always enough votes

of the other States obtainable to give Prussia, which means the Kaiser, the majority. For, aside from the fear of displeasing the Kaiser, a sentiment which is strong in the bosoms of the smaller States and their rulers, and for which experience has furnished them good reason, Prussia's interests in any pending measure naturally run parallel with those of a number of its neighbours. And the great weight which the interests of a State must naturally have which alone forms three-fifths of the territory and contains two-thirds of the population of the empire, will be the decisive factor in many otherwise doubtful cases. At any rate, it is a fact that the Bundesrath, ever since it held its initial session in 1871, has in the end run counter to the Kaiser's and Prussia's serious interests in not a single instance.

The Reichstag has not always been so amenable to the Kaiser's influence. On a number of conspicuous occasions that body has rejected measures strongly urged by the Imperial representatives. Some of these measures have been definitely dropped, while others have again made their appearance and been passed, with or without alterations, as was the case with several of the bills for the increase of the army and navy. Nevertheless, the Reichstag has always been recognized by the Emperor as an uncertain element in his calculations, and as one which, in spite of the utmost clever manipulation, can never be depended upon to give effect to his wishes. But the powers of the Reichstag are more narrowly circumscribed than those of the Bundesrath; and the very fact that this body is composed of so many and so heterogeneous political units prevents it from becoming at any time a very formidable adversary, and from ever presenting a solid front against Imperial encroachments. It has, besides, no "patronage," so-called, to distribute and no other tangible favours to bestow, and its hold upon the confidence and affections of the nation at large has been steadily diminishing.

The opposition, therefore, which the Kaiser has met, and is likely to meet in the future, from this quarter is much less serious than at first sight would appear to be the case. The amount of this possible opposition, however, is still measurably decreased by the personal influence of the Kaiser. For the Kaiser strikingly embodies an epitome of all the driving forces in the German character of to-day; and just as he in that capacity

exercises a well-nigh mesmeric influence on the mind and imagination of the nation, so, too, he does on its representatives in the Reichstag. His masterful ways, and the forceful and picturesque manner in which he usually presents his views in public, greatly add to the authority of his personality. But he has still other means of impressing his will. Among these are speeches from the throne. These public enunciations, which in other countries are mere cut-and-dried papers to which little attention is paid, are really meant by the German constitution to be nothing more. Under the present Kaiser's predecessors they *were* nothing more. They were read in a perfunctory manner, precisely as worded by the Imperial Chancellor. But William II did not follow in his grandfather's footsteps in this respect. He has repeatedly and in a dramatic manner disregarded the exact wording, and even the spirit and substance, of the manuscript prepared for him by his Chancellors, and strongly infused them with his own ideas and opinions. From impersonal and unimpressive documents, such as the constitution contemplated, his throne speeches have become sensational events, reverberating through the whole Empire, and stamping in advance as his personal opponents, nay, enemies, all those delegates in Reichstag and Diet who resist the passage of the measures proposed by him. The receptions the Kaiser accords, in conformity with a long-established custom, to the presiding officers of the legislative bodies, and which under William I were merely formal, are regularly turned to the same account by the present Kaiser. By strong and eloquent suasion on these occasions the Kaiser has several times turned the scale in favour of important measures.

William II has often given public utterance to his conviction that the most potent support of his throne is the army. It is not surprising, therefore, that he has steadily aimed at keeping that pillar of his strength perfectly under his own control. In doing this he has made use of every available means. All the year round finds him busy attending parades, manœuvres, anniversaries of battles, birthdays of sovereign or otherwise distinguished chiefs of a number of his regiments, and delivering speeches, toasts, formal or impromptu addresses, in which he never fails to inculcate precepts and traditions of loyalty and of every other military virtue, seizing, too, opportunities thus afforded him to

pay compliments to the heads of allied or friendly nations, or to express other sentiments likely to benefit Germany in her political relations. Above all, though, he fraternizes with the officers of the army at luncheons or banquets given at their barracks, to which he invites himself. His after-dinner remarks on such occasions have often astounded the world, but from his own point of view, that of Commander-in-Chief of the army, they have been highly effective, and have tended to knit still more firmly the bonds which unite the army to his person. Then there is the entire category of rewards and punishments which he, as head of the army, dispenses at will—promotions, orders and decorations, praise or censure meted out to individuals or bodies in army orders and bulletins, confirmations, revisions or nullifications of sentences imposed by courts-martial. It will easily be understood that these varied and constantly applied means alone suffice to make the influence of the Kaiser over his army an element of surpassing force. But to all this must be added the power he acquires through his "Military Cabinet." This is a bureau under his exclusive control, whose mission it is to supply him daily, by regular verbal or written reports, with that wealth of personal details about his army, and especially about the corps of officers, which enables him to know at all times the exact spirit and degree of efficiency noticeable in each regiment, even each company or squadron, and which lends to his personal relations with the army a spice of intimacy and comprehensive knowledge which is of enormous value. It is credibly asserted that the Kaiser personally knows half of the 25,000 officers in the German active army.

His "Naval Cabinet," whose scope of duties is similar, is largely responsible for his intimate knowledge of the ships and men composing the German navy. His constant visits to the naval vessels also have a share in this, and it is probably true that he knows every one of the one hundred and twenty-three vessels and 1,500 naval officers under his command. At the regular autumnal manœuvres of the German navy he has, besides, an opportunity of testing the mettle of his ships and men.

As regards the citizen population, and more particularly the immense corps of government officials, his "Civil Cabinet," of which Herr von Lucanus is the dreaded chief, puts him in a posi-

tion to acquire a great deal of similarly intimate knowledge about it. Thousands of petitions, letters of thanks, special reports, etc., reach him in the course of every year through this "cabinet" which give him a keen insight into the lives, ambitions and aims of the middle and higher classes. The peculiar passion for titles and decorations, for which the Germans themselves have coined the word "*Titelsucht*," likewise furnishes the Kaiser with a strong lever by which to turn people at will. Every winter—on January 18th, as a rule—the so-called "*Ordensfest*," or Fête of Decorations, is celebrated at the Berlin court, when between 5,000 and 8,000 newly decorated citizens, drawn from every walk of life, are invited to court, file before the Kaiser and his consort, and are subsequently regaled in a number of the most splendid apartments of the Old Castle, and affably treated by a large and gorgeously attired body of flunkys. Thus an indelibly sweet and powerful impression is left on the minds of this heterogeneous multitude, largely composed of unsophisticated and intensely loyal denizens of rural districts or smaller towns. The official organ of the empire on the afternoon of that day publishes a special edition, containing on a score of quarto pages the full names, callings, etc., of all these happy persons, together with a minute classification of the decorations and medals awarded, and all the newspapers in the empire reprint the list, wholly or in part. The present Kaiser has used this quite inexpensive but very effective mode of rewarding loyal subjects with steadily increasing lavishness, and has invented a number of new decorations, besides. He indulges the ambition for titles with like generosity and with like effect.

By vastly increasing the splendours of his court the Kaiser has also materially heightened his personal influence. The simple and unostentatious manners and customs prevailing at the Berlin court during the days of William I have been superseded by an elaborateness of ceremonial, a brilliancy of appointments and costumes, and a display of taste and refined luxury which rival, and in some features even surpass, the elegancies of the Tuileries under Napoleon III. The exterior and interior of Berlin Castle, and of several other royal homes belonging to the Prussian monarchs, have been renovated and embellished, and connoisseurs claim that the so-called White Hall in Berlin Castle, in its

new guise, is the most beautiful and chaste extant. The banquets given by the Kaiser on grand days enjoy a deservedly high reputation among European diplomats, and the royal cellars are unequalled to-day in any capital. The pressure to attend the Berlin court festivities has on account of all this become stronger every year, as the list of festivities has been published by the chief court marshal, and even many distinguished strangers have strenuously exerted themselves to that end. But in like ratio has the Kaiser's tendency increased to render these festivities exclusive.

All these means used by the Kaiser to extend and strengthen his influence on every class of the population are legitimate. But some other means he uses are open to serious objection, for they amount to nothing less than an overriding of the constitution. It was Bismarck who drew up this fundamental instrument, and it contains provisions clearly defining not alone the powers and prerogatives of the Emperor, but also those of the Imperial Chancellor. One of these provisions is to the effect that every public utterance by the Emperor, oral or written, must receive the sanction of the Imperial Chancellor to acquire the character of a government emanation. Without that, such utterances are to be considered merely as private enunciations, having no binding force on the sovereign, the government, or the nation. The constitution provides that every document signed or written by the Emperor in his public capacity must have the counter-signature of the Imperial Chancellor, whereby he, the Chancellor, assumes the responsibility for it toward the nation and its representatives in Bundesrath and Reichstag, and becomes amenable to them. Bismarck in his Memoirs says that the intent was to render the Chancellor alone responsible, he having identified himself with the monarch's act or expression by his signature, and thus "shield" the sovereign; the further inference being that if it becomes manifest at any time that the nation, through the majority of its representatives, disapproves of measures or opinions thus endorsed by the Chancellor, the sovereign has the simple remedy of dismissing the Chancellor and appointing a successor—which would be the pure parliamentary form of government.

This important provision of the German constitution has been

practically nullified by the Kaiser for many years past. He has declared himself in favor of projects or pending measures; he has proclaimed a new policy, or an important alteration in an old one; he has launched the ship of state into the troubled waters of a dangerous adventure, without even first consulting with his Chancellor. This he did throughout the Hohenlohe régime, and he has done it on several occasions since the present Chancellor came into power. The seizure of Kiaochou was a step undertaken not alone without the knowledge of the Chancellor, but directly against his will. If Germany at that time had become involved in war with China, that war would have been due to a flagrant violation of the constitution by the Kaiser. Public declarations have been made scores of times by the Kaiser, condemning or approving men and measures, without previous consultation with his Chancellors. Yet, while thus ignoring the constitution himself, the Kaiser has, when such utterances of his were adversely criticised, taken advantage of the existing very illiberal judicial practice, in prosecuting such critics whom he, on a conspicuous occasion, styled "*Nörgler*" (fault-finder), and whom he advised to "shake the dust of the fatherland off their shoes." If these utterances of his had been made with the consent, or over the signature, of the Imperial Chancellor, they would have become fit subjects for criticism within reasonable bounds. But by this doubly unfair proceeding on the Kaiser's part neither the Reichstag nor the nation at large is permitted to pronounce public judgment on his sayings and doings.

Again, the Kaiser has, contrary to the constitution, practically monopolized the direction of the foreign policy of Germany for many years—in fact, ever since the retirement of Bismarck. The empire's foreign policy, by the explicit terms of the constitution, is left wholly to the Chancellor. If the Kaiser be not satisfied with the Chancellor's foreign policy, he can dismiss him. But the Kaiser found it more to his taste to shape the empire's foreign policy entirely according to his own ideas, making the Chancellor, at least in this important respect, a mere figurehead. Bismarck, with whom he first tried these tactics, would not submit and was retired. Caprivi, a soldier before being a statesman, and regarding the Kaiser solely as his commander-in-chief, obeyed blindly. Hohenlohe, who was of a

different moral and intellectual fibre, disliked being thus cavalierly treated, and finally resigned. How long von Buelow will submit to this treatment remains to be seen.

These are the two most important features in which the Kaiser shows a studied and persistent disregard of the constitution. But there have been other less important instances in which he has shown small respect for the instrument which created his position. These autocratic doings of his would, in other countries with a longer past of constitutionalism, be a most dangerous defect. But in Germany, where parliamentarism is an importation which has by no means as yet been as firmly established as in England, France, or even Italy, these absolutistic tendencies of the Emperor figure not nearly so prominently in the people's eyes as one might think. For what in Germany is termed the "monarchic principle" is rooted very deep in the heart of the nation as a whole. The Socialists are the only exception; nearly all the rest of the nation, say three-fourths of it, is intensely monarchic.

But, after all, it is the personal influence of the Kaiser which is most potent. His forceful personality simply compels attention. For years after his accession millions of Germans stood aloof, ignoring his kaleidoscopic activity, and firmly believing that after he had "sown his wild oats," and after the novelty of the situation into which he had been summoned so unexpectedly had worn off, he would cease his pyrotechnic interference in every phase of public life. But these would-be "indifferents" were forced to abandon their attitude. When, after one of his speeches, often ill-advised, flamboyant and overshooting the mark, but always striking and earnest, the press of the whole world would be ringing with comment, and at every German fireside heated discussions *pro* and *con* would take place, these sober-minded Germans, while still condemning his methods, found it impossible to stand supinely aside. The Kaiser, on every weighty problem that came to the surface for solution, would split the nation into two hostile camps, stimulating discussion and keeping both adherents and opponents of his views at fever heat. It is this sensational side of his personal influence, probably more than any other, which has been, and is still being, felt most strongly. Into every political campaign in

Germany he has thrown firebrands in the shape of mottoes, pithy and apt sayings, sarcastic allusions, or ironical retorts to his adversaries. Every weapon of warfare has been successfully employed by him.

When the Kaiser disapproved of the violent Agrarian agitation in 1894, he coined the phrase: "You cannot expect me to sanction bread usury." And the phrase flew like wildfire all over Germany. When he dedicated the important Baltic-North Sea Canal, he said: "Oceans unite; they do not sever." And, similarly: "The world's present motto is, 'Easy Communication.'" When he considered it necessary to check the advancing tide of Socialism, he spoke of the Socialist party, numerically the largest in his Empire, as: "A horde of men unworthy to bear the name of Germans." And the bitter words still rankle in the breast of every German Socialist. When he rebuked the Ultramontane Centre party for refusing to do honour to Bismarck on his eightieth birthday, he said: "This is a national disgrace, unequalled in modern history." When he had veered around in his ideas on the Agrarian question, he said: "Agriculture is the backbone of the country, and it must be protected." He coined the phrase about the "Greater Germany," and said: "Our future lies upon the water"; and, more strongly: "Without the consent of Germany's ruler, nothing must happen in any part of the world." His sayings about the "mailed fist," about "planting the banner of Germany upon the walls of Pekin," about the "yellow danger," and all the other highly coloured and startling sentences descriptive of his conception of the situation in China, are still in everybody's recollection.

Now and then he has been checkmated, or even defeated outright. The several attempts made by him to bring about anti-Socialist legislation have been foiled. The great Reichstag election of 1898 went strongly against him, and this despite his vigorous interference, and brought an increase of strength to the Socialists. Both the Reichstag and the Diet refused, in the face of the Kaiser's urgings, to pass laws (the so-called "*Lex Heinze*" and "*Lex Arons*") which would virtually have throttled the remnant of public and private freedom of speech and thought, though in this fight he had the Centre with him and nearly the solid Conservative faction. The Diet, on two conspicuous occa-

sions, and notwithstanding the fact that the Kaiser had publicly, repeatedly and in emphatic language pledged himself personally in favour of it, refused to sanction the construction of the Midland Canal.

These are important and far-reaching measures in which he was worsted, but he had a like experience on many minor occasions. A conspicuous instance was the struggle between the Kaiser and the Prince-Regent of Lippe, ruler of a small state comprising but 1,215 square kilometres, with a total population of 139,000. The regent of this petty principality had been, prior to his accession, a mere count of modest means and a major in the Prussian army. Yet in his earnest attempt to unseat this ruler of an unimportant fragment of the empire, the Kaiser was signally defeated; and as his object had been to supplant Prince Ernest by his (the Kaiser's) brother-in-law, Prince Adolph of Schaumburg-Lippe, and as the committee of arbitration deciding against him had been presided over by the Kaiser's friend, the late King Albert of Saxony, this defeat was all the more galling.

However, despite occasional rebuffs, the Kaiser, in nine cases out of ten, has had his way, and is likely to have it in the future. His influence to-day is felt more strongly than that of any other single factor in Germany. In some ways this has been beneficial to Germany. It has led to the adoption of a most comprehensive plan of naval increase. It has infused more enterprise and self-confidence into the nation. It has inaugurated Germany's world policy. Despite the fact that the nation gave undue prominence to sentimental considerations during the Spanish and the Boer wars, and thereby embittered relations, first with this country, and next with England, it has steered the ship of state so cleverly as to lead to the present *rapprochement* with this nation, and to at least a maintenance of correct relations with England. Perhaps, however, the same results might have been obtained by the Imperial Chancellors, if they had been left untrammelled to the exercise of their constitutional functions.

The Kaiser's influence upon education and upon science in Germany has been great and, in the main, wholesome. He has clearly perceived the urgent need of remodelling the German educational system on new lines—lines more in accord with the requirements of this age of practical things; and his ideas, though

at first they met the united opposition of the professional pedagogues of the old school, are now slowly prevailing. In the wide domain of applied science the Kaiser's influence has also wrought a vast amount of good.

But the incalculable harm done by the Kaiser's influence in other fields of public life probably more than balances accounts. For one thing, it has lowered the national standard of political thought and liberty. To all intents and purposes Germany, though nominally enjoying a constitutional form of government, is ruled autocratically. This is a curious instance of political atavism, when the previous history of political development in Germany during the nineteenth century is considered.

On German literary and art life the personal influence of the Kaiser has also been noxious in the highest degree. He has waged, with more or less success, a savage war upon that highly interesting movement known variously as "Secessionist" or "Realistic," and of which, in literature, Hauptmann and Sudermann have been the main standard-bearers, and in art, Böcklin, Liebermann, Klinger, Thoma, Stuck, and others. With all his might he has fought this movement, the most promising Germany has known for a century, and despite its extreme and unwise partisans one powerfully moulding German thought and ideals. In place of it the Kaiser has, so far as lay in his power, substituted tame mediocrity, as strikingly exemplified by his own marble "ancestral gallery" in the Siegesallee in Berlin, and by the bombastic historical dramas of Joseph Lauff, the latter owing their very existence to the Kaiser's inspiration.

But perhaps the most portentous injury, and certainly the most completely achieved, done to German public life by the Kaiser's personal influence, is that inflicted upon the press and periodical literature. Honest expression of opinion, whenever it contravened the Kaiser's ideas and convictions, has been so persistently and severely punished that it may be said to be effectually muzzled. There has never been any régime in Germany, so far as the records go, during which convictions for *lèse majesté* and all sorts of press offenses have been even approximately as numerous. All this is not only in consonance with the Kaiser's wishes, but it is in large measure directly due to him, the appointment of the judges forming the highest

tribunal in the empire, and the positions leading up to this highest court, being under his control. The Kaiser has never during the fourteen years of his reign pardoned a single one of these offenders against his own dignity, nor even shortened, in any instance, their penalty. Besides, he is on record with many sayings wherein he expressed nothing less than downright hostility to a free press.

In the Kaiser's veins mingle strange and unharmonious elements—the blood of the Hohenzollerns, than which there is none more matter-of-fact in Europe, nor more cool and well-disciplined, and the blood of the Guelphs, than which there is none more stubborn, proud and unruly. William II shows very distinctly this double lineage in his physical as well as his mental make-up. When one keeps this in mind, the discordant qualities of his personal influence, in its baneful as well as its beneficial effects, are more justly appreciated and adjusted.

CHAPTER IV

THE KAISER'S FAMILY LIFE

THE Emperor's family life is wholesome and restful, and since his accession to the throne, when still a young man, no scandal has publicly been connected with his name. The one great scandal which stirred his court, eight years ago (and which found its last quietus only recently in the death of Baron Schrader, the traducer, as a consequence of a duel, on homicidal terms, with the traduced, Baron Kotze), met in no one a severer judge than in the Kaiser himself. I refer, of course, to the disgraceful "anonymous letter affair," in whose meshes for a time not only Countess Hohenau, one of the chief figures at the Berlin court, but even the brother of the Empress, Duke Günther of Schleswig-Holstein, were entangled. It was a case of such diabolical malice and petty meanness, and for several years so shrouded in mystery, that it led to the wildest suspicions and most sensational rumours. Yet it resolved itself in the end, when the full truth was established, to nothing worse than the cunningly devised intrigue of an envious and ambitious minor court official against his superior, the chief chamberlain, and the sole motive in the intricate network of cabal was a desire to supplant one of the Kaiser's favourite underlings. It chanced that the issue of the duel fought between Kotze and Schrader, whose terms were "until death or mortal wound," was favourable to the victim of the whole miserable intrigue, and so even poetic justice was satisfied.

But this scandal, like some minor ones before and since, did not touch the person of the Kaiser, nor his family. Whatever his peccadillos may have been as a prince, until several years after his marriage, and, of course, tales of that kind have been circulated by the court gossips and found their way into the sensational and into the Socialist press, he has outgrown them long ago, and none of those light amours which even so honorable a

monarch as his grandfather, William I, indulged in now and then, are charged to the present ruler of Germany. Nor is this astonishing, for a man so engrossed with serious thoughts and with the multifarious duties of his position as he, has scarcely time or inclination for those lighter affairs of the heart which less busy monarchs might find pleasure in. He is, indeed, an intense and rapid worker, and a brief sketch of an average day with him will show that between rising and bedtime hardly a minute is not accounted for.

The Kaiser plunges into his day's work with cheerful and vigorous alacrity. He is, in summer, often up with the lark and always before the postman. He often rises as early as five o'clock, and in any case is sure to be astir before seven. During the hunting season he rises even earlier. When the boar is hunted in the Grunewald, near Berlin, late in the autumn, the Kaiser's pink coat may be dimly perceived gleaming through the misty forest long before sunrise, and in midsummer, when he regularly stalks the capercailzie cock in the Thuringian woods around the Wartburg, in company with the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, he has sacrificed half of the night's sleep to indulge in this, the most sportsmanlike sport to be had in Germany. But these, of course, are exceptions.

He regularly braces himself with a shower bath, and then he slips into his uniform and goes straight to breakfast. This is a simple but substantial meal, consisting of eggs, cold meats, tea, rolls, and butter. At this meal he meets his entire family, the Empress rising as a rule as early as he, and often hurriedly supervising the tea-making. He greets her and the children with a kiss or a playful pat, and then the meal, like those later in the day, is quickly despatched.

Next he betakes himself to his study, where a mass of correspondence confronts him. There are several hundred letters, petitions, etc., arranged and classified for his inspection by his six secretaries, who have already been at work for an hour or more. The Kaiser works his way quickly through them, now and then making marginal notes in his large, bold and rather odd-looking handwriting, or dismissing the missives on their routine way without comment. In the piles before him he may notice here and there a familiar hand, and then he will grasp

and read the letter, and sometimes, but rarely, write an answer on the spot, or else dictate one. The reports on a thousand and one subjects are also glanced at, and thus a bird's-eye view obtained of the whole, which is then further assorted by the staff, the Emperor perhaps reserving a dozen or so of the whole batch for his own prompt attention. The Kaiser's personal correspondence, once quite voluminous, has dwindled more and more, but once in a while he still sits down to pen a letter. He has not made friends with the typewriter, considering it an outrage on good taste, and he refuses to accept any machine-made or manifolded letters or manuscript.

There is a regular clipping bureau daily at work for the Kaiser. This forms a small part of the Ministry of the Interior, and it sends him for his inspection every morning the latest cullings supposed to interest him, among them for some time past clippings from the American daily and periodical press. The Kaiser keeps a scrap-book, tabulated according to subjects and arranged as to dates. Thence, if the wish occur to him to learn something more definite about a special matter, he will cause one of his secretaries to make extracts and to read them to him, the notes in each case containing source, authority, date and place. Then, often, he sends out orders that he wants to see some particular person or persons on this same matter, with an intimation as to what he expects to hear from them. He has thus listened to what the German university professors call "*privatissima*" from perhaps half the noted men in Germany and hundreds of famous foreigners—men of science like Helmholtz, Slaby, Riedler, Roentgen, Koch, Behring, Leyden, Harnack, Pfeleiderer and Delitzsch; men of action like Ballin, Wiegand, Siemens; or men of eminence in other paths of life, such as travellers, explorers, soldiers, naval men, inventors, discoverers, political leaders.

His daily reading is, however, very small. He glances, when he has the time, at the Paris *Figaro*, at the London *Times*, occasionally at a Russian paper, and, of the German press, at the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, the *Cologne Gazette*, and on special occasions at papers of the opposition, including the *Vorwärts*, the Socialist central organ. Frequently, though, he does not see a newspaper for a whole week or longer, and of periodicals and illustrated papers he sees, generally speaking, but a few extracts or

articles of special interest to him. Books he seldom reads, and then only those strongly appealing to him, like the naval books of Captain Mahan, whose adoption as German text-books he subsequently ordered. On his midsummer trip to the Northern Seas, however, he takes a big supply of carefully selected volumes along, both of the latest and of old books. Last summer he had with him, for instance, the original French version of the interesting correspondence of his ancestor, Frederick the Great, but he threw that aside, remarking at the cynicism in it, and saying: "What an old heathen he was!"

After rapidly disposing of his correspondence in the manner above indicated, the Kaiser usually receives some verbal reports, from members of the Cabinet sometimes, but oftener from department chiefs, from some army general or one of his aides-de-camp, and more often still from the chiefs of his "cabinets" or bureaus. There are three of them, military, naval and private. The military cabinet deals with all questions of a personal nature that affect the army, such as promotions, dismissals, furloughs, individual merit or misdemeanor, etc. Through this agency he is enabled to keep in that strongly personal touch with the whole corps of Prussian officers, which gives him, as it did the Prussian monarchs before him, such a strong hold on them. The naval cabinet enables him to do the same thing with the navy, and as its *personnel* is much smaller he is even more intimately acquainted with all the details of his naval officers' affairs. The private cabinet, finally, handles a great variety of matters, such as petitions, promotions, decorations, anniversaries, etc., and it performs for him a similar service in its own way as the other two for the army and navy. There has often been complaint in the German press that relatively little reaches the Kaiser as to the affairs of State as well as to the affairs of his subjects that has not previously gone through the channel of these three so-called "cabinets," and that the chiefs of these, while occupying no constitutionally amenable positions, really exert more influence in shaping the mind and the prejudices of the head of the nation than do his constitutional advisers. This complaint is founded on fact, and to this surreptitious but regularly exerted and powerful influence must be attributed much in the Emperor's views and actions which otherwise would be

inexplicable. The trio Lucanus, Huelsen-Haeseler and Senden-Bibran, who are the chiefs of these three bureaus, unauthorized by either the Prussian or Imperial constitution, have now and again exerted a baleful influence on the Kaiser's mind. They are, however, personally men of the highest integrity.

There is another institution which demands the daily attention of the Emperor, viz., the Household Ministry, to whose province belongs the administration of the Kaiser's personal, family and crown estates, and of the whole court with its variegated interests. In this domain the Empress relieves her husband to some extent, but it claims, nevertheless, his almost daily attention. The Kaiser's personal and crown estates are very considerable. He owns at present one hundred and two of them, many being leased or rented for lifetime or a long term, usually fourteen years. A great part of his personal income is derived from these estates, and that makes the Kaiser, so to speak, an agrarian, as the constant falling in the rent values of these farms, dairies, and big manorial holdings, largely due to American competition in agricultural products, reduces his revenues to that extent.

By nine in the summer, and by ten or eleven in the winter, these reports are usually disposed of, and the Kaiser then takes his first airing, with his wife accompanying him. When in Berlin he will either drive or ride on horseback to the Thiergarten, the fine large park just without the Brandenburg Gate. At a certain spot he dismounts, and then walks rather rapidly along the side paths for a half or whole hour, according to the weather and other circumstances, with the Empress on his arm and one of his military aides by his side, while one or two follow him at some distance, and others precede him, he chatting or conversing the while. It is rather a wonder that no attempt has ever been made on the life of William II during these walks. Their hour and place are well known in Berlin, and the Thiergarten is, of course, accessible to all. There are always several of Baron Windheim's shrewdest sleuths from the secret branch of the police circling at some distance around the Kaiser when he takes these walks, scurrying through the bushes and dodging out of sight at the turns in the path, for he dislikes to see these gentry so close to him. Besides, at the Emperor's own sug-

gestion some time ago, the dense vegetation in the Thiergarten has during the past few years been considerably thinned out, so that it is now not so easy for an unknown person to creep up unawares toward the path. Skulking and poorly clad persons are forthwith stopped by the detectives when met with near this part of the park. For all that, it would be a relatively easy task for a determined man to get near enough to the imperial person during these morning walks to throw a bomb or fire a revolver at him, and Baron Windheim, the Berlin police president, has for years vainly tried to dissuade him from this form of exercise. The Kaiser is, personally, a man of high courage, and believes, like Napoleon, in his star. Besides, to give up his much-needed exercise in the Thiergarten would by no means eliminate the danger of assassination from his path. On his way from the royal castle to this park, which he often takes twice in the day, he has to pass along the whole length of the *Via Triumphalis* of Berlin, the Unter den Linden, and thus it would be an easy matter for an evil-disposed person to kill him while riding past a given point, although he always goes at a quick trot or canter. At any rate, the fact that no such attempt has yet been made on his life is a striking proof that Anarchists are few and Socialists not murderously inclined in Germany.

From this walk he will often ride or drive to Count Buelow, the imperial chancellor, to converse on matters of state for an hour, or take luncheon with him, or else similarly surprise another cabinet minister, or one or the other of the ambassadors, especially Count Szoegenyi, the Austro-Hungarian representative, or Count Osten-Sacken, the Czar's man in Berlin, for both of whom he has a strong personal attachment. He doubtless would frequently pay similar visits to Mr. White, the American ambassador, whom he sincerely likes, if this country, like the leading European countries, had a fine palace for the home of its embassy, instead of obliging every newly arriving ambassador to Germany to go house-hunting during the first year of his stay, and then to put up with rented apartments for the rest of his short term. What such personal and more or less intimate intercourse with a monarch like William II is worth to an astute and suave diplomat needs no pointing out.

If the Emperor has made no such informal call on his way

from his airing, he frequently employs an hour or two in visiting the studios of sculptors, painters, or other artists, who are perhaps executing some work ordered by him, or he inspects some public institution. Then he returns home, and the regular routine work with his various "cabinets" is resumed, audience is given to persons by previous arrangement, and more reports are listened to, and decisions made. In fact, this part of the Emperor's duties goes on, with interruptions, the whole day, and often far into the night. Like Bismarck, the Emperor is an indefatigable worker, and it is by no means a sinecure to be closely attached to his person. He never takes a nap during the daytime, not even after luncheon or dinner, in this breaking with an old German custom.

Luncheon comes at two, and it is not, as a rule, a very sumptuous meal. The table is always set very daintily, with flowers from the Potsdam or Berlin imperial hothouses and nurseries in crystal vases, fine royal china and gold and silverware set off by snowy linen, a fashion introduced by the late Empress Frederick, the Kaiser's mother. But when no guests of royal rank or otherwise of great distinction are present, luncheon consists of but four courses, viz., soup, oysters or fish to begin with, next a roast, with vegetables, then game in season, or fowl, followed by ices or pudding, fruit, and cheese. With this two or three rather light wines are served, such as some fragrant Moselle, a young Rhine wine, a bit of Bordeaux, or, sometimes, a glass of German sparkling *mousseux*. All these wines, so far as they have grown on German soil, come from the imperial vineyards. On state occasions, or on festive family days, choicer wines from the Emperor's cellars are served, and there is probably no other court in the world where wines of such rare and racy flavour and of such special vintages are to be found in like quantities. But for ordinary occasions the Empress, like the thrifty housewife she is, feeds her family, including her husband, on simple and homely fare. This, besides, is in accord with the Kaiser's own tastes. There is a legend at the Berlin court that the Kaiser's favorite dishes are "Sauerbraten" (a species of potroast with a sour and fat gravy) and "Schmierkäse" (unsalted fresh cheese), but that his medical man, Doctor Leutholdt, has forbidden him these two items of diet.

During the afternoon, so far as it is not taken up with the aforementioned duties, the Kaiser again takes a drive or ride to the Thiergarten, when in Berlin, or a stroll through Sanssouci Park when residing in Potsdam, and gives more audiences, or devotes some time to the study of papers in important or pressing cases. One of his peculiarities is to annotate nearly every paper he has thus read, often very liberally. Reports made to him from the general staff of the army are frequently turned by him topsy-turvy, requiring the whole work to be done over. He has, as the world knows, a nimble and pliant mind, able to grasp many subjects with remarkable rapidity. During his audiences, too, his questions sometimes intuitively go straight to the core of the matter. Besides, he possesses a smattering of nearly everything in the wide domain of human knowledge, due to his quick perception and his retentive memory. If fate had not placed him on the imperial throne, he would have had the stuff for a good journalist in him. But his often fatal mistake is to assume that he knows everything, that the little which he has been able to pick up about the sciences, military lore, literature and art, is all there is worth knowing about these matters, and that he must direct and guide every subject that comes under his personal observation, which in the twentieth century is a manifest absurdity. His ideas on art particularly are crude and swayed strongly by prejudice against the independent spirit that nearly always characterizes the original-minded artist, and his influence on German art, which happens to be in a very interesting stage of transition, I consider wholly bad and largely responsible for the gingerbread style of official sculpture rampant in the Germany of to-day.

The evening ushers in the brightest and by no means the least valuable hours of the Kaiser's day. Guests are always invited to the dinner, ordinarily timed for six o'clock. In the choice of these guests it must be confessed that the proud ruler of Germany shows an amazing catholicity of taste and a refreshing absence of social conventionality. While during the daytime his bearing is rather stiff and haughty, and a strong sense of his dignity seems to dwell with him, at the dinner hour he appears to be actuated by a desire to please and to be pleased and instructed in turn. Under the stout oak of his dining-table

have been stretched the legs of noted men of almost every rank of life and of every variety of thought. Recently, for instance, the Kaiser shocked the orthodox clergy by inviting repeatedly as his guest Professor Delitzsch, the greatest living Assyriologist, and one of the most formidable opponents to the theory of the divine authorship of the Old Testament, and listened with evident interest to his views on cosmogony and comparative mythology. He similarly received at his table the late Cecil Rhodes, even unto that iconoclast's unceremonious frock coat, and thereby gave strong offence to the whole tribe of Philistines in the empire.*

Supper is served at nine, when there are more guests, and when the Munich beer and cigars are handed around the Emperor likes to have some lively music, bright conversation, or a game of skat—a very interesting German game of cards, played always for very low stakes. This year he wanted to hear something of American national music, and he had Van Eweyk, a young American barytone who is settled in Berlin as a music teacher, repeatedly sing him and his guests quaint plantation songs.

The interval between dinner and supper is often spent by the Kaiser with the Empress and his children, and to judge by the hilarious shouts which are heard from the apartments where these little reunions are held, they must represent the simplest and happiest moments which this tremendous worker allows himself.

It is at dinner and supper that the varied play of a many-sided mind scintillates its brightest. Quick at repartee, and with an inexhaustible mine of anecdote, the Kaiser then frequently gives himself up unreservedly to the charm of unconventional conversation. He discourses, when in the mood, with great fluency and vivid flashes of wit. He, however, questions more than talks, always on the alert for enriching his fund of knowledge. He quickly recognizes on such occasions the

*During the winter the Emperor and his immediate *entourage* or guests often visit the theatre. He prefers the old-fashioned style of drama and comedy, being strongly opposed to the new literary current in Germany, and to Ibsenism and Tolstoism as well. Unlike his grandfather, who was an enthusiastic admirer of the ballet, he cares nothing for that class of stage divertisement.

man who has mastered the subject under discussion, and then proceeds to "pump" him. His voice and lively gestures help to emphasize everything he says, his voice being pitched in rather a high and strident key, but full of modulation and insistence.

No doubt this habit of the Emperor's always to deal with men rather than books is an excellent one, as it enables him to often draw out the very marrow of a master-mind. And as he seldom forgets a fact he has learned, and never a face, this pleasant habit of treating men as walking cyclopædias and extracting from them their mental essence stands him in good stead. His speeches are often the result of pondering the thoughts he heard from others. After these gay and lively dinner and supper conversations, the Kaiser frequently sits calmly down by his desk in his quiet study and there jots down the facts he has learned that evening. Then he retires, but within reach of his hand, on a little table, is always paper and pencil, so that ideas which strike him before falling asleep or during wakeful nights may not escape him.

The Kaiser is such a marked personality, and his wife of so retiring and rather bashful a disposition, that very little has ever crept into publicity regarding her. But she, too, is a distinct personality. She is a perfect wife in the old-fashioned German sense, and *taceat mulier in ecclesia* her motto. She lets her husband do the talking, to use a homely phrase. She is also an affectionate and indulgent mother, and all her children adore her.

In 1896, at the Berlin municipal exposition, the Kaiser wanted to buy her a costly dress there exhibited and adorned with a very long train. She smilingly refused. "What use would it be?" she asked. "With two or three of the boys always hanging to my skirt, it would be torn in a jiffy." And when, during religious instruction, the young princes were taught that all are sinners, Prince Eitel Fritz cried: "That can't be true,—my mother isn't a sinner."

The Kaiser's ways with his boys are often, too, very pleasant. Once when he had won, as the best shot at a military rifle tournament, a small money prize, he put it in his pocket, saying: "I can buy something for the boys with that." He has the habit, whenever he is dining out, of loading his pockets with candy and sweetmeats, generally remarking: "That is for the chil-

dren; they always like best what I bring home, just as I used to do with my father when I was a boy."

Both the Kaiser and his wife keep up the national traditions as to Christmas and Eastertide, so dear to little Teutons. The Christmas tree is annually decorated in fine style, and gifts that show a wealth of loving thought are placed underneath its spreading boughs. At Easter the imperial couple invite their own children and some of the latter's playfellows to the park of Chateau Bellevue, in Berlin, and there both Kaiser and Empress hide Easter eggs in hundreds of bushes, the Empress crawling around with the little ones on all fours, and subsequently treat the whole juvenile crowd to goodies and chocolate in the chateau near by.

It almost broke her tender mother's heart when, one after the other, her sons fled from the maternal nest.

As to her other qualities, they are preëminently housewifely ones. She thoroughly understands every department of house and kitchen work, and often herself cooks, or superintends the cooking of, some favorite dish for her husband or guests. She has a very devout and pious mind, and has made it her special province, ever since her husband's accession, to aid church, hospital and charitable work of every kind. Not unfrequently she visits personally worthy persons in distress, especially mothers of large families and recently confined ones, and then her bounty is lavish. While in Berlin, she frequently visits hospitals and asylums, evinces heartfelt sympathy, and charms by her gentle solicitude.

The building of new churches, though, and the extension of church life have been her special hobby. When she became Empress, the need of more churches in Berlin and many other cities of Prussia had become very palpable. Since then forty-two new churches, nearly all of them being fine structures, have been built in Berlin alone, mainly through her instrumentality. Her chief court marshal, Baron Mirbach, under her instructions, is spending a great part of his time in personally visiting wealthy citizens and soliciting contributions for the erection and endowment of churches or eleemosynary institutions. In the execution of this task he shows a very catholic taste, for he does not scruple in the least to visit well-to-do Jews for the purpose.

They were, in fact, among the heaviest subscribers toward the building of the magnificent Emperor William Memorial Church and of the new Dom, or cathedral, near the royal castle in Berlin, which latter alone cost about five million dollars. Even Socialist leaders, if they only be wealthy, like Singer (who is, besides, a Hebrew), this Imperial messenger seeks out for these pious ends. The Socialist press, which is frankly atheistic and anti-monarchic, has not failed to comment on these facts with vitriolic fury.

How charmingly unaffected, kind and genuinely human the Empress is, all those who have had occasion to meet her attest. She made the American colony in Berlin her enthusiastic champions several years ago by showing, at one of her hospital visits, tender and graceful attention to Miss Morgan, an elderly American spinster residing in Berlin, and just at that time a patient in that particular institution. There are innumerable stories current in Germany, wherever she has stayed for a shorter or longer time, illustrating her amiable gifts of heart. Throughout Bavaria, where her husband is strongly disliked, she is extremely popular. When, several years ago, she spent a month in the summer in the Bavarian highlands, the rude and simple-minded peasantry fairly worshiped her.

Like every normally constituted woman, she has her little vanities. She seriously rebelled for a time against her husband's dictum that she must have no more dresses made in Paris, but to get all she needed in that line made either in Germany, if at all feasible, or else in Vienna, and to follow the same principle as to the garments needed for her children, excepting such sporting goods as were not readily obtainable at home, and which she was allowed to order from England. But when the Kaiser once detected her in a flagrant case of insubordination, there is said to have been a scene, and since then she has submitted in this, as in nearly all other things.

Some years ago, when she suddenly began to grow stout, she was induced by a lady at court to begin, unknown to the Kaiser, a special treatment, into which the regular consumption of certain pills made from the thyroid glands of sheep largely entered. The treatment had indeed the desired effect, but it had otherwise rather unpleasant consequences, and the change wrought

in her appearance was such a rapid one that the Kaiser could not fail to notice it. Investigation brought out the above state of facts, and then she was prevailed upon to accept the services of her regular physician in undoing, as much as possible, the evil done. The Empress, however, shows to this day the effects of her own treatment, and her hair has been fast turning gray since.

She is by no means what is termed *chic* or "stylish" in general appearance, and her dresses, no matter how costly and elegant, never fit her perfectly. But she has a quiet, demure gentleness of demeanor and of aspect, and kindness and charitableness of heart are so conspicuous in her that she easily wins and pleases. Her aspirations never soar higher than those of a model German "Hausfrau," and her tastes in literature and art, if she have any, never became known. She converses always in a low, slightly lisping voice, and she speaks German with a distinct Holstein burr, due to family and educational influences. She understands and speaks French well, however, and English tolerably.

The Empress is a few months older than her husband, and she looks, despite her placid disposition and despite the arts of the toilet, fully five years more than he. This is a point on which she is very sensitive. When he was still plain Prince William, and especially during the first three years of her married life, she was violently jealous of him, and rumour has it that there was some cause for it. It is related that on one occasion she went complaining to the old Emperor, her husband's grandfather, with a tale that had come to her ears. The old gentleman, after courteously listening to her, playfully patted her cheek and half-chidingly, half-sympathetically, said to her: "Well, child, then you ought to have married no Hohenzollern." From that time on she learned to hide her feelings.

Altogether, she is about the best wife a man like the Kaiser could have found. She has justified Bismarck's choice. The Kaiser has, now and then, given expression to his approval of her in terse and slightly sarcastic sayings. As when he remarked that she was the old German ideal in confining herself to the three "Ks"—*Kirche* (church), *Küche* (kitchen), and *Kinder* (children); or, on another occasion, remarking that she always acted on him as "an anodyne."

CHAPTER V

GERMANY'S POLITICAL TURNING-POINT

✓ For years past Germany's policy, domestic and foreign, has been vacillating. It has now arrived at a point where irresolution becomes impossible. There must be decision, and there must be a break with the past. She must change her foreign policy and she must modify her fiscal policy. The Dreibund is crumbling before our very eyes, and the important tariff bill now before the Reichstag is a clinching proof that Germany intends to alter her policy in that respect. Count von Buelow's repeated declarations before the Reichstag showed, as plainly as the words of a statesman of purely diplomatic training could do, that reliance is no longer placed on the international confederation composed of Germany, Austria and Italy; and these declarations have been so understood by the entire German press. The Kaiser's advances during the last few years both to this country and to England, of which the mission of his brother, Prince Henry, was but the latest and most striking illustration, clearly point out the direction which he means to give to Germany's foreign policy in the near future.

In the chapter of Bismarck's Memoirs which is devoted to a discussion of the genesis and the probable duration of the Dreibund, the matter is treated without any reserve. Bismarck there makes it plain that the understanding with Austria was based, primarily, on the assumption that a war with Russia was likely to come, not one with France; and the admission of Italy was designed to safeguard that country and Germany against French aggression. That Bismarck, when he wrote that chapter, not long before his death, had begun to have strong misgivings as to the intrinsic and lasting force of this tripartite agreement, is evident from the concluding paragraph, in which he says:

"The Triple Alliance is a strategic position which, in view of

the dangers threatening at the time of its conclusion, was advisable, and was the best that could be attained under existing circumstances. It has from time to time been prolonged, and we may succeed in prolonging it again; but no lasting treaty of this kind is possible between great powers, and it would be unwise to regard it as a secure foundation for every kind of possibility, which may change in the days to come the conditions, needs and sentiments which once made it possible."

He winds up with a skeptical expression of even a more decided cast. Since Bismarck's death, conditions have altered more rapidly than could have been foreseen then. Russia under Nicholas II has become eminently peaceful. The Panslavic movement has been arrested. More friendly relations than existed for fifty years past have been established between Russia and Austria. There is no longer any fear on Austria's part of Russian aggression. For Austria, then, the reason which controlled her in becoming a member of the Dreibund no longer exists. On the other hand, Austrian internal politics have simultaneously changed in a manner more and more hostile, or at least more averse, to the alliance with Germany. The Czechs, the Poles in Galicia, and all the other Slavic populations of the polyglot empire, have gained political ascendancy; they have been, from the first, opponents of the Dreibund, and they are more opposed to it now than ever. The Polish question in Prussia has of late greatly embittered the Poles against Germany, whom they regard as a persecutor of their race. The pending German tariff bill adds new fuel to this feeling. In Italy, the situation is similar. Italy no longer fears French hostility, and the recent Italian naval demonstration in French harbours was intended and accepted as an outward sign of mutual good-will. The long Franco-Italian tariff war is over, and an amiable understanding between the two nations as to the Mediterranean question, and as to Tunis and Tripoli, has removed the last inflammable material. Therewith the chief cause which induced Italy to join the Dreibund has disappeared, and she, too, looks upon the proposed German tariff legislation as inimical to her fiscal interests. The alliance with Austria was always unpopular in Italy because of the *Italia Irredenta* movement, which was handicapped under Dreibund auspices; and of late the Francophiles,

always a large and very influential part of the nation, have gained enormously in Italy.

In a word, then, so far as the other two members of the Dreibund are concerned, no important reason obtains any longer for their remaining in it; and a number of important reasons tell against the further continuance of this alliance. For Germany, too, several potent factors have come to the surface which make against the Dreibund as the pivotal point of Germany's foreign policy. The chief one, perhaps, is the military weakening of both Austria and Italy, whose resources, in the event of a future big war, both on land and sea, are, relatively speaking, much smaller now than when the Dreibund was formed. Aside from that, however, in taking a front place as a world power, Germany has had to reckon, and will have in future to reckon, with other powers which are strong in commerce, in colonies, and in naval force, these being England and the United States. Neither Austria nor Italy has been in a condition, nor willing, to further Germany's vital interests as a sea power and as an expansive commercial and colonial empire. With France and Russia more closely than ever allied in Europe and abroad, and with Germany's inability to attain to the rank of the first naval power, it is manifestly her interest to put herself not only on a thoroughly friendly footing, but on terms of intimate friendship, if not on those of a formal alliance, with the only two powers that are, so to speak, open to such an engagement. This would not mean that Germany would entirely relinquish her long-continued friendship with Italy and Austria. As far as she is able to do so she will tenderly nurse those good relations; but the character and importance of them, nevertheless, will undergo—has even now undergone—a very great change. They will henceforth be of secondary consideration, and by no means the determining factor in her foreign policy. ✓

Now, as to England, the anomaly is presented that, while the German Emperor and his government are anxious to tighten the political affiliations with that country, and while, particularly, the Kaiser's strong sympathies and desires go out in that direction, the overwhelming public opinion of Germany is averse to this. It is within the truth to say that a sentiment of downright bitter hostility, of a strength seldom equalled in his usually

placid bosom, rages in the breast of the average German against his English cousin at the present moment. Sentiment counts for something in that. The war against the Boer republics was all along strongly condemned in Germany, largely for sentimental reasons; and that feeling was so widespread and powerful that even the Kaiser, on one or two occasions, and the Imperial Chancellor, had to take it into account. Other sentimental reasons lying further back there also are; and there is, besides, the fact that England for a time took a somewhat unfriendly attitude towards Germany's colonial aspirations, and that England has been Germany's chief commercial rival, and not always a generous or fair one. At any rate, there is no doubt that an Anglophile foreign policy is just now unpopular with the larger, and the politically dominant, part of the German people. The Liberal political parties in Germany, who traditionally favour such a policy, are not the determining factors in her political life.

But, while all this is true, it does not mean that a foreign policy friendly to England is impossible in Germany even at this moment. For the Kaiser practically shapes her foreign policy. The Imperial Chancellors since Bismarck's retirement have, virtually, merely carried out their imperial master's behests, and have vouchsafed only that explanation to the Reichstag and Bundesrath for the steps taken or decided upon in Germany's relations with other countries which they saw fit and considered safe. It is idle to discuss here the question whether this is in strict consonance with the constitution of the empire. Certain it is that such has been the unvarying practice since the Kaiser, twelve years ago, took hold of the helm himself and became, to use Bismarck's expression, his own Chancellor. And that the Kaiser is strongly in favour of an Anglophile foreign policy there is not the shadow of a doubt. ✓

As to the United States, things in a measure are similar. When the war with Spain broke out, in the spring of 1898, the German people violently, and almost altogether for sentimental reasons, sided with Spain; indeed, until the close of that war the torrent of popular abuse of the United States flowed as fiercely and was fed from as many sources as that which is now directed against England. The German Government, however, took a consistently friendly attitude toward the United States—a fact

which recent publications have brought out clearly. This, it may be admitted here, was due at first more to Count von Buelow—then still Secretary of Foreign Affairs under Prince Hohenlohe—than to the Kaiser personally, whose sympathies for a time rather leaned to Spain. But the Kaiser is, after all, Bismarck's pupil, and as such he considers concrete facts as of paramount importance. He quickly came to see that the United States was bound to be victorious, that Spain represented a lost cause, and that the United States would emerge from the war much stronger and more ambitious than ever, and become a new and leading factor in the process of reshaping the world. He saw clearly that Germany's interests bade her remain the best of friends with the United States; and, once he had recognized this, he frankly and without reserve accepted the new situation, and shaped his policy accordingly. The relentless force of logic told him that the closer Germany's relations became with the great American republic, the better chance there would be for a friendly understanding with it at all those points where its new political or commercial interests might clash with those of Germany. His foresight has since been proven true in the settlement of the Samoa difficulty, in the acquisition of the Carolines, and during the recent troubles in China.

In his political calculations, he took into account the policy of expansion to which the dominant party in this country stands committed, and he has since given adherence to the American definition of the Monroe Doctrine. Is he sincere in this? Has Germany absolutely relinquished those old, but never more than half-formed, designs upon West Indian and South American territory? Does she consider herself bound, under all circumstances, to abide by that interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine which rests, not so much upon the vigorous yet withal conservative enunciation quite recently made by President Roosevelt, as upon that somewhat hazy yet tangible and more far-reaching idea of it held by the larger half of the American people? Time alone will show. At any rate, neither the Kaiser, nor the German Government, nor the even more important public opinion of Germany, any longer defines the Monroe Doctrine as Bismarck did in my hearing, on May 26, 1898 (two months before his death), as "a species of arrogance peculiarly American and quite

inexcusable." True, the Pan-Germans and the colonial enthusiasts in Germany continue to rail against this "species of arrogance"; and in a late issue of the leading German colonial organ, the *Koloniale Zeitschrift*, Dr. Rudolf Breitscheid declaims against it and against the alleged unholy designs of the United States upon South and Central America, and calls upon Count von Buelow to quicken the pace of German colonization in South Brazil and Argentina. But he and his kind do not influence the German foreign policy. There is no manner of doubt that Germany — Kaiser, government and people — is at present honestly desirous of close and friendly relations with the United States.

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL LIFE

NOTHING more characteristic of present German political life exists than the new Reichstag palace. It rises, a splendid and impressive edifice, just without the monumental Brandenburg Gate, in Berlin, its most magnificent façade toward the broad expanse of the Königsplatz, and its southern side turned toward the fine old trees of the Thiergarten. The statue of Bismarck, flanked by allegorical figures, stands in the centre of the immense square to the west, and that grand old man stretches out his hand of bronze in the direction of the pile where the elected representatives of the nation legislate for its weal or woe, as if to caution and guide them. A fountain throws its powerful column of water into the pure air, and from afar the thunder of busy life comes in a steady boom. Plainly visible to the west is the golden glint of the Column of Victory, whose massive shaft was welded from guns taken by Germany's conquering hosts during three successive wars, each swift, terrible and glorious.

The Reichstag is an immense structure, built throughout of graystone, and in that architectural style termed the German renaissance. Rich sculptures everywhere embellish portals, windows, pilasters and roof, and several gigantic figures in dark bronze heighten the artistic effect. The building was paid for out of the French war indemnity. Inside, too, the eye is gratified. The great lobby, all in white marble, and a flood of light pouring down upon it from the enormous gilt cupola, is stately and beautiful. The session hall, with its wealth of stained glass, its bright colours on ceiling and cornices, and its light yellow oak on walls and galleries, makes a fit setting for the dignified body of men who here, for nine months of the year, discuss national affairs and frame the laws of the country. The committee rooms are handsomely and appropriately furnished, and the spacious reading rooms and library give ample facilities for

nutrimentum spiritus. In fine, nothing could be more appropriate or suitable for its purposes.

But when examining all this a bit more closely, a number of things strike the observer. The events and persons everywhere glorified by the numberless works of art adorning this palace of the people are wars and rulers. Dynasties and their obedient servants are shining down from glowing glass and burnished frame. The carved and fretted symbols that decorate the walls speak exclusively the same language. Nowhere is there made the slightest attempt to recognize the virtues, the sacrifices, the deeds or rights of the people, of its representatives, champions, or spokesmen. Nowhere is there a sign that this fine building arose at the will of, and with the money appropriated by, the nation's representatives. No motto, no inscription indicates or even hints at it. This palace was built after plans approved and in every detail directed by the present Kaiser. It stands as an eloquent witness to the fact that you are in an intensely monarchical country, in a country where everything is of the monarch, by the monarch, and for the monarch. This new Reichstag building is the very essence and outflow of the Kaiser's masterful spirit.

If any more proof of that, however, were needed, it is but necessary to enter the big session hall and attend an average meeting of the delegates. The session is opened and closed with cheers for His Majesty. Whenever one of the speakers attempts to criticize or even to name the Emperor, the president, worthy old Count Ballestrem, with an unctuous and disapproving shake of his silver locks, warns the offender that he is infringing on the "*Brauch des Hauses*" (custom of the house), and nips his ambition in the bud. There is no constitutional barrier against such criticism; on the contrary, the constitution of the empire explicitly permits it. But the "custom of the house," as it has grown up under a majority of time-serving Conservatives and their allies, forbids the practical exercise of this constitutional privilege. With the exception of an occasional Socialist or radical Liberal speaker, such a phrase as "rights of the people" is not even heard in this hall.

And this is the body which of all others in Germany is supposed to watch over and defend these same rights of the people!

With a spirit so glaringly subservient to the will and pleasure of an autocrat, it is no wonder that the Reichstag, as a body, has more and more lost the confidence of the nation.

But that is not the only reason for the moral decadence into which the Reichstag has sunk. An even more potent one is its disintegration. There is no party rule in Germany. There cannot be under existing conditions. The 397 members composing this body legislating for the Empire are divided and subdivided into a score of factions and particles of factions, the difference in political creed between them often amounting, indeed, to the splitting of hairs. It is the old Teutonic spirit, the spirit which Bismarck and so many great Germans have always deplored, the spirit which is almost solely responsible for all the misfortunes, reverses, and calamities that have befallen the German nation since the dawn of its history—the spirit of factional strife, of discord, and of mutual and petty jealousy. And yet, be it said, nobody has done as much as Bismarck himself to breed and foster this spirit. To play off one party against another, to allow none a share of the government, and to rule supreme by dividing them all—that was his unbending policy in shaping and dominating parliamentary legislation. The deplorable state of impotence to which the Reichstag is to-day reduced is very largely due to this Machiavellian policy. To judge from present indications, the process of disintegration has not even reached its limit. Within the recent past two new factions—the League of Husbandry and the Bavarian Peasant Federation, have come into existence, and the number of Independents—*i. e.*, members unaffiliated with any faction, has in the same time largely increased.

However, despite this curious splitting up into relatively small fragments, it is nevertheless not difficult to describe the component parts of the Reichstag, and to show how, under ordinary circumstances, the dominant majority is formed. What in common parlance might be styled the government party in it is made up from the two Conservative factions (numbering in all 91), the Centre (or Catholic Ultramontane faction, with 107 votes), and a larger or smaller portion of the National Liberal faction (at present reduced to 49), with occasional accessions from the ranks of the other factions or subfactions,

and Independents. This, in ordinary cases, gives the government a good working majority of 25 to 50. Ordinary occasions in the above sense are legislation concerning the army and navy, the budget, the tariff, and tax questions. On religious matters, on education, and on a great many others, there is no solid phalanx either way, and it often happens that on this kind of legislation a majority for the government is formed from its opponents in principle, including the extreme Radicals and the Socialists.

There are many bills drawn up by either individual members or by factions or a group of factions in the course of a Reichstag session, and presented to that body for consideration. But the important bills, and the larger portion of those ultimately becoming laws, have been carefully prepared and phrased by the government in its various departments, and have been passed by the Bundesrath, before they reach the Reichstag. In other words, relatively few and certainly no very important bills originate in the Reichstag itself. But even the bills thus originating do not, as a rule, become laws. The Bundesrath, whose province and whose powers are more extensive than those of the Reichstag, and to whom all bills passed by the latter body have to go, usually refuses to sanction them. Perhaps the most glaring case in point is the bill providing compensation for the services of the Reichstag-delegates. This bill has been passed, each time with a larger majority, by the Reichstag year after year, ever since the Reichstag itself came into existence, thirty-one years ago. Bismarck had purposely avoided fixing such compensation, in the belief that this would keep Socialist delegates and other representatives of the lower and politically radical-minded classes out of the Reichstag. But he had reckoned without his host, for the Socialists have all along paid a modest *per diem* allowance to their representatives out of party funds, the only party or faction in Germany, by the way, that has followed this practice. No matter how often the Reichstag has passed this bill, however, the Bundesrath has always promptly rejected it.

Generally speaking, the code of parliamentary rules governing the Reichstag is neither so comprehensive nor so exacting as in either the English Parliament or our Congress. Nor are breaches of these rules so severely or summarily dealt with. The presiding

officer not infrequently makes mistakes in applying the rules of the house, but appeals from his decision are rarely taken, and much forbearance and good humour are displayed in this respect. Parliamentary customs are fashioned more after those obtaining in the French Chamber of Deputies than after English or American ones.

Reichstag sessions are often dull. The phlegmatic temper of the average German has something to do with that, for it is seldom that speakers lose their temper, or that their listeners indulge in witty, humorous, or abusive interruptions, sallies, or shouts. There being, besides, relatively few young men among the members, the whole tone of the House is rather dignified, subdued and calm. The decorum preserved is admirable. Billingsgate, uncouth or indecent language are never indulged in, and personal insults are extremely rare. As a rule, the current of talk flows on rather sluggishly, and many of the members can then be seen dozing or peacefully slumbering in their seats. Friends of members, or constituents who wish to speak with them, are never allowed on the floor of the House, but must always state their business first in writing to one of the handsomely uniformed Reichstag servants, who thereupon informs the member, and the latter will see his man outside in the lobby or in one of the committee rooms. Reached by separate stairs outside, galleries run around three sides of the session hall, about twenty feet above the floor of the house. These are separated from each other, so as to make intercommunication impossible. One of them contains a very spacious box over the row of seats occupied by the Conservatives, and this is reserved for the exclusive use of the imperial court, and of other personages sent by the Kaiser to attend certain sessions in whose results he is interested. On gala days this and the diplomatic box adjoining are often filled with a highly distinguished audience, brilliantly attired court ladies, army and naval officers wearing high decorations, and occasionally even princes of the blood. The Kaiser, however, has personally never visited the inside of the session hall.*

*The gallery for the press contains seats for about sixty reporters and correspondents, and when crowded to its utmost capacity accommodates about 200. It is right above the Socialist row of seats—a significant fact, and the acoustics of the hall being wretched, it is impossible to hear with understanding any but the very best speakers—*i. e.*, best in enunciation and quality of voice. The press up there has, therefore, to preserve a respectful silence during the proceedings, on pain of “botching” the work in hand, and also because offenders are summarily expelled.

One other reason for the dullness usually prevailing during Reichstag sessions is the general absence of oratory. Few Germans are fluent or impressive speakers. This is as much due to the language itself, which in its grammar is difficult and in its syntax still more so, full of pitfalls for the unwary or hasty speaker, as it is owing to the recentness of German parliamentarism and to the complete lack of any tuition or systematic training in public speaking. German education has so far neglected this field. There are no courses in elocution in either colleges or universities, nor even in private schools. Neither are there debating societies or clubs in existence where the nascent rhetorician might develop his talents. The genius of the nation does not incline that way, and "fine speaking" is not only not admired, but it is positively looked upon with suspicion and disdain. That form of "spread-eagleism" which exists, too, in German legislative bodies is essentially different in form—not so picturesque, nor so exuberant in fancy, but more rugged and homely than the American species. The most perfect specimens in Germany of this type of rhetoric are Liebermann von Sonnenberg, the rabid anti-Semite, and Doctor Hasse, the Pan-German leader. Both possess in a high degree the gift of touching certain chords in the German soul.

But while deficient in oratory, as that much-abused word is commonly understood, the German parliament possesses a number of earnest, forcible and convincing speakers, and on "great days," when subjects are under discussion that fire the national heart, the sessions are interesting enough. The most impassioned speaker—now that old Liebknecht is dead—is by all odds August Bebel, the Socialist veteran. His style of speaking indeed approaches nearest to the American. He is fluent, uses his resonant voice to good advantage, thrills, hypnotizes, transfixes his hearers—opponents even more than friends. He always goes into his subject heart and soul, and is fairly tireless. As he warms up to his work, after the first half-hour or so, he has captured the whole house. From the benches on the Right, where the aristocrats of birth sit, these gentlemen of immaculate linen and daintily pointed mustache come crowding around the high desk behind which this leader of the unwashed multitude stands, his strongly marked face aglow with very genuine excite-

ment, his unkempt beard quaking, and his vitriolic eloquence pouring forth like a resistless torrent. The toiling masses in the Empire have no more dauntless or unsparing champion than him. Up in the galleries court ladies press scented lace to their eyes as he depicts the sufferings of the lower classes or declaims with burning words against tyranny. He is a fanatic by conviction, and it is that which lends peculiar force to his vibrating periods. As a coiner of striking similes and metaphors he has not his like in the Reichstag.

As popular a speaker, and likewise of the opposition, though a man of wholly different fibre, is Eugene Richter, he who often crossed swords with Bismarck in the Reichstag, and usually vanquished the grim Chancellor. Finance and budget matters are his specialty, and these dry topics this radical veteran knows how to invest with such a brilliant array of witticisms, humorous allusions, anecdotes, and sarcasm, as to hold the house spell-bound. Richter has passed his whole lifetime in parliamentary struggles, and he knows the finances of Prussia and of the empire better than the whole government, past and present, put together, and has convicted of serious errors scores of finance secretaries. In England, Eugene Richter would have become a Gladstone or a Goschen; in Prussia he edits an excellent paper of small circulation. Dr. Theodore Barth, also a radical Liberal and in some respects the younger and fresher type of Richter, is likewise a convincing and able speaker. As the best-equipped and stanchest friend of this country in both the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet, he is, of course, the special *bête noire* of the Agrarians in both houses. Doctor Paasche, Bassermann, and Doctor Lehr are able speakers among the National Liberals. The members of the Polish faction, thirteen in number, are nearly all fluent and passionate speakers.

Among the Socialists, Singer, Auer, and von Vollmar, but especially Bernstein, may also be mentioned as forcible and competent orators. What makes von Vollmar more impressive than the others is his past and his personality. From a member of the privileged classes, from a brave officer who fought in the war against France with such distinction as to win the highest decoration for bravery, the iron cross, he has become one of the fiercest champions of the lower classes. When he

climbs with some difficulty up the steps that lead to the speaker's stand, the French bullet which lamed him for life still occasioning him much discomfort, his pale and handsome face as cold as marble, there is none of his erstwhile companions-in-arms on the aristocratic side of the house who does not feel a throb of involuntary respect. Among the Conservatives there are few good speakers; one may, however, mention von Kardorff, von Manteuffel, Count Kanitz and Doctor Arendt. But not one of them is able to command at any time the undivided attention of the house. Prince Herbert Bismarck, the little son of a great father, is one of the poorest speakers there. Among the South Germans it is especially Conrad Haussmann, leader of the small Democratic faction, who deserves notice. He is impressive and caustic, and is the only non-Socialist in the house who occasionally defies the "custom of the house," and its president to boot, by arraigning in biting words the crowned head of Germany. Among the Alsatian "protesters" the Abbé Wetterlé is the ablest and most resourceful orator, but his rhetoric is French, not German, and generally misses, therefore, its aim in a German audience. The recent death of Doctor Lieber has robbed the Ultramontane Centre not only of its greatest party strategist, but also of its greatest speaker. Doctor Bachem, of Cologne, Doctor Groeber and Doctor Spahn are now the oratorical towers of strength of the Catholic faction.*

In the Reichstag and in the other German legislative bodies it is the custom, as in France and England, for the government to send members of the cabinet and department chiefs into parliamentary sessions in order to furnish special information and answer interpellations or attacks made by members. This has, of course, occasionally an enlivening effect upon sessions, though in the main these government representatives make a point of preserving a great outward dignity, and seldom say much, even when they talk enough. Count von Buelow, the Imperial Chancellor, is in some respects an exception to this rule. Of course, he has not a tithe of the prestige which Bismarck enjoyed, either as a parliamentary speaker or as a statesman.

*Affiliated with Doctor Barth's radical Liberal faction is Prince Emil Schönaich-Carolath, popularly known as the "Red Prince" because of his advanced political views. This gentleman is a voluble speaker enough, but a much better poet and writer.

When it was known that Bismarck would speak, the pressure of the public to gain admittance in the Reichstag used to be terrific, and the interest manifested intense. This was purely due to the matter, not to the manner, with which he regaled his hearers, for that mighty man of brain and brawn, physical colossus though he was, had a voice very disproportionate to his massive frame. It was high-pitched, thin and grating, and altogether of an unpleasant quality, besides which his mode of delivery was jerky, halting, and uncertain—he would often come to a complete stop, painfully striving to hit upon the words expressing his nimbler thoughts. But there were great ideas, bold conceptions, in what he said, and many of his phrases, struck off fresh from the forge of his mind, will live forever, so pregnant and inspiring were they. Buechner's "Winged Words" contains a large number of them. In the case of Count von Buelow, whom his admirers love to call a pupil of Bismarck, it is quite otherwise. He is, it must be remembered, a diplomat purely and simply, and he plainly shows the virtues and failings of one. There is none of that subdued fire, that deep earnestness, which made the words of his great master living, sentient potentialities. Instead, he is fluent, almost glib, happy in graceful, pretty similes and parables, paying a dainty little compliment to the one party, and administering a waspish, venomous sting to the other, calmly and elegantly gliding over the surface of the topics he handles, but never by any chance going deep down to the very core of a matter. With an almost Gallic wit he indulges in cleverly worded sallies, cracks jokes, relates anecdotes, gives full play to his lively imagination, and amuses everybody. Now and then he coins a new catch phrase, as when he compared the "concert of the powers" to an orchestra, now well directed, now playing out of tune, and adding that Germany, whenever harmony had turned into discord, would quietly lay down her flute and step out of the orchestra. But that is an exception—as a rule, reading over Buelow's speeches in cold type, minus the charm of personal manner and the facile grace of gesture, they appear rather commonplace and devoid of vitality. Nevertheless, in the kingdom of the blind the one-eyed man is king—among the government speakers he is *facile princeps*. For the initiated it is amusing to watch him then, and particu-

larly the careful and minute *mise en scene* set by his underlings. I remember one such occasion. I happened to have obtained from the lips of the American ambassador in Berlin, Mr. White, the distinct and formal news that a definite understanding had been effected between Germany, the United States and England as to the final settlement of the Samoan squabble, including the actual terms of this understanding. This information was given me early in the afternoon, and I cabled it in full to this country. The next noon, twenty hours after, a session of the Reichstag took place, and the morning papers threw out dark hints that some great news of startling import was to be vouchsafed at this session by Count von Buelow. At the Foreign Office in Berlin they claimed not to know of any settlement, and no German or foreign correspondent was given the above news, nor was able to obtain confirmation of it. This was, of course, a tiny but deep-laid plot by the Imperial Chancellor to prevent the news from leaking out before he had imparted it, with dramatic effect, to the representatives of the nation. And after the session had been solemnly opened, Count von Buelow ascended the speaker's stand with the mien of an haruspex and delivered, in a highly impressive manner, what purported to be a great and exclusive piece of news. His little trick worked to perfection and nobody in the house except one was aware of its being a trick. This little incident is, however, highly characteristic of him. He is a man accomplishing little ends by little means—a diplomat, not a statesman.

Impressive in his own peculiar way is also Count Posadowsky, the Imperial Secretary of the Interior, and the man who would like to step into Buelow's shoes. He is tall, has strongly marked features, with a long and flowing beard to set them off, and loves to unroll a long list of statistics which he then proceeds to illuminate in a more or less startling and graphic manner. Some years ago he was the first, in a Reichstag budget debate, to draw attention to the "American danger" in international commerce. He has more solid attainments than Buelow, but lacks almost altogether that gentleman's easy and unctuous manner, and also his gift of saying platitudes with infinite solemnity.

Buelow is very careful how he handles the Socialists in the Reichstag, for they are more than a match for him there. Bebel

on one occasion, in a half-hour's speech, utterly demolished von Buelow's smooth eloquence by disproving, one after the other, all his statements. Like Chamberlain in England, von Buelow is very neat and tidy, almost fastidious, in his appearance, but while his British prototype prefers an orchid as a boutonnière, his German imitator likes a white camellia or chrysanthemum in his buttonhole. By that anybody going into the Reichstag can usually pick him out.

It would be a futile and thankless task to go here into an elaborate and detailed description of all the factions represented in Germany. For one thing, even after such a description, it is doubtful whether the reader would have obtained a clear idea of it all. Besides the parties and particles composing, for instance, the Reichstag, there are scores of other political organizations making up the independent legislatures of the twenty-six separate German States, and the names given to a number of these differ greatly, and many of these names acquire other meanings in some of these State bodies. For most purposes it will suffice if some mention be made here of a few of the main organizations, and to point out some of their peculiar features.

In the Reichstag one is struck, for example, by the strange fact that it contains numerically about one-fourth of the total membership in factions whose entire programme, or at least its vital part, consists in repudiating and protesting against the existing government and the present order of things. Besides the large Socialist faction of 62 (which is treated rather fully in a separate chapter), there are of these: The Polish faction (13), the Alsace-Lorraine faction (10), the Hanoverian faction (4), the Danish faction (1), and a number of Independents, all of whom "protest" against the state of annexation and amalgamation of their native soil and nationality by Prussia or Germany. This interesting fact seldom becomes apparent, however, to the visitor in the Reichstag, for these members do not, as a rule, take part in either the debates or in the committee work, excepting when the narrowly circumscribed interests of their constituents are involved, which happens, perhaps, once or twice during a whole season. The rest of the time they remain supine, and content themselves with the consciousness that their mere presence there is a living protest.

In Alsace-Lorraine a change of sentiment is slowly being wrought. Part of these provinces—in German politically called the “Reichslande,” or “Lands belonging to the Empire,” and which have no separate sovereign beside the head of the whole nation, but are governed by an Imperial Stadtholder—are now resigned to their separation from France, but the larger part is still irredentist, and submits with an ill grace to the inevitable. This is especially the case in Upper Alsace (the district comprising Mulhouse, and stretching along the Swiss frontier up to Belfort and Montbéliard) and in the French-speaking portion of Lorraine, around Metz. Several times Alsatian constituencies have elected Socialists into the Reichstag, like Bueb and Bebel, and the densely populated industrial districts will no doubt one day become permanently the legitimate prey of the Socialist propaganda. But the larger portion of this fertile and progressive region is, in its policy of “protest,” under the domination and leadership of the Catholic clergy there, who naturally object most strongly to amalgamation with a Protestant country like Germany. The bitterest and most resourceful “protest” delegates, therefore, which the annexed French provinces sent to the Reichstag, have been Catholic priests and abbots, and they, too, have owned and edited most of the Alsatian journals in which the hope of ultimate reunion with France has been steadily held out. But even their opposition is no longer so violent, and there are signs of a slow process of eliminating the fiercer and irreconcilable “protesters,” many of the latter still drifting to France. No difficulty has been experienced from the start with the Alsatians and Lorrainers in the German army. This is owing, of course, in part to the cautious policy pursued of avoiding the formation of military bodies made up largely or wholly of these men from the “Reichslande,” who instead have been apportioned to the various regiments in Germany, where they imbibed more or less German sentiment, had to cultivate a knowledge of the German language, and became acquainted with the real sentiments of the nation at large. Returning, these men have often become the best and most useful advocates of reconciliation. But aside from that, the men of these former French provinces have always been good and willing soldiers, which the names of many of the best and

most successful generals during the reign of the two Napoleons attest. Their natural inclination gets the better of them, so to speak, under the new régime. The German government does everything to hasten and facilitate this process of winning over the inhabitants of the "Reichslande," of course, but it has not always been happy in its choice of means to bring this about. The Kaiser has exerted great influence in this direction, by captivating the lively imagination of the Alsace-Lorrainers, who love, like the French, a dashing soldier for a sovereign, and by showing the population many favours. The fact that he has enlarged and beautified his fine estate near Courcelles, not far from Metz, and that he spends some time there with his family every year, has heightened this effect. Then, too, the domestic and foreign policy of France has for a number of recent years had a deterrent influence on the people of these provinces. In this connection the Dreyfus affair has done much, and the close political affiliation with Russia is also looked upon by them with disfavour.

The Danish faction (of one member) exerts, of course, no influence upon the Reichstag; neither does the Guelph, or Hanoverian faction, which, aside from its numerical weakness, has never enjoyed much sympathy in Germany, and this for a variety of reasons. The population of this Prussian province enjoys indisputably a far larger measure of prosperity under its present rule than it did under its last Guelph king, blind and obstinate George V, and the larger part of the province is fully reconciled. It is very different, though, with the thirteen members composing the Polish delegation.

Another anomaly, and in a sense more striking still, which the observer notices in the Reichstag, is the fact that in an overwhelmingly Protestant country like Germany, with its 36,000,000 of Protestants against 20,000,000 of Catholics, the Centre (or Catholic Ultramontane party) has become the dominating factor in her political life. There must have been gravely disturbing elements at work to effect such a reversal of natural conditions—that is the inevitable inference. It was the "Culturkampf," so called, the fiercely fought battle between the Catholic hierarchy and the Protestant State, which Bismarck brought to a climax in the seventies, and which has been mainly responsible

for the fact that the largest political faction in Reichstag and Diet was formed, and maintained itself ever since, on the simple lines of its religious faith. The Centre has now one hundred and seven members in the Reichstag, with a constituency of about 1,800,000 voters. It is the mightiest single factor in domestic politics. It is, of course, composed of otherwise very heterogeneous elements—side by side with Prince Arenberg, whose title is one of the oldest and most honourable in the empire, sits another member of the Centre in whose veins flows churlish peasant blood; and the wealthy Catholic manufacturer of Cologne meets in the same committee a party member whose class interests are diametrically opposed to his own. The single cohesive force binding together this mass of men from every walk of life is their religious creed—a unique thing in international politics. This is not enough, though, to make them a unit on a great number of questions that come up for legislative solution, and on these they often split. Windthorst, physically the smallest but intellectually the most gigantic of Bismarck's foes in Germany, welded the Centre together for a couple of decades, displaying consummate generalship during all crises that his party weathered in the German Parliament. After his death, Doctor Lieber, recently deceased, continued his work, though in a more conciliatory mood.

The make-up of the Conservative faction, in its two wings—the old-fashioned and uncompromising portion, which is by far the larger, and the Reichspartei, or "Liberal" part of it—is well enough known not to require lengthy explanation. In numbers it remains far behind both the Centre and Socialist factions, but by the unreformed elective system still in vogue in Prussia and by adhering to the districting plan of thirty-one years ago as far as the elections for the empire are concerned, this party sends about twice as many delegates into the German legislatures as it is by rights entitled to. It thus presents the second largest body of delegates in the Reichstag, and on nine questions out of every ten it is a unit. Its membership is drawn, with few exceptions, from the wealthiest and privileged classes, numbering in its ranks high government officials, owners of vast estates, etc., and through this fact and their wide and intimate personal and family connections the Conservatives exert an influence both

upon the government and upon legislation which is out of all reasonable proportions. This influence is used largely in furthering their class interests, and in the main is a most unfortunate one upon the political life of the nation. By confederating with the Centre, and according to circumstances with a part of the National Liberal faction, they are enabled to push through most bills which have been stamped with their approval. They may be called the most reliable government support, at least on all legislation which does not militate against their class interests.

The enormous decrease of political Liberalism in Germany, which has been one of the most marked symptoms of the past decade, is that feature in the political life of the young empire which fills the friend of Germany with deepest sorrow and with direst forebodings. During the sixties, the Liberals (then called the *Fortschrittspartei*, or Progressive party) were the dominant party in Prussia, and it was then that Prussia was recognized all over the German-speaking lands as the champion of political progress. This moral factor had as much to do as all others together in giving Prussia her hegemony, and in bringing about the formation of the North German Confederation, and next the adhesion of the Southern States to the empire. It was during that period that King William I of Prussia, afterwards the first Emperor, seriously feared meeting the same fate as Charles I of England, as Bismarck has told the world since, because of the long conflict between him and his Cabinet on one side, and the Liberal majority in the Diet on the other. From its proud eminence the Liberal party in Germany has sunk to a pitiful depth. Liberalism, as the word was formerly understood in Germany, is almost dead there. And the Reichstag bears eloquent testimony to this fact.

The National Liberal party, which after the foundation of the Empire represented for a score of years the most important and energetic impulses of the nation, and contributed more than any other to its national unity and greatness, has been steadily declining. It now sends but forty-nine members and polls about 850,000 votes. It has, besides, ceased to be "Liberal" in all but name. From patriotic it has become "jingo." In its ranks to-day are found the wildest ranters for Pan-Germanism, men like Doctor Hasse and Doctor Lehr. Their platform has been tinkered

out of all recognition, and more and more of their old-time constituencies have repudiated their candidates. The other three Liberal sections, the old Progressive party, its offshoot, the Liberal Association, and the People's party, have come down to 862,000 votes combined. All the Liberals elected either to the Reichstag or the Prussian Diet are numerically too weak to undertake a policy of their own, and they lack cohesion and a community of political aims and interests. Thus, they shift about and are barely able, now and then, to defeat a specially obnoxious measure by filibustering tactics. Under such dispiriting influences, they have become mere obstructionists. This decrease of Liberalism has occurred since jingoism was injected into German politics, and since a blatant and ill-directed greed for colonies took hold of a large part of the nation. Of course, it is too early to surmise what, if anything, will come of those colonial dreams.

An anachronism as pronounced in its way as the Ultramontane party (or Centre) is the anti-Semite faction. It originated a score of years ago in the so-called Berlin Movement, and acquired at that time a good deal of force and a wide spread throughout the empire. At a particular point in its development this peculiar political creed could boast of a voting strength running close up to a million, and that portion of the press subservient to its interests was both numerous and violent.

Its three shining lights for a time were Hermann Ahlwardt, rector of a college; Adolf Stoecker, court and cathedral preacher under the old Emperor; and Liebermann von Sonnenberg, a well-known writer. All three of them were forcible speakers, and their methods of appealing to the popular prejudice against the Jews by cunningly devised arguments and wholesale abuse, and by demanding the social, political and business ostracism of this part of the population, proved eminently successful for years. They flooded the country with anti-Semitic pamphlets and circulars, explaining the growing wealth of the Jews in Germany by attributing to them greater unscrupulousness and clannishness, and declaiming against the ascendancy of Jewish capital; and their newspaper organs, above all the *Berlin Staatsbürger-Zeitung*, systematically inflamed public opinion to a dangerous pitch. They adroitly manipulated as campaign capital the sen-

sational "Passover murder case" on the lower Rhine, where an orthodox Jewish butcher named Buschoff was charged with the slaughter of a little Christian girl for ritual purposes. In spite of the utmost efforts on the part of the anti-Semites, however, and despite the unsafe state of public opinion at the time of the trial, the court failed to convict Buschoff, and the evidence, such as it was, showed a deplorably low mental condition and the darkest kind of superstition pervading large classes of the German people. After definitely failing in this and several other and similar cases, trumped up for the express purpose of intensifying ancient prejudices, the anti-Semites began to decline as a political factor, though they have every now and then renewed their demands upon the imperial and the several State legislatures to frame special laws against the Jews. One of their standing demands is to enforce a government translation of the Talmud and of several rabbinical writings, as they claim that such translation would show an orthodox Jewish code of morals wholly at variance with the Christian one and with the best interests of the nation. This demand, however, as sundry other ones, have steadily been declined by both governments and legislatures.

Thus, anti-Semitism in Germany is no longer a strong factor in politics. Nevertheless, it makes itself greatly felt. The dozen anti-Semite members in the Reichstag, led mostly by Liebermann von Sonnenberg, a flamboyant but effective orator, comprise by no means anti-Jewish sentiment in that body or in the various State legislatures. It is not long ago that a well-known Conservative leader in the Reichstag could say, "To-day every decent man is more or less an anti-Semite," and earn vociferous applause by this remarkable statement.

The last census gave Germany 567,884 Israelites—*i. e.*, members of the Mosaic faith. That means but one per cent. of the total population. But in certain parts of the empire the Jews are, nevertheless, a great power. This is the case in the provinces of Silesia and Posen, in Hesse-Nassau and the Rhine province, but particularly in Berlin, which has a Jewish population of over 100,000. In Berlin the Jews occupy indeed an eminent place in public and business life, more especially as financiers and manufacturers, brokers and agents, writers, journalists,

actors, artists, etc., and that in a measure explains the strength of the anti-Jewish sentiment in that city. But the curious fact remains that the movement is also strong in parts of Germany where the Jewish admixture in the population is numerically very slight, as in Saxony (9,000 out of 4,000,000), Mecklenburg (489 out of 600,000), and elsewhere.

This is not the place to go into the question whether Jewish influence upon the recent development of Germany has been in all respects wholesome and uplifting, but it can be truthfully said that the Jewish part of the population there is absolutely necessary to Germany's welfare, and that without it the empire would not have attained so quickly, if at all, that eminence in trade and industry which is the just pride of the nation as a whole.

While, however, anti-Semitism as a political entity is quite evidently on the wane in Germany, the tide of anti-Semite sentiment is still running fast and furious.

The Prussian Diet is the legislative body next in importance in Germany. It antedates the Reichstag by a score of years, as it was the outgrowth of the Prussian revolution of 1848, which was fought for a constitution and for legislative representation of the people. It is in many of its features patterned after the English parliament, and has a "Herrenhaus," or house of lords, and a "Abgeordnetenhaus," or house of delegates. The upper house is of minor importance, and its members are either hereditary, like the princes of the royal family, the heads of the wealthier and more ancient noble families, or are appointed by the Kaiser, as king of Prussia, such as rectors of universities, chief mayors of leading cities, and high court and royal household officials. The lower branch, like the House of Commons, is the more important, and nearly all distinctively Prussian laws of moment originate there. The 433 delegates to this body are elected by the nation, and receive a stipend of 15 marks per diem, or about \$3.75, also mileage, and some other emoluments. But the suffrage on which this house is elected is not general, as in the case of the Reichstag, but is plutocratic pure and simple. It was Bismarck who stigmatized this antiquated Prussian election law as "the worst in existence." The law works in this way: From the total number of adult citizens in

each of the 433 election districts are eliminated all those who do not pay a certain minimum of direct taxes. This removes nearly the whole labouring population and a considerable fraction of the poorer middle classes. The remainder is divided into three classes of electors—those paying the highest amount of taxes in each election district, those paying the next highest amount, and those paying the lowest. Each class, no matter how small the number of those belonging to it, counts as an even third in making up the electoral vote, so that, for instance, three electors in the first class count for as much as the 225 of the second class, or the 14,800 electors of the third. As if this, however, were not sufficiently absurd, no general figures are given as to what shall constitute inclusion in each class, so that in one district, where wealthy taxpayers abound, a tax receipt showing 10,000 marks in taxes paid as a minimum will be necessary to secure the privilege of voting with the first class, while in the adjoining district, where not a single wealthy man resides, 500 marks paid in taxes will be enough to enjoy that boon. Under the operation of this ridiculous law it has often happened that while a wealthy master tailor has voted in the first class, his customer, a minister of state (though poor), has had to vote in the third class, along with his own coachman and valet. One man in the first class of electors (the only really wealthy man in the town) and three in the second have together outvoted the 3,000 or 4,000 electors of the third class in a town of medium size. And so on in all sorts and degrees of unreason.

Against this travesty on election based on the franchise, the entire Liberal party of Prussia has been arrayed for two generations, but all their efforts have not availed in the slightest. The Prussian government and the present privileged classes there know that under this law they are secure against political or social reforms, and they also know that the Socialists and the entire lower class cannot enter the Diet and "disturb the peace" there, and so they keep this law.

It is under these circumstances not surprising that the lower house of the Diet is made up of 199 Conservatives and 100 members of the Centre, while the impotent minority of 134 is composed of the various branches of the Liberal party, of the Polish "protesters," etc.

But the Kaiser and his Prussian cabinet are playing with a double-edged tool in this matter, for the reactionary elements in the Diet are there in such a strong majority that they feel not the slightest hesitation about defeating the will of the government, whenever that seems to run counter to their class interests, and to frustrate promptly any unwelcome legislation. Thus it happened, for instance, that the Diet, at successive sessions, killed without any compunction the all-important Midland Canal Bills, although the Kaiser had personally pledged himself for their passage and although the government had agreed to all sorts of "compensations" as a reward for their acceptance by the stubborn Agrarian majority. There was a fine tinge of poetic justice in this.

Political life and parties are a more or less faithful copy of their Prussian prototype in the other twenty-five States of Germany, but with some modifications. There is, for instance, more political freedom observable in South Germany to-day, although the difference is certainly not very marked. The most liberally governed State at present is Württemberg, where there is a complete absence of the "Yunker" element, and where *lèse majesté* trials are unknown. Bavaria, too, is rather democratic, and her legislative bodies often indulge in an amount of plain speaking which would not be tolerated for a moment in either the Reichstag or the Prussian Diet. Baden, however, has been Prussianized, in this respect as in others. And the day is gone when South Germany, either in its compact entity or in its individual parts, could determine, or even measurably influence, the political destinies of the nation. These States and their rulers are manipulated so cleverly by the Kaiser and his Chancellor that, consciously or unconsciously, they are made to do Prussia's bidding on all important matters of legislation. This, in fact, is the logical trend of events, the unpalatable price the smaller powers in Germany have to pay for the great boon of national unity

CHAPTER VII

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT

"WE will make short work of the Socialist movement!" This, as Prince Bismarck related one day to a group of friends in Friedrichsruh, after his retirement, is what the young Kaiser said to him a fortnight after his accession to the throne. "Leave that to me," he continued; "I shall win them over to my side inside a year."

Bismarck smiled his enigmatic smile, and ventured to point out some of the great difficulties that seemed to stand in the way of such an easy and simple solution. But the Kaiser knew better, and mapped out a whole programme to his own satisfaction.

The world knows how egregiously he failed. Fourteen years have passed since then, and the Socialist party has grown to more than double the strength it mustered then. To judge by its voting strength, it represents to-day one-fourth of the German people, but even that high estimate is probably below the actual truth. Whoever lives in Germany cannot help mingling daily, almost hourly, knowingly or unknowingly, with Socialists. The valet who gives you admission to his master's drawing-room may be a Socialist. In the ante-chamber of Count Buelow, the Imperial Chancellor, you are likely to meet him. In every government department Socialists are employed by the score. Nay, the Kaiser himself, do what he will, has Socialists at his court and in his immediate entourage. Only thus is the enormous influence of that party, its resources and ramifications that extend everywhere within the Empire, at all explained.

As the Mayor of Kolberg, in a controversy with the government district president about the renting of a public hall to a body of Socialists once expressed it, "He who does not want to sit where Socialists have sat, will nowadays be somewhat em-

barrassed to find a seat anywhere in Germany; at least, he cannot any longer travel in railway carriages. What we eat and drink is for the most part made by Socialists. Our clothes have been manufactured by Socialists. You cannot live in a new house in the building of which Socialists have not been engaged. In short, to avoid Socialists or to stigmatize them as a class outside of the pale of respectable society is an absolutely futile task. Only by acknowledging them as a public factor on an equality with all other public factors can the social peace be furthered."

Indeed, the Mayor of Kolberg did not overstate the facts. Strange as it seems at first blush that at least one in every four men one meets in Germany belongs to a political organization which has written on its banners the obliteration of the present state of government, the abolition of monarchy, and the substitution of the immense army by a much vaster militia body, a party that looks upon the present State as its mortal enemy—it is only too true. It is the same party which the Kaiser, thoroughly recovered from the dream of his first year as a ruler, characterized, at the opening of a new Reichstag session, as a "horde of men unworthy to bear the name of Germans"; the same party—and the only political party in Germany, be it said,—which by its masterly generalship, its cohesion, and in many cases by the justice of its cause, has defeated the Kaiser whenever he crossed swords with it. His thrice-repeated attempt to force through the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet special legislation putting the Socialists outside the pale of the Constitution and of the common law of the Empire, miscarried utterly. The whole power of a splendidly drilled bureaucracy has been employed in vain against it. Thousands of Socialists have been sent to the hulks for uttering critical or abusive words regarding the Kaiser or monarchy, and the editors of Socialist papers have been sent to jail by hundreds—and all the effect produced was the election to the National Parliament of new Socialist delegates and the increased circulation of the Socialist press.

While no "exemption laws" could be passed against the Socialist party, the existing laws have been strained to their utmost by willing judges, and the enormous powers of an administration which practically is above the law has been steadily and pitilessly exerted against its followers. Socialists for many

years have been virtually denied nearly all the benefits which the constitution confers on every subject—liberty of speech, liberty of the press, liberty of worship, and liberty of associating for political, social or economic purposes. This has, of course, not been rigidly done in every part of the empire. In the large cities, especially, this roughshod overriding of the fundamental law of the empire could not, in many cases, be even attempted, for fear of uprisings, and still more for fear of driving the Liberal and well-to-do portion of the citizens into the Socialist camp as well. But in the rural districts and in the smaller towns, above all in the less enlightened provinces of Prussia, in the North and East, such high-handed measures to stamp out Socialism have been much in vogue, and have found the enthusiastic approval of the Kaiser. But all to no purpose. The ranks of the party have become more serried than ever, and persecution of creed and thought has had in this instance, as it nearly always does, but a contrary effect.

Were it not for the comparative freedom of speech which still obtains in the Reichstag, and for the 63 Socialist delegates in it, there is small doubt that the Socialist masses would be treated even much more harshly than is the case. But the solid Socialist phalanx in that body calls the worst offenders in this line to account. It is in the army that the Socialist fares worst. Of course, nobody can blame the Emperor for insisting on the stern exclusion of anything like a Socialist propaganda within the army, and on severe punishment for any attempts in that direction. The possession of Socialist literature in any shape—books, pamphlets, newspapers, etc.—and the mere reading of it, is visited by condign retribution. Utterances of a Socialistic nature, too, meet with strict disciplining, and often with long jail sentences. But many cases have been brought to public notice where the culprit, on being asked by his superior officers, merely admitted his Socialist belief, and was thereupon cruelly punished. Every Prussian minister of war makes a point of being severer in this respect than his predecessor has been. This abuse of military authority, as well as similar cases within the province of civil administration, finds castigation on the part of the Socialist spokesmen in the Reichstag and in the legislatures of the different German States, though this cannot

prevent recurrence, and, besides, leads to worse persecution of the victims, if the latter can at all be traced by the authorities. Still, on the whole, this parliamentary uplifting of the veil that hides these outrages committed from a mistaken sense of zeal, has a salutary effect in checking persecution both in volume and in degree.

Of course, the Kaiser as well as the whole German government and the different sovereign rulers of the German states, know perfectly well that Socialism, as it exists to-day in Germany, has practically been robbed of its revolutionary sting. Evolution in German Socialism, not so much in its nominal creed as in its practical aims and in the hold it has acquired on the masses, has been more and more away from its original sources. After the savage suppression laws against Socialism which Bismarck framed, and which were in force for a number of years, failed to be renewed by the Reichstag at their expiration, the Socialist party, it is quite true, gained quickly and enormously in numbers. In 1878-79, owing to these repressive measures, the Socialist vote dropped to 312,000 as against their 493,000 votes in 1877. But from that time until the last general election, that of 1898, the Socialist vote rose rapidly and steadily, and in the latter year it attained to 2,107,000, while the vote of all the other parties gradually went down, and to-day some of these parties poll barely one-fourth of their former strength. The parties suffering the most were the Liberal, in its various shades of opinion, with the National Liberal and the Centre following. All the Liberal factions together to-day do not poll as many votes as the Socialists alone, showing plainly that whole classes of the population, formerly trusting to a large Liberal party for the carrying out of a programme embodying a greater measure of political liberty, had despaired of that hope, and in that despair turned to the most radical reform party of all as a last resort, and as the only available means of uttering a protest against the present régime. The constituency of the remnant of the once powerful Liberal party has also greatly changed during this process. It used to comprise nearly the whole middle class in Germany—this was preëminently the case before, under Bismarck's warfare against the Catholic Church, the Ultramontane Centre was formed—*i. e.*, the best and most progressive

part of the nation. It was this part, in fact, which made Germany what it is to-day. But now, after the Centre has become the largest party in parliamentary representation (but by no means in the number of votes polled), owing to the most flagrant and wholesale case of gerrymandering on record in the political history of any nation, and after the enormous accessions to the Socialist party from the Liberal ranks, the Liberal factions represent in the main the plutocratic interests of Germany, the large banking, shipping, and industrial classes and their millions. In that capacity they still wield, owing to the great wealth represented, a certain, mainly negative, influence on legislation. But their hold on the masses is entirely gone. One by one the election districts held for generations by the Liberals have surrendered to triumphant Socialism. The industrial and manufacturing centres, such as the whole Rhenish and Westphalian provinces, and nearly all the large cities with their rapidly growing population of "hands" employed in factories, textiles, the iron and steel industries, etc., have become strongly Socialistic. Berlin and its suburbs, comprising a population of two and a half millions, has an enormous Socialist majority. So has Hamburg, Breslau, Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Altona, Stettin, Königsberg, Dantzic, Nuremberg, and nearly all other large centres. The election districts of Germany are still the same they were in 1871, although since that time they have changed entirely in their population, the urban ones having in many cases doubled, trebled, and even quadrupled in size, while the rural ones have actually diminished. All attempts to effect a redistricting, however, have been stubbornly resisted by the government as well as by the dominant parties, the Conservative factions and the Centre, even by the National Liberals, since such redistricting would at once increase the Socialist representation by at least one hundred per cent., and decrease the representation of nearly all other parties, but most of all that of the Conservatives and of the Centre.

Berlin, for instance, would, with its suburbs, alone send 17 Socialists to the Reichstag, instead of 7 as at present. There would then be about 120 Socialist delegates in the Reichstag, out of a total of 397, and the Conservatives would be reduced to less than 50, against their present 91, while the

Centre, instead of 107, as now, would muster barely 60. With the more radical Liberal wing, now a pitiful twoscore, but under a redistricting having at least 60 members, and a portion of the numerous Independents, the Socialists would then be the dominant legislative factor in imperial affairs. It is not astonishing that the government and the parties now controlling legislation should resist to the utmost such a contingency. In fact, both government and the more extreme factions in the Reichstag usually siding with the government harbour the design of curtailing the general franchise in order to perpetuate their present power before the Socialists have, even under present unfavourable conditions, attained the control, a thing which is greatly feared by them, and which, judging by the signs of the times, there is abundant reason to fear. For the bye elections that have taken place during the last two years, to replace members who had died or resigned, have, with one or two exceptions, all resulted in Socialist victories, even in former strongholds of other parties. The whole trend of affairs, in fact, seems to point to very large Socialist increases at the next general elections, in 1903. It is probable that the Socialist gains will be larger than at any previous election.

These designs of curtailing the general franchise, either by attaching to the ballot the condition of a stipulated minimum of taxation, or by some other discrimination which would disfranchise large numbers of the lower classes, has thus far met with a determined resistance on the part of the Reichstag majority, composed of the entire Left and part of the Centre, and there does not seem to be any chance to realize it in the near future. However, the plan exists, and whenever the time should come that the government deems it necessary to realize it, the Kaiser and his resourceful advisers may find the means, either in coercing or otherwise influencing the Reichstag, or by an infringement of the Constitution, to make a concrete fact of it. It would, indeed, be a matter of life and death with the government to prevent the Socialists from obtaining control—although the mere majority in the Reichstag would not yet give complete control, there being the Bundesrath as a coördinate and equally powerful body to consider, while the army would still remain, as now, under the sole command of the Kaiser—and

the Kaiser at least is not the man to give up the fight until the last ditch.

However, it is by no means certain that even if the Socialists should obtain control of imperial affairs in the Reichstag, they would make an attempt to carry their party programme as it was originally framed by their earlier leaders, a programme in its main features corresponding with the doctrines of Marx and Engels, or even of Liebknecht, one of their later prophets.

Liebknecht, who had suffered much for the faith, and who was put in jail for a long term for "implied *lèse majesté*" (as the judge who convicted him of this offense, not found in the statutes, phrased it) only a short while before death finally released him from all Prussian jurisdiction, had died happy in the firm belief that the great day of reckoning was close at hand. He, like Bebel and Singer, had been an honest fanatic and an undaunted champion of Socialism in its earlier form, involving a bloody uprising of the lower against the upper classes and against the present form of government, and a complete reorganization of society on the lines of State control of all the means of production and consumption. This Utopian dream formed, of course, an integral and vital part of orthodox Socialism as taught until a decade ago, and though successive Socialist party conventions had gradually weakened and modified this original platform, its main features, smoothed over somewhat, were still contained in the party programme adopted at the great Erfurt convention, in the middle of the eighties.

Since then, however, a strong counter-current has set in within German Socialism. There has been a steady and increasing inclination to lop off from the parent tree these revolutionary branches, and to confine the party, in creed as well as in practical aims, to a set of reforms which, radical as they are and diametrically opposed to the class interests of the dominating factors in Germany, could nevertheless be carried out on peaceable lines, and could easily find a place within the present order of society. In its main features this revised programme, though out of deference to the feelings of their old-time leaders it has not been adopted in so many words, not even at the last party convention, is that of a radical reform and labor party. It includes State control of all means of communication and of

all factories, mines, shipyards, etc., with the voice of owner and toiler coördinated, and provides for a minimum of wages and a maximum of hours of labor, etc., etc. But it does away with any violent upheaval, with forcible dispossession, and with nearly every paragraph in the earlier creed to which other political parties, no matter how friendly disposed otherwise to the just demands of labor, have had all along strong objections. And though, as stated above, this new programme has not so far been formally adopted by the Socialists of Germany as a party, largely for sentimental reasons, there is, as a matter of fact, not the slightest doubt that the overwhelming part of their armies have really accepted it as their true aim and wish. This has become plainer year after year, and the older and irreconcilable elements of the party, though still in a good many ways representing the Socialist masses in public, have been pushed to the wall and gradually reduced to a small minority.

For a time it looked, indeed, as if there would be a formal split in the whole party, with the extreme wing forming the nucleus of a new one, and a year ago Singer, in a public speech in Munich, threatened as much. But at present it seems as if this smaller wing of dyed-in-the-wool Socialists of the earlier Marx school had abandoned that idea, and intended to remain in the party, where their counsel and voice will be in many ways invaluable. As tacticians and campaigners and as political organizers of an opposition party, they are, and will probably continue to be, of immense service to the party and to its younger and less experienced leaders, and as Socialist spokesmen in the Reichstag and elsewhere their influence could hardly be missed. Outside of these practical considerations, of course, the fact that these old-time leaders of Socialism in Germany have been the martyrs of the party on innumerable occasions, and have spent half their lives in jail for the cause of the working man, makes the moral bonds that unite the Socialist masses to them much stronger.

The great change that has been wrought within the aims and convictions of the Socialist masses in Germany has been due to two great causes. The first of them is the altered character of the rank and file. It was pointed out before that immense accessions have come to the Socialist party during the past ten

years from the various factions of the whilom great Liberal party in Germany, and also from the Centre, especially in the industrial districts of the Catholic Rhine and Westphalian provinces and in some parts of the Polish-speaking districts of Silesia. These recruits, becoming more and more numerous, had for the most part little faith in the sanguinary part of the old Socialist programme, but they firmly believed in the reforms advocated by the party. Their mere numerical weight, however, great as it was, would not have sufficed to turn the scale. But there was much brain power used in the same direction, and the head and front of this intellectual warfare waged against the earlier dogmas of Socialism was Bernstein, for twenty years an exile from Germany—like so many other of the ablest Socialists driven out by Bismarck under his repression laws. He had been, in fact, a fugitive from German justice, and a long term of captivity was awaiting him if he had been found, any time these score of years, on German soil. The “Steckbrief” (a demand upon all German authorities to arrest him wherever found) had been regularly renewed by publication in the *Reichsanzeiger* to prevent its losing legal effect. Meanwhile Bernstein was following his trade as a writer on economic questions in the British metropolis. The extensive experience he thus acquired in an entirely new field of labor, and the consequent widening of his mental horizon, produced due effect in the course of time. Bernstein modified his theories on Socialism more and more. He has been recognized within the Socialist party for many years as the intellectual successor of Engels and Marx, as the most scientific and keenest thinker on their side. This opinion became so firmly grounded among the Socialist masses while he was still an exile that it cannot be uprooted now. During the last years of his stay in England he wrote and published a series of books and pamphlets which found a powerful reflex in Germany, and which have done more than any other single thing in moulding anew the doctrines on which theoretic Socialism is built. But his main work in this line has been done since his return to Germany. For a couple of years ago his “Steckbrief” was not renewed by the German government, which in itself is a very significant fact, since the omission can hardly have been due to an oversight. Bernstein returned

to the party fold in Germany. Upon his return the entire Socialist press sang pæans of joy. But a goodly part of this press has since changed its tune. For Bernstein issued in quick succession a number of pithily written and wholly convincing writings wherein he demolished, one after the other, the strongest pillars upon which the old Socialist structure, as a scientific, political, and economic system, rests—the dogma of the steadily advancing pauperization of the masses; of a social cataclysm being bound to come; and of the unearned increment in the capitalists' incomes, etc., etc.,—and there has been nobody within the Socialists' ranks able to disprove his arguments and conclusions.

A great howling and shouting and gnashing of teeth set in within the Socialist party, and in a measure this still continues. The old irreconcilable leaders, foremost among them, of course, Bebel, Singer, and Auer, began to call for the ostracism of this heretic. A campaign was opened against him, in which nearly all the old-time leaders at first joined. One of the most influential Socialist papers, the *Tribune* of Erfurt, clearly proving that he had, *seriatim*, denied and tried to destroy all the essential theories upon which Socialism is founded, demanded his removal from the party. The central organ of German-speaking Socialism, the *Vorwärts* in Berlin, which at first had rejoiced at his return, now mentioned him with cool disapproval. But below all this noise and animosity was plainly perceptible the fear that Bernstein had the great mass of Socialism with him in this matter, and that if the old leaders insisted on his forcible removal from the party, it would be they who would be defeated. There were all sorts of indications of that. So, after a while, the open opposition against him and his teachings died down, and the new situation created by him is about as briefly outlined above. The irredentist part of the Socialist army has virtually subsided, and thereby acknowledged its overthrow. A truce, if not indeed a peace, has been declared between the warring factions, and at the last party convention the breach has been patched up, and a sort of amicable understanding tacitly established between them. A short while later, not many months ago, Bernstein was elected into the Reichstag by one of the most influential and largest Socialist constituencies

in the whole Empire, and the stamp of approval thus formally affixed to his work. He is now the acknowledged leader of the larger and more enlightened as well as moderate wing of the Socialist party in Germany.

That these new conditions are permanent and not of an evanescent character is seen by every unbiased and observant politician in Germany. But there are, on the other hand, many, even whole political parties, who do not wish to see, and who, by keeping up the cry against the Socialists, expect to reap political or personal advantages. It is an open secret, for example, that the Kaiser, and through him the government, has not dared to break with the Conservative party, although often sorely tempted to do so, because his entourage has known how to impress him with at least a suspicion that the Socialist party as a whole is only kept from rising in a bloody revolution, in which his crown and all the institutions, political and religious, which he holds dear would be at stake, by the constant fear of an army absolutely devoted to him, the Kaiser; that to make any pact or compromise with the Socialist party would be worse than any humiliation the Conservative party may subject him to, and that such a thing, in fact, is out of the question with him.

The Kaiser was greatly shocked when he heard, some time ago, that a monarch as proud as himself—namely, Francis Joseph of Austria, met and conversed in friendly fashion with the Austrian Socialist leader, Pernerstorffer, and that his relative, Grand Duke Ernest Ludwig of Hesse, did the same with a Hessian Socialist leader. It is a pity that the German Kaiser has had his mind systematically poisoned against so many millions of his subjects as to reject all approach, even the slightest, from that quarter. If it were possible to convince him of the real truth, viz., that the bulk of these German Socialists are to all practical intents and purposes good enough citizens, who make the best soldiers, the best and most intelligent mechanics and artisans, the best industrial toilers, whose handiwork has enriched the empire and made of it a great industrial and exporting country, and that they pay their taxes as regularly as the rest of the population—that would be a great step forward in freeing him from his mediæval shackles, from the tutelage

and the almost exclusive influence of the reactionary classes in Germany, the "Yunker" party, the mortgage-ridden and caste-proud manorial lords of the unprogressive eastern and northern Prussian provinces, and give him a much firmer and broader hold upon his people than the army with its bayonets, an army, by the way, composed about one-third of young Socialists, or sons of Socialists, can give him. Of course, one cannot blame the Kaiser for feeling offended that his distinct advances during the first year of his reign were rejected almost with scorn by the Socialists, and that he cannot have a feeling of affection for a party whose platform embodies an anti-monarchic plank. But neither can one blame the Socialists for harbouring a strong dislike for a ruler who has done his best to estrange their feelings by endless and unjust persecution, and by applying to them the strongest terms of opprobrium that ever fell from the lips of a monarch toward his own subjects. Strong contrasts of political belief are noticeable between rulers and ruled in other enlightened countries, this country and England included. But nowhere else is there such a systematic and wholesale attempt to put a large part of the nation virtually without the pale of the constitutional and legal guarantees that encircle the liberties of all. There is, indeed, small doubt that if at this present juncture of Socialist development in Germany the Kaiser and his government were to abandon forever their present policy of unconstitutional repression, and show unmistakably their good faith in this matter, a *modus vivendi* could be established with the Socialist party that need not be derogatory to imperial dignity, and that would suffice for all practical purposes of politics.

The Socialists, in fact, had given repeated proof, even before the transition described above had been fully wrought, that they can be had for the asking in furthering or framing important legislation not in dissonance with their creed. The most striking instance of this they gave under the régime of Count Caprivi, Bismarck's successor, the only chancellor so far who faced the Socialists without prejudice. Without their votes Caprivi's system of commercial treaties could never have been passed. And yet it was this which enabled Germany to start out on that brilliant industrial and commercial career which has been, for

a decade, the marvel of the world. It was these same commercial treaties which the Kaiser, in conferring the order of the Black Eagle and a correspondingly high rank upon Caprivi, termed "a real saving deed." Much of the work done by the Socialists in the various legislative bodies of Germany, but above all in the Reichstag, redounds to the best interests of all classes of the Empire, although, of course, their main efforts are directed towards benefiting their constituents, the labouring classes. But that, too, is to the interests of the whole nation. Their work in the various committees of the Reichstag—and they hold the chairmanship of some of the most important—is more painstaking and conscientious than that of any other party, and is so acknowledged. In acting as a radical leaven in the broad mass of tame subserviency which the majority of the Reichstag presents, they consciously or unconsciously accomplish a vast amount of good, and prepare the way for a more liberal general policy in the empire, but above all help greatly in preserving at least that modicum of freedom in speech, press and religious worship which has survived the fourteen years of *quasi* absolutist government inaugurated by the present Kaiser. With them and their influence permanently removed from the Reichstag it is hard to conceive to what depths of inanity and impotence that body would have sunk by now.

It has often been stated that the German government has done more, and is doing more, than any other for the good of the toiling masses, and in proof of this assertion the inquirer is pointed to the well-known so-called "Social Legislation." This consists, as the world knows, in the laws providing for compulsory insurance, invalid and old-age pensions, and accident premiums paid the wage workers in mines, factories, industrial establishments of every kind, and, to some extent, also, to those in domestic service.*

The benefits which the labouring millions in the cities and

*The rural labouring population has been omitted throughout in this legislation, owing to the determined opposition of the Agrarian party, whose contention it is that such an additional burden would ruin them. No legal restriction whatever is placed on the rural employer; his farm hands work as long as he makes them, which in harvest time and during the sugar beet "campaign" means 16 to 18 hours. Child labour and woman labour have no boundaries set, either in the matter of wages or hours. Death or accidents while at field labour are in nowise compensated.

towns of Germany derive from these laws are undeniable, although by no means as large as might be supposed. For one thing—and that is the main drawback to their efficiency—the collection and administration of the funds out of which these moneys are subsequently paid have been made so cumbersome and withal so needlessly expensive, that a clear third of all the sums paid goes into the pockets of the army of small bureaucrats who are entrusted with this task, and who are a sad incumbrance on the actual toiler who is to be benefited. Magnificent palaces have been erected by the government out of these moneys of the poor, in which vast hordes of these administrative government employés are housed. The most gorgeous of these palaces—for no other name will fit—stands on one of the most aristocratic avenues of Berlin. The biting sarcasm of the masses has dubbed it the “Klebepalast”—i. e., “Pasting Palace”—in token of the fact that the millions required to erect it came from the weekly “pasters” which every employé and employer in the Empire has to buy and affix every week to the pages of small booklets provided for the purpose. Nor is this all. Much of the money paid under these laws both by employer and employé never reaches the persons for whose behoof it is ostensibly intended, for there are whole lists of exceptions, annulments, etc., owing to sins of commission and omission on the part of the laborer. Again, the old-age limit is fixed entirely too high. Sixty is an age which not one in twenty reaches in whole branches of unhealthy industries, such as mining, chemical specialties, polishers and grinders, etc., etc. But above all, the amounts finally paid the beneficiary in case of complete disablement or old age are entirely insufficient to meet the purposes for which the law was passed. Twenty-five to thirty cents *per diem* is not enough, even in the most frugal districts of Germany, and even with the greatest amount of rigid economy, to subsist on. And in many cases the allowance is even smaller than that. The laborer himself has contributed, out of his meager income, one-half of the whole fund that has accumulated during his lifetime, and in the end he is, by premature death, cheated out of the blessings held out to him so enticingly for many years, or else he receives a mere pittance on which it is impossible for him to live the brief space still allotted

to him. These and a number of other drawbacks to the present system not enumerated here have embittered the working masses in this respect. They feel that instead of a real reform they receive but the semblance of one.

All these defects have been pointed out many times in the Socialist and non-Socialist press of Germany, but nothing is being done or even attempted, and nothing seems likely to be done for many years to come to better matters. The sentiment among employers all over Germany is that to impose a greater burden than their present ones on them in this respect would seriously handicap them in competition with their foreign rivals in industrial output, and this sentiment they have known how to impose upon the government and the legislative bodies. But even the little tangible good actually achieved by this much-heralded "social reform" legislation is clearly attributable, not to the initiative of the imperial government, but to the influence of the Socialists themselves. Bismarck it was who framed and pushed these bills through the Reichstag and the Bundesrath, and we have it from his own mouth that his single motive in doing this was to "take the wind out of the Socialist sails," as he phrased it. For the Socialists had, through their delegates in the Reichstag, for years advocated, and very forcibly, too, just such measures, only more comprehensive and shorn of the present ballast of costly bureaucratic management, and up to the moment that it struck Bismarck as a clever strategic move to take their scheme up himself, not the slightest attention had been paid by the government to the Socialist cry for relieving the aged or invalid toiler. It is, therefore, not very surprising that the Socialist party, and with it the entire labouring class of Germany, does not consider a large amount of gratitude as the proper share of the government in this matter.

But, generally speaking, the German labouring classes, whether Socialist in creed or not, both in city and country, have a long and serious list of grievances. Nowhere else in modern times are the relations between employer and employed so unsatisfactory. Caste spirit is nowhere else so strong. That fair measure of manly independence exacted by the worker and accorded by the wage-giver in other countries is as yet not the German workingman's. He is still looked upon as the serf, the

"thing" of the man whose bread he eats, and the treatment he receives is, leaving exceptions out of the calculation, on a par with this low estimate in which he is held. The Kaiser's intimate adviser and friend for many years, the late Baron Stumm, a multi-millionaire and owner of huge iron, steel and coal interests in the Saar district, was a man who embodied to the full this type of German employer. His sway over his army of 25,000 workmen was not only autocratic but tyrannical as well. He was inexorable in the demands he made upon every fibre of his "hands." He allowed no strikes, of course, no representations by his men about any unjust overseer or foremen, no complaint about anything whatever. He allowed no newspapers except those approved by him in the homes of his men. He dictated to them whom they were to vote for at elections. He discharged and blacklisted any man who dared disobey him in the slightest. In short, he played high-handed omnipotence in the large district he ruled absolutely (a district popularly known as "Saarabia"), about as sternly as it is at all given to man to do. And this man was after the Kaiser's own heart, and his methods, condemned even by nine-tenths of the unprogressive employers in the empire, found the Kaiser's enthusiastic endorsement on numerous public occasions. His case was an extreme one, it is true, but in the main the principle he unflinchingly stood for, that of absolute non-interference by the employé, is to this day the ruling one in Germany. On the other hand, constant interference by the employer in the private affairs of his men is not only held permissible but praiseworthy, and public opinion supports this view. The toiler of the wage-earning classes, in other words, is to this day looked upon in Germany as a being deficient in sense to the degree necessitating constant surveillance. He is, as a rule, treated harshly, often brutally and cruelly. Nobody makes it his business (always excepting the Socialist party) to enforce his rights as an adult and thinking fellow-creature, and as a fellow-citizen protected by the same constitution which confers similar rights upon the other classes of the population.

Every attempt to enforce these constitutional rights by lawful means is discouraged, above all by the very power which ought to aid in enforcing them—the courts. Germany is still

a land of class legislation, but even more of class administration. There is no such thing as even-handed justice, where the parties to a quarrel belong the one to the upper crust and the other to the lower strata of society. This is a grave charge to make against an otherwise so enlightened country, but it is amply borne out by the facts. Is it any wonder, then, that the rigorous maintenance of such class distinctions and of class rule has bred in the lower classes a fierce and inextinguishable hatred of their oppressors?

Class legislation and administration! For proof of this one has not far to go. The records of the German courts teem with convictions and harsh sentences imposed against the poorer classes for the most trifling offenses. Strikes, for instance, are permissible under the laws. But several late special laws, fixing very severe penalties for strike sentinels, for intimidation, and other excrescences incidental to industrial warfare of this kind, and, more than these laws, the far-reaching interpretation given by the courts to them, practically render the right to strike illusory, or at best very dangerous. Any breach of the peace, easily committed by uneducated men when in a state of intense excitement, are also draconically punished by the courts. And so it goes all through the list. Similar offenses committed by members of the educated classes find much more lenient judges. All through his life of unrelieved and hard toil the German workman meets severity and an utter lack of sympathy on the part of the ruling classes.

In the matter of taxation the lower classes are again discriminated against most unfairly. This fact obtrudes itself upon every impartial observer in Germany, and it is this which gives the Socialist agitator his heaviest ammunition. Here are, for instance, some figures, taken from German official sources, bearing out the claim. The German imperial budget for 1898-99 was 4,980,000,000 marks, or about 1,200 million dollars. Of this sum fourteen per cent. went to the army and ten per cent. to the navy. About twenty dollars *per capita* is what the imperial government required. This, be it noted, does not include all the taxes raised by the separate states, towns, and provinces for their own support. Of course, the labouring population has to pay its full share for this support of both army and

navy, about seventy-three out of every hundred serving belonging to that class. Now, where does a large part of the taxes come from? The tax and revenue system in Germany seems to be gotten up so as to lie with crushing force upon the weary backs of the poor. For the whole sum from import duties for 1901 is 478,978,000 marks. Of this the duty on cereals was 131,557,000 marks; on petroleum, 70,913,000; on coffee, 64,503,000; on lard, 12,540,000; on cotton, yarn and finished, 8,804,000; on meats, 8,459,000; on rice, 5,365,000; on salt herrings, 3,045,000; on cheese, 2,991,000; on tea, 2,856,000; on eggs, 2,793,000; on cattle and sheep, 2,666,000; on butter and margarine, 2,608,000; on table fats, 2,382,000; etc. It will be noticed that these articles, which are so greatly enhanced in price in Germany by high duties, are all articles for the poor man's consumption. Then, as to the internal revenue taxes. Three of the principal ones, viz., on tobacco, sugar, and salt, and the tax on home-made spirituous liquor, figure in the returns for 1901, respectively, as 11,960,000 marks, 111,380,000 and 48,943,000; and liquor, which is twice taxed for internal consumption, is put down as 109,768,000 and 18,087,000, while the brewing tax amounts to 31,136,000. The government which thus raises the price of nearly every foodstuff and liquid the poor require encourages the distiller (who is nearly always owner of a big rural estate) in every possible way.

From all the facts cited above it will be apparent that the lower classes in Germany, from whose number after all the rank and file of the Socialist party are largely drawn, though the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and other strata of the lower middle class have of late years also flocked to it in ever increasing numbers, have indeed serious reason for complaint, and that it is not astonishing that they wish, somehow and anyhow, for a radical change of system. It must not be supposed, however, that the higher classes in Germany are a unit in thus keeping the lower classes under by fair means and foul. The best mind of the nation, in fact, not only recognizes the dire need of meting out a fuller measure of justice to the labouring classes, but freely acknowledges the great guilt of the nation committed in its treatment of this part of it, the one standing most in need of kindness, forbearance, and consideration. Movements like

those set afoot by the orthodox Pastor von Bodelschwingh and by the liberal Pastor Naumann, the latter amounting to an organized attempt to fight Socialism with a counter-party having similar aims but exempt from all strictly Socialist features, show that this consciousness of guilt has penetrated large strata of the upper classes. The clergy all over Germany, in fact, is more and more coming around to the opinion that instead of treating the Socialist, singly and *en masse*, as an enemy worthy only to be exterminated, the proper way is to try and understand, and if possible rectify, his just grievances. This of late is especially true of the Protestant clergy, who have allowed these millions of the disinherited of this earth to drift away from their influence and teachings, while the Catholic priesthood in Germany still persists in treating them as accursed of God and man. But the highest trained intellect in the empire, the professors and university teachers, have likewise begun to preach a different mode of combating Socialism than the one in vogue with them for so long. They have seen a not inconsiderable portion of their former hearers and students turn to Socialism and swell the rising flood of the "learned proletariat" of the country, and their cool and haughty indifference is fast disappearing with such an object lesson before their eyes.

An increasing number of the most noted professors of economics, history, and political science in the leading universities have under this new impulse begun to publish writings in which the idea is clearly brought out that to cure the nation of its Socialism it is above all necessary to cure the evils and to redress the wrongs which have caused the movement. These writings have met with just as violent opposition as acclaim, but in any case they have not failed of a deep impression which augurs well for the future. In a recent number of the *Deutsche Monatschrift*, one of the leading German magazines, Prof. Rudolph Sohm, of the University of Breslau, advocated a perfect programme for the regeneration of German political life, and in this the idea of rendering tardy justice to the German laboring classes occupied a prominent place.

It is indeed necessary to remember the historic development of Germany in order to understand the low political and social status of the lower class—the labouring man, the mechanic,

the small shopkeeper, the farm hand. This class has never been able to acquire what the same class of the population has acquired in France since the great Revolution, in England during the course of the nineteenth century, on social and political lines, and what has been the birthright of every man in the great American Republic since its foundation. The only revolution that ever took place in Germany, that of 1848-49, proceeded from the middle classes, and had purely political reform for its aim. It lasted, besides, too short a time, and was not successful in the end. When its waves had rolled back, things returned much to their old level. Thus it was that the status of the lower classes, and of the poorer middle classes, had virtually not changed when Lassalle and Marx and the other earlier Socialist leaders began to make their appeals to the "proletariat"; and, excepting the political and social awakening for which the Socialist party is responsible in Germany, there has come no other to the masses of the lower strata. They are still, even where the leaven of Socialism has worked, rather behind their fellows in countries more favoured politically, so far as self-respect, maturity of convictions and sturdy independence are concerned. These reasons explain, of course, partially the remarkable rise of Socialism as a political and social power in Germany. For there is no gainsaying the fact that it has had, in many respects, a salutary effect on the masses there. It has quickened the intellect of the worker, and has first enabled him to think, however faultily, on political and economic topics. It has, by organizing thousands of social clubs, given these whilom dull and torpid masses a genuine taste for and appreciation of purely æsthetic pleasures, such as music, singing, theatrical performances, concerts, and above all, books. The Socialists in Germany have done what the government had left undone, viz., founded thousands of workingmen's libraries. The Socialist press has in this respect done wonders.

Thus, looking over the vast field of German Socialism, the unbiassed observer finds much that he cannot help admiring. The cohorts and legions that obey the Socialist trumpet call are by no means the dullards and fools which persons not acquainted with the real facts are too prone to fancy them. What the final issue of the great struggle will be which the Socialist

party, single-handed, is making against all the powers of government and society there, it is too early to predict. Certain it is, however, that the party is making headway, and that it is gaining over to its ranks an increasing percentage of the cultured middle classes as well. It is also certain that just at present at least there is no prospect of a more liberal form and spirit of government save and alone through this very Socialist party. | Shorn of its revolutionary character, freed from its former visionary features, and reduced to a radical and democratic reform programme, there seems no valid reason why this party should not have a great future in store. It alone, of the score of political parties and factions in the Empire, has great ideals and aims, and it alone is a living and growing force, throbbing with power, with hope, and with faith in its own destiny.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POLISH PROBLEM IN PRUSSIA

A NUMBER of manifestations in the Polish provinces of Prussia, giving evidence of a growing spirit of unrest and of dissatisfaction with existing conditions, and a marked desire to force the Prussian government to abandon its present policy, have recently awakened fresh interest in the Polish problem, and more especially so far as it concerns Prussia.

It is of interest to note that it is precisely in that part of ancient Poland which is in a material way by far the most prosperous, as well as intellectually the most advanced, namely, the Prussian section, that the Polish national spirit is now most vigorously asserting itself. The Austrian part, known politically as the Kingdom of Galicia, has practically been enjoying autonomy for a generation; and there the Polish element, constituting the bare majority, in a total population of about seven millions, is dominant both politically and socially. But Galicia, economically and intellectually considered, is far behind the Polish provinces of Prussia. This is also true in a still higher degree of Russian Poland. The reasons which operate in bringing about this strenuous resistance to Prussian rule in the Polish provinces are diverse. The principal ones, however, are differences of race and creed.

The only two provinces of Prussia which can be properly called Polish—that is, where the Poles are numerically predominant—are Posen and West Prussia. There are also, however, in the provinces of East Prussia and Silesia, large districts which are settled almost exclusively by people of Polish race. In Silesia it is the “upper” or eastern portion, adjoining Russia and Austria, which is Polish, and in that region Polish agitation is of very recent growth. But it has made rapid progress there, so much so that at recent elections to the Reichstag and the Diet the candidates of the Polish party were triumphant. Altogether, the population of Polish blood and language in these four prov-

inces numbers about two and a half millions. Scattered throughout the remainder of the empire, or settled in more or less compact colonies—particularly in the mining districts of Westphalia and the Rhine, but also in both the Prussian provinces of Saxony and in the little kingdom of Saxony, as well as in Berlin and its suburbs, where there is alone a Polish population of about 50,000—another half-million of Poles may be found. But while the latter cause the Prussian government some anxiety for various reasons, it is in the Polish provinces that they have become a real danger to the State.

Disaffection had repeatedly shown itself in previous years. Both during the Polish rising of 1846 in Russia and Austria and during that of 1863 in Russia there were evident signs of it on Prussian territory as well. But while a few slight skirmishes took place between Prussian detachments and ill-organized bands of Polish insurgents, there was no general insurrection of the Poles in Prussia. Since 1863 Polish disaffection both in Prussia and Russia has been latent.

So far as the material development of her Polish provinces goes, Prussia deserves unstinted praise. This can be shown on every count. When they became an integral portion of the Prussian monarchy, the condition of these provinces was truly deplorable. Not only German but also French and Polish writers agree in this judgment. Frederick the Great, with his characteristic energy, at once went about the task of amelioration. He devoted a considerable portion of Prussia's meagre resources to improvements of every kind. Whole villages and towns were rebuilt. The impoverished peasantry was furnished with seed corn, potatoes and cattle, and taxes were remitted for years. German colonies were established, and for a long time the government aided them in attaining a sound financial basis. German mechanics and merchants, German physicians and druggists, were encouraged to settle in Polish towns. The civil administration, which had been in a chaotic and wholly unsatisfactory state, was put on a sound basis, and security of life and property was rigidly enforced. During the fourteen years that intervened between the acquisition of these Polish lands and the death of Frederick the Great, the population had increased nearly fifty per cent., and a revival of prosperity was apparent.

This policy of improvement has been more or less faithfully adhered to by all the Prussian rulers from that time on. Of course, the long Napoleonic wars and Prussia's reverses between 1806 and 1813, during which time she was deprived of her Polish provinces, had an unfortunate effect upon the latter. But with the restoration of peace and readjustment on the same political lines as obtained before the Napoleonic upheaval came a return to steady if slow improvement.

The more rapid rise of these provinces, economically considered, dates, however, from 1863. It is coincident with the long and successful reign of William I, afterward chosen German Emperor. Within the last forty years the wealth of the Polish sections of Prussia has quadrupled. The Polish spendthrift nobility, who were in the habit of squandering their revenues in riotous fashion in either Paris or Warsaw, have become thrifty and money-wise, and much of their capital is now safely deposited in Polish banks. Agricultural methods have undergone a radical change for the better. Primitive tools and contrivances have given place to labour-saving machinery, and the work of the small farmer and tenant has become much more efficient. On the larger estates especially, owing to more intense culture and to the establishment of beet-sugar factories and distilleries, revenues have vastly increased, and the old and rickety barns and stables have been replaced by solid, well-constructed buildings. Minerals, which formerly were left where nature had placed them, are now scientifically mined. Iron and coal are among the most important staples of Upper Silesia, and salt and iron mines are worked at a handsome profit in West Prussia. Agricultural products of every kind have greatly improved in quality, and cattle and horses of good breeds are now the rule. Agricultural fairs are an established institution.

The greatest boon, however, that has come to these provinces is the rise of a sturdy and fairly prosperous middle class. It was the absence of this class which probably contributed more than any other single factor to the downfall of Poland as a nation. Up to about twenty-five years ago the small middle class to be met with in Polish towns and cities was composed almost wholly of Germans and Jews. To-day the young and well-educated generation of Poles have largely replaced them. Polish mer-

chants, bankers, shopkeepers, mechanics, artisans, physicians, lawyers and engineers are now in the majority.

Within the last two years the Prussian government has decided on another vast scheme for benefiting these provinces. This was done at the instance of the late Prussian Minister of Finance, Doctor von Miquel, a very able man. His programme, which was carried through the Prussian Diet, binds the State, for an indefinite period, to an annual expenditure of some ten million marks in erecting new and substantial schoolhouses, public libraries, museums, and buildings for higher institutions of learning, the latter, of course, in a few of the centrally located cities, like Posen and Dantzic. Special appropriations are made for the adequate endowment of these institutions.

Education has, of course, also made rapid strides. While in the Polish provinces of Russia illiteracy is still frightfully prevalent, the latest obtainable statistics showing but twenty in every hundred of the population able to read and write, the percentage of illiterates in the Polish provinces of Prussia is but slightly above three—surely a striking contrast. Compulsory education is now strictly enforced. The percentage of Poles who study at German universities has increased tenfold since 1880. German scholars of Polish race have of late distinguished themselves on several conspicuous occasions. The projected establishment of a fine and liberally endowed technical high-school in Dantzic will be another step in advance.

In fine, nobody conversant with the facts can doubt that the material and intellectual progress of these Polish provinces under Prussian rule has for the last generation been all that could be reasonably expected. While it is true that even to-day the material and mental level of that region is not as high as in the western provinces, with their greater natural resources and their older civilization, it is equally true that the relative gain in the former has been more marked.

In her political attitude toward her Polish subjects, Prussia has not, however, been so successful. It is true that she has never used such harsh or cruel measures in suppressing Polish national aspirations as Russia has employed all along. But, for one thing, there are enormous racial and religious differences that interpose obstacles in the path of amalgamating the Pole with

the Northern Prussians. And, for another thing, Prussia has been neither consistent nor wise in her endeavour to Germanize the Poles. There has been neither a steady policy of suppression nor one of moral suasion. Her policy in this respect has materially differed under every Prussian monarch that has reigned since 1772. Not to go back too far, I shall merely speak of the period since the accession of William I, about forty years ago.

That monarch, as will be remembered, had been kept from marrying Princess Elise Radziwill, a noble and beautiful Polish lady, only by dynastic reasons and by the strict command of his father and sovereign, Frederick William III. He had retained from that romantic incident in his life an affection for the Poles. This was particularly true as regards the Polish nobility. Hence the Polish policy of that kindly old ruler was for a long time friendly, nay indulgent, and at his court were seen many of the foremost representatives of the Polish aristocracy, the so-called Polish "court party," of which the brothers Radziwill, Prince Czartoryski, Prince Sulkowski and others were the most striking figures. Prince Antonin Radziwill was the old king's favourite aide-de-camp, and likewise his usual counsellor in Polish affairs.

But in the middle of the seventies Bismarck precipitated the so-called "Culturkampf," that bitter struggle between the Roman Church, or rather hierarchy, and the Prussian State. The Poles have been for centuries among the most devoted sons of Mother Church, and when Cardinal Ledochowski, the Polish primate, was thrown into jail at Posen, and with him scores, and at one time almost an even hundred, of the minor clergy, for steadfastly refusing to submit to State dictation in the governing of the Church, this treatment produced a dual effect. It made the Polish priesthood the inveterate foe of Prussia, and it injected a new and rancorous element into the anti-German sentiment of their flocks. During those years there was sown a seed of hatred which has since sprouted rankly. There has been added to the strife of race the venom of religious antagonism. It is only since then that the masses of the Poles in Prussia have learned to look upon their German neighbors and fellow-citizens as enemies of their faith. This belief has been studiously fostered by the Polish clergy, and it has by this time been so firmly engrafted in the head and heart of the lower-class Pole as to have

become with him an axiom. This is so much the case that even those Germans who, like the Poles, are Catholics, are not exempted from the Pole's unreasoning hatred, as the Centre, or Catholic party, in the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet has since found out to its cost, when its candidates were defeated in Polish election districts.

However, the "Culturkampf" finally ended. Bismarck, who later on himself admitted it to have been a sad mistake, had to bend before the power of the Roman pontiff. But the evil had been wrought. If anything, the Polish religious hatred of Protestant Prussia and Germany has since been intensified. For the old king and emperor, William I, the Poles had preserved at least a part of the old affection. Their feelings for the present William are of a different kind. The Polish nobles have disappeared from the court of Berlin. Some five or six years ago, yielding to the urgent appeals of the German press and a number of political advisers, William II and the Prussian cabinet decided on a more energetic policy toward the Poles. The most potent argument that has been advanced in the Emperor's hearing, and doubtless the one which decided him, was that the Poles plotted treason. Furthermore, it was urged that the powerful aid of the State was required to prevent the continuance of the process of Polonization as directed against the German minority in the Polish provinces and districts. This needs some explanation.

No doubt the ultimate object of Polish agitation everywhere is the reëstablishment of Poland as a national and political entity. This aim, in fact, has been proclaimed by every Polish orator and politician—and with the Poles these two terms are synonymous—on numberless public occasions. Even such moderate Polish leaders as Cegielski and Koscielski, who at one time belonged to the Berlin court party, have confessed the restoration of Poland to be their ideal. This was avowed in the speeches they made two years ago at a great Polish gathering in Cracow. The Kaiser thereupon struck their names from his court list. The Polish press in Prussia and Austria has often elaborated this idea. The aim of every Polish patriot, according to these papers, is to see a Poland arise, on the ashes of the past, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea—a country 720 miles in length and

almost as much in width, comprising 400,000 square miles, and with a population of 35 millions. It would embrace the so-called Polish provinces of Prussia, to within a short distance of Berlin, with half the Prussian shore of the Baltic. It would also embrace Galicia, and the whole of that portion of Russia which at one time, some of it three hundred years ago, formed part of Poland at her largest.

Such a Poland would be by no means homogeneous. It would include the Cossacks of the Don and the Dnieper, and the domain of the so-called "Little," "Black," and "White" Russians, as well as that of the Ruthenians, Lithuanians, and Masovians. There would be fifteen per cent. of Jews and six per cent. of Germans in this total population, as well as a liberal sprinkling of Rumanians, Magyars, and gypsies. Thus the real Poles ethnologically—*i. e.*, those speaking Polish and of Polish race and sympathies, would barely form the majority. However, there are other countries where a similar apportionment seems to work quite satisfactorily, as, for instance, in Hungary. But in point of creed there would be a similar diversity; for of the total population now dwelling in the territories embraced by this projected Pan-Poland, about forty per cent. are of the Greek Orthodox faith, and only another forty per cent. of the Roman Catholic, while fifteen per cent. are Hebrews, some four per cent. Protestant, and the small remainder pagan. As to the standard of civilization, that, too, would show enormous differences. Of the total population thus formed, over sixty per cent. would be grossly illiterate. Thus, the new body politic would from the first carry within it the seeds of racial and religious dissension.

However that may be, the creation of such a new Poland, by whatever means, is the ultimate goal of Polish patriots everywhere, according to the Polish press and the Polish writers and poets. The present agitation is but preparatory to that. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that there is impending a great Polish revolution having for its purpose the realization of the above dream. The Poles have learned patience, concentration and wariness in the awful school of adversity through which they have passed. Since the last great uprising, that of 1863, they have acquired the wisdom and caution that come even to an ill-starred race from a defeat sealed by the slaughter

of thousands. They now know better the sources of their own strength and weakness, and they mean to bide their time. They trust to time to right them. No more rash and ill-prepared risings for them, nor any reliance on the impotent sympathy of the world. In that respect the Boer war has been another stern lesson for them. They are waiting for the possible great events of the future—for serious entanglements among the great powers; for a great revolution in Russia—hence the large percentage of Poles among the Nihilists; for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary after the death of the present monarch; for a general political upheaval and a state of deep exhaustion following; for any or all of these catastrophes. And what is then to be done for a reëstablishment of Poland by the Polish leaders in thought and action will depend on circumstances. This is about the gist of their reasoning on this matter. Meanwhile the Polish martial spirit is to be kept alive; the longing for national independence is to be stimulated by every effective means; and agitation in every form is to go on. The advance of education among the Poles, and particularly among those in Prussia, will make them, when the time is ripe, all the more formidable foes.

This, be it understood, is the outline of the Polish programme as it lives, more or less succinctly defined, in the breast of the Poles on Prussian, Austrian and Russian soil, and as it has been proclaimed on many public occasions of recent years. The great patriotic gatherings that have taken place, mostly on the soil of Galicia, were exploited in that sense, as, for example, the meetings in commemoration of great Poles like Mickiewicz, Krasinski, Sobieski, Kosciusko, Copernicus, and Slovacki, which took place in such Polish centres as Cracow, Lemberg, Warsaw, Posen and Gnesen. On some of these occasions the Austrian government allowed a great latitude in proselytizing the masses that had come from beyond the Russian and Prussian borders in behalf of the idea of an independent Poland. At some of these great patriotic gatherings, however, the authorities interfered. At the unveiling of the Mickiewicz monument in Warsaw there was a collision between the Russian troops, called out for the purpose, and the crowd, and a number of persons were killed or wounded. Sometimes, too, such inflammable meetings are prohibited by the authorities, or else shorn of their exciting features.

The Polish gymnastic associations, or *sokols*, serve, as similar organizations did in Prussia when that country was preparing to throw off the yoke of Napoleon in 1813, the purpose of forming the nuclei of armed bodies. In the Prussian Diet the Minister of the Interior, not long ago, in the course of a long *exposé* of the methods employed by Polish agitators, described these *sokols* as hotbeds of treason, and read several speeches made at *sokol* meetings which were certainly violent enough. The number of these clubs in the Prussian part of Poland he gave at between two and three hundred, with a total membership exceeding 50,000. He said that many of them were well supplied with arms, and regularly drilled in military fashion. The membership of these *sokols* in Galicia is unknown, but it must be considerable. About the *sokols* in Russia statistics are not obtainable. At all events, in case of another Polish uprising these *sokols* could furnish a large and well-organized body of insurgents.

Polish literature, more particularly lyrical poetry, has been for many years instrumental in keeping alive the national aspirations. Most effective in this way are the popular ballads that have been set to music, and that celebrate Polish deeds of valour in days gone by, especially those in which Germans or Russians were defeated. Such ballads are sung at Polish social gatherings, both private and public, and their number and scope are constantly added to. Booklets containing several hundreds of them are sold at a nominal price, and may be found to-day in the humblest Polish homes. They are nearly all keyed in the popular vein, and they cannot fail to inflame the minds of such impressionable people as the Poles. But Polish prose literature, too, has largely been in the service of the national idea. This is the case with even the majority of the works of Henryk Sienkiewicz, whose Polish historical novels are pitched in the patriotic key.

But to speak once more exclusively of the Poles in Prussia, the fact must not be overlooked that representative government has given them, just as to the Irish in the British Parliament, another formidable weapon. There are in the Prussian Diet, as well as in the German Reichstag, thirteen Polish delegates, composing in either body the so-called Polish faction. Nearly all these men are able, bold and eloquent. They are, besides,

skilful in parliamentary tactics, and wield a power far beyond their actual numbers. Of course, it is the cue of these Polish delegates to hinder as much as possible the government's Polish policy, and to pooh-pooh the charges made on the floor against Polish agitators. In this they find, in almost every case, powerful allies in the Ultramontane party.

And that brings me to the Polish clergy as a political factor in Prussia. I stated above that the Polish clergy, largely as a consequence of the so-called "Culturkampf," have become the most dangerous foe of the government in its Polish policy, and more especially in its systematic attempt to Germanize the Poles. From the Polish primate, Archbishop de Stablevski, down to the humblest Polish village priest, the Polish clergy in Prussia, as also in Russia, present a solid phalanx in their resistance to the plan of amalgamation. And when it is said that the Polish priest exerts an almost absolute sway over the minds and sentiments of his parishioners, it will be understood how powerless the State is, even in a country like Prussia, which has a great many more direct and indirect means of coercing subjects than is the case in less bureaucratically governed countries. Above all, it is due almost wholly to the Polish clergy that the knowledge and use of the German language are not general in the Polish districts. The Polish clergy correctly argue that with the adoption of German as the language spoken in the home and from the pulpit, the battle would be virtually won for the friends of Germanization. Hence their strenuous and constant efforts have been directed against the use of German wherever they have had the power to prevent it.

And they have, indeed, succeeded remarkably well, especially when it is considered that the Poles, as a class, had to forego all those material advantages which naturally would accrue to Poles able and willing to speak and write both languages. To carry out their programme logically, the Polish clergy have succeeded in persuading their countrymen that to abandon the constant use of Polish means to become a renegade, an enemy to the race, and a "hireling to the foreigner," as the Polish press puts it. The Poles in the service of this idea have voluntarily shut themselves out of every career and calling which would force them to make habitual use of German as their ver-

nacular. This includes, of course, every kind of government service.

But not content with preserving Polish as the only language for themselves and their children, the Poles have also successfully carried on a campaign of Polonization within all those districts of the four Prussian provinces before mentioned where they form the majority. This process has been aided a good deal by the fact that the Polish rate of natural increase, since hygienic rules are strictly enforced, owing to Prussian authority, is decidedly larger than that of the Germans. Not only in the rural districts has this higher birth-rate told greatly in favour of the Poles, but still more so in the cities and towns. In nearly all of them there has been a relative or positive increase of Poles as against Germans. A number of cities, like Posen, Gnesen, Schroda, Schrimm, Bromberg, Schneidemühl, Thorn, etc., where the German element dominated not many years ago, have been already brought, or are gradually being brought, under Polish influences. Of course, the Polish migration from the rural districts to these towns has likewise had something to do with this.

The most alarming feature, however, from the German point of view is the successful, though slow, process of Polonization to which the German element resident in the Polish districts is being subjected. This is accomplished partly by fair means and partly by foul. Inter-marriage between Poles and Germans is one of the most effective in the first-named category; for that nearly always means the loss of nationality for the German part. Social and business influences are also astutely employed, as are religious and family ones. For obdurate Germans coercion is used. This most frequently takes the shape of social and business ostracism.

The Prussian government, as pointed out before, has no equally potent means at its disposal. The one great panacea, the German Colonization Fund, started by Bismarck for the purpose of counteracting these Polonizing influences, may be pronounced a flat failure. The fund has been increased at various times, and now amounts to a round two hundred million marks—that is, fifty million dollars. Its main object is to further the settlement in Polish districts of German colonists or compact

colonies, with a view to thus honeycombing the whole country. This scheme has miscarried more and more. It is now found next to impossible, despite the strong inducements held out by the Prussian government, to persuade any desirable German colonists to settle in districts where, from the German viewpoint, it would be most advantageous. The reason for this is obvious when the above facts are kept in mind. The other purpose of the fund—namely, the purchasing by reputable and patriotic Germans of Polish farms or estates which their Polish owners are forced to sell, at public auction or private sale—is also rendered nugatory or ineffective by the Poles. Such estates are either sold to competing Poles as the highest bidders, or else, if they are purchased by Germans, their new owners are soon made sorry for their bargains; the system of boycotting them, pursued relentlessly by all their Polish neighbours, and of inflicting all sorts of annoyances and injuries, proving too much for the unfortunate purchasers.*

The government in Prussia is, therefore, as the above unbiased statement shows, actually in an attitude of self-defense, instead of proceeding on aggressive lines against its Polish subjects, as has been widely believed abroad. To permit the Poles to proceed unchecked in their Polonization scheme would mean the abandonment for good and all of the object which Prussia has had since the day she acquired her Polish provinces—namely, to Germanize them by bringing about the gradual adoption of the German language, civilization, ideals, and aims by the Poles, and by strengthening the German minority in all those districts by the settling of new colonies of Germans. Yet, so far as the facts point at present, that is precisely what is happening. Prussia is at her wits' end in the matter. The Poles have only adopted enough of German civilization to become thereby more powerful adversaries. The very wealth of these provinces, fourfold what it was a little more than a generation ago, has made the task of Germanizing them all the harder—nay, seemingly impossible.

*Another large increase in this Colonization Fund, lately made by the Prussian Diet, by which its total has been raised to \$87,500,000, and which is further augmented by an additional fund of \$25,000,000 to serve for the purchase of Polish estates, shows that the Prussian government means to persist in this means of extending German influences in the obstreperous Polish provinces. Whether with greatly enlarged financial means will come larger success remains to be seen.

The Poles with an intellectual training, the men who have been educated in German universities, are the leaders in the movement to perpetuate the Polish race, language, and mode of thought, and to put the masses in Poland in a state of readiness for the great Polish uprising which they all firmly believe is bound to come some day. The problem, in a word, is of its kind—or, perhaps, even without that qualification—the most serious which the Prussian monarchy has to face.

CHAPTER IX

THE AGRARIAN MOVEMENT

REFERENCE has elsewhere been repeatedly made to the Agrarian movement in Germany, but this is a topic which requires more extensive treatment, as in a sense it furnishes the key to the whole political situation in the empire to-day. A fuller explanation of the nature and the underlying motives of that movement, and particularly, too, an analysis of the social and economic forces at work in it, both *pro* and *con*, will at the same time help the reader to understand the strange and complex conjuncture which the people and rulers of Germany are now facing. Inasmuch, too, as the present and future relations between this country and Germany, both commercial and political, very largely depend on the ultimate solution of the problem which is wrapped up in this movement, there is hardly anything in the political life of the empire which is of more immediate concern to the American public.

Be it said, then, that the Agrarian movement is the most dangerous and most powerful utterance of those reactionary and mediæval-spirited elements in Germany's public life which are these days making, it is hoped, their last stand against the spirit of progress and of modern energy that for a time had proved triumphant, but whose supremacy is now once more seriously threatened. The struggle between Agrarianism and Industrialism which is raging in the Germany of to-day is the struggle between Mediævalism and Paternalism on the one side and Modern Progress and Social and Political Liberty on the other. It is nothing less than that. The outcome will determine whether Germany is to continue on the path she has trodden with such signal success during the past decade, and emancipate herself more and more from the fetters to which outworn traditions have bound her, or whether she is to sink back into the old rut of the past, where class distinctions and political tutelage await her.

In certain respects the present political complexion of Germany bears a striking resemblance to the political complexion of the United States at the outbreak of the great Civil War. There, as here, we have one large portion of the country whose economic, social and political conditions are almost diametrically opposed to those of the remainder. There, as here, we have a landed aristocracy determined to hold on to their cherished privileges and "peculiar institutions" at all hazards. There, as here, this portion of the nation is politically much more potent than its numbers would justify; inured to power and luxury, this portion would make the nation believe that its narrow class interests are identical with those of the whole nation. And there as here these unfounded claims have been foisted, by an adroit and persistent appeal to prejudices, on a large part of the public opinion of the nation.

But the similarity ends there. The German situation has a number of features distinctively its own.

Prussia consists of two halves, which in point of size are nearly equal, but in population, wealth, status of culture and mode of life differ radically. Its eastern provinces, namely, East and West Prussia, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Posen, and Silesia, are in every respect behind those of the west, namely, Hanover, Hesse, Westphalia, Rhine, Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein. The latter are in the main densely populated, with a highly developed industry, with an old civilization, imbued with the progressive spirit of the age, with an intense agriculture and horticulture, with a remarkably high average of education, and with a *per capita* wealth that almost reaches that of England. In these western provinces of Prussia are found, with the single exception of Berlin, nearly all the famous seats of learning in the monarchy, all the towns of a rich historical past and of a high degree of material comfort, such as Cologne, Frankfort-on-Main, Aix-la-Chapelle, Wiesbaden, Bonn, Altona, Hildesheim, and so on, and the modern centres of industry and commerce, like Crefeld, Barmen, Bochum, Siegen, Düsseldorf, Essen, and others. It is there that the great German "captains of industry" have arisen, and there that the latent energies and potentialities of the race have been set free of late and achieved marvels of rapid material progress. In a word, these western provinces

are the industrial and intellectual backbone of modern Prussia, and, to a large extent, of the whole of modern Germany as well.

The eastern half of the kingdom is made up of provinces having a poor soil, very few other natural advantages, a population with a large admixture of Slavic blood, and not comparable with the remainder in intellectual or material achievements, withal decidedly behind in wealth, in education, and in political ideas. This eastern population is overwhelmingly an agricultural one. In the western provinces the soil is rich and holdings small but very productive. In the eastern ones the soil is infertile and the holdings either large and worked on patriarchal lines, or else given over to a poverty-stricken class of small tenants.

These in the main are the leading characteristics of those two sections of Prussia. The description does not, of course, hold good as to every district in these two sections, but it accurately enough fits the general aspects of the case.

Now, it so happens that the eastern provinces of Prussia are the "old" ones of the monarchy—*i.e.*, those which formed the nucleus out of which the subsequent powerful and fairly prosperous Prussia of to-day has grown. These "old" provinces shared to the full the storm-and-stress period of Prussia. They had to undergo all the hardships and vicissitudes of the monarchy during evil days, most of them as early as the Thirty Years' War, and then the horrible period of the Seven Years' War under Frederick the Great, and, worse still, the time of defeat under Napoleon I, when the little kingdom was rent into fragments and sank to the lowest imaginable depths in welfare and power. This original portion of Prussia, wretchedly poor in culture as it was, clung to its dynasty with a devotion and a self-sacrifice seldom equaled in history, and its loyalty under the bitterest humiliations was unflinching and truly superb. In the harsh school of adversity its temper became like steel, and an intensely martial spirit became the chief virtue of its population, a spirit which in the end proved the political salvation of the whole of Germany and the means of national unification.

The western provinces of Prussia, on the other hand, had come to the monarchy by conquest or by clever diplomacy—anyway, by the power of the Prussian sword and by the ruthless exercise of her ambitious policy. The larger part of these west-

ern provinces had been amalgamated with Prussia against their own will—such, for instance, as the whole province of Hanover, Hesse-Nassau, Schleswig-Holstein, portions of the province of Saxony, of Westphalia, and the larger half of the Rhine province. Along the Rhine, in the Prussian districts, although united with the monarchy since 1815, there is still a strong undercurrent of anti-Prussian sentiment, and this is even truer of Hanover and some other districts. The people of the old provinces of Prussia know and appreciate this, and do not feel at home in those more liberal-minded, more easy-going and wealthier new provinces, where they are met with a very perceptible prejudice and are looked upon in a sense as inferiors. The latent dislike is mutual, and that spirit which is distinctively called "Prussian" in Germany, and which is more or less antagonistic to the rest of the nation, is confined to these eastern, the "original," provinces of Prussia.

From the purely dynastic viewpoint it is, of course, quite natural that the kings of Prussia have all along had a feeling of much stronger affection for this kernel of their monarchy, and it is also easily understood why they should above all care for the welfare and the specific interests of these backward provinces, the ones which stood by them through good and evil report, and which won them their power and influence of to-day. The old monarch, William I, grandfather of the present Kaiser and King of Prussia, had this feeling in a much more pronounced degree than the Kaiser of to-day. This was to be expected, for William I made war upon a large part of the domains that subsequently were incorporated with his kingdom, and up to his death he felt rather as the Prussian King than as the German Emperor. There were many illustrations of this during his reign, long after the imperial crown had been placed on his grey head by Bismarck, and some of these illustrations were curious and significant.

But the present Kaiser is by no means exempt from the same feeling. He has frequently emphasized it in public. A number of his speeches attest it. Every winter he presides at the annual banquet given by the Brandenburg provincial chamber, and then he always refers to himself as their "Marggrave of Brandenburg," and expresses the hope that the death-defying

loyalty of his Brandenburgers has remained unabated, and that when the day should come to call upon them again to follow him into the fray, they will equal the prowess and the fidelity of their ancestors. In his informal toasts at regimental banquets he likewise often dwells on this theme, recalling the warlike feats of old Prussian regiments—among them many wrought against what are now his subjects—and hoping that this “old Prussian valour” will again spring forth when the occasion demands it. In a word, he, like his grandfather, though not in the same degree, makes a distinction between his provinces and their inhabitants—a distinction always in favour of the “old” provinces.

With such a bent of mind on his part, and it must be added on the part of his government as well, whose members are still, as in the days of old, largely drawn from these “old” provinces, the office-holding ones, it is not astonishing that the undeniable agricultural depression in Germany, which is far more pronounced in the eastern than in the western provinces, should strongly appeal to him and to this government with pro-eastern sympathies. This depression is indeed in its operation confined almost altogether to the northeastern part of Germany, that part which is in German political slang dubbed “Transelbia,” because it lies east of the Elbe River. It comprises, beside the eastern provinces of Prussia already named, only the two Grandduchies of Mecklenburg and the Grandduchy of Oldenburg, but in the latter agricultural and social conditions are more favourable. There are, it is true, also some portions of agricultural Bavaria, and some districts of Württemberg affected by it, but not in the same ratio, and the movement there has a different character. Largely, then, this Agrarian movement proceeds from, and is dominated by, the eastern and least progressive provinces of Prussia. But there again it is by no means the unanimous movement of the entire population. It is rather confined to that small fragment of the population which is severely hurt by the large and increasing importation of agricultural products—*i. e.*, the class of titled manorial lords. This class is numerically very small—a few thousands, with estates in the provinces of Posen, East and West Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and eastern Silesia.

Some of these estates are very large — of 50,000 to 100,000 acres and over. But the majority are between 4,000 and 10,000 acres in size. The Duke of Ujest, Prince Liechnovski, Baron von Tiele-Winkler, Baron von Arnim and Count Mirbach, are among the largest estate holders, and Prince Pless owns land the size of a principality in the eastern part of Silesia. The Kaiser and the royal house likewise own vast tracts of land in these backward regions. These are thinly populated, when compared with the western provinces, and the steady influx to the larger towns, especially Berlin, of this poor rural population, as well as the proportionately very large emigration, has made the labour question there very difficult during the past twenty years. Most of these estates have been forced to hire foreign help every season, obtaining hundreds or thousands of ignorant and brutalized Poles, Russians, or Lithuanians from beyond the Russian or Austrian frontiers, and discharging them in the autumn. This has been about the only kind of rural labour they have been able to get to make up the deficiency of home labour, for these men from Russia, although in some respects undesirable, work for low wages, and can be gotten rid of when the crop is in, whereas German agricultural labour from the west, even if they could obtain it, is much more expensive and would not come on the same terms. Still, this system has been all along a makeshift, and has greatly tended to render social and economic conditions more unsatisfactory. From a political view, too, the system has been harmful, and it has all along led to constant differences between the Prussian and the Russian frontier authorities. Various attempts by these large estate-holders to procure rural labour by importing Chinese coolies, attempts largely confined to Mecklenburg and the Baltic shores, have miscarried. The cost of transportation proved too high, and other conditions were also unfavourable to this class of contract labour. This part of the agricultural problem in the eastern parts of Prussia remains entirely unsolved.

The reason why these large estate-holders in Prussia's eastern provinces are especially affected by the agricultural depression in Germany lies in their methods, their mode of life, and in the nature of their estates as well as in the soil and climatic conditions. Under the existing commercial treaties with Germany

the duty on various cereals is not high enough to protect these men against the competition of the foreign producer. Their wheat, rye and barley does not yield them a price high enough to enable them to pay the interest on their mortgages—and they all have big mortgages on their estates—together with their running expenses, and allow them enough surplus to live in that easy and luxurious fashion to which they and their forefathers have been habituated. It must be remembered that these men nearly all belong to the nobility of Prussia; their estates are entailed so that a portion of the income always goes to younger brothers, to dowagers, and other penniless relatives; the sons of the owner go to universities or, more frequently, to the army as officers, where they need much money; the daughters require large marriage portions; the owners themselves are politicians, former army officers, sportsmen, etc., and almost all indulge in expensive tastes. Their estates, as pointed out, are mortgaged, and since land all over Germany, even in these backward provinces, is very high in price when compared with farm lands in America or Argentina, or even Russia and Rumania, these mortgages are mostly for large sums, often running into the millions, and the interest, while lower than here (for it seldom exceeds 3 1-2 to 4 per cent.), amounts to a good deal.

During the last ten years—*i. e.*, since Bismarck's successor, Count Caprivi, concluded commercial treaties with Russia, Roumania, Argentina, Austria, etc., an increasing number of the titled owners of these entailed estates have gone to the wall, and the utter ruin of a score of noble families has been the consequence. Up there in "Transelbia" these men suffer most from the direct competition of Russian cereals, and only indirectly from that of this country. But the effect in both cases is the same. From the American imports of meats, lard, bacon, ham, etc., they suffer, however, directly. Then comes their class bias. They, as aristocrats and intensely loyal monarchists, despise and hate this country of ours with a venomous hatred, whereas for Russia, as an autocracy after their own heart, they have a sincere liking. Anyway, this much is certain: While their present aim is to do away with the agricultural competition of all other countries, Russia included, they have a special spite against this country, and if their efforts to obtain what they

consider adequate tariff protection on their produce should after all fail, they will at least spare no endeavours to precipitate a tariff war with the United States. If this tariff war should then prove of particular injury to the industries of Germany—as it doubtless would—they would like that all the better, as next to the “Yankees” they hate and despise the German merchant, shipper and manufacturer. That is about as far as they go in their reasoning.

At first sight, however, it seems strange that so relatively small a number of men should be able to practically dictate the political and economic policy of an enlightened country like Germany, especially as these represent but a portion of the agricultural interests of the most backward provinces of just a single State of the empire. Undoubtedly it is a glaring anachronism. But the fact is readily susceptible of explanation.

The Agrarians represent that portion of the Prussian aristocracy—and comprise a number of the most influential noblemen in the remainder of the empire as well—which has practically ruled the monarchy for the last three hundred years. From their ranks have sprung Prussia's renowned soldiers, her most successful statesmen—including Bismarck—her leading administrators and officials, diplomats and courtiers—in a word, nearly all the men who in the past as well as the present have had the shaping of the country's policy in their hands, are and have been the kith and kin of the Agrarians of to-day. The sympathy of the whole vast government machine, in all its departments, belongs in the nature of things to them. The Kaiser in his heart of hearts is an Agrarian, and a fellow-feeling makes us all, of course, wondrous kind. Count von Buelow, the present Imperial Chancellor, is an Agrarian, and has confessed it on a number of public occasions. The Prussian cabinet, as well as the imperial one, is in its majority Agrarian.*

The above facts naturally go far to explain the enormous power wielded by this handful of men. But there are other

*The new Prussian Minister of Commerce, Theodore Moeller, is really the only member of the Cabinet who is sincerely an anti-Agrarian, but this fact has aroused the bitter antagonism of the whole Agrarian party, as well as of the majority of the Cabinet members, and while he within the proper sphere of his department does his best to further the expanding commercial interests of the country, he is practically powerless to stop the rising tide of Agrarianism.

reasons. The Kaiser fears the moral and social and political effect of the ruin of these thousands of his titled landholders. It is true the chances of these men to emerge from their slough of despond, and become once more fairly prosperous, would be good enough if they had American "grit" and enterprise, coupled with a determination for strict economy. A rational change in their agricultural methods, a more sensible conforming to actual conditions, such as the introduction on a larger scale of labor-saving machinery, and the raising of cattle, the growing of fruit, etc., might in many cases save them. But these are things that are beyond them. With present conditions the Agrarians are bound to go to the wall. That would eliminate from German public and social life an element whose preservation the Kaiser, and with him not only the higher classes but many German thinkers, regards as of prime importance.

But aside from that, there is the great political power which the Agrarians exert in the various German parliaments—in the Reichstag, where they form one-half of the membership; in the Prussian Diet, where they are, in the lower and higher house, an overwhelming majority; in the legislative chambers of the other German States, especially those with large agricultural interests, where they often dictate local politics. In the upper chambers, where the hereditary wealth and nobility are paramount, and whose membership does not depend on the ballot—in imitation of the House of Lords in England—they exert, of course, dominating influence. In the Prussian upper house of the Diet, for example, the Agrarians represent about seventy-five per cent. of the total. It is similar in Bavaria and Württemberg, in Saxony and Baden, and in the two Mecklenburgs conditions in this respect are even worse. All these purely aristocratic halves of the different State legislatures of Germany do not, or at least but very rarely, exert much influence upon public opinion, and they seldom originate any legislation of their own. But their power is, nevertheless, quite real, for they often block the wheels of legislation, refusing their consent to measures passed in the lower houses. They furthermore, by reason of their close affiliations with the sovereigns and their courts, know how to sway the minds of these rulers.

However, it is in the lower houses after all that the Agrarians

wield the most telling power. And this they are enabled to do by reason of antiquated election laws. While the Reichstag is elected on the principle of general suffrage—every reputable male subject of 25 years and over, irrespective of wealth and social conditions, being a voter; and while in this way every class of the population has at least approximately just representation, the reverse is true of the electoral system under which delegates to these State legislatures are chosen. All of them are unfair to the poorer classes, and the worst of all is the old Prussian Diet electoral law. This fact is so palpable that even the very statesmen who are upholding it for purposes of their own admit it at least in theory. Of its workings another chapter of this book contains details. Suffice it to say here that by means of this hoary and wholly unrepresentative election law the Agrarians of Prussia, while really representing but a minimal fraction of the population, are regularly enabled to return enough delegates to the Diet to dominate there. Without their consent no law can be enacted. The government is obliged to purchase their votes in that body by compromises or by constantly renewed favours. To show their paramount power, they repeatedly defeated of late years pet measures of the Kaiser, such as the so-called Midland Canal project, because they insisted that this measure would prove unfavourable to agricultural interests in the eastern provinces. In a word, they dictate legislation in the Prussian Diet, and what is true of that body is true in smaller degree of a number of the other German legislatures.

Then there is the Agrarian press of Germany. That is also very influential. The capital required for the founding and running of the hundreds of Agrarian sheets in the empire is furnished largely by the wealthy landowners, aided and abetted by a not inconsiderable number of high government officials and other sympathizers of the cause. This press is skilful and bold, insinuating and threatening by turns, as the situation seems to demand. Its specious pleadings are plausible and keyed in the popular vein. By pandering to national prejudices and to the Jingo spirit that is now so rampant throughout the empire, it is read by, and influences, large sections of the nation who else would never swear allegiance to Agrarianism. By its ramified connections in court, army and legislative circles, this press,

while showing a paucity of despatches, in many other lines of solid news often obtains earlier and more reliable information of the Kaiser's and of the government's doings and intentions than the large Liberal sheets are able to get. Above all, it has managed to so twist and misrepresent the facts for years as to make it appear that the cause of Agrarianism is the national and patriotic cause, and that the Liberal press, in advocating a renewal of the existing commercial treaties and in defending a policy of commercial expansion, is really the mouthpiece of foreign countries, especially of hateful America and England. It has persistently misrepresented this country, and has magnified the danger of American commercial supremacy in Germany; it has done its best to make America odious to the higher classes in Germany. And in this it has very largely succeeded. Its methods in this respect are unscrupulous in the extreme. The Agrarian press never prints news from the United States which is creditable to this nation, but it elaborates or adorns every tale, no matter how exaggerated, improbable or untrue, which speaks of events more or less to be deprecated, such as lynchings, sensational robberies, embezzlements, railroad accidents, political quarrels, assassinations, and so forth. Generally, too, the editor attaches a moral to such tales, and dishes them up with a heading like "Echt Amerikanisch" (Typically American).

The present commercial relations obtaining between this country and Germany are insistently represented as gradually beggaring Germany, and often fictitious or garbled statistics seemingly bearing out this claim are published by this press. The German government is taunted with its lack of courage in "showing the Yankee what's what," and every effort to bring about a better understanding between the two countries is stigmatized as unpatriotic. Every member of the Cabinet who shows himself at all friendly to America or Americans is vilified and slandered, and his influence is neutralized in all possible ways.

This has been the deliberate policy of the German Agrarian press all along, but more particularly since the outbreak of the Spanish war in 1898. At that time they did more to inflame German public opinion against the United States than all other agencies together. The rancorous and rather hostile feeling

towards this nation which even now pervades Germany is in large measure directly traceable to this press. So far as the higher classes in that country are concerned, they have an entirely distorted conception of America and the Americans, and the picture of us they carry in their minds is by no means a lovely or enticing one.

During the past three years the Agrarian movement has been going on at an accelerated pace, and it has become more intense. One sign of that is the formation of two new political parties, or factions, the Husbandry League and the Peasants' Federation. The last is confined to certain largely agricultural parts of Bavaria, but the former is strong in the whole of northern Germany. Both owe their origin to the belief of the fanatics among the Agrarians that the existing political parties do not go far enough in antagonizing the growing industrialism of the empire. Baron von Wangenheim is the chief leader of the Husbandry League, and Doctor Hahn and Doctor Roesicke are his ablest lieutenants. This organization has been rapidly gaining, and is now very large, counting by hundreds of thousands. Their gala day is the national convention held every year in the Circus Busch in Berlin, where by violent speeches they seek to intimidate the government, and sometimes succeed in doing so. On one of these occasions the chief orator threatened the government with the conversion to Socialism of the whole Husbandry League, and with a forcible uprising of the agricultural masses, unless their demands were heeded. Count Buelow he told to go to a very hot place. All this, it must be borne in mind, in a country where usually the State's attorney's aid is invoked by the government for any lapse of speech. But nothing happened to this speaker nor to all the other violent agitators who systematically patrol the country to win recruits for the ranks of this extremist party.

Though the Husbandry League has not so far elected many members into the Reichstag, it is an important factor just now, for it acts as a continuous spur on the milder and more reasonable Agrarian masses, and on their delegates in Reichstag and Diet, urging and pressing them on a good deal further than they would otherwise be likely to go.

This has been seen very clearly in the course of the present

Reichstag session, when under the instigation of the Husbandry League the Agrarian majority of that body increased their demands on the government more and more, asking for much higher duties on American agricultural products than the original bill provided, until these duties finally assumed a distinctly prohibitory character. The principal orator of the Husbandry League, Doctor Hahn, is what the Germans call a "Krakehler," *i. e.*, a ranter and shouter, and his speeches are usually devoid of logic and common sense. But notwithstanding this he exerts great influence on the agricultural masses, who are nowhere famous for clear reasoning, and also in the Reichstag, largely because of the glowing reports of his speeches in the Agrarian press.

It should be explained here that the rural masses of electors who send both the Conservative and the Husbandry League delegates to Reichstag and Diet are in their majority dependent for their bread and butter, wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, on the successful candidates, many of whom are the owners of the soil which the poor and ignorant elector tills. In those districts, located (as before set forth) in the most backward provinces of Prussia, and where the authorities and officials are the kith and kin of these same Agrarian candidates, the voting masses are treated somewhat worse than were the black electors in some of our Southern States during the Kuklux days. Opposition, nay, a lack of blind and mute obedience, is punished severely. It is these bulldozing tactics, some of which are occasionally dragged to the light during election contests decided by the Reichstag, upon which very largely rests the political power of these aristocratic landholders. And since it is always a committee in either Reichstag or Diet which in its majority is again made up of Agrarians, it is rare, indeed, that any such election result, no matter how flagrantly illegal the methods employed, is subsequently nullified. But even in the few cases where that has been done, the ultimate outcome is not changed, for the next candidate uses the same methods with less obviousness and with the same success.

Of course, it must not be presumed that the nation as a whole is blind to these doings. The protests against them are frequent enough. But as these protests naturally come only from either the Liberal or Socialist press, they are not heeded. A couple

of years ago one of the leading Liberal papers of Germany published a series of articles describing the exact nature of one of these political campaigns in a district fairly typical, viz., located in a purely rural part of West Prussia, the candidates being an Agrarian manorial lord (at present one of the shining lights in the Agrarian ranks of the Reichstag) and a well-to-do merchant, member of the radical Liberal wing. These descriptions (whose accuracy was not disputed in any particular) showed very plainly the high-handed methods of intimidation employed to force the voter to cast his ballot for the Agrarian candidate, the utter lack of argument and reasoning in the Agrarian election manoeuvres, and the glaring illegality of the whole proceedings. The Agrarian candidate won, of course, and the publication of his misdeeds had no visible effect. He retains his seat to this day. It may be partially owing to the fruitlessness of such exposures, at least so far as practical results go, that the Liberal press of Germany does not do its full duty in the premises. Insufficient enterprise and insufficient persistence is shown by it in tracking these gross violations of the election laws of the land, which practically nullify the real wishes of the electors in vast provincial districts. A couple of our enterprising and outspoken American newspapers would have wrought a change in this respect within a year, and a noticeable veering around of public opinion would inevitably follow the vigorous and consistent exposure of these lawless methods. And public opinion, although it does not count for as much in Germany as here, still counts for something.

How far the Kaiser, who after all is the most powerful factor in German public life, is personally cognizant of all the details stated above, is mere matter of conjecture. But it would be passing strange indeed if he did not know enough about them to give him a pretty shrewd idea as to the original source of much of the enormous political power wielded by the Agrarian party. Doubtless he is aware of enough to make him silently desire he had some other party whereby to impose his will upon the masses of the German people. But his mind, as is well known, is strongly tinctured with prejudices. To abandon definitely the cause of the Agrarians, and to seek the political support of the more advanced and liberal-minded part of the nation, would mean a perfect break with the past, a past to which he is tied

by education, by cast of thought, and by what he deems his dynastic interests. It would mean sole reliance upon the broad middle classes and, as he fears, upon the Socialist masses as well. His nature rebels against that. With all his modern ideas in many respects, he is still thickly enfolded by layers of traditional sentiment and prejudice. His public speeches up to the most recent past show that unmistakably. A man who speaks of the nobility of his country as "the best and loftiest of the nation" must necessarily have a conception of the other classes of the population—*i. e.*, ninety-nine per cent. of it, which is totally at variance with the conceptions held by them of themselves, and totally at variance with the conceptions held on these points in more liberally governed countries.

At any rate, the fact is notorious that the Kaiser has not so far in a single instance expressed disapprobation of either the Agrarian party—which under the circumstances is perhaps not astonishing—or of the Agrarian methods and of their habitual misuse of power at elections. As the Agrarians have, on a number of conspicuous occasions, even defied the Kaiser, and have felt no hesitation in making him eat his words, the hold they have on him is best illustrated thereby. His mental attitude is such that he prefers rather to be snubbed and treated as a *quantité négligeable* by the Agrarians than to try and govern with the other elements composing the nation. In theory he is a champion out-and-out of modern progress and of the further industrial development and commercial expansion of Germany. In practice he tamely submits to Agrarian dictation when Agrarian interests clash with the vital interests of industrialism. He either does not see or will not be guided by the fact that the progress of industrialism means for Germany practically the relegating to a secondary place of agrarianism. In a country where, according to the latest figures, the overwhelming interests of the nation have become industrial and commercial, in the proportion of five to three, and where 57 out of every 100 are living on industry and allied branches, common sense tells that these majority interests must rule, on pain of severe injury to the whole national fabric.

Count Buelow, the present Imperial Chancellor, is evidently not the man to make the Kaiser see and feel this plain fact.

CHAPTER X

PRUSSIAN HEGEMONY

A MATTER which is generally misunderstood in other countries is the exact position which Prussia occupies in Germany. Indeed, there is a very extended opinion abroad that Prussia virtually means Germany, and that the remainder of the empire is a mere appendage, *sans* importance and *sans* vital powers.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The empire was formed and proclaimed on January 18, 1871, as the result of a number of compacts made between the different sovereign States of Germany. One of the States, although no doubt the largest, which was merged into the empire was Prussia. But Prussia, viewed merely as a component part of the new confederation, was granted no more rights than the tiniest and least populous of the other sovereign entities making up the empire.

The case, in fact, offers many analogies with the United States. The State of New York, with its seven millions of population and with its enormous wealth, has no more rights as a member of the Union than has "Little Rhody." Like New York, that small State has adequate representation in the United States Senate, just as the principality of Waldeck, with its 57,913 inhabitants as against the 34,463,377 inhabitants of Prussia, is adequately represented in the Bundesrath, or Federal Senate. Each of the twenty-six sovereign States of Germany enjoys independence in the same ratio as do our several States, nay, even more so. To the Kaiser, as head and chief of the nation, certain exclusive and paramount rights are vindicated by the Imperial Constitution, just as is the case with the President of this Union. These exclusive rights are neither so manifold nor so important as those conferred on our President. As King of Prussia, however, the Kaiser enjoys no more privileges and powers than does the sovereign of any of the other twenty-five States composing Germany. The Imperial Constitution explicitly enjoins the

Kaiser from in any way interfering in the internal affairs of the other sovereign States of Germany, and though no doubt this comes very hard to a monarch of such imperious instincts, the Kaiser has been forced all along to rigidly adhere to this compact. A strong and healthy sentiment in Germany, which is even found in Prussia to some extent, acts as a perennial curb on him. The several attempts he has made, now and then, to break down this barrier were all vigorously resisted, and at once called out such ominous signs of dissatisfaction, both by the other rulers of Germany and by the people at large, that he in every instance retreated.

Bavaria has been from the first that State which has most jealously guarded its sovereignty. The sentiment there is so strong that it would not be safe to slight it. In a minor degree this is likewise true of the Kingdom of Württemberg, of the Grandduchy of Baden, and of the Kingdom of Saxony. But in a more or less pronounced manner it is also distinctly traceable in all the other States.

In the case of Bavaria there are sundry special reasons for the vigour of this feeling. Bavaria is the second largest State in Germany. True, its population but slightly exceeds 6,000,000, and is therefore less than one-fifth that of Prussia, and in territory, too, it shows but 75,864 square kilometres, as against Prussia's 348,607. But it forms, nevertheless, no inconsiderable portion of Germany, and its population has always held—and does now hold—a feeling very much akin to dislike for Prussia and Prussians. In historical development, in manners and in modes of thought there is a radical difference between these two peoples. The Bavarian—like the other South Germans—is by nature a democrat, and abominates that precise drill and that intensely loyal monarchism which distinguishes the Prussian of the old provinces. Bismarck tells us in his Memoirs what an extremely difficult task he had, in the autumn and early winter of 1870, to induce the then King of Bavaria, Louis II, to come over into the Imperial camp and allow the incorporation of his monarchy with the empire. As it was, the task was only accomplished by granting to Bavaria a number of exceptional rights—the so-called “Reservatrechte”—which included a wholly separate army management, a separate postal department

(with special stamps and various other exclusive features), and other prerogatives marking sovereignty quite plainly.

Württemberg, too, had been granted similar privileges, but the growth of pan-national sentiment in that country has been pronounced enough of late to make this kingdom voluntarily relinquish part of them. There is, however, in that country, as in Bavaria, still a very large portion of the population rather hostile to Prussia, and while this sentiment is latent in politics, except on special occasions deemed provocative, it is by no means so socially. The average Prussian even to-day finds his path by no means strewn with roses when becoming a visitor or resident of Stuttgart or some other Württemberg town.

How unabated is this feeling of Borussophobia in South Germany particularly may be noticed in the Reichstag, for instance. Speeches are made there every session, by delegates from either side, breathing this mutual dislike. Among the delegates from Württemberg none is abler and none enjoys such thorough popularity at home as Conrad Haussmann, a democrat pure and simple, and yet on very good terms personally with his king. On all important occasions he ventilates his anti-Prussianism in the Reichstag, and these speeches particularly have gained him his wide popularity. A Bavarian delegate, however, Doctor Sigl, recently deceased, outdid him in this respect. On one occasion he told his Prussian fellow-delegates in the Reichstag that Berlin would be a charming city to live in as soon as the "—— Prussians had been kicked out of it." He edited a newspaper, called *The Bavarian Fatherland*, in which he habitually abused his pet enemy, and his wildest utterances were always most applauded throughout Bavaria.

There have been repeatedly serious and bitter misunderstandings between the Kaiser and the ruler of Bavaria, Prince-Regent Luitpold, in every case owing to attempts made by the Kaiser to even slightly transgress the Constitutional limits fixed for him, and in every case the Bavarian ruler had his whole people to back him up. The vigilance of the Bavarian press in this respect is surprising. Thus, on one occasion the Kaiser had invited himself, in his somewhat abrupt manner, to a review of Bavarian troops. The fact that he had not waited for such an invitation from the Prince-Regent was sufficient to inflame Bavarian pub-

lic opinion. When the Kaiser appeared in Nuremberg, a day before the review, he was at once made aware of the state of things. Not a shout of welcome greeted him in the streets. The populace silently stared at him. He was intensely annoyed by the incident, but it has taught him caution. During the review itself the Bavarian ruler treated the Kaiser precisely as he would have treated the sovereign of a foreign country, and the Bavarian generals and all the lower officers behaved to the Kaiser with distant courtesy, thus emphasizing the force of that paragraph in the compact between Bavaria and the empire which vouchsafes to that country perfect independence in military matters during times of peace, and only recognizes the Kaiser as supreme commander in the event of war. The Bavarian army swears allegiance to the ruler of Bavaria, not to the Kaiser.

These illustrations of anti-Prussian sentiment in Bavaria and elsewhere in Germany could be centupled without any pains, but they will do to show how strong among high and low it is even to-day. All this may seem very strange and futile to Americans, but it is, after all, but natural.

It must be borne in mind that the empire is but thirty-one years old; that up to the time of its formation Germany did not amount to a nation, in the sense of being a political entity and having common political ends in view; that as late as five years before the formation of the empire the power which gave the main impetus to this gathering of all the tribes under one head, that is, Prussia, had been at war with Bavaria, with the other South German States, as well as with Saxony and a number of the other northern and central ones, and that even to-day there are many widows and orphans in the non-Prussian parts of Germany who became so by Prussian bullets. Keeping all this in mind, it will hardly seem astonishing that millions of Germans do not yet experience that fellow-feeling towards their late foes which one part of a nation would under different circumstances have for the other.

But there is more than that. There is, as we all know, some sectional sentiment in other countries. Italy has it, for instance, in a pronounced degree. The Sicilian harbours for the Lombard or Piedmontese a sentiment far from friendly. The French *méridional* looks upon the blond from Pas-de-Calais as

belonging to a different race—as doubtless he does. Study the school of literature in the South of France made illustrious by Mistral and you will discover a strong current of animosity against the men of the North of France. Even this country, young as it is, is not exempt from sectionalism. The South has only lately come bag and baggage back into the fold. There are differences of race and faith, of customs and thought, between the different parts of the same nation in probably every country. But the difference is one of degree. In Germany it is particularly strong. The whole history of the nation furnishes the explanation for that. From its beginning the nation has been rent into fragments, always under some kind of nominal or real head, but always with a federative configuration. For centuries the country was split up into many practically autonomous parts, which in hundreds of cases made long and bitter war upon one another. The present form of government, while an enormous step in advance as compared with formerly, to a certain extent and in a certain sense still encourages this sentiment of separatism. These old dynasties, many of which are much older than that of the Hohenzollerns, and look back upon a glorious past, such as the Wettin dynasty of Saxony, which some time ago celebrated its eight-hundred-year-old reign; the Wittelsbachs of Bavaria, about as ancient in lineage; or the Mecklenburg line, which is even older, practically act as a powerful impediment to that national consolidation which from one point of view would be desirable for the empire's own good.

Of course, so subtle a mind as Bismarck's had thoroughly gauged this obstacle, and he was perfectly aware of its future injurious effects upon his creation, the empire, when he framed its constitution so as to leave to the small German sovereigns practically all the prerogatives they had enjoyed anterior to national unification. He did simply the best that was feasible at the time, preferring, as an eminently practical statesman, half a loaf to none. He trusted to the beneficent influences of time, and to the gradual intensification of pan-national aspirations. In that again he probably builded quite right. For there has been a perceptible lessening of this sectional feeling throughout the empire from which even Bavaria is not wholly exempt. This process of closer amalgamation would unquestionably pro-

ceed at a much more rapid pace, were it not that there are certain traits of character in the Prussian himself which naturally retard the movement.

To explain this, it is necessary to remember the history of those provinces of Prussia out of which that monarchy has grown, and whose population has impressed its indelible stamp upon the character of Prussia as a whole. Those provinces were originally settled by Slavic tribes, like the Vends, the Sorbs, the Poles, Masovians, Lithuanians, and others. The German settlers and conquerors in mingling and intermarrying with these Slavs naturally changed ethnologically. They changed in physique, in mode of life, in their whole mental and moral make-up. Large districts in the old provinces of Prussia, even leaving aside in consideration the purely Slavic ones like Posen, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia, are predominantly Slavic in blood. This is the case even in the very cradle of Prussia, in the present province of Brandenburg. A few miles from Berlin (which city itself is Slavic in origin) there is the so-called Spreewald district, which is inhabited by a population purely Slav, even in speech and costume.

It is no more than might be expected that the South and West of Germany do not, therefore, look upon the average Prussian from these originally Slavic provinces as one of their own race, but rather as largely sprung from a race held by the German an inferior one, especially in culture and morals. True, in the extreme West and South of Germany again the admixture of blood is hardly smaller in degree, for there Celtic and Latin elements have commingled with the German as early as the days of Cæsar. But this blood is not regarded as inferior—rather the reverse, and this with reason. There is, then, a distinct race prejudice in part answerable for this latent distrust and dislike felt for the Prussian of the old provinces in the rest of Germany. And race prejudice, when felt by one part of a nation for another, is perhaps even stronger and more unreasoning than when felt by different nations for one another.

It is but necessary to glance at other nations to perceive this truth. Thus, the race prejudice against the negro, which in this country, for instance, is remarkably strong, exists but in a latent form in those countries where the negro plays no figure in popu-

lation statistics and where he consequently forms no problem in national life. Parallel cases might be adduced from other nations.

Besides this large race admixture, however, there are other factors which enter into anti-Prussian sentiment. Owing very largely to its peculiar historical development, and to the paucity of natural resources which is a marked characteristic of those Prussian provinces that formed the nucleus of the present monarchy, a spirit of ruthless aggression and of a self-assertiveness which is often closely allied to arrogance and bluster, has grown up there and become a leading characteristic of the modern Prussian. This alone would demonstrate his mixed blood, if no other proof of it existed, for it is a trait wholly foreign to the German of pure race. Historians and writers of every description are all agreed on this, that one of the chief qualities of the Teuton is modesty and an absence of "brag." Since Prussia, however, became the dominant part of the nation, her sons have made themselves obnoxious to the remainder of the nation by the qualities stigmatized. This is a fact beyond dispute, so much so that it has been proverbial in Germany for centuries.

With the blood of the conqueror flowing in their veins, with a history which makes them justly proud and conscious of superior prowess, the modern Prussian, both before and after the foundation of the empire of to-day, has shown a great knack of making himself offensive to the other Germans. The dislike felt for him in all non-Prussian lands is indeed very pronounced. No observant traveler understanding the language of the country can fail to notice that in Germany. The writer remembers that while on a trip through Bavaria, some few years ago, numerous instances of the feeling came within his ken. One old peasant in the environs of Munich, suspecting his questioner to be a "Preiss" (Prussian), refused point-blank the information sought, but on being assured that his suspicion was unfounded, became quite affable and communicative. At a theatrical performance in Munich, the audience hissed at the mention of the mere word "Prussia" in the play. Riding in railroad cars, the Bavarian fellow-passengers always behaved very distantly towards Prussians, whom they usually detect at once by their harsh and precise enunciation. Picking up at random a local newspaper

in a Bavarian café, the eye lighted upon a satirical editorial aimed at Prussian self-sufficiency. In a Nuremberg restaurant, overhearing the conversation at a neighbouring table which was monopolized by jovial burghers of the town, one of them was heard to tell a story at the expense of his Prussian boarder, whereupon the others remarked in chorus, "What else can you expect of a conceited Prussian?" And so it went on throughout the whole trip. In Stuttgart, where the writer had several conversations with a local editor, the same ferocious dislike of Prussians was said by him to exist, though not so outspoken as in Bavaria, where people are more given to speak their mind. While traveling in the Rhine country, the writer noticed that the inhabitants of the whole province, though politically forming part of the Prussian monarchy, invariably avoided calling themselves Prussians, but always spoke of themselves as "Rhine-landers," and in their casual remarks betrayed the same dislike and semi-contempt of "Prussians," meaning thereby, of course, the inhabitants of the old provinces of the kingdom. In Saxony the same fact may be noted, although the dislike is there largely mingled with a sentiment of fear. Whoever remembers how hard little Saxony has fared at the hands of Prussia, and how after the last dismemberment of that enlightened and charming country but a small fragment of its original self is left, cannot wonder at this mental attitude.

Go where you will, in fact, in all the non-Prussian districts of Germany, and you will discern a strong undercurrent of Borussophobia, and this extends even to the capital, Berlin. They call Prussia, half in jest and half in anger, "Der Hecht im Karpfenteiche"—*i. e.*, the pike in the carp pond, or the equivalent of an insatiable, conscienceless robber. While it is generally admitted that such a predatory and ruthless force is needed in the political life of Germany, they contend that it is not possible to love such a person.

And indeed, the difference in character and behaviour, in modes of thought and life, between the typical (old) Prussian and the typical German is quite marked. Even street life in Berlin when compared with that in non-Prussian cities proves that. In Dresden the stranger asking his way is directed with the utmost politeness. In Munich he is accompanied part of the way.

In Stuttgart he is given circumstantial advice which corners to turn and which to avoid. In Berlin he gets a snappish and gruff reply, or none at all. In Berlin the policeman will treat him like a pickpocket or a suspect; in Dresden he gets elaborate courtesies.

The Prussian of the typical class has, no doubt, a number of sterling qualities. But he is puffed up with vanity; he is haughty and discourteous; he is very close-fisted and inhospitable; he has an offensive manner; he brags and blusters, and delights in disparaging remarks at your expense; above all, he is utterly lacking in amiableness and tact. In fine, he is not a pleasant person to associate with. The prejudice against him is largely based on these characteristics. He does not wear his heart on his sleeve, and he does not enjoy a chat like the man from South Germany or Saxony. They do not feel at home with him.

Yet, with all that, the rest of Germany clearly apprehends and fully acknowledges that the Prussian element in the national make-up is an absolute necessity; nay, more than that, that they owe Prussia a heavy debt, and that there are good and sufficient reasons why Prussia should be and remain the dominant factor in German political life. Her right to hegemony is universally, if ungraciously, conceded. And there is no gainsaying the fact that Prussia's preponderance in Germany is an established fact, a fact which is inherent in the whole situation, and which the country cannot, if it would, shake off.

Prussia is only one of the twenty-six sovereign States of Germany. This is true; but Prussia holds three-fifths of the territory and of the population of the empire, and some of her acquisitions during the past century comprise portions of the most fertile and highly cultured districts of Germany. This fact makes it inevitable that Prussia should exert supremacy in the empire. And though the whole Imperial Constitution was framed in such a way as to yield apparently more influence to the remaining two-fifths of the empire than that portion is entitled to by size and population, practically things are very much shaped as Prussia wants them to be. There is no escape from that, and it is precisely this unpalatable truth against which the Bavarian and the others chafe.

The Bundesrath has never crossed Prussia—*i. e.*, the Kaiser,

very seriously. To obtain the thirteen additional votes in that body which Prussia requires besides her own seventeen to carry her point on any measures, has never proved very difficult. Prussia has so many ways of making herself dreaded by her smaller neighbours, such as railroad connections, river regulations, postal facilities, etc., that this fact alone accounts for much of the actual subserviency shown. But Prussia's material interests are also identical with those of her smaller neighbours in so many instances that this proves another very potent motive. Thus, the impetus given by Prussia in legislation of any kind is nearly always followed by the other States, no matter whether willingly or unwillingly. With a Prussian king of such a bend of mind as the Kaiser, this paramount influence is naturally greater than it might be in the case of a monarch of more placable and conciliatory disposition. The rulers and the populations of all the smaller States appreciate the fact that it is not wise to provoke Prussia, and act accordingly.

That the present status of affairs cannot go on forever, and that at some future time Prussia will probably swallow up, little by little, the other States of Germany, there can be but little doubt. But whether this is likely to happen in the very near future or at some remoter period must be largely matter of conjecture.

In the above it was pointed out that anti-Prussianism is widely disseminated through the smaller German States, and that this feeling has lost but slightly in its intensity when compared with thirty or forty years ago. But, after all, there has been some modification of it, and the ratio of this change is likely to increase more rapidly as the present generation disappears from view. Every year adds to the strength of the habit of bending under Prussian domination, and the growing generation will not know about the time when Prussia was really nothing more than Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, etc., namely, an integral part of the German Federation, with no more rights and powers than either of them. Besides, this antipathy to Prussia is a force in only two-fifths of Germany—that is, in the non-Prussian part, and if there are no strong outside influences (as there were formerly) at play, the feeling on that very account cannot predominate in the empire, and can certainly not sway its destinies, nor determine its action on vital occasions. Again,

there is another current of sentiment in Germany, and one of slowly gathering strength, which makes for the further consolidation of the empire. This current exists not only in Prussia itself, but also to quite an extent in the smaller States, at least in some of them.

It runs parallel with the pan-German movement, and of its essence it is the same. It aims at the gradual elimination of the smaller States and of "particularism" in politics. The ablest and most famous advocate of it was the late Professor Heinrich von Treitschke, who held a chair in history for many years in Berlin University, and whose writings have a large sale and hosts of enthusiastic admirers all over Germany. By the pan-Germans he has been hoisted into the exalted position of their patron saint. Treitschke was by birth a Saxon, and after 1866, when his native country had just been defeated by Prussia, he, vigorously sided with Prussia, took up the literary cudgels for her, and left Dresden forever. During the remainder of his life he proved the most potent factor in the Prussianizing of Germany and as the prophet of complete national consolidation. Among his disciples and successors Dr. Frederick Lange takes the lead. He, too, is a powerful and popular writer on political subjects.

Various agencies are advocated by the spokesmen of this school of thought—coercion and moral suasion; the incessant teaching of the dogma; press, pulpit and university chairs; the gradual weaning away of the population from their own dynasties; annuities for the rulers and their households; pressure of public opinion; and other means are spoken of. But it is quite safe to say that the present generation of Germans is not yet ripe for all or any of these measures. Nor does the empire itself as yet rest on such a rock foundation that the experiment of bringing about the complete welding together of its members by violence and internal strife—and at present at least nothing else would accomplish the result—could safely be tried. The small rulers of Germany are for the time quite securely ensconced behind the buttress of their loyal subjects' affections and devotion. It would require a hurricane to dislodge them thence.

Nor is there any particular reason to deplore this fact. True, these rulers of the twenty-four States (for the twenty-fifth—*i. e.*, Alsace-Lorraine, is governed by an official appointed by the

Kaiser) cost their dear subjects quite a penny, at least in the aggregate. But not nearly so much as might be supposed. Bavaria, for instance, grants an annual revenue of but 5,402,683 marks, or about \$1,300,000, to the regent and all the other members of the dynasty. The king of Saxony receives about half that sum for the same purpose, and so it goes down in a sliding scale to the rulers of some of those minimal principalities like Waldeck, Reuss, or Lippe, who yet enjoy incomes as large as this big and wealthy nation pays to its president. Altogether something like \$10,000,000 are annually paid by the German people out of their pockets to this brood of dynastic rulers, large and small, leaving out of consideration the much larger revenues drawn by them out of crown and private domains, estates, farms, forests, mines, and other remunerative property, which in the first place, of course, came from the people.

However, this is not so large a sum for a nation of 56,000,000 to pay for a political hobby—for such, after all, the keeping of crowned chiefs is—and there is comparatively little complaint on that score to be heard throughout Germany. And this money is spent in the country, and helps home industry and manufacture, while a not inconsiderable portion of it is all along devoted by these rulers to encouraging native art and science, assisting deserving poor, and like objects. The existence of over a score of courts, with their partially wholesome influence on the stage, on literature, art and science, has been largely instrumental in raising the intellectual level of the German nation to its height. Without going so far back as the court of Weimar in the time of Goethe and Schiller, it is worth remembering that the court of Munich has done, at various periods during the recent past, a great deal for the advance of German music (Wagner and Louis II) and literature (Paul Heyse and King Maximilian); that the court of Dresden (Weber, Rückert, Tieck) has done even more for stage and literature, and that scores of names of the contemporaneous roll of fame are intimately connected with one or the other of these smaller courts, while the court of Berlin, of course, likewise exerted much influence in this direction.

The beneficial influence thus wrought on certain important phases of the national life of Germany cannot easily be overestimated. Germany largely owes to it that diversified and

many-sided complexion of her art, literature and science, and perhaps in nothing more so than in her dramatic art (whose regeneration in certain lines was, for instance, due to the Duke of Saxe-Meiningen, a tiny State), which constitutes one of the chief charms and virtues of her whole intellectual life. There has never been a time during the last one hundred and fifty years when there were not at least three or four of the German sovereigns to encourage and sustain German philosophers, poets, and other distinguished leaders of thought, who might without that aid have been left to starve. Republics are in that respect notoriously ungrateful and inconsiderate, as history amply proves.

So there is, as you see, a rather broad silver lining even to this cloud of petty rulers.

Germany will undoubtedly work out her own political salvation in this respect as in others. As a matter of fact, it is singular that what is called there "the monarchic idea" has never been so overpoweringly strong during the whole nineteenth century as it is now. But if the undercurrents of her political thought are read aright, she is steadily if slowly gaining in the direction of complete national consolidation.

CHAPTER XI

PAN-GERMANISM

THAT movement for territorial and national expansion which in its most naked form is called "Pan-Germanism" (or in German, *Alldeutsche Bewegung*) is a perfectly natural outgrowth of the political, social and economic conditions obtaining in the empire. It is intimately allied with the colonial movement. In fact, the two interlace and meet at every point. Both have their roots in the undeniable fact that the limits of the present empire are too narrowly drawn for the size of its population and for its importance and its aspirations. This fact was more or less instinctively felt by the entire nation since soon after the close of the Franco-German War, but the sentiment slowly and steadily gathered strength before it came to the surface, and became a force in Germany's national politics. By the middle of the eighties it had gained enough momentum, however, to compel Bismarck, much against his will, to heed it. It is well known that since then, one after the other, colonies (or in German "*Schutzgebiete*"—i.e., protectorates) have been acquired by Germany in several parts of the world, and that the desire for more colonies is unabated to this day.

This colonial movement, however, found a number of very strong obstacles in its way. These are spoken of elsewhere. Suffice it to say, that it did not take a number of the most enthusiastic and pushing leaders in the colonial movement long to discover that so far at least as the possibility was concerned of creating a number of "new Germanies," peopled with the enterprising surplus of the nation, the colonies would not "fill the bill." There seemed to be no more conveniently located territory left on this globe which could under existing political conditions be seized or otherwise acquired, and which would do for the new home of large numbers of Germans. As Schiller in one of his oft-quoted ballads put it: "The earth had already been otherwise disposed of."

Under these circumstances a current of political sentiment which has always existed in a not too well defined shape in all classes of the German-speaking population gathered renewed power. That sentiment may be briefly defined as consisting in the wish, quite natural and laudable in itself, of uniting under the ægis or under the direct sway of the Imperial crown of Germany all those populations of Teutonic blood which, due to a variety of causes, had strayed away from the national fold, so to speak.

A longing to effect this reunion with the old fatherland can be traced very plainly through German literature and German political aspirations for several centuries past, ever since in the wake of the Thirty Years' War a number of these former members of the holy Roman Empire of German nationality—which was the official title of the old German Imperial federation until its final and dismal dissolution in 1806—had been lost or wrested away, or set up independently for themselves, as Holland and Belgium, Luxemburg, etc., had done. While Germany, however, was but an impotent and decentralized congeries of States, these dreams of an "All-Germany" were of no practical consequence, either to the Germans themselves or to their neighbours. University students, wearing across the chest the broad silk sash showing the Pan-German colours, black-red-gold, might sing all they pleased about "*Das ganze Deutschland muss es sein*"—their song was so much air, nothing more. Pamphlets might appear advocating the reuniting of "all the tribes," and Pan-German athletic or singing societies might hold conventions in any of the more populous cities of German tongue, including Vienna, make rousing speeches and swallow oceans of beer—and the practical effect would be *nil*.

All this changed, as a matter of course, when Germany had overcome her traditional foe since the Middle Ages, France. She now stood monarch of all she surveyed, and could begin to think seriously how to solve the problem of a Pan-Germany. So far as the overt acts of the German government are concerned, there is nothing to show that it has instigated or furthered this movement. Indeed, there have been a number of occasions during the last thirty years when the Pan-Germans have seriously inconvenienced their national government, as it

is but natural in a movement which tries to discount the future and to disregard the actual political needs and situation of the present. Such a movement is very apt to "queer the course" of the helmsman who is steering, with more or less difficulty, the ship of state through shoals and cliffs into the harbour of safety. The interference of men whose aims lie in the distance and who on that account are too apt to overlook the obstacles near by may render the task of the man at the head of affairs all the harder. This has actually happened in Germany, and of late more frequently than years ago. Whenever Germany has become involved in a controversy of any kind, no matter of how trifling a nature, with some other country, the Pan-Germans, with their motley following of Jingos, Imperialists and extreme Nationalists of every description, have set up a great howl, have expressed extravagant opinions and proposed plans of extravagant revenge in a way which naturally embarrassed the central government in Berlin. They have, in every instance, inflamed public opinion, and made a terrific noise, without, of course, representing in any sense the sober and dominant minds of the nation.

Still, for all that, the Pan-Germans are a power in their country, and it is not too much to say that they stand for a programme which, while it is certainly not the one officially admitted in Berlin, and while it has not been adopted in so many words by either the Kaiser, his government or the nation at large, dwells in the minds of all as a vague dream, as a contingency which the nation must prepare for, as a sort of hazy ideal that the future will reveal one day in more tangible form. The Pan-Germans, in other words, may be justly regarded as the political vanguard of the nation. Their aims are shared by millions, both inside and outside of Germany proper, and while as a well-defined and concrete factor in every-day German politics their influence is not yet large, they exert a very decided and powerful impetus on the imagination of every part of the nation, and tinge national thought much more strongly than they themselves are probably aware of in many cases. In a sense, they play that part in German political thought which the advocates of a united Germany did during the period of 1815-70.

As a powerful future ally, as a party embodying those half-

avowed dreams of larger national glory, the Pan-Germans are necessarily handled with extreme care by the central government. Any other course would be, from the purely national point of view, unwise. For the German government cannot afford to seriously discourage the movement which the Pan-Germans represent. Some day they may—nay, probably will—prove its mainstay.

It is, of course, difficult to write with any degree of authority about the Pan-German movement, for there is, in the very nature of things, little that is tangible about it. It deals with ideas, with aspirations, and nothing palpable has as yet come of it. Nothing that can be touched and seen may come of it for years. But to neglect discussion of this movement would mean a grave omission, for in its essence it is of as great importance as the Imperialistic movement in England, as the Expansion movement in this country, or as the Irredentist movement in Italy. And in all these cases there is that behind the movement itself which always commands respect and attention—a strong national feeling. It is well to premise this as to the Pan-German movement, for without that strong backing of national sentiment it would be undeserving of notice, since it aims at things which at this juncture of international politics appear almost impossible of realization, and which, at best, are lying in the womb of the future, so inchoate as to be shapeless.

But the movement itself is very real. The Pan-Germans number by millions in Germany, and there are probably another couple of millions of them in Austria, in America, and scattered broadly or thinly in all other countries where the Germans are strong in numbers and influence. They have an ably and powerfully edited press, and a political organization which makes up in boldness and skill what it lacks in numerical strength. Its delegates are to be met with everywhere. Some years ago Dr. Carl Peters, one of the most daring leaders of the movement, made a proselytizing tour of the world, in the course of which he also visited the cities in this country having a large German population, and founded Pan-German clubs in every one of them. The movement has its representatives in the legislative halls and in the press of Germany and elsewhere. In the Reichstag there are scores of Pan-Germanists among the members, and

two of their leaders there, Professor Hasse and Doctor Lehr, play a very prominent rôle in that body.

One of the most striking evidences of its strength, however, is the rapid growth of the Pan-German federation, or Alldeutscher Verband, with a membership of 22,000 and consisting of 218 clubs, whereof 190 in Germany itself and twenty-eight in other countries, such as Australia, the United States, and South Africa. This organization comprises within its membership many men of great influence and distinction, such as Count Arnim-Muskau, Count Udo Stolberg, Doctor Samassa, Professor Stintzing, and others. It issues a party organ, *Die Alldeutschen Blätter*, in Berlin, whose circulation runs into the hundred thousand, and it has everywhere zealous and devoted friends. The party programme of this federation confesses in almost unveiled language what it aims at. The first paragraph says:

"The Pan-German Federation has for object the revival of German-nationalistic sentiment all over the earth; preservation of German thought, ideals and customs in Europe and across the ocean, and the welding into a compact whole of the Germans everywhere. The clubs constituting the Pan-German federation in the different countries decide for themselves, in conjunction with the chief officers of the Federation, by what means these aims are to be attained, keeping in view their particular conditions."

Under the second paragraph there are a number of sub-heads, such as "(1) opposing all contrary tendencies by every available means;" "(2) solution of the educational, school, and intellectual questions in the sense of a united Germanism;" "(3) furtherance and support of all German-nationalistic currents and aims in all those countries where persons of our race have to fight for the preservation of their kind, and massing together of all the Germans on the globe for these aims;" "(4) promotion of an energetic policy in favour of German interests in Europe and across the sea, and, in particular, continuation of the German colonial movement towards practical results."

The interpretation put upon this programme may be read every day in the Pan-German press, and heard in the campaign and other public speeches of their leaders. This interpretation goes a step or two further than the above words, on their surface,

seem to imply. To understand that fully, though, it will be necessary to describe the core of the movement, as it has been expounded for years in the party organs. It will also be necessary to outline the political situation, as understood by the Pan-Germans, and so far as it applies directly or indirectly to the forces composing this movement.

It is well known that the German-speaking race, so far as it was grouped politically together, was virtually severed into two parts of very unequal size by the Prusso-Austrian war of 1866. The battle of Sadowa meant not only that Prussia proved triumphant in that fraternal strife, but that the German influence in Austria-Hungary, up to that time dominant in the internal affairs of the polyglot empire, was doomed to succumb to Slavic and Magyar influences, once the hegemony in Germany herself had been wrested away from the Hapsburg rulers of the dual monarchy. And so it proved. The Germans, who by their higher culture and education, by their greater wealth and further progress in the arts, in industry, manufacture, etc., and by the strong backing they had always had from Germany proper, had played the leading rôle, the rôle of educator in Austria-Hungary, became by easy stages, during the past thirty-six years, the Cinderella in politics there, being gradually outnumbered, outvoted, and out-manceuvred by their Slavic and Magyar fellow-citizens. Generally speaking, it is true that the German-speaking Austrians and Hungarians, numbering some eleven millions altogether, are intensely dissatisfied with the turn affairs have taken, and that they cast more or less longing eyes across the frontier at powerful and energetic Germany, where their race is achieving more progress and power and wealth every day. The Pan-Germans believe that the Austrian Germans would, as soon as the way was clear for it, like to join the German empire, and totally relinquish their allegiance to the empire of the Hapsburgs.

For this belief they have strong grounds. Whoever has watched the internal race strife in the politics of Austria-Hungary, during the past few years, especially—and this race strife has substantially been the keynote to everything done politically there—must have noticed how German sentiment in that monarchy has become steadily more and more bitter, and how it

has been consolidated more and more on the lines of consanguinity. The German factions there, up to recent years still warring upon each other for a variety of minor reasons, have one by one dropped these marks of separation, and have begun to feel as one nationality—one that is opposed by all others, and must, therefore, stand together for that very reason. But these political reasons, which tended to alienate the Germans in Austria from the rest of the population there, were not the only ones, nor even the principal ones, working in that direction. Material reasons came in. Under the new régime in the Austro-Hungarian empire they have been crowded more and more to the wall. Their best markets were taken from them, and with them the chief sources of their wealth. As Hungary developed in manufactures, she shut the doors against the Austrian-German manufacturer, and as Germany imported more and more of her food stuffs and raw products for industry from America and other countries, it was the Austrian exporter of German blood who again primarily suffered by the change. Vienna rapidly sank from a wealthy, even luxurious, metropolis of a powerful empire to the chief capital merely of the one-half of the empire. As Vienna sank, so rose Budapest and Prague, and all that meant great loss of trade to the German merchant and manufacturer of Austria.

A political party arose among the Austrian-Germans whose professed creed, as proclaimed in the Austrian Parliament by its spokesmen, Wolff and Schönerer, was: "Los von Oesterreich"—*i. e.*, "Away from Austria." This party grew in strength and importance, and represents to-day the main driving force among the men of German blood in the ill-assorted monarchy. Nay, even religion was forced into this propaganda for the severance of these Germans from Austria. As the Catholic clergy, acting under instructions from Rome, discouraged this German nationalistic current, thousands and tens of thousands of Catholic Germans in Austria have lately turned Protestant, and this movement is still spreading.

There are other factors working in the same direction, and thus it is not astonishing that those in Germany proper who wish to believe so do believe that the end of it all must and will be the reuniting of these detached fragments of the German

race to the people they ethnologically and intellectually belong to—viz., the German.

But the Pan-Germans do not sufficiently appreciate certain facts. The *vis inertiae* of political conformations, no matter how poorly joined together, is very great. History proves that. And to forcibly split up a monarchy which has lasted for seven centuries, and which hangs together by innumerable threads of traditional feeling and by immense totality of common interests, is no light task. But there is, besides, the peace of Europe to consider. Nowadays such great upheavals as the falling to pieces and breaking into a mass of incongruous entities of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy would be, are usually prevented by the concerted action of the powers, but even more perhaps by the mutual jealousies of these same powers—a fact to which European Turkey, for instance, solely owes her continued existence.

Be that as it may, it is out of the question that the dismemberment of Austria will be such a simple or easy process as the Pan-Germans imagine. It certainly will not occur during the lifetime of the present monarch, Emperor Francis Joseph. His heir-presumptive is an unknown quantity practically, but that he sides rather with the Czechs and the Magyars than with the Germans of wavering loyalty there seems to be no doubt. It is possible, of course, that under him such a cataclysm might happen as the complete downfall of the Austrian monarchy would be. But the contrary is even more possible, in view of all the circumstances that will tend to keep the old political configuration together.

However, the Pan-Germans reckon not only with the possibility of this dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian empire, but count it a moral and political certainty. They do not say how they will overcome the geographical difficulties that stand in the way of annexation of the German provinces of Austria—how the German part of Bohemia, with its three millions of Germans, is to get rid of the larger half, the Czech half, of Bohemia, with its four to five millions; how the German-speaking provinces to the east and south of Vienna are to get over the fact that they are separated from Germany by Slav populations; nor how the Germans of Carinthia and Carniola, who are sur-

rounded by other and more numerous Slav populations, are to oust these; and they indicate no means whereby the three million of Germans in the other half of the monarchy, scattered through a vast space peopled by Magyars and Slavs, and separated like the Germans in Transylvania by hundreds of miles from their fellows, are to come any nearer to the German empire. These difficulties seem almost insurmountable, and they are a wall erected against the national aspirations of the Pan-Germans.

This, then, in a nutshell, is the great problem that confronts the Pan-Germans in Austria. That, however, is but one item, though the weightiest, in their programme. The annexation of the German-speaking cantons of Switzerland, that of Holland, of the Flemish part of Belgium, of Luxemburg, of the German-speaking or Baltic provinces of Russia, are so many more problems. As to Belgium and Holland, there has of late been a sort of movement which seems to indicate at least a veering around of public sentiment there in favour of a *rapprochement*, or a closer political and commercial understanding with Germany. The Flemish movement itself is an indication of the reawakened race sentiment of that fragment of the great Germanic tree, a fragment, however, amounting to about four million souls, and which has been strong in history and successful in commerce. The annexation of the Flemish provinces of Belgium and of the whole of Holland would give Germany a powerful position on the North Sea and reunite with her a people that is purely German in race and tongue, although estranged from her for centuries, and with different political and social ideals and customs. For a powerful empire like Germany it is undoubtedly a galling fact that the whole lower course and the mouth of her most navigable and important river, the Rhine, is in the possession of another, a much smaller but very independent, people, and that that people stops the empire's egress towards the west, the sea. The same argument applies to Belgium.

However, the ugly fact remains that Holland and Belgium, while they have become very friendly towards Germany, show no inclination whatever of giving up their political independence and of throwing their lot in with that of Germany. True, there is a movement afoot both in Germany and Holland which, if successful, might lead to a sort of political and colonial

protectorate exercised by Germany over Holland. It has been nursed by the fear of the Dutch that either the United States or England might seize their valuable Indian possessions, especially Java and Sumatra. This fear has been magnified by the Pan-German press by pointing to the Spanish-American War and drawing analogies therefrom. But so far the majority of the people of Holland have not taken this warning very seriously, and indulge grave doubts as to its disinterestedness. However, there is no telling what the evident *rapprochement* of Holland and Germany may eventually bring forth, since the fact is undeniable that Holland, in a far greater degree than Switzerland, is at the mercy of her powerful neighbour at home, and that her colonial empire might be wrested away from her any day by an unscrupulous power possessed of a strong navy. The advocates of a close understanding between Germany and Holland say that Germany might guarantee to Holland her colonies, in exchange for special commercial favours to be shown Germany in these colonies, and that a tariff league, or "Zollverein," such as bound, for instance, Austria and Germany together for many years, could be concluded between the two countries at home. Holland is even now one of Germany's best customers; in fact, relatively considered, the best—*i. e.*, *per capita*. Holland ceased to be a member of the old German empire only with the Peace of Muenster, in 1648, and might become a member of it again without sacrificing much of her national independence, about on the same plane as Bavaria—with a number of reserved rights. The greatest obstacle in the way of that, however, is the average Dutchman's dislike to military service—above all, compulsory military service. This aversion is with him even stronger and more settled than with the average Englishman. Probably he would rather run his chances of being "gobbled up" as a result of his military unreadiness, and his weakness on the seas, than "play soldier," as he calls it.

In Belgium, things in the main are similar in this respect, though not quite to the same extent. There is a larger and a better equipped army, and there is a chain of powerful fortresses encircling the little kingdom, so that it would not be quite so easy a matter to annex Belgium. Besides, she has no colonies, if we do not count the Congo Free State, and this may be properly

done, since King Leopold assumed sole financial responsibility for that colonial venture in the heart of Africa. Thus, Belgium can do without a navy. On the other hand, contrary to conditions in Holland, the internal political situation in Belgium has been steadily growing worse for years, and the very large Socialist element there desires amalgamation with Germany for party reasons. The Belgian dynasty, too, foreign in race and represented by so poor a specimen as King Leopold II, has no deep root in the country, whereas the old Orange line in the Netherlands grows with every fibre in home soil. Economically considered, Belgium, like Holland, is on the closest terms with Germany, and these economic ties are becoming stronger all the while as German enterprise expands.

What finally is to become of both Holland and Belgium, especially in a ruthlessly aggressive age, when material interests ride roughshod over sentimental considerations, as we have seen in the case of the war in South Africa, is mere matter of conjecture. Only this much seems certain: That in a general political convulsion, such as may come on the continent of Europe before long, and which might end with a regrouping of powers and countries on strictly nationalistic lines, such guarantees as so far have vouchsafed the international position of both Belgium and Holland would prove no insuperable barrier to the powerful currents of German national aspiration that were portrayed above. The tendency towards national expansion and consolidation is too strong in the leading and most energetic nations to be checked by mere paper walls that should happen to stand in the way. However, all this is, to borrow an expressive German phrase, "Zukunftsmusik," and only the future will show.

At any rate, the dream indulged in by the Pan-Germans and all their conscious and semi-conscious followers, the dream of building up an empire extending, after the annexation of the German provinces of Austria, and of Holland and Belgium, from the shores of the Adriatic to those of the western North Sea, is such an enticing one, and one so powerfully spurring on the imagination of an ambitious nation, that its force on the public mind of Germany must not be underrated.

A concomitant part of that dream is also the acquisition some-

how of the German-speaking cantons of Switzerland, comprising two-thirds of that republic territorially, and four-fifths in wealth and population. The desire, I say, exists in Germany, but there seems precious little to build this hope on. For not only have these districts been politically separated from Germany much longer than either Holland or Belgium, but they are also very well satisfied in every possible way with their present lot—prosperous, independent and respected. Their long republican training has, besides, bred in the German Swiss a fierce hatred of autocratic and monarchic rule, and this strongly militates against any such close political understanding with Germany as is the case with Holland and Belgium. The Swiss press, as well as every other kind of Swiss public expression, has uniformly, whenever the idea has been broached in Germany of winning back that originally German territory, scouted the very mention of it. In a military sense, too, the Swiss Federation is no mean foe, at least so far as defense is concerned. Their militia system, while, of course, it cannot wholly take the place of a thoroughly trained regular army, is the best in the world, and the officers are excellent in spirit and ability. The Swiss are naturally a warlike race, like the Germans, and take to the profession of arms quite kindly. The chain of powerful forts and mountain fastnesses which has been perfected by Switzerland along her whole extensive frontiers, but strongest on her eastern, or German one, since the close of the Franco-German War, and her excellently trained militia, numbering in all several hundreds of thousands, would, in a war where the national existence should be at stake, represent a total force of no mean pretensions, even for Germany, to cope with. Thus at first blush there seems not even a scintilla of fact favouring the Pan-German aspirations in this quarter.

But there are, nevertheless, several facts of great importance that tend in that direction. The chief one is economic. Switzerland has during the last twenty years become more and more dependent on Germany, commercially viewed. Her exports and imports to and from Germany now overbalance by far those with any other country. Germany bought last year from Switzerland to the amount of 180,000,000 marks, or about \$45,000,000, and sold 300,000,000 marks' worth, or \$75,000,000.

This trade of \$120,000,000 with a nation numbering barely 3,000,000 is relatively immense, and on the Swiss side is not equaled by the joint trade with her two other main customers and neighbours, France and Italy. A wise economic policy on Germany's part and an equally unwise one on the part of France and Italy, with both of whom Switzerland has been waging bitter tariff wars, has aided greatly to bring this about. Such a close community of economic interests means much in this age, where material interests predominate. Identity of language and literature, identity of culture and art, and similarity of manners and customs form another strong bond between the two countries, and this bond particularly has greatly strengthened during the last thirty years. The natural attraction which a powerful and fast-growing empire has for a small country of the same race—one whose independence is, after all, like that of Belgium and Holland, only safeguarded by international agreement and mutual jealousy, likewise counts for something. Nevertheless, all things considered, there seems but slight tangible reason for the hopes of the Pan-Germans to bring the German part of Switzerland eventually under the sway of the empire, and this view is shared by the sober-minded and overwhelming portion of the German people.

Luxemburg, also purely German in blood, language and civilization, is another small country which the Pan-Germans claim as fair prey. One of the old German emperors was from Luxemburg, and by history and political affiliations it belongs clearly to the empire. But it is now a grand duchy with a German for its ruler, and was made politically independent as the outcome of the French intrigue of 1867, which Bismarck nipped in the bud. It forms, however, a member of the German tariff union, so that all its economic interests are identified with those of the empire. The inhabitants are quite satisfied with their present lot, which frees them from the burden of taxation incurred by their great neighbours for military and other purposes.

Lastly, the programme of the Pan-Germans embraces the acquisition, by conquest or otherwise, of Russia's so-called Baltic provinces—Livonia, Courland, and Esthonia. These represent, like the province of Prussia from which the kingdom of that

name took its appellation, territory which was conquered, settled, and christianized by German orders of knighthood during the Middle Ages, and where the civilization, the dominating influence and the entire intelligence has been from the start, and still is, German. Under these German influences the three barbarian provinces, so far to the north on the borders of the Baltic, attained a fair measure of culture and prosperity, and when, during the time of German political impotence, these provinces were finally incorporated with Russia, they contributed, despite their relatively small German population, an enormous number of Russia's great men—soldiers, statesmen, scientists, etc.—whose names shine on every page of Russian history since the days of Peter the Great.

The German element in these provinces formed a sort of aristocracy of birth, mind and wealth, during the last six hundred years, and the university of Dorpat (now Russianized under the new name of Yuryeff) counted among the best, and many of Germany's leading minds taught or graduated there. They remained faithful to their German blood, and kept up the closest relations with the men of their race in Germany proper, despite all the allurements held out to them by official Russia to wean them away from these influences.

Unfortunately for Pan-German aspirations, the German element in the Baltic provinces is numerically inferior to the native element—Esthonian, Livonian and Kurelian. The Russian government since the days of the present Czar's father, Alexander III, has seriously entered on the task of thoroughly Russianizing these provinces, and has steadfastly continued this policy ever since. In doing this the Russian government has utilized the native element spoken of above very skilfully and successfully. This Russifying process has now progressed far enough to show very palpable results. The political domination of the German element has been well-nigh broken, and by strictly enforcing the preponderance of the Russian language in the schools and in the university of the provinces, a death-blow has been given to superior German culture there. Territorially separated from the empire, and forming a part of gigantic Russia, it is indeed difficult to see how these provinces are ever to be united to Germany. As a matter of fact, the German gov-

ernment discourages the propaganda in favour of Germanizing these provinces. During Bismarck's time, when the Russification of them first became a systematized effort of the St. Petersburg central authorities, and a wave of popular indignation and sympathy thereupon swept all over Germany, it was the Iron Chancellor himself who, in the Reichstag, severely deprecated such manifestations.

Thus, casting a bird's-eye view over the whole situation, it is seen that the Pan-German movement in favour of reuniting all these lands of German or Germanic tongue and thought, but politically estranged from the rejuvenated empire, has uphill work before it, work which will not only require all the mettle there is in the race, but also luck, unusual luck, to accomplish anything palpable. Its main hope is builded, of course, on the unknown political events of the future, and in the crucible of national amalgamation—a tendency of almost elementary strength these days—things unforeseen may be evolved. Meanwhile, the Pan-German movement itself, as pointed out above, gathers momentum every year, and is drawing into its vortex larger and ever larger masses of the German-speaking race.

The published programme of the Pan-German Federation, as translated above, embraces, however, the further task of "continuing the German colonial movement towards practical results." The interpretation given to this part of the society's creed, to judge by the utterances of the Pan-German press and leaders, means this: To create new colonies, suitable for settlement by native Germans, and to remain under the political and economic control of the mother country; to organize the Germans now residing in other lands which are still in the political and intellectual period of formation, into a distinctively German element, in sympathy with the institutions of their native country and a power working on political, social and commercial lines primarily for the good of Germany, and not of their adopted homes.

This statement of the purposes of this federation—which, it must be remembered, is after all but the nucleus for that far larger body of men which it governs and directs in these matters, is amply borne out by the facts. Hundreds of public speeches have been delivered in Germany during the last ten years, both

in the legislatures there and before large and representative societies, such as the Colonial Society, for instance, and thousands of press utterances have been printed in which the above idea is carried out to its logical conclusion.

Now, from the German national viewpoint, there is nothing more natural or laudable. For a hundred years Germany has seen millions of her sons emigrating to other countries, especially to North and South America, who carried with them a large part of the nation's energy, culture, and industry, yet who in the end were totally lost to the mother country, so far as an extension of its political and commercial power was concerned. The best and purest minds of Germany have deplored this deeply, and justly so. What more natural than the wish to so shape and influence German emigration henceforth as to benefit in the first place the country which gave them birth and all the blessings of a vast and varied culture! German statisticians have estimated the average loss sustained by the nation in the person of each adult and healthy emigrant at \$1,000. For the 12,000,000 of Germans who have left their country for others during the nineteenth century that would mean a financial and political loss so enormous as to almost defy imagination.

Yet, on the other hand, it needs no pointing out that this new programme of the Pan-Germans as to emigrants from the fatherland smacks of danger for the countries they hereafter will choose as a new abiding place or a second home. However, this danger cannot be considered very great, for so far as this country, for instance, is concerned, the assimilative powers of the people of the United States are, as experience has proven, so enormous as to undo even the strongest original intentions that the individual emigrant from Germany may on arriving have harboured in his mind as to preserving his German *ego* in all its pristine purity. Nothing has been better demonstrated than this truth during the period when German immigration to this country formed the largest factor in the total—the period, let us say, from 1872-85, and before that, the one from 1850-55. All the flighty dreams of founding “new Germanies” on the soil of this Republic (dreams which, indeed, were indulged in by many thousands of German immigrants in those days, and which were fostered and encouraged by millions of Germans at home) came to naught,

The few such colonies, intended as a nucleus of future German empires, in Texas, Wisconsin, Iowa, and elsewhere, were after a few years, or at most a generation, easily and quietly absorbed in the great body politic of the Republic. And this came about in every instance through the simple and natural process of political and social attrition and assimilation exerted by a vast homogeneous body upon these small foreign excrescences.

Since then German immigration here has dwindled more and more. This is not an accidental or short-lived fact, as the figures for the past ten or twelve years unmistakably prove. It comes from the empire's greater powers of absorption, incident to higher industrial development. There were years of late when the number of foreigners immigrating to Germany—Poles, Russians, Austrians and Italians—was far greater than the number of her own sons seeking foreign shores.

But even if that were not the case, and assuming that German immigration here, perhaps during another lengthy period of financial depression in the empire, should again mount up to former figures, or even exceed them; and assuming that every one of these German immigrants should be a convert to the Pan-German programme (which, however, is out of the question, the contrary being much more likely), no serious danger would or could threaten this Republic from that source. Leaving all other considerations aside, the one fact that we here have a commonwealth of 80,000,000, and rapidly growing and more firmly consolidating, shows how utterly absurd is the idea that any bodies of immigrants, even rising into the hundreds of thousands, could here found new political colonies based on a spirit foreign or hostile to existing conditions. The idea is not worth being seriously entertained, and could only find lodgment in the brain of a madman or of a blatant and insincere demagogue.

I will add, of my own knowledge, that this crackbrained scheme of creating here a German element so strong in numbers and influence as to be able to form a "State within a State," of exerting as such a determining political influence during critical points in American national life, has been abandoned for good by all the sober-minded men of Germany, and that means the overwhelming majority. There are still, it is true, some prominent men there who hold to this view, but this proceeds from

ignorance of real conditions here, and such men are few and far between.

It is otherwise, of course, as to certain parts of South America. The German government emphatically disclaims any intentions, immediate or remote, of either founding or furthering the foundation of such German colonies there that would enjoy autonomy under the German flag. The Kaiser through his ambassador in Washington, and through his ministers in South America, as well as through the mouth of Count von Buelow, the Imperial Chancellor, has repeatedly given strong assurances that no such plans are harboured by him or his government. And in any case there is nothing to show that such plans exist.

But the programme of the Pan-Germans does embrace such a scheme of creating independent German colonies, existing by the power and under the flag of the empire, and redounding to that empire's political and commercial advantage. There is not the smallest doubt about that. This I can affirm of my own knowledge, and there is plenty and convincing evidence to sustain it. The interest felt all over Germany in this scheme is indeed general and extraordinary. The papers are full of it. Letters from prominent men advocating it appear constantly. Reports about conditions in those parts of South America where German colonies of importance already exist are printed almost daily in the influential press organs, and in common conversation the topic is frequently referred to. In the rough, then, both the will and the wish exist in the German nation, at least in very large and influential strata of it, to found distinctively German and national colonies, particularly in the three States of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Parana, all located in the moderate climate belt of Southern Brazil, and in Southern Argentina and Uruguay, where the climate, too, is suited to the German agricultural colonist and trader. ✓

The German population in those parts of the earth is even now considerable and fairly prosperous, and such colonies as Blumenau, Neu-Württemberg, Joinville, and others, enjoy even under their present Brazilian régime practical autonomy and independence. In numbers this German population amounts to something like half a million, settled rather in compact bodies than scattered, and this in a territory boasting all told of but a

million and a half of inhabitants, means more than appears on the surface. However, this German population there is constantly growing, and emigration to those districts is systematically promoted and encouraged in Germany. The North German Lloyd company has bought immense agricultural territory there, in size amounting to more than a half dozen German principalities, and furthers German emigration to it. At the time the North German Lloyd first began to engage in this venture, some seven years ago, it was said in Germany that the Imperial Government stood behind the scheme as sponsor, but of this I was unable to obtain official or otherwise reliable corroboration. Several circumstances, however, lent colour to the story.

There exists, too, a powerful and numerous private organization in Germany, the German-Brazilian Society, whose president is Rear Admiral Plueddemann, and whose main object is to foster German interests and emigration to that country. Lieutenant-General von Alten, one of the Kaiser's intimates, is one of the directors of this organization.

Another promising field for German emigration, from the viewpoint of the Pan-German Federation, is South Africa. Up to the breaking out of the Boer war the impression was very general throughout Germany that German political and commercial influence could there, with some effort, be made paramount and overleap the British. Knowledge of this state of feeling in Germany had doubtless something to do with the exceeding bitterness displayed in England after the Kaiser's congratulatory despatch to Kruger after the failure of the Jameson raid. Germany had already large possessions there—German Southwest Africa, adjoining to the south for hundreds of miles the northern border of Cape Colony, and German East Africa, more tropically located. Neither of these colonies is at present of great value, in any sense, but it was hoped that the internal strife between Boer and Briton would eventually terminate to Germany's advantage, and give her the position of paramount importance in the whole of South Africa, so eagerly sought for. Even now, after peace between England and the Boers has been restored, many persons in Germany think that England's prestige has been permanently destroyed there and that Germany will step in as *tertius gaudens*. This feeling o.

self-interest in the outcome of England's fight there had a share in the otherwise almost inexplicable depth of Anglophobia rampant in the empire for years past. ✓

With the view of ultimately strengthening Germany's political position and commercial interests in South Africa German emigration to those parts has been consistently encouraged at home. Every German going there is looked upon as a pioneer of German interests and as a future factor in helping to bring about German supremacy there. The systematic immigration to German colonies of Boers from the two former Free States and from Cape Colony or Bechuanaland is similarly regarded, and this immigration has only just begun to play a figure. The latest accounts in the German colonial press show that thousands of these Boers, presumably every one of them a bitter foe to England, have already been settled in the southern districts of German Southwest Africa. Whether all these hopes of future domination in South Africa are also doomed to fail time alone will show.

CHAPTER XII

THE TARIFF PROBLEM

THE Germany of to-day is a workshop for many nations. The express from Cologne to Berlin shoots for hours through swarming towns, which are almost as well lighted at night as by day, with tall chimneys belching flame, where thousands of skilled mechanics, miners, and artificers turn out the finished product of shuttle and anvil. This busy district is the creation of the last two decades. Nature has provided coal and iron ore, in enormous layers and veins, but most of it so deep down that the cost of mining is considerably higher, despite lower wages, than in either Pennsylvania or England. Yet such flourishing industrial centres as Essen, Bielefeld, Bochum, Muenster, Minden, Dortmund, Elberfeld, Barmen, Krefeld, Aix-la-Chapelle and Siegen have for years successfully competed with the world. The backbone of Germany as an exporting centre is in this district, and there the great German captains of industry have built up their immense plants and their gigantic fortunes. But in transportation facilities, and especially in railroad freights, they are again worse off than their two chief rivals, and the mines, too, for the most part, are not convenient to the harbors by the North Sea and Baltic, or to the people of the eastern provinces. The canal system which the Kaiser planned years ago, to give the industrial output of the west cheap transportation to the eastern agricultural provinces, and the latter's foodstuffs an easy transit to the west, is still unrealized, since the Agrarian party in the Prussian Diet twice killed the bill. The harbor at the mouth of the Ems River, Emden, will be turned into an important shipping point, it is true, with four or five times its present capacity for handling merchandise. But the Prussian government's plans will require at least ten years for execution. Then Emden will become another Hamburg or Bremen, and German manufactures from the

Westphalian lowlands can be cheaply shipped. But the present drawbacks for the German manufacturer in those regions are serious.

Yet, aside from the financial depression in Germany, the effects of which bid fair to last several years longer, German industry to-day is somewhat demoralized. The fear of American competition has wrought its spell there as well as in England. The phrase "American invasion," has taken thorough hold of the German imagination. Nor is this to be wondered at. Such a veering around of trade conditions as has taken place between the United States and Germany is enough to strike terror even to unimpressionable Germans, and the enemies of the United States there have naturally made the most of it. In 1880 the total imports of Germany were 2,844 million marks, of which less than six per cent. came from the United States; while Germany exported out of a total of 2,977 millions more than six per cent. to this country. In 1890, nine and one-half per cent. of German imports came from the United States, while she exported twelve per cent. to this country. In 1900, out of a total import of 6,043 millions the United States furnished seventeen per cent. of the whole, and out of 4,752 millions' worth of exports but nine per cent. went to this country. The change is astounding. Of course; much of this rise of American imports into Germany was due to German prosperity, since the large bulk of goods consisted of rawstuffs which were subsequently finished and either re-exported or consumed. But a steadily growing proportion were finished products, a rising percentage of them successfully competing on German soil with German products. It is this development of the last five years which inspires in the German manufacturer and merchant a fear of the overpowering strength of American competition. It has become plain to him that a country which twenty years ago exported 40 million dollars worth of goods, or 5.8 per cent. of the total, to Germany, and now sends 250 million dollars' worth, or 17 per cent. of the total, while taking practically no more of German goods than it did ten or fifteen years ago, is a country with which trade relations urgently need adjusting. And that is really at the bottom of the German government's desire to bring about a commercial treaty.

The trade relations between the United States and Germany have so far been based on the old treaty of 1828 between Prussia and this nation. By this treaty neither Prussia nor the United States could admit other nations to more favourable terms of commerce without admitting at once the other contracting party to the same terms, and this without previous negotiations. This at least has been the German interpretation of the treaty, which, after the foundation of, first, the North German Confederation in 1866, and next of the German empire in 1871, was extended to the other parts of Germany as well as Prussia, with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine, at least so far as certain paragraphs go. Now this interpretation, after being practically in force for many years, has been disputed of late on several occasions by the United States, particularly by Secretary Gresham; and the German government, by the wording of the so-called Saratoga Convention in 1893, gave a *quasi* tacit consent to this later American interpretation. The question became acute several years ago when Germany, under her treaty rights, denied to this government the right of concluding separate reciprocal commercial treaties with France or other countries without at once admitting Germany to the same benefits. The questions have never been settled, and the treaty of 1828 is, therefore, still valid, even if its provisions have not at all times been scrupulously adhered to.

Germany, under the chancellorship of Count Caprivi, between 1892-94, concluded special commercial treaties with a number of her more important customers, notably Russia, Austria, Italy, Belgium, Rumania and Switzerland, and with some South American countries. These treaties have benefited Germany's trade. The steadily rising column of her exports and imports proves it. Since 1892 her exports have risen from 3,150 million marks to 4,752 million in 1900, and her imports from 4,227 millions to 6,043 millions. Trade with several of the countries has already more than doubled. Yet under the treaties agriculture undoubtedly suffered. This had been expected by the Agrarian party, which opposed the treaties when they were before the Reichstag, and in the autumn of 1894 drove Count Caprivi from office. To what an extent German agriculture really has been injured by the importation of Russian, Rumanian,

American, Argentine, Austrian and Italian agricultural products it is impossible to tell, since no official figures have ever appeared and since the Agrarian party and its press magnify these injuries as their opponents belittle them. There is no doubt, however, that the damage done fell unequally. It was least noticeable in the industrial West, where, indeed, the small farmers and peasants, who form the bulk of the agricultural population, were actually benefited; it was not severe in the southern and central portions (except in certain districts of Bavaria); but it hit hard some of the eastern provinces of Prussia, where there are thousands of large entailed estates, whose owners could not adjust themselves to the new conditions, and, unable to compete with the cheaper grain, cattle, etc., of the treaty States, lost much money or, in some cases, saw their mortgages foreclosed and themselves beggared.

Now, the commercial treaties will expire by the end of next year, and the whole Agrarian party are doing their utmost to render renewal impossible. The tariff bill now pending in the Reichstag, the government claims, is intended as a forerunner to renewal. It is a mooted question whether Count von Buelow is sincere in this claim. He has publicly declared that he is an Agrarian, and family traditions and personal relations and interests point in the same direction. But whether he is sincere or not, this bill, though it goes very far in meeting the wishes of the Agrarian party, does not go far enough, and they mean to tack on a number of amendments which would render the chances of any subsequent commercial treaties quite illusory—which is precisely what they want. Such a bill, however, would fail of approval by the Bundesrath (or Federal Council), and would thus entirely miscarry. It would then be necessary for the imperial government to prepare another bill, which would have to go before a new Reichstag, after a dissolution of the present one with its Agrarian majority. It is, therefore, a matter of conjecture what will become of the tariff bill as a whole. The government had framed it to hit with particular force the products of the United States, both agricultural and industrial. If it were to be finally passed substantially in its original shape, it might either lead to retaliatory measures by the American government or to a mutually satisfactory commercial treaty.

The still-existing German tariff is frankly protectionist, and is, with some subsequent alterations, the one framed under Bismarck when that statesman became converted from his free-trade views. It is, however, when compared with the Dingley tariff, very moderate, viz., showing an average of thirteen per cent., as against the Dingley tariff's fifty-four per cent. The bill would raise that percentage to about seventeen or eighteen per cent., but many items on it, and particularly some touching American goods, show a much higher percentage—up to fifty and sixty. Not only are heavier duties laid on such leading articles of American export as cereals, copper, petroleum, meats, and nearly all other foodstuffs, but also, and mostly much heavier ones, on such American manufactures as within recent years have begun to compete with German industries, like bicycles, shoes, labour-saving and tool machines, leather ware, furniture, locomotives, stoves, electric appliances, etc.

The German government is, however, not in as strong a position in this whole matter as would at first appear. The vulnerable points may be summarized thus:

Germany must do her utmost to preserve her markets, for she, like England, must largely export in order to live.

German agriculture does not now produce, and is not likely to produce in the future (even under a new and more favourable system of commercial treaties or tariffs), enough food for the nation.

Germany, by enhancing the price of foodstuffs by higher duties, renders competition for her industry yet more difficult, and is liable to precipitate a severe industrial crisis.

A tariff war between the two countries would fall with much more crushing force upon Germany, for the simple reason that while Germany absolutely needs for her industry or her labouring population the more important items in her list of American imports, the United States would suffer no very appreciable discomfort if no German imports whatever should reach this country.

In Germany, according to the latest official census, fifty-seven out of every hundred people are engaged in industrial or commercial pursuits, and only forty-three in agricultural and allied employments. The overwhelming interests are industrial.

About one-third of the foodstuffs consumed in Germany to-day comes from beyond her frontiers.

By far the larger part of the German people are opposed to the pending tariff bill. The whole labouring population condemns it. So do the industrial classes, the merchants, and even a very large portion of the smaller farmers and landholders in the western and central districts of the empire.

The Agrarians dwell with special emphasis on the large discrepancy between the amount of imports from the exports to the United States. Yet by analyzing these figures it becomes apparent that Germany as a whole can hardly do without the bulk of the commodities purchased from this country. The American cotton, which forms the largest item in the list, she certainly cannot spare. There is nothing produced elsewhere which, given prices and quality, could take its place. And cotton forms one-fourth of the entire American imports. American petroleum, copper, and meat preserves cannot be spared nor obtained in like quantity and quality from other countries. As to petroleum, the German government has for years encouraged in every possible way importation of the Russian article, but all to no purpose. The Russian petroleum was found unavailable for most purposes, and the American variety still holds its place. American meat preserves, against which a systematic campaign was also made by the Agrarian press and party, in the course of which much was heard of the grave hygienic dangers from the consumption of "embalmed meat," has also more than held its own. An amusing illustration of this was furnished at the time the German war vessels and troops were fitted out for the suppression of the troubles in China. It fell like a thunderclap in the Agrarian camp when it was learned that the government had equipped the expedition with American canned goods. The Agrarian press raved, and the government was formally interpellated about it in the Reichstag. The answer was that there was nothing else so good—that the American goods had given uniform satisfaction in the German navy and army for many years.

The great bulk of American imports, then, are substantially indispensables. The better paid the German worker is, and the more German industry flourishes, the larger will be the con

sumption of these American commodities. Other American goods, in a coming tariff war with Germany, it would not be feasible to exclude from the market. They are American cereals, hides, leather, etc., and American manufactured goods, notably those spoken of above, less than one-sixth of the whole. In a tariff war they would doubtless find their way to German consumers in a roundabout way, via Holland, Belgium and England. This is Germany's real position if it ever should come to retaliatory measures between the two nations.

On the other hand, it would be relatively easy, and fraught with no perceptible hardship to the American trader and consumer, to bar out German imports here, as a glance at the list of German goods reaching this country will show. They are, in the order of their importance: beet sugar, textiles, chemicals, chinaware, toys. These five items cover seventy-five per cent. of the German imports here, and while it is likely that for a short time it would be difficult to replace these goods in quality and price, they could within a few months be purchased of England, Belgium and France. And at any rate, neither these nor the rest of the German commodities bought by America are indispensables in the sense in which the chief American ones are to the German market.

The German government knows, of course, the weakness of its position if it should ever come to a tariff war, and so does the unprejudiced Liberal press in Germany. Dr. Theodore Barth, a leading German parliamentarian and editor of the Liberal organ, *Die Nation*, has pointed out these facts time and again. His argument and that of the entire Liberal Left in the Reichstag is that the tariff war with this country which the Agrarian party is doing its utmost to bring on would be suicidal for Germany, and that the pending tariff bill, tending in the same direction, is to be condemned for this and for other potent reasons. The fate of this tariff bill will, therefore, decide the material welfare of the empire for years to come.

CHAPTER XIII

COMMERCE AND MANUFACTURING

It was in August of last year that Mr. David B. Henderson, Speaker of the House of Representatives, while on a week's stay in Berlin, made the casual remark to me: "Berlin, for an American, is the most delicate ground to tread."

He illustrated his meaning by some additional talk. What he meant, in fact, was that Germany, as the most formidable rival of this nation in political and commercial expansion, required on that account the fullest exercise of American tact, American love of fair play, and American rightly directed energy in competing with the lusty empire, competing in such a way as to give no needless offense and yet to stand always firmly on our own national rights and to see to it that no serious American interests are injured.

Mr. Henderson's view in this respect may probably be taken as the typical American one, so far as Germany is concerned. And it is indeed true that the two countries, if the hotspurs on both sides were allowed to have their way unchecked, might easily come to serious misunderstandings, for their interests and their aims clash at many points, no matter if the diplomats and statesmen on both sides of the water studiously avoid mention of them, and if their efforts—as is but right and within their proper functions—are ceaselessly bent in the direction of smoothing over difficulties that have arisen, and explaining away, with more or less success, unpalatable facts.

But there is this about commerce—that it both approximates and antagonizes mutual interests. In the long run, as history teaches us, commerce has made both for peace and for war. The whole eighteenth century was a struggle for commercial and colonial supremacy between England and France, and the latter's final overthrow was the root of that deep-seated enmity which indirectly led to the twenty-years' struggle between the two

nations at the outset of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, our civilization of to-day, with its elements taken from a score of different nations, is largely the product of commerce.

The great advance of Germany of late years, both as a manufacturing and trading nation, has riveted the eyes of all thoughtful Americans. Isolated facts in plenty have become public here, and have been variously interpreted. It will be of interest to summarize on this occasion the chief features of this rise and of the present status.

Up to the outbreak of the war with France, viz., 1870, Germany had been mainly an agricultural country. Her commerce was relatively unimportant, and within her territory there existed not a single large banking institution. Her industries were in an undeveloped state, and were carried on with extreme caution and on small capital. The more complicated and highly finished manufactures she imported from either France or England. Enterprise, though doubtless present in a latent form, was hampered by narrow conditions. From this stage Germany emerged after the successful end of that war, progressing at first—up to 1885—at a slow rate, but afterwards at a more and more accelerated pace, in the same proportion as she learned by experience her own full powers. The phenomenal period of expansion, however, dates only since the year 1895—the time when the commercial treaties she had effected with six of her most important neighbours had begun to take complete effect.

A faithful thermometer of this growth is furnished by her commercial relations with this country. In 1880 she bought only \$40,000,000 worth of goods from this country, and this was almost six per cent. of her total imports. This amount was later on again reduced, under the workings of Bismarck's protective tariff. In 1882 she bought but \$28,000,000 worth of us, or 3.7 per cent. of her total imports; in 1884 but \$30,000,000, or 3.8; in 1885 but \$29,000,000, or 4.1 per cent.; and in 1886 only \$25,500,000, or 3.6 per cent. That was the lowest ebb in her commercial relations with us, as it was in her whole material condition since the war with France.

But from that time on the figures began to jump. In 1889 Germany bought \$76,000,000 worth of us; in 1897 the value of American goods purchased by her had gone up to \$161,000,000,

or 13.5 per cent. of the total; and in 1900 she has bought an even \$250,000,000 worth of us, which figure remained nearly stationary last year, despite the general depression in Germany. Thus, within fourteen years' time she had multiplied tenfold her purchases of us.

The total volume of her import and export trade rose alone in the decade 1890-1900 from 7 2-10 billions of marks, or about \$1,800,000,000, to 10 3-4 billions of marks, about \$2,650,000,000.

In 1890 the total imports and exports of the world amounted to \$18,000,000,000, and of this Germany claimed one-tenth. In 1900 the world figures showed total imports and exports of \$21,000,000,000, and of this Germany could claim over twelve per cent., or about one-eighth. England that year showed a volume of 4.1 billions in exports and imports, whereof two-thirds were imports and but one-third exports. The United States ranked below Germany, with 2.3 billions, whereof nearly two-thirds were exports and but one-third imports; while France figured with slightly over 1.5 billions, imports and exports being almost evenly apportioned.

As to capital, too, the growth of Germany was surprising, especially if her poverty thirty years ago be given due weight. The total British capital invested in 1899 in foreign countries is given in the authoritative work on "The History of British Trade," by Percy R. Broemel (London, 1899) at \$10,000,000,000, and the interest drawn from it, at an average of four and one-half per cent., at \$450,000,000. Of this \$800,000,000 are invested by British capitalists in this country, and about \$3,000,000,000 in foreign railroads and \$200,000,000 in foreign mines.

For Germany there are tangible and reliable facts obtainable as to this matter, while as to England the figures, after all, are largely based on private information. In 1898 and again in 1900, with the other official material submitted by the German government to the Reichstag, during the pendency of the naval increase bills, there were exhaustive figures collected by the Foreign Office through its consular and diplomatic corps all over the world. These showed 3.4 billions in foreign papers held by Germans, and another 1.8 billions invested by them in foreign industrial enterprises, such as railroads, mines, factories, street car lines, etc., of this sum \$500,000,000 alone in South

America, \$250,000,000 each in North America and Africa, and the remainder elsewhere. The grand total held by German citizens in foreign investments of every kind amounted to \$5,000,000,000, or half the sum held by Englishmen. When it is considered that this accumulation of capital represents, not entirely but certainly largely, the efforts of only thirty years, while in the case of England the accumulation is of much longer growth, the facts thus presented are astounding. True, however, that quite a percentage of these foreign investments of Germany's—certainly a larger one than in the case of England—are financially rather unsound, as in the case of Servia, Greece, Portugal, Argentina and others.

Perhaps no more striking illustration of this rapid accumulation of capital can be given for Germany than by briefly tracing the simultaneous growth of one of her financial institutions of to-day. A score of gigantic ones have arisen within the period referred to, such as the Reichsbank, or Imperial Bank, which last year did business to the tune of 189 billion marks, or nearly \$46,000,000,000, and which now occupies under its safe yet enterprising president, Doctor Koch, an honored position equaling that of the Banque de France and of the Bank of England; the Dresdner Bank, the Disconto Gesellschaft, the Prussian Mortgage Bank, and others. But for the purposes of illustration, the Deutsche Bank, a purely private and unaided institution, will serve best. This bank started in April, 1870, in Berlin, with a modest capital of 15 million marks, or about \$3,750,000. It had in that year a total business of about \$60,000,000, and distributed a dividend of five per cent. Ten years later its stock capital had risen to \$13,000,000, and it had done a business of \$2,500,000,000, and distributed dividends of ten per cent. Another decade saw it advanced to \$25,000,000 in capital, \$7,000,000,000 of business, and still ten per cent. dividends. In 1900 its capital had grown to \$49,000,000, its business to \$12,000,000,000, and its dividends to eleven per cent. And last year, despite the severe financial panic that had been rampant through Germany, and that had partially paralyzed enterprise, the capital stock had been increased to \$50,000,000, the volume of its business to almost \$13,000,000,000, and its dividends had remained eleven per cent.

At the counters of this bank German shareholders received

last year payments of interest or dividends upon moneys invested in 495 industrial enterprises or government and private loans. The institution has floated State loans for Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse and a score of other German States and large cities. It has launched loans for Austria, Chile, Denmark, Italy, Mexico, the United States, Sweden, Egypt, Rumania, and other countries. It has founded or materially assisted in founding several hundred industrial enterprises, many of them in far-away countries, such as South America, Central America, China, etc., and financed other enterprises like the German-Atlantic Bank, the German-Asiatic Bank, the largest German electric and mining societies, the Anatolian and the Macedonian railroads, and to a large extent the Northern Pacific Railroad as well. The leading position of Germany in electric enterprises of every description is largely due to it. In a word, it is an epitome of German industrial and commercial progress during recent years.

From a country extremely cautious in investing its funds, as was the case until 1870, Germany has become one of the most liberal and daring investors and promoters. It is again her banks, of course, which illustrate this best. During a decade of extraordinary prosperity, they fathered thousands of industrial ventures, some of them inflated and financially unsound, it is true, and supplying far beyond the legitimate needs of the country, but the vast majority of them conceived with great shrewdness and keen business foresight. They started and maintained or promoted factories, electric power plants, railroads, new steamer lines, shipyards, mines, street car lines, etc., both at home and abroad, and in the main showed in these transactions a progressive wisdom and a clear-sighted optimism which were, until recent years, entirely foreign to the national character. The same applies to foreign financial investments. The holdings of German capitalists, mostly small ones, in Russian securities alone amount to twice the amount of the indemnity France paid her after the war. The Balkan States owe German faith in their future, as expressed by loans and investments aggregating some \$200,000,000, a great deal of their economic rise. The same can be said of Hungary, whose young industry was very largely financed by German promoters. German holdings there are com-

puted at about \$120,000,000. The fact that Asia Minor is again, after centuries of sleep, coming to the front as a promising country, is also partly due to German capital. This is more or less true of South and Central America and of Mexico, of the Dutch Indies (where of late much German capital has been put to good use, especially in Sumatra), of China, of Japan, of Cochin-China, and Siam, of Greece and Portugal.

The amazing growth of German cities is another illustration in point. Many of them have outstripped Chicago in their ratio of increase. Berlin, for instance, grew within thirty years from 720,000 to 1,888,326; Leipsic from 100,000 to 455,000; Munich and Dresden from 120,000 to 500,000 and 400,000 respectively; and so forth. The country grew during the lustrum 1895-1900 at the rate of eight per cent., or 4,000,000, showing a total of 56,345,014, putting Germany easily in the second place in Europe as regards population. Significant, too, is the very small number of German emigrants during the same period.

Germany's national debt is very high, being 12,950 millions of marks, or about \$3,250,000,000, as against \$1,900,000,000 owed by this country, and whereof \$850,000,000 belong to individual States of the Union. But of Germany's total debt not less than 10,450 million marks, or five-sixths, belong to the separate States of the empire, and this vast sum represents largely the value of the railroads, these having been purchased by the various governments, and have thus become prime sources of revenue for the public treasuries. Other profitable public works, such as canals, mines, government factories, etc., are also included in this total of national debt. These institutions are more or less profitable, and relieve to that extent the strain of taxation.

This fact must be borne in mind in looking at Germany's national debt, for it alone gives the clue to its real inwardness.

There have been several special causes in operation of late which undoubtedly bore a considerable share in Germany's commercial prosperity. These were the going into effect of the new Imperial Civil Code, the new tax system, and the great improvement in both the postal department and the railroad system.

As to the new civil code, which went into effect in 1900, that

has for the first time given all Germany a uniform law in civil matters and has been an immense step forward. It took the place of a number of codes, differing widely from each other in their provisions and spirit, and of which the Imperial Law Collection, the Prussian Common Law, the French Code Civil of Napoleon (in force up to that time in the Rhine districts), and the Saxon, Bavarian, and a dozen other codes were the leading ones. This new civil code has for the first time regulated uniformly the questions of minority, of guardianship, of the marriage relation, and other very important matters. But so far as the commercial and industrial classes of Germany are concerned, its benefits consist mainly in giving laws devised and fitted to the modern conditions of trade, of the modern wage system, etc., which have equal force all over the empire. Its provisions in this respect are acknowledged to be thoroughly adapted to present conditions, and were the joint product of a number of Germany's ablest jurists who acted largely on information furnished them by chambers of commerce and other bodies possessing intimate acquaintance with the legitimate wants of commerce. Under the administration of this new code fraudulent bankruptcy and similar banes of commercial life in other countries have become practically unknown, and there cannot be the slightest doubt that it has become a great boon to the whole commercial class of Germany, and that it is directly and indirectly furthering its material prosperity immensely.

Similar benefits, although of a different kind, have been derived by this same class from the operation of the present tax system of Prussia and of nearly every other German State. This new system is the income tax and tax upon profit-bearing capital, taking the place of a variety of unevenly adjusted taxes which bore with much less equity upon the population, and more especially the portion of it engaged in trade and manufacture. Prussia gave the example, her recently deceased finance minister, Doctor von Miquel, being the creator of the new tax law. It is so ingeniously and fairly constructed that it really comes near the ideal of placing the burden of direct taxation according to the ability to bear it, and unlike the former direct taxes it does not discriminate in favour of the privileged classes and against the middle classes. The income tax applies to all in-

comes above 900 marks, or about \$220, per annum, but beginning with three and one-half per cent. of the amount of income, after deducting all running and other expenses, it gradually rises in percentage with the amount of the income itself. Its provisions are rigidly but justly and equitably enforced, and though during the two first years after its taking effect there was considerable friction and complaint, these complaints have now almost entirely subsided, as both public and officials became better acquainted with its workings, and after some needless official chicanery had been done away with. The tax upon interest-bearing capital is conceived and executed in a like spirit, and gives no cause for reasonable criticism. Under the operations of this law the revenues from this source—forming now the bulk of the general revenues of the various State governments, while the empire now as before relies on tariff duties and other imposts—have steadily increased, and show a remarkable stability, these conditions, of course, likewise possessing a tendency to steady and conserve trade.

The railway system of Germany, one of the most extensive and soundest in the world, is largely owned by the various State governments. Out of a total length of about 50,000 kilometres, or 32,000 miles, all but 4,000 kilometres of it belongs to the States within which the several lines are operated. From a purely fiscal point of view they have all along been very successful. The clear profits from them have steadily increased. In the case of Prussia, for instance, its 30,000 kilometres of railroads yielded a net revenue of \$80,000,000 ten years ago. Last year this sum had grown to about \$150,000,000. By so much the burden of taxation resting on the population of Prussia has been lessened. The case holds good as to the other States of Germany. This method of owning and managing railroads has, however, its disadvantages as well. With a total lack of competition grew up a lack of enterprise and an unwillingness to keep step with improvements. The rolling stock became insufficient for the demands of both passenger and freight service, and its quality suffered as well. The scale of comfort and accommodations began to perceptibly sink. For years there was much just complaint on this score.

But during the past two years there has come decided improve-

ment. The rolling stock has been both greatly improved and increased, and progressive methods have been introduced in every department. The average speed of trains has materially grown. A number of the leading commercial centres, such as Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Frankfort-on-Main, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Leipzig, Königsberg, Dantzic and Stettin, have been brought nearer together by the establishment of lightning express trains. Some of them are as fast as the fastest in England and the United States, and faster than any in France. Dining-room and sleeping cars have been multiplied, and much more done for the comfort of passengers than heretofore. The long delays in the delivery of freight, which were formerly chronic during certain seasons, owing to an insufficiency of cars and locomotives, have ceased, and even the exceedingly high freight rates have been somewhat reduced. In a word, there has been decided progress made, and German merchants are correspondingly profiting thereby.

Similar improvement has taken place in the postal department. Deliveries are now more frequent and much prompter in the German cities of large size than in corresponding American ones, and the mail matter is likewise more frequently collected. The pneumatic letter delivery in Berlin and other centres insures, for seven cents, arrival at its address within half an hour, and works more rapidly, cheaply and safely than any contrivance in New York or elsewhere. The reliability and probity of the postal department and its 200,000 employes is proverbial in Germany. There are several features, alien to our American postal service, but worthy of imitation, in Germany. The most important, perhaps, is its system of making payments and collections for a trifling fee, but with great security, speed, and general satisfaction, there being, besides, absolutely no risk to sender or recipient in this species of transaction. The parcels post system is also far superior to our express service, both in despatch, reliability, and cost. The telegraph and telephone are, it will be remembered, exclusively managed by the German postal authorities, and while the former is hardly more efficient than our telegraph service, the telephone service in Germany is certainly superior and just as certainly much lower in price.

These four factors are points in which the German merchant

has to a certain extent the advantage over his American competitor. The impression prevails widely in this country that he enjoys an even more decided advantage in having cheaper and more reliable labour. I am not quite ready to admit that in the matter of labour supply the German employer does enjoy an advantage when comparing him in that respect with the American employer. Certainly, he does not pay as high wages, and in a narrow sense it is also probably true that German labour is more reliable, if by that word is meant that strikes are rarer and that whims are fewer. As to strikes, for instance, last year cannot be taken as a fair type, because of the wide-spread depression and the consequent large number of unemployed. But the year before, 1900, may be cited. In that year, then, there were altogether 1,336 strikes in the empire, in which 154,017 persons were engaged. Of these strikes, 331 were wholly successful; 429 were partially successful, and 528 were wholly unsuccessful. This shows, indeed, a very much smaller number of strikes and strikers when compared with this country, even taking the difference in population into consideration.

Ordinary wages in Germany are still decidedly lower than in America, and they average for unskilled labour not more than 3 marks, or 72 cents, per day; skilled labour averages between \$5.00 and \$10.00 per week, although there are certain branches and cities where higher wages are paid. So that in this respect, too, the German employer is at an advantage. This is, however, partially offset by the obligatory contributions he has to pay towards the invalid, sick and old-age relief for his employés, and by the premiums he has to pay on the accident insurance policies, and for pensions granted widows and orphans of men who lost their lives in his service.

In comparison with the English workman, the German is also more sober and steady-going, but I think in both these respects he is inferior to the average American wage-worker.

The German workman is, besides, docile and obedient, quiet and well-behaved. He is also more economical than his American fellow. But he has several serious drawbacks, when compared with the average American toiler, and these, I think, more than make up for his good points, so far at least as the benefits derived by the employer are concerned.

The German workman is not so strong physically as the American. This is constitutional and largely hereditary. He himself is underfed, and his whole race, his forefathers, before him. The principal foodstuffs are so high in Germany that the workman's earnings do not suffice to buy him and his family enough nitrogenous and nourishing food. Even the lower grades of fresh meat sell too high for his purse, and so he is obliged to sustain life and strength as best he may on potatoes, sausage, bits of bacon, lard, rye bread, "acorn coffee," with occasional vegetables, fresh or canned. Instead of the more expensive beer, he drinks potato brandy, which is injurious and full of fusel oil. With insufficient nourishment, he cannot do a man's work, and he does not, despite longer hours. The amount of work actually accomplished by him in from ten to fourteen hours is about two-thirds of that accomplished by an American workman in eight hours. At no time is he either willing or able to put forth his best efforts during his work—neither physically nor mentally. Of course, beside his deficiency in bodily strength due to the above cause, there is a certain amount of bias about him. He is as a rule a Socialist, and on principle deems it right to give his employer as little work for the money as possible.

The German workman lacks initiative and inventiveness. Hardly one German workman to ten English and fifty American ones ever takes out a patent or is credited with important inventions or improvements in the machinery or tools he handles. The contrast between him and the American is particularly strong in this line. The German workingman even to-day works—and prefers to work—with inefficient and clumsy tools, such as chisels, planes, hatchets, axes, hammers, and very seldom thinks out and then practically applies a new and easier method of accomplishing results of labour. He has not the intuitive knack of even the totally uncultured American toiler to do the piece of work in hand with the smallest expenditure of energy attainable.

Striking a general balance, then, the conditions under which the German manufacturer or merchant lives must be called at least as favourable, if not more so, as those his American competitor has to reckon with. Everything considered, his taxes are not as high as those in American cities; his property is safer

than property is here; the labour market provides him with as abundant material and at lower rates, though not in such choice and of such high quality; his rawstuffs are obtained in part at as low prices, while, to be sure, for others he has to pay more, and in some cases considerably more, than the American. But what about the material out of which the German manufacturer or merchant himself is made? How does that compare with here?

The German manufacturer or merchant of to-day is a rather superior man in some respects. In general education he beats his English and his American competitor. He has almost invariably gone through a German college first, and afterwards complemented his studies by a three years' course at an industrial or technical high school, and by extensive travels abroad, keeping his eyes and his ears open the while. Thus he is extremely well equipped theoretically when he attains years of early manhood, and he keeps this up more or less through life. He is a conscientious, although seldom an intense, worker like the American. He rarely enjoys working for his business in the same degree in which the American enjoys it. Social demands on his time are much greater and more exacting than they are here. He does not cultivate that spirit of intimate acquaintance with his employés, high or low, which the American cultivates; in fact, he cannot very well do so, given the strong class sentiment which still exists in Germany, and which acts as an insuperable barrier between the different classes. He is fairly enterprising and progressive in business, more so than the Englishman, but in a minor degree when compared with the American. He assiduously keeps himself informed of all that is going on in his line of business, both at home and abroad, and generally keeps and regularly reads at least one English and one French trade journal in his line. He risks his money with greater ease than the Englishman, although not with as much as the American. He is eager for gain, and not more scrupulous than his competitors in the chase after the dollar. He plays a not unimportant part in politics and in public life generally, and if not directly then at least indirectly succeeds as a rule in impressing the home government with his needs and his wishes, and influences legislation, though again not nearly to the same extent as the American—

in fact, hardly as much as the Englishman. Unless greatly disturbing influences should prevail in German political life, he will gain greater influence upon the legislation of his country, and upon its diplomatic relations, and it is quite within the possibilities, even to a certain extent probable, that he will ere long become the dominating factor in Germany's public life, but as yet he is not. Where in exceptional cases the German manufacturer or merchant possesses those characteristics we call distinctively American, viz., great pluck, indomitable perseverance, and bold initiative, coupled with intense application to business, he succeeds in his country, despite the great differences in ideas and social structure, nearly if not quite as much as these characteristics succeed here. Witness in illustration the career of such men as Baron Stumm, the Krupps, the Siemens, the Loewes, the Bleichroeders, Baron Thiele-Winkler, and others, who are no mean parallel cases to our Morgans, Carnegies, Rockefellers and others.

A chapter of the special Imperial census taken throughout Germany in 1895, and which dealt exclusively with the relative numerical strength of the different callings, professions, trades and avocations followed by the population, is quite instructive, although, of course, the figures there quoted are to-day, after seven years of further rapid progress, away below the actual mark. At that time there were in the empire no less than 296 large industrial enterprises going, each of them employing over 1,000 persons, and together showing a total of 562,628 employés, and operated by 665,265 horsepower. The chapter in question gives a wealth of details, and ten of the largest ones, being typical for special development in certain directions, are critically examined, not only so far as their resources and capacity goes, but also in their influence upon the life of the nation as a whole. These ten gigantic establishments were those of Krupp in Essen; the ship-building yards of the Vulcan in Stettin; the Baden Aniline Works in Ludwigshafen; the great textile works of Wuensche's heirs in Ebersbach; the immense plant of the Schultheiss Brewery in Berlin; the phenomenal department store of A. Wertheim in Berlin; the Berlin Electric Works; the Hamburg-America Line in Hamburg; and the Deutsche Bank in Berlin.

Any American wishing to study in detail the modes and methods in vogue in these typical German establishments, and thus form a comprehensive and adequate conception not alone of them, but of German industry in general, its points of strength and weakness, cannot do better than procure—with trifling trouble and expense—this chapter of official and thoroughly reliable data.

But with all this prosperity and commercial wisdom, Germany has not been able to escape a period of depression lasting now fully two years, and whose full effects are not likely to be exhausted for some time to come. It could scarcely be called a panic. It came at first in driblets, and even after clear-sighted observers had cast the national horoscope in a way to show that a period of exhaustion had set in, the great masses did not take warning. They continued, in fact, up to the early summer of last year to invest, to promote, and to organize new industrial and financial ventures with nearly the same degree of optimism, not to say recklessness, which had been a chief trait in German commercial development during the five years preceding. It is, indeed, worth while going a little more closely into the peculiar character of this receding wave of German prosperity. It teaches an object lesson.

Sober-minded writers in Germany had often pointed to the United States as an example to avoid. They had pointed to the kaleidoscopic changes in the commerce and industries of this country, its fat years and lean years, the rising and falling column of our imports and exports, the "booms" and "panics" that spread all over the big Republic—in a word, the quick and sudden shifting in the tide of American national wealth. And then these sober-minded German economists had gone on, for the hundredth time, holding this country up as a "fearful example," as the incarnation of "how not to do it." Many have been the prophetic warnings as to the awful fate that was sure to befall this rash and venturesome young giant. They proved it mathematically to their own satisfaction and that of the whole German nation. "The country of millionaires and of beggars," they called us, and showed minutely how unhealthy and abnormal was our growth in all that goes—so far as statistics can ever show that—to make a nation more prosperous. But then came

this last decade of phenomenal material progress in Germany herself.

The rise was so sudden and unlooked-for by the nation at large, nay, even by the very men who brought it about, that for the first two or three years of it the ruling sentiment was one of surprise, mingled with another and somewhat curious feeling, a feeling of apprehension that this rise was too good to last. The admirably correct and promptly issued Imperial statistics were studied, month after month, by every business man in Germany with a dread that the flood time must be passed, and that the figures must begin to tell the disagreeable story of retrogression. But when, month after month and year after year, the barometer continued to indicate a rise, steady and yet greater and greater, this first sentiment of diffidence began to wear off, and by and by it was replaced by its reverse, by a recklessness and daring, by a wild speculation in all the values that could be traded in and forecast, and by an absolute confidence in the permanence of the "boom" which by this time had percolated down to every stratum of the population. Of course, it would be saying too much to include the whole nation in the above statement. Cool-headed men there remained, and prophets of evil as well, just as they had remained with us during every period of excessive inflation. But the great masses of the people, including the great majority of the commercial classes, were so affected.

Shares in every class of industrial home enterprises, even the worst of wild-cat ones, rose to fabulous heights, and found ready takers. The bourses of Frankfort and Berlin were swamped with industrial papers some of which had but a very slender financial basis, and the nation abandoned its old favourites, the government securities, which yielded but a paltry three and one-half or four per cent., and bought shares in mining, electrical, and every other kind of industrial enterprise, making returns for years, some of them, at the rate of fifteen, twenty, and more per cent., while these shares had risen in the market to twice, thrice or four times their nominal values.

And at last the great crash came. It came otherwise than it would have done in most other countries—it came slowly, reluctantly. And there was no panic. Instead there was desperate and stout resistance to what panicky feeling appeared here

and there. The great financiers and banks of Germany resolutely put their backs to the wall and fought catastrophies inch by inch.

Yet what a showing there was! Such a gigantic and foul failure as that of the Leipziger Bank in Leipsic, with its filial institution, the Trebertrocknungs Company in Cassel, occupies a unique place in financial history. Here was one of the oldest and staidest banks of Germany, which for generations had been considered, especially throughout Saxony, as secure as the Bank of England, and which had again and again been the fiduciary of the Royal Saxon government itself. Through all the rapid rise of Germany's material resources this bank had remained what it had been—ultra conservative, extremely cautious and set in its ways—until a new man got into it. This man's sole claim to consideration had been that he, as a member of the German Merchants' Commission which had gone out to China a few years ago, had written on his return a pamphlet filled with glittering generalities as to the chances of German trade with China and the far East. That was all the recommendation and introduction he had on entering the old bank. He had not even any capital to invest in it. And yet this man had it all his own way in the Leipziger Bank. Somehow the staid old gentlemen there had been induced to look upon him as a very bright representative of the new school of German bankers, and in their blind confidence in him they permitted him to manipulate the funds and the credit of the bank in an utterly reckless and dishonest way.

They allowed him to advance to the concern in Cassel, which had virtually been bankrupt ever since it started, millions upon millions, and let him strain the bank's credit to the utmost, until not only the Cassel concern but the Leipsic bank itself failed with a shortage that ran into the hundreds of millions. Among the depositors who lost considerable by this failure was the Saxon government and court, the Leipsic municipal government, and scores of the oldest and most respectable private societies. The chief culprit is now serving a term in jail, and two of his victims and fellow directors committed suicide.

This was but one of a score of similar failures, nearly all showing a large admixture of dishonesty, of loose business methods,

of wild speculation, etc., although none reached in magnitude or rascality the case above described.

Yet through it all there has been displayed by the German business world a splendid courage and a calmness of judgment which have done much to retrieve the nation's faults—faults bred by a season of inflation, and which seem to pass away in a measure in a season of penitence like the present one. It is a wholesome sign that the press of Germany, both daily and financial, has not been afraid to speak out, but on the contrary has been reading many a severe lesson of late to the nation, among them being this, that there is no occasion hereafter to throw stones at the English or American merchant, the German merchant sitting himself in a glass house.

While this period of depression in Germany is not yet completely over, there are already signs of recovery. A pretty thorough and extensive reform has been wrought in German business circles, and one of the chief causes of the present depression itself, viz., the artificial creation of companies entrusted with the task of inducing cities, towns, and private concerns to use electric motive or lighting power, even in cases where such advanced methods are intrinsically needless, and were going far in advance of present requirements, merely in order to find employment for capital, seems to be undergoing a process of extirpation.

In any event, despite the set-back which came temporarily to German industry and commerce, the figures for her trade last year and this present one show scarcely any abatement in her upward movement. For 1901 there is still a total exceeding the \$2,500,000,000 mark, the decrease all told amounting to but \$140,000,000 for exports and imports combined, and there has been this present year again a slight upward movement. Indeed, it looks as if her imports and exports this year will be somewhat larger than ever. The figures for her iron and steel production in 1900 show a similar tendency. In iron Germany produced last year 8,520,390 tons, as against England's 8,959,691, and this country's 15,878,354; and of steel she produced 6,394,222 tons, as against England's 4,850,000, and against this country's 13,369,613 tons.

This period of depression is tantamount to a rather severe

castigation of the German people for losing temporarily their mental and moral balance under a strong and honeyed dose of rapid prosperity. But it evidently has not seriously checked the nation's progress in the path of commercial advance.

CHAPTER XIV

KRUPP AND SIEMENS

EMINENTLY illustrative of the high degree of industrial efficiency which contemporaneous Germany has attained, are the two mammoth firms of Fried. Krupp and Siemens & Halske, firms which have achieved a world-wide reputation and whose growth and present capacity are the distinctive outcome of those characteristics of the modern German by which he has climbed to his enviable position of to-day, viz., persistence, enterprise coupled with caution, scientific and thorough methods applied to technical pursuits, and infinite painstaking in the mechanical execution of his work.

There are, as briefly referred to elsewhere, a number of other giant establishments in the Germany of to-day, all of which exhibit the same characteristics, and a brief history of which might be fully as interesting and to the point as the above two. Inasmuch, though, as the two named are best known on this side of the water, they have here been selected for the purpose.

The firm of Fried. Krupp is now nearly a century in existence, having been founded in 1810 by Peter Friedrich Krupp in Essen, then a small place unknown beyond a radius of a few miles. Its beginnings were extremely humble, and though the first smelting furnace for the manufacture of cast steel was already built in 1811, and the first workshops were constructed in 1818, it was not until 1843 that the first application of cast steel to small arms barrels was made, and only in 1847 that the first finished gun, a three-pounder, entirely made of cast steel, was turned out. The first universal exposition, the one of 1851, held in London, gave the firm the long-coveted opportunity of attracting the attention of the world to this new and path-breaking industry. The exhibits made there by Krupp accomplished that purpose, and henceforth, with orders coming in from foreign countries, progress was rapid.

Meanwhile, however, the founder of the firm had died, in 1826, of a broken heart, at the early age of thirty-nine, having sunk his entire slender fortune in these early and experimental days of the firm. His ill star had willed it that his time was one of profound peace, when there was no call for arms, good or bad, and when Prussia's slumbering ambition had not yet made the reorganization and new equipment of her army a watchword. His son, Alfred, born in 1812, and early matured in the school of adversity, bravely continued his father's work. The small cottage in which Alfred was born, and in which his father had known much care and sorrow, still stands to this day, in the very heart of the present giant works, as a memento of the humble origin of the family. Alfred Krupp, who died himself in 1887, left testamentary provisions to keep this tiny cradle of his race intact.

It was in 1848 that he had taken over the works as sole proprietor, and in 1853, two years after the London Exposition, he took out his famous patent for the making of weldless steel tires, and in the next year constructed his first twelve-pounder gun. In 1861 he started his fifty-ton hammer, "Fritz," at that time a marvel, to work, and made in the succeeding year his flat-wedge breech-closing arrangement, which was soon followed by the round-wedge one. In 1864 the rail and plate mills were erected, and in 1867 he introduced prismatic powder with seven perforations, and adopted the ring construction for larger guns. In 1886 he incorporated the existing great steel works at Annen with his own, and his son and successor, Friedrich Krupp—the present owner and head of the firm—has since then done much to enlarge the works, its field of operations, and to improve methods. In 1889 he introduced smokeless powder and the horizontal breech-closing arrangement for quick-firing guns; started in 1890 the manufacture of armour plate, using newly built 2,000 and 5,000 ton hydraulic forging presses for the purpose, and purchased in 1893 the existing Gruson Works, near Magdeburg, and in 1896 the Germania Shipyards in Kiel and Berlin. By the census of 1900, the firm employs nearly 50,000 all told, and this figure has since been exceeded. The Germania shipyards in Kiel and Berlin, in 1898 with a force of 2,651, have now more than doubled this number. The firm owns, besides its main works in Essen, whose working army totals 30,000, and

besides the works in Annen and the Gruson works and the Germania yards, four other gigantic blast furnace plants at Rheinhausen, Duisburg, Neuwied and Engers, and also big iron works, foundry and engineering works near Sayn—all lying close to the original establishment. It moreover owns large coal and iron mines in Germany, and likewise iron mines producing ore of exceptional quality at Bilbao, Spain; also a number of quarries, clay and sand pits, and three large sea-going steamers. The Krupp proving grounds near Meppen, Prussia, of a length of ten miles, and with further facilities for firing to a distance of fifteen miles, is a unique feature in itself, of the greatest interest to all army and navy men the world over.

The present owner is in the enjoyment of the largest income within the German empire, paying an income tax on clear annual profits of close on to \$4,000,000. He has refused, on repeated occasions, all titles of nobility and other distinctions of a similar kind, preferring to remain plain Herr Krupp. But he has seen the Kaiser and a score of other crowned heads as guests under his roof, in his splendid estate of Villa Huegel, near Essen, and has dispensed a lavish and tasteful hospitality on these and many other occasions.

The oldest specialty of the Krupp works was the production of crucible steel—that is, of steel made by melting together, in closed crucibles, iron and steel specially produced for this purpose, which is poured from these crucibles into ingot moulds, the largest blocks thus made weighing about ninety tons. It was a block of this crucible steel, faultless in the minutest particular, which first attracted the attention of experts at the London Exposition of 1851 to the then unknown German manufacturer.

In this process only the best raw material is used, all taken from the firm's mines. The ingots and blooms thus obtained are absolutely homogeneous, close-grained and uniform throughout. Such reliability cannot be obtained by any other method of steel production. It is for this reason that this type of steel is used for all purposes where reliability is of the first importance, especially for guns, rifle barrels, and armour-piercing shells, also for the more important structural parts of locomotives, steam engines, marine engines, hoisting machinery, for tool steel and

spring steel, tires and axles for locomotives, tenders and cars, dies of various kinds, etc., and for all such machinery parts where a minimum of wear and tear is desirable, and which demand the greatest possible safety against breakage. The Martin-Siemens (or open-hearth) steel produced at these works is generally used for similar purposes as crucible steel, with the exception of guns. The last-named steel is also much used in fashioning steel parts of ships.

Puddled steel is also produced in enormous quantities, and while mainly used as raw material for crucible steel, there is a great demand for it abroad, where it is sold under the name of Milano and Bamboo steel for the manufacture of tools. The Bessemer steel turned out in large quantities is especially employed in railroad building, such as for rails, fish-plates, sleepers, etc. Besides the grades of steel mentioned, alloys of steel, with nickel, chrome, manganese, tungsten, molybdenum, etc., are produced for particular purposes. Of these alloys, nickel steel is by far the most important, being considered the ideal metal for all constructions. It shows not only higher qualities in the tension tests than the best cast-steel, but possesses that extreme toughness formerly only obtained in the sinewy wrought iron. It is as tough as leather. Krupp has improved on the methods of production, so that his nickel steel has a tensile strength and an elastic limit of 92,500 and 62,600 pounds, respectively, per square inch, which considerably overtops any other record.

This nickel steel makes incontestably the best material for ships' main shafts, and for all such parts of machinery as are obliged to withstand extraordinary strain and yet must be made absolutely secure against the possibility of sudden fracture. Crank shafts weighing up to fifty tons and intended for large steamers are turned out at the Krupp works. The only item telling against a more extensive use of nickel steel for all structural purposes than at present obtains is its vastly increased price.

However, the chief article made of nickel steel at the Krupp works is armour plate. Krupp sold his patent rights to both this country and England, while he is working at more than full capacity in manufacturing plate of this nickel steel for the German navy, for a number of foreign navies, including the Russian, and for private customers. For the German navy

alone scores of thousands of tons of this best of all armour plate will be made by him between this and 1908. The 5,000-ton hydraulic press and the smaller ones of 2,000 tons each are at work on these plates. All the tool machines used in their making are driven by separate electric motors. When the plates made here are ready for reception, careful tests show that, superior to the product of former years, their face is absolutely invulnerable to the hardest steel tools. This layer of hardened steel reaches to about an inch under the surface, and thence very gradually changes to the original material, a soft, tough nickel steel of extraordinary resistance. This excellent quality of the plate is the result of the treatment it undergoes after being rolled, a treatment which has been developed at Krupp's during these last ten years and put into practice by marvelous novel appurtenances. No modern armour-piercing shell can drive its point through the skin, hard as flint, of these plates, and the fragments of projectiles fired against such plates show that their heads have been completely flattened. It is a question of the energy saved in the body of the projectile after such action whether it may still be able to punch a hole into the plate in the way a punching machine will. At any rate, the upsetting and flattening of the shell's head consumes a very considerable part of its energy and changes it into heat, and this explains why these plates offer a resistance equal to that of common steel plates twice their thickness, or of wrought iron armour thrice their thickness. Besides, each plate as a whole possesses, like leather, a toughness in consequence of which even a number of hits close together fail to crack or break it. With such results it is easily understood what extraordinary reduction in the dead weight of armourclads is obtained by the use of this latest product of armour plate manufacture.

But Krupp is popularly known as the "Gun King," and the making of guns is even now his main business. Up to the present he has sold over 50,000 of them, from the smallest quick-firing guns of two-inch calibre up to the largest turret guns of twelve-inch calibre and over, coast guns (up to fifteen inches in calibre) siege and fortress guns, field and mountain artillery, especially the quick-firing varieties. He turns out complete batteries including their accessories and ammunition, projectiles of every

kind, such as armour-piercing and half-armour-piercing shells, common steel shells, mining shells, high explosive shells, steel shells, common cast-iron shells, case shot, fuses and ammunition ready for use, and also rifle barrels. The manufacture of war material is not confined to the Essen works. At the Gruson works Krupp turns out, as a specialty, armoured turrets, chilled cast-iron armour for coast and inland fortifications, gun carriages of special construction, etc.

At Essen and at the other establishments along the Ruhr and Rhine, Krupp manufactures, besides, railroad material of every description, ship-building material, such as plates, stems, stern posts, cylinders, piston rods, crank shafts, and many other things that enter into the construction of a vessel; parts of machinery of all descriptions rough or finished; sheet steel and sheet iron, from the thinnest to a thickness of over thirteen feet; rolls of hard steel for plate-rolling mills, and also hardened rolls for rolling gold and silver; tool steel, files, rock drill steel, steel in bars for all industrial purposes, and many other objects. A rudder frame of cast-steel, twenty-six feet high, and weighing over eleven tons, is among the sights just now at his Essen works of special interest to an expert. Altogether, the works at Essen alone comprise the following shops, viz.:

Two Bessemer steel works (fifteen converters), four Martin steel works, two steel foundries, puddling works, welding shops, foundry for crucible steel, iron foundry, projectile foundry, brass foundry, two annealing shops, hardening shop, crucible shop, rail mill, plate mill, rolling mill for fish-plates, etc., spring shop, hydraulic presses and armour plate mill, hammer shop, wheel forge, hearth forge, horseshoe forge, tire rolling-mill, turning shop for wheels and axles, boiler shop, shop for portable railway material, machine shop 1, file factory, four repairing shops, repairing shop for railways.

Next, the ordnance works, consisting of: Machine shops 2 to 4, gun shops 1 to 6, emery shop, boring shop, hoop shop, fuse shop, burnishing department, gun inspection department, gun carriage shed, gun carriage shops 1 and 2, limber workshop, forge for gun shops, galvanizing and pressing shops, engravers' shop, laboratory workshop, nickel-plating shop, tool store, projectile turning shop, smithy for projectile turning, lead melting shop,

projectile inspection department, gun store, packing shed, straw rope manufacturing shop, proof butts; and test house, chemical laboratories, carpenters', tinsmiths', builders', joiners', cartwrights', painters', mortar shops, saw mills, saddlers' shops, tailor's shop, electrical plant, steam producing plant, gas works, water works, fire department, shops for telegraphs, telephones, lithographic and photographic institutions, cooking plant, and so forth.

An idea of the magnitude of the whole establishment may be obtained when it is mentioned that the coal and coke consumed is now about 1,500,000 tons per annum; that the water consumed is about 9,000,000 tons, or as much as a city of half a million would use; that the gas consumed for lighting purposes alone is over 500,000,000 cubic feet, and that the plant for electric light includes over 2,500 incandescent lamps and 700 arc lamps.

One particular feature of the whole cluster of Krupp enterprises deserves special and more than passing mention. It is that which explains in large part the prodigious and unbroken success of the firm, and furnishes the key to its steady policy as an employer of vast bodies of workmen. All over Germany the mechanic's and laborer's dearest wish is to be inscribed on the Krupp pay-roll. This is not so much caused by the high rate of pay in vogue there, but rather by the admirable and minute manner in which the firm takes care of its employés of every grade, from the humblest to the highest-priced. There are some high officials in Krupp's pay—former colonels of the regular German army artillery, for instance—whose salary and emoluments rise into the scores of thousands every year, and there are others, humble puddlers or stokers, who earn but a modest couple of marks per diem. But they all share in proportion in the far-sighted arrangements made by the firm to shield all the employés against the reverses of fortune—prolonged illness, incapacitation for toil, accidents of a serious nature, death, invalidity, the feebleness of old age, the lack of provision for widows, orphans, aged parents, etc. There is no possibility whatever in the line of adversity that has not been discounted in advance by the firm and its benevolent or semi-benevolent institutions, so that a toiler of common fibre, as well as a skilled

and brainy technician, on entering the service of the firm has the moral certainty of being well and even tenderly taken care of for the rest of his natural life, and that this care will apply after his death to his loved ones—always providing, of course, that his behaviour is what may be reasonably expected, and that his services last for longer than a short spell.

It would require a good-sized volume to describe in detail these institutions and provisions and their genesis, and, indeed, books have been written on this subject ere now. Space, however, will permit of but a cursory glance at the whole interesting topic, a topic of transcendent interest to all large employers the world over, for there can be no doubt that it has been owing chiefly if not solely to this comprehensive care taken of the workmen that such a thing as a strike or even a threat of one has never troubled the firm in the long history of its existence, and this despite the greatest efforts made on many occasions by labour agitators and by the entire Socialist press of Germany to foment dissatisfaction and precipitate strikes. The relations between the Krupps and their hosts of toilers have remained unvaryingly cordial and intimate, differing in this respect enormously from those commonly obtaining in the empire between the wealthy employer and his men.

To quickly run over this chain of institutions specially created by the Krupps (in the course of three generations), it must be mentioned that they consist of seventy-three supply stores, of of which fifty-one are in Essen and the surrounding colonies and twenty-two at the other works; two slaughter houses, one ice factory, one brush maker's shop, one paper bag factory, two tailors' workshops, one shoe maker's shop, one hotel, one club, seven refreshment houses, two cafés, one laundry, one industrial school for adults, three ditto for school children, one household training-school, two infirmaries, barrack hospitals for epidemics, workmen's barracks, dining-rooms for workmen, lodgings for unmarried superior workmen, and the dwelling-house colonies for his workmen at Baumhof, Westend, Cronenberg, Schederhof, Alfredshof (all within or near the confines of Essen), and the Altenhof, a pretty colony for invalid and retired workmen.

On the erection of these various workmen's colonies above enumerated the firm has laid out altogether a sum aggregating

considerably over three million dollars, yielding interest of between 1 1-2 and 2 per cent. only, and in the planning of buildings and the choice and embellishment of sites for this purpose the unflagging practice has been one of steady improvement. The first colonies of Baumhof and Westend were nothing better than closely packed tenements, plain and unpretentious exteriorly and interiorly, though provided with every hygienic device and kept scrupulously neat and in good repair. The later colonies, Cronenberg, Alfredhof, and Schederhof, are far better in every respect—laid out with gardens, the streets wide and lined with trees, and the houses themselves largely on the cottage and one-family plan, avoiding that uniformity and sameness which characterized the earlier efforts in this line.

At the stores the employes obtain every species of goods and provisions at the wholesale cost price, but strictly on a cash basis. Of late years the firm has successfully inaugurated the system of enabling its workmen to purchase their own houses on ground belonging to the Krupps, about a thousand such houses being now in such hands. This policy was persistently frowned upon by the late Alfred Krupp, he fearing all sorts of unpleasant complications, but the present owner has broken with this, and by exercising reasonable caution has avoided these dreaded consequences.

Of course, the firm has to conform, like every other in Germany, with the provisions of the Imperial Workmen's Insurance Law, which, as elsewhere stated, yields the sick, aged or incapacitated toiler a minimum of financial security. But its own policy in this respect, antedating that of the empire by half a century, is far more comprehensive and generous in scope. The firm pays, under the imperial law, a matter of half a million marks, or about one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars, annually into the public treasury for this purpose. But its own exclusive and voluntary provisions demand an annual outlay of about six times that sum, divided and subdivided into sums large and small, so as to fit the exact needs of every case. These various institutions are constantly added to by the present owner, who on one special occasion donated no less than one million marks, or about two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, to one single fund alone, and who has lately enlarged the Altenhof colony,

built invalid and convalescent homes, erected a new workmen's colony (the finest and most homelike of all) in memory of his father, and constructed a score of other buildings for special benevolent purposes besides.

Nevertheless, the consistent policy pursued by him as by his father before him, is to rob all these institutions as far as may be of their purely eleemosynary character, and to exact a certain cash payment, no matter how small, for the enjoyment of the rights and benefits of all these institutions, excepting a very few where the case absolutely required it, as in the Altenhof, for instance. By thus enlisting the coöperation of his men for the financial support of these institutions, he has served two very important ends. He has conserved the sense of self-respect of his employés, and he has made them feel a far greater interest in their success and proper management than if they were supported solely out of his own pocket.

The firm's care, however, did not end with the common grade of toiler in its employ, but extends likewise to its salaried officials. There are a number of funds that were specially created for that purpose, such as compulsory life insurance, sick and accidental insurance benefits, etc., and the coöperation of this higher and highest class of employés is insured by the signing of a contract on entering the service of the firm, whereby a small percentage of the salaries is deducted each pay-day, the firm contributing as much or more towards the fund thus created.

A special colony for this class of well-paid employés has also been built, forming a beautiful thoroughfare in Essen called Hohenzollern Strasse, each house being surrounded by a pretty garden, constructed after special plans of the firm's architects, and presenting a very handsome appearance in every case. The rents charged for these houses also represent about two per cent. on the investment. A very fine and well-appointed club house has also been built by the firm for these high-grade employés, and likewise a theatre and other resorts.

In carrying out such an extensive benefit scheme for its employés of every class, the largest possible opportunity was presented of testing practically a number of mooted questions and of trying all sorts of benevolent and humane experiments. One of these is a system of premiums, awarded in proportion to the

industry, fidelity to duty, and intelligence shown by individual workmen in their allotted fields of labour. The system has, on the whole, worked very satisfactorily. Another has been the regular distribution on special occasions—such as the end of a strenuous campaign for the purpose of finishing an important and remunerative piece of contract work within a certain specified time and of a certain specified quality—of a portion of the profits accruing to the firm, a portion determined beforehand. This has also produced very favourable results, in spite of many predictions to the contrary, and in spite of the fact that elsewhere in German establishments of some magnitude the experiment had miscarried. In short, various incentives, rarely afforded the common workman elsewhere in the empire to intenser and more thoughtful work, have been held out by Krupp to his men, and in almost every instance with good results.

To actively aid in rendering the homes of his men more home-like, and in making their family life more harmonious, purer, and more comfortable than is the case in most of the homes of the industrial toiler, has been another ambition of this remarkable firm, and in this, too, the success attained has been far greater than the firm itself had dared to hope for in the beginning. The industrial and the household and cooking schools in which the wives, daughters and sisters of the employés are trained under competent instruction have been a great boon in this respect. Instruction in every department of domestic work, in sewing, embroidery, in mending and dressmaking, in millinery and other advanced female art, is regularly imparted with excellent result, and in this as well as in the training of nurses, in kitchen and bakery work, the wife of the present owner, a niece of one of the Kaiser's favorites, General von Ende, has all along been taking an active and intelligent interest, so much so that the Empress, on a recent visit, declared this part of the firm's humane endeavors a model for all industrial employers in Germany.

In fine, the brutish, grossly sensual and spendthrift manner in which the average industrial toiler lives and has his being in most of the towns of the empire that are given over principally to manufacturing has been greatly modified for the better by these systematic efforts of the firm to foster the purely human instincts of its army of workers. In this respect, in fact, the Krupp

establishment presents a contrast with similar establishments in Germany which is as striking as it is satisfying, and which seems to give the lie to those in Germany's high councils who maintain that nothing but force and severity will answer with the labouring man. It is, perhaps, in teaching this lesson that the Krupp establishment is most remarkable of all, although to the world at large its chief claim to distinction lies in the fact of having been the pioneer in that vast and all-important field of a highly developed and technically perfected steel industry, an industry which as a matter of fact lies at the root of modern economic progress, and which made its triumphs and successes possible, and furthermore in having carried this industry to the furthest present limits.

In another though in some respects allied field of human activity, the brothers Siemens, pioneers like the Krupps, and like them, too, eminently successful, may stand as the highest type of German industry where industry comes closest to art and science. Their rise, growth and triumph would likewise furnish plenty of material for a book of all-absorbing interest, but for present purposes it will suffice to sketch the bare outlines of the life of this firm.

It consists to-day of three allied establishments—the parent one at Berlin, under the firm name of Siemens & Halske, with large works in Germany and Austria; the London house, Siemens Brothers & Co., and the St. Petersburg house, likewise called Siemens Brothers. Together they have at present 19,000 employés, of whom 4,000 are officials, engineers, scientists, and technicians, and 15,000 are workmen, mechanics, etc. The three brothers, Werner, Carl, and William, have done more than anybody else in developing the field of electrotechnics in its practical application to the needs of the race.

The firm was founded on October 12, 1847, by the artillery lieutenant, Werner Siemens, associating himself with the mechanical engineer, J. G. Halske, both in Berlin. Of the two, however, it was Siemens who had by far the best scientific equipment, and who was possessed of a daring inventiveness and a marvelous power of utilizing resources and entering hitherto untried spheres of activity. Halske was a man of no initiative, timid, and of narrow horizon, and when the first great inter-

national successes came to the young firm, and its range of view and its financial enterprises extended beyond the limits he was able to grasp, he withdrew and left Werner Siemens with his two younger brothers in sole possession of the field.

Werner Siemens and his partner began with a borrowed capital of 6,000 thalers, or about \$4,200, and began the manufacture in Berlin, on a small scale, of the needle telegraph, which Werner technically improved. During the Prusso-Danish war of 1848 he laid the first submarine mines in the harbour of Kiel and in the Rhine near Cologne, following this up with submarine cables for telegraphy, the first ever laid. In 1849 he constructed the first long telegraph line in Germany, between Berlin and Frankfort-on-Main, placing it underground. In 1850 the firm began experimenting with the Morse writing telegraph.

At the London Exposition of 1851 the firm was awarded the council medal, one of the highest prizes. Their first phenomenal work, however, was done during the Crimean War for Russia, laying in a short time telegraph lines between the Prussian frontier to Warsaw, St. Petersburg (a distance of over 1,000 miles), and later to Odessa, Kieff, Reval, Helsingfors, Kovno, and to Sebastopol itself, where at a certain time Siemens' perfected telegraph apparatus was worked during the siege both on the Russian and the British sides. Owing to the speedy and reliable manner in which the firm had served Russia in those early days, the Russian government appointed them contractors for the erection and maintenance of telegraph lines within the whole empire, and from that time on the firm did a steady and flourishing branch business in St. Petersburg.

In 1853 another brother, William, after doing a successful business in England with the telegraph and cable apparatus of the Berlin home firm, was entrusted with the management of a branch house in London, one which steadily grew until at times it outvied the parent in size and earnings. The first two important strokes of business done there by the firm was the furnishing of all the material needed in the government telegraph lines in India, and later on in the manufacture and invention of a water meter. In 1857 they laid, for an English firm, the cable connecting Sardinia with Bona in Africa, at a depth of 10,000 feet below the sea surface, and after an English contractor had

thrice failed. In the execution of this difficult task Werner Siemens discovered and fixed for all time the scientific foundation for the laying of cables. In 1859 the firm built the cable line from Suez via Aden to Kurrachee in India, a total length of about 3,500 miles.

In 1866 the firm showed the first little dynamo-electric machine, a mine exploder, to a body of scientists in Berlin. Shortly afterwards they laid the overland telegraph line between England and India, via Germany, Russia, and Persia, as far as Calcutta, a distance of about 7,000 miles, fitting it out with the new automatic telegraph system, likewise an invention of the firm. From that time on, the business of the firm having grown enormously both in bulk and in intricacy, the policy was inaugurated of admitting to partnership or entrusting with the direction of various departments, young and ambitious men of talent, such as the two electrical engineers, Carl Frischen and Hefner-Alteneck, who later on made some inventions of extraordinary importance, which the firm subsequently exploited.

Early in the seventies the firm devised some startling improvements on the Morse telegraph, such as the perfecting of the ink writers and embossers, and constructed a new instrument for automatic fast writing, the chain fast writer, the relay fast writer, and fast printers, all of which was accomplished by Hefner-Alteneck, while Frischen successfully devoted his attention to the railway block-system. In 1874 the firm succeeded in breaking the monopoly of the existing British cable ring, built its own cable-laying steamer, the Faraday, and erected its own large gutta percha works in Charlton, near London, so that its employes there numbered 2,500, and enabling them to lay a number of big cable lines to America and elsewhere. The firm went on devising improvements both in the material used and in the manner of laying submarine cables, and the most perfect of these lines was laid in the summer of 1900, for the Commercial Cable Co., which formed a supplement to the cable which the German government had ordered at the same time. The firm also laid, from 1876 on, a network of underground telegraph lines through Germany. At the Paris Exposition of 1900 the firm placed, side by side, the two great inventions of its own, the differential lamp of the eighties and the electric tramways of the nineties, both

from an economic standpoint of vast importance in the development of modern industry, and received for its exhibits the highest awards granted by the jury to any exhibitor, of whatever nationality, in cognate lines.

For considerable time past, since about 1890, the best energies of the firm have been engrossed in the construction of electric plants, of electric railways, trolleys, central stations, etc., and in this respect it has done more in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, England, South America, and elsewhere than any other single firm, and has been the chief factor in raising German electrotechnics to its present height. The firm has been constructing dynamos in Berlin and Vienna at the rate of 200,000 kilowatts per annum. In applying themselves to this task Siemens & Halske created, as the first 1,000 h. p. electrical engine, a totally new type of dynamo machine, the so-called inner-pole machine, leading to a new era in dynamo construction. In order to display a more intense activity in the line of dynamo building, the firm found it necessary to encircle the inland and foreign countries with a net of technical branch offices, a novel and bold move, which at the time and since has been much criticized. Among the later achievements of the firm, the improvement of the Hughes apparatus deserves to be mentioned, and the large telegraph offices at Berlin, Munich, Nuremberg, and Stuttgart were equipped with it. They also invented a contrivance supplying ships with electric power transmission, especially for operating armoured turrets of men-of-war, and invented and practically applied the rotary current plant to railway stations, the first successful instance on a large scale being in the new and enormous central station in Dresden. They have constructed electric elevators as early as 1880, electric hammers, rock drills, electric ploughs, etc. They were also the first in the world to solve the problem, to a certain extent at least, of operating long-distance railways by electricity.

Much has also been done by the firm in railroad signals, night signal apparatus for ships, railroad safety appliances, electric switches, electric signals, telephones microphones (of which last year they manufactured 60,000 each for the Berlin postal authorities), megaphones, and loud-speaking telephones. The firm was the inventor of the cyanide of potassium process of

extracting gold from tailings and slime, and they lead in the matter of constructing electric smelting furnaces.

Thus the firm has maintained up to the present, all through the long space of fifty-five years, an unbroken reputation of being always abreast of the times in both scientific research and in technical fructification of the latest inventions, although in its composition it has undergone great changes. Werner, the greatest genius of the family, both in theory and practice, is dead, and his two brothers likewise. The sons of these men are now at the helm, and the financial management has been greatly modified.

As to the relations subsisting this long time between the founders of the firm and their employés, they have, as in the case of the Krupps, been uniformly characterized by a spirit of mutual kindness and forbearance. No strikes have ever troubled the firm, and as early as 1872, while the concern was still in its infancy, the stockholders first created a beneficiary fund for their employés. From that on a spirit of fairness and a willingness to assist employés in distress has been uniformly shown by the Siemens. So that in this respect, as in others, the firm resembles that of Krupp. Both seem to be, indeed, living and powerful exponents in Germany of the fact that it pays employers to treat their employés with more than mere justice.

CHAPTER XV

SHIPPING

OVER the portal of the Navigation House in Bremen may be read the Latin device: "*Navigare necesse est.*" And, indeed, to Bremen and Hamburg and some other German cities navigation is a necessity. But not only to them—to the whole of Germany to-day, an absolute necessity. For the recent development of that country on industrial and commercial lines has been such that the cessation of German marine transport, if only for the short space of a month, would be a very serious national disaster. It would stop her manufactures; it would work temporary ruin to her trade; it would bring her people to the brink of starvation, and beggar thousands of her merchants. Those beehives of human industry along the Rhine and its tributaries would become mute, and the long freight trains which now at all hours wend their way, laden with the spoils of every clime, from the seaboard to the inland towns, supplying their toilers with the rawstuffs to be wrought into finished fabrics, and empty stomachs with the wherewithal to live, would idly clog the rails. Hundreds of thousands of tons of manufactured products, intended for shipment to the four quarters of the globe, would encumber warehouses and docks, unable to leave for their destination. For Germany is now essentially an exporting and importing country, unable to live for even a month without supplies from abroad, just like England.

Time was when Germany, like this country, "was sufficient to herself"; when her fields and meadows brought forth enough nourishment to all her people. That time, however, is past. She now cannot feed all her hungry mouths. She would have to let die of starvation every third inhabitant of the empire, were she to rely solely on her own agricultural produce. This is a truth which has not yet been sufficiently recognized within her borders. But unpalatable as it is to her, it is, nevertheless,

a truth. The imperial census of 1895 and the one of 1900 proclaim the fact in unmistakable language to the whole world. No legislation will change this, or if changed it would at the same time precipitate a gigantic economic crisis, a crisis so pitiless and far-reaching that one stands aghast at the mere idea of it. Germany had the ambition to become a great commercial nation, a vast emporium and centre of international trade. Well, she has become that, but with the incalculable benefits thus accruing to her she must also accept the inevitable penalties.

The enormous and rapid rise of shipping has gone parallel with the rise in industry and commerce. It is the growth of the last two decades, and more especially of the last one. When the nineteenth century dawned, German seafaring had almost become a lost art. Hamburg, till then one of the most prosperous and important shipping centres on the European continent, had been doomed to almost annihilation by the Napoleonic policy of shutting off the whole continent from English sea trade. But it is precisely Hamburg which to-day illustrates most strikingly Germany's rise in shipping. Up to 1872 Hamburg was more an English than a German harbour. In that year 5,913 ships put into that leading German port, with a total capacity of 2,100,000 register tons. Of these the English vessels showed 1,100,000 tons and the German vessels but 658,000 tons, the remainder being vessels of other nationalities. Fifteen years later the point had been reached where the German vessels exceeded the English both in number and capacity, for out of a total number of 7,308 ships, with 3,900,000 tons, that arrived in Hamburg in 1887, there were 3,674 German with 1,734,271 tonnage, and but 2,509 English, with 1,696,181 tonnage. Since 1895 German superiority has become a settled feature. In 1900, of the 13,102 ships that arrived in Hamburg, having a joint capacity of 8,000,000 tons, there were 7,640 German ships with 4,300,000 tons and 3,442 English with 2,800,000 tons. Of these English vessels about one-half, viz., 1,816 with 1,300,000 tons, were colliers. And as in number, the German vessels have also increased in size. In 1872 the German vessel averaged about one-half the size of the English one. To-day the German vessel averages fifty per cent. more in size than the English one.

Up to 1872 the London shipper and trader was the middleman

for Hamburg. In London the goods arrived first, from the British colonies and from nearly all far-away countries, and after selecting from this wealth of goods the choicest and best for the English market, the London merchant sent a portion of the remainder over to Hamburg, to supply the continental market. The development of Hamburg and Germany as a whole wrought an entire change in this. The direct transatlantic trade of Hamburg grew by mighty bounds. It grew at a much larger rate than the city's trade with England, although that, too, has increased wonderfully. Between 1899 and 1901 the transatlantic trade of Hamburg increased by 279,000 tons, while its trade with English ports increased but 210,000 tons. In 1901 there arrived in Hamburg 1,612 vessels of a total tonnage of 3,600,000, with transatlantic freights on board, and 11,235 ships of together 4,800,000 tons from European ports.

The receding wave of English trade to Hamburg is also seen in the figures given for Hamburg's quay traffic. These quays, because of the relatively high dues exacted, are only used by ships with costly cargoes. In 1897, of the 4,341 ships with 3,500,000 tons which there loaded and unloaded, there were still 1,768 English ones with 1,300,000 tons, as against 1,715 German ones with 1,900,000 tons. But in 1901 out of the total of 4,973 ships that put in at these quays, having a combined tonnage of 4,700,000 tons, there were 2,116 German with 2,900,000 tons, as against only 1,862 English ones, having a tonnage of but 1,300,000.

Hamburg is indeed the best illustration to be found of Germany's rise as a seafaring nation. It is now by far the largest harbour on the European continent, having left Marseilles and Bordeaux far in the rear years ago, and being exceeded in number of ships and in bulk of value of traffic by only one other harbour in the world, viz., London. But she has done, too, everything which enterprise and wise foresight could do to bring this about. Hamburg has spent more money than any other two harbours in the world together during the last score of years to perfect her technical facilities. Her system of quays and docks is the best in existence, and the twenty-five million dollars laid out by her municipality and her shipowners in these improvements are bringing rich fruit. All these improvements are made of durable

material, stone and iron and steel, are handsome in appearance, and are equipped with hydraulic machinery, with cranes and other hoisting apparatus, that are equal to any emergency. In fact, to-day hydraulic engineers the world over go to Hamburg just to study these triumphs of professional skill, as they formerly used to go to London and Liverpool. The water front of Hamburg, with its miles of docks and quays, is a modern marvel of practical genius, and may stand for a fitting and eloquent type of material progress in Germany. American engineers are particularly struck with that fact on their first visit to Hamburg, and with patriotic qualms they draw involuntary comparisons with the ragged and ill-appointed water fronts of our leading American harbour cities, in whose management unfortunately no such prevision and wisdom is shown.

And there is another thing that needs pointing out. Hamburg is now drawing a steady and ever-increasing revenue from these costly improvements, revenues which are even now equivalent to a good percentage on the capital invested, while the indirect gain accruing to the city in attracting a larger and larger volume of shipping is many times greater. The thing has paid in every sense of the word.

What is said here of Hamburg is equally true of the other German harbours, though not in the same ratio. It applies to Bremen, whose growth, too, in every respect has been remarkable. It has grown to almost 200,000 population, as against Hamburg's 700,000, and its shipping has more than doubled since the empire was founded. It applies to Stettin, whose population is a quarter of a million, and whose trade has grown fourfold, and which not only has appropriated to itself a large portion of the Scandinavian and Russian Baltic trade formerly possessed by Copenhagen and Gothenburg, but has reached out to America as well and includes a regular freight and passenger steamer line to New York. It applies to Dantzic, now a city of 150,000, and whose shipping interests are again what they were in the Middle Ages. It applies to Elbing and Pillau and some other Baltic harbours of Prussia near the Russian border, and it applies to a dozen smaller ports on the North Sea, like Geestemünde, Vegesack, Emden, Wilhelmshaven, and others. It applies above all to Kiel, the terminus of the Baltic Canal, the seat of the im-

mense imperial navy yards, and of the Krupp Germania shipyards, and now a city of 120,000, having quadrupled its size since 1870.

Rapid and yet steady progress is seen everywhere in the German shipyards, and intense activity as well. From very small beginnings they have risen step by step until they equal the British ones in efficiency and capacity. Nay, in the light of recent experience it must even be admitted that their claim of building the finest and speediest ocean greyhounds seems well founded.

At the close of 1901, Germany had 4,017 seagoing vessels afloat, with a tonnage slightly exceeding the two million and a half mark, and has attained second place in the world, England alone surpassing her. Of these less than 400,000 tons fall to the share of her Baltic fleet, the rest having their home in some North Sea harbour. A total of over 50,000 men formed the crews of these ships. At the end of the war with France, in 1871, German shipping was still so far behind that it was largely confined to that inland sea, the Baltic. Of the ships then, but few were steamers and hardly any of iron. But 147 were steamers in 1871, and 4,372 sailing vessels, the total tonnage for all German seagoing vessels then being considerably below 500,000, having since quintupled. Now there are 1,293 steamers, against 2,288 sailing vessels, and of the steamers all but a few are built of steel, while even the sailing vessels are for the most part of the same durable material. In size, too, there has been the same rate of increase. Of her sailing vessels, 158 are 2,000 tons or over, and the largest sailing vessels afloat to-day are German. They are leviathans of 4,000 tons, and trade only between the west coast of South America and Hamburg.

The larger part of our American shipping plies on the big lakes, the tonnage of these vessels exceeding the seagoing ones. Germany, too, has besides the above ocean ships a very large number attending to her river and inland lake traffic. No later figures exist than those for 1897, but in that year there were 22,564 such vessels, with a total tonnage of 3,370,447, of which 20,611 were propelled by wind and 1,953 by steam or electricity. Many of these steamers are of good size and well appointed for the passenger traffic, and 2,519 of these river ships were over

300 tons in size. The passenger steamers on the Rhine, on the Elbe and on the Weser and Oder are handsome and substantial vessels, and equipped with a high degree of comfort. The extraordinary development of this internal system of water communication has been greatly aided, of course, by the fact that all the larger German rivers are navigable by good-sized vessels for great distances, and that they flow through densely settled parts of the country. Such relatively unimportant rivers as the Pregel, the Vistula, and the Ems have, for instance, navigable parts of a respective length of 273, 508, and 274 kilometres. The navigable canals constructed to connect the Oder and Elbe rivers and their tributary systems have a length of 150 kilometres, and the Elbe system alone has navigable parts of over 3,000 kilometers, or about 2,000 miles, while the Oder system shows navigable parts of a total length of 2,300 kilometres, and the Weser of 1,100 kilometers, while the Rhine navigable system on German territory is 2,700 kilometres in length.

The quantities of goods of every description that are transported on these internal waterways are simply enormous. Thus, at Emmerich, the German-Dutch frontier station on the lower Rhine, there passed in 1899 altogether some 7,000,000 tons of various wares on board of German Rhine vessels, ores, cereals, petroleum, coal and flour being the leading products among them. The goods reaching Berlin by water on the Spree (a tributary of the Elbe River) and Havel, amounted last year in bulk to about 9,000,000 tons, and in value to some \$120,000,000. From Hamburg the Elbe ships brought in 1899 goods amounting to some 4,200,000 tons in weight and about \$56,000,000 in value. These are but figures taken at random.

After all, though, it is Germany's ocean traffic that the world at large feels mainly interested in. And brief mention of some of her largest shipbuilding firms and of her leading steamer lines will be necessary to give an adequate idea of that.

Of the latter, the Hamburg-America and the Bremen Lloyd companies are, of course, best known to Americans. They are, too, the most representative and the largest German lines.

There had been, prior to the founding of these two companies, a sort of regular ocean passenger and freight communication between New York on the one side and Hamburg and Bremen

on the other. The first of these regular lines was started in 1828 by some Hamburg capitalists, but after a few years failed. Next, the Hamburg firm of Sloman & Co. organized another line in 1836, but it never amounted to a great deal. Then, the Ocean S. S. Navigation Company was started, in 1874, for traffic between Bremen and New York, the shareholders being the Bremen municipality and a number of wealthy German merchants both in New York and in Germany. They built the steamer *Washington*, which thereafter plied regularly, for a number of years, between those two ports. It was a paddle steamer of some 1,500 tons, and rather slow. The *Washington* flew the American flag.

These were the first modest beginnings in regular ocean traffic between this country and the two enterprising German Hansa towns.

On May 27, 1847, the Hamburg-America Line was founded in Hamburg, the initial capital being 465,000 marks, or a little over \$100,000. With this money they built two sailing vessels intended primarily for steerage passengers—*i. e.*, emigrants, and for freight. The first of these vessels was the *Deutschland*, of 717 register tons, and with a capacity for 200 steerage and 20 cabin passengers. It cost 132,000 marks, or about \$32,000. This ship was then the first, and out of it has grown under that cautious and wise management for which that line as well as the Bremen Lloyd Company have ever been noted, the present enormous fleet. The Hamburg-America Line is to-day the largest in the world, no British or French company comparing either in size or in steamer connections with it.

Success and growth came slowly. The company increased the number of its sailing vessels to six, with together 4,000 register tons capacity, and each of these six vessels made three trips back and forth per annum between Hamburg and New York. They required about forty-two days for the western and thirty days for the eastern, the homeward, trip. In 1855 the company started out on the "new tack," with two steamers. One of them was the *Borussia*, of 2,026 tons, and of twelve knots speed. This ship had to be built in England, no German shipyard those days being able to construct a vessel of this size. It had a crew of seventy-seven men, and the English government hired the

Borussia during the Crimean War to transport British troops. But in March, 1856, the *Borussia* started on regular trips between Hamburg and New York. Soon after, with growing success, the Hamburg-America Line got a formidable rival in the North German Lloyd, founded in 1857, and the competition thus resulting between the two companies proved a very material element in the increasing efficiency of both lines.

The Hamburg-America Line grew apace. In 1880 the company's capital had been raised to 15,000,000 marks, or nearly \$3,750,000, and its fleet consisted of twenty ocean steamers, with which they sent 58,000 passengers and 273,000 cubic metres of freight to this country. The first rapid steamer built by the company was the *Hammonia*, which began her trips in 1883, and from that time on the company built one fast steamer after another. But it was particularly the last decade during which the Hamburg-America Line, simultaneous with the empire's phenomenal rise in commerce and industry, made its most rapid progress. New branch lines were started to Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Canada, Mexico, Genoa, far Asia, South America, etc., and the freight traffic to New York rose stupendously.

Up to the time the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* began to run, not long ago, the company had, too, unquestionably the fastest and largest steamer afloat in the world—the *Deutschland*. The *Kronprinz* now contests that claim. The *Deutschland* was constructed by the Vulcan Works in Stettin, and in 1900 began regular trips to New York. The *Deutschland* measures 686 feet in length, 67 feet in width, and 44 feet in depth. She carries 16,502 register tons, which enormous space is, however, almost entirely reserved for passengers and their requisites, so that hardly anything is left for freight purposes. She has a recorded speed of 23.36 knots, and her machinery has 35,600 horsepower. She has a crew and other personnel of 525 people, and room for 767 cabin and 300 steerage passengers. She requires 485 carloads of coal on every trip, and cost \$3,000,000 to build.

It is interesting to note the rate at which the steamers of this company, as their cost, size, and machinery were gradually increased, have gained in speed. In 1858 the *Hammonia* made her fastest trip between Southampton and New York in 13 days

and 1 hour. In 1867 the second *Hammonia* made it in 9 days and 3 hours. In 1891 the *Fuerst Bismarck*, one of the company's new fast steamers, reduced this for the same trip to 6 days, 11 hours, 44 minutes. And in 1900 the *Deutschland* further reduced this time to 5 days, 7 hours, 38 minutes.

The increase in vessels and tonnage has proceeded at an accelerated pace with the Hamburg-America Line of late. During 1900 some 145,000 tons were added to its capacity, and during 1901 the increase was even larger. In 1900 it sent 160,000 persons across the seas. Besides its branch lines mentioned before, it now sends seven or eight steamers per month to the West Indies, has regular communication to Galveston, to the west coast of America, including San Francisco; undertakes regular passenger pleasure trips as far south as the Mediterranean and as far north as the North Cape; and sends two other lines of steamers around Africa, one along the east coast, via Suez, and another along the west coast.

On December 31, 1901, the annual report of the company showed that it had worked with a capital of 160,000,000 marks, or about \$40,000,000, and had earned profits from the trips undertaken by its vessels to the amount of \$4,500,000. Its fleet of ocean steamers at that date numbered 127, with a capacity of 630,091 register tons, and 152 river steamers of together 31,264 tons. This includes thirteen vessels now under construction, of together 77,730 tons. The number of its employes ashore is over 10,000, and on the seas about 7,500.

But slightly behind the Hamburg-America is the North German Lloyd in Bremen. Its beginnings also as humble, its growth as gradual, the Lloyd started in 1857 with three small steamers, the *Adler*, *Möwe*, and *Falke*, which plied regularly between Bremen and the English ports, while four good-sized propeller steamers had been ordered built in English and Scotch yards, intended to inaugurate regular and relatively fast steamer communication with New York. The *Bremen* was the first of these vessels, and she made her initial trip on June 19, 1858, having 94 passengers and 100 tons of freight on board. This vessel had the respectable length of 334 feet, and a depth of 42, measuring from the upper deck, and was of 700 horsepower. There was considerable comfort on board, for besides

luxurious furniture and good beds, there was also a fine piano, two bath-rooms, and a good library. The trip to New York took 15 days, but the return voyage was made in 12 1-2 days. During the same year three other steamers were put into service, the *Hudson*, the *Weser*, and the *New York*. The service was a fortnightly one. The next year the United States and the British governments entrusted the carrying of the mails to the Lloyd, a fact which helped it greatly in business and prestige.

The Lloyd started the building of fast steamers soon after the *Arizona*, of the Guion Line, in 1878, had shown a speed of 16 knots, and in 1881 the *Elbe* made the first fast trip to New York, two other speedy steamers, the *Werra* and the *Fulda*, following soon. At that time, too, the service was changed to a weekly one, and the duration of the trip to New York had been reduced to eight or nine days. It was then that the Lloyd scored the triumph of carrying the United States mail to Southampton and London in the shortest time on record—till then, of course. An increasing number of these fast steamers was built, and the capital stock of the company was several times raised. In 1885 the German empire made a contract with the Lloyd for regular mail steamer lines to a number of ports in East Asia and Australia.

The *Deutschland* of the Hamburg Line was answered by the Lloyd with the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. Its dimensions are: 663 feet in length, 66 feet in width, and 43 feet in depth. It holds 15,000 register tons, and is considerably larger than the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, exceeding that leviathan slightly in speed as well. Her machinery shows 35,000 horsepower, and her bunkers contain 4,450 tons of coal on leaving either port. Her crew numbers 500, and she can accommodate 650 first-class passengers, 350 second-class, and 700 steerage passengers.

At present the Lloyd operates twenty-seven steamer lines—five lines to North America, two to South America, two to far Asia, one to Australia, four branch lines connecting with the far Asia lines, nine branch lines in the coast and archipelago service of far Asia, and four European lines. Last year Lloyd ships made 4,707,000 sea miles, and transported 253,225 passengers, thus beating the world record. In all, up to 1901, the company's ships transported 4,160,431 passengers. The consumption of coal during 1900 amounted to 20,750,000 marks, or over

\$5,000,000, and for provisions it spent some \$2,300,000. The company's capital now reaches 110,000,000 marks, or about \$26,000,000. Their combined fleet is manned by over 10,000 persons, of whom 505 are captains and 522 engineers. On shore the Lloyd employs 320 clerks and managers, 2,000 technical employ  s, and over 6,000 hands as stevedores, long-shoremen and so forth.

There are seventy-seven large-sized ocean steamers in the Lloyd, forty-six coastwise steamers in the Chino-Indian trade, and forty-three river steamers with a tonnage of 598,457. As a specialty it deserves mention that the Lloyd has also a training ship of 2,581 tons, the *Duchess Sophie Charlotte*, in continuous operation, whereon the future officers and engineers to man the Lloyd vessels are learning their business practically and theoretically, and very thoroughly at that. This ship, under the command of one of the best old seadogs of the Lloyd, Capt. G. Warnecke, is undertaking trips around the world with this crew, more or less advanced from its embryo state, of course. The pressure to be enrolled in the ranks of this future   lite corps of the German merchant marine was so strong that but one out of every six could be actually chosen. Another similar vessel is now in construction. This idea, which originated with the management of the Lloyd, is so sound and sensible that it will doubtless be imitated by other big lines, as it seems to vouchsafe a regular and perfectly trained corps of men for every branch of the company's service, which means, of course, the perpetuation of efficient service on the part of the concern itself. The pension system of the Lloyd—although not an exclusive feature, since it occurs also in the Hamburg and all other German lines—is brought to a high degree of excellence, and every one of its employ  s knows on entering the company's service that he is—barring serious misbehaviour—practically provided for for life, and his family, present or prospective, as well. That, of course, is an enormous incentive for its men to do their best, and to die, if need be, in fulfilling their duty—a thing which has been repeatedly exemplified by Lloyd captains and men.

It is of interest to note that, contrary to statements made in the English and American press, the German steamer lines are not subsidized at all by their home or any other government.

Hence their success as competitors cannot be accounted for in that way. And the payments they do get from the imperial German treasury are confined to an adequate remuneration for carrying the mails to America, Asia, Africa, and Australia. But this remuneration is by no means as large as the one paid by the English government to British lines. In the year 1899 the sum paid by the British government to British vessels for mail service amounted to \$3,810,000, as against \$1,920,000 paid German vessels for the like service by the German government—just about one-half the former sum. Besides that, the British government obligated itself to a further annual payment to British steamer lines of \$300,000, for which sum the latter agreed to put such of their steamers as are suited for the purpose at the government's disposal as cruisers in time of war, while the German steamship companies are under the same obligation without receiving any specific payment therefor.

Whether the "Morganizing" of the leading British steamer lines, and the special agreement made also with the Hamburg-America and the North German Lloyd lines, will have an altering influence upon the management of the latter, and especially whether it will tend to stop progress in the further development of speed and efficiency in steamer service, remains to be seen. It is not unlikely that that, in a measure, might be one of the effects of that gigantic deal. But at any rate, data so far at hand do not indicate a tendency toward retardation, and it may be expected, on the other hand, that competition with the companies not comprehended in the "pool," as well as competition with new lines to be started, may counteract such a tendency, if it should become apparent. Another thing—the German companies have vigorously disputed, and do so still, that their understanding of the "pool" is of a nature to in any way curtail their independence, or to make it superfluous for them to go on doing their best.

It is quite possible, however, that the latest conjuncture brought about by the efforts of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan may have the effect of gradually increasing again the rate of steamer freights, which, indeed, have of recent years sunk to a point never before equaled in low compensation. Some figures will show to what an extent this is true.

According to some statistics lately published by the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, the average freight per ton on wheat or maize from New York to Liverpool was thirty-three shillings in 1873, and went down steadily until in 1894 it amounted to only six shillings. According to figures collected by the New York Chamber of Commerce, the above data were correct for those commodities, while the decrease in freight charges when measured by the cubic foot was fifty per cent. Cereals from the lower Danube were freighted in 1870 to Hamburg at 37 marks (equal to so many shillings) the ton, while in 1895 the rate had sunk to 11 marks. The cost of water freight on a ton of rice from Rangoon to Hamburg was in 1872 between 73 and 80 marks, and had fallen to between 25 and 26 marks in 1895. Since then there has been a further decrease, and water freights now have reached the lowest ebb on record. In the fall months of last year a ton of cereals was transported from New York to Hamburg at 5 marks. That was the average, but in many cases the price paid was considerably lower than that. In May of 1899, when the official rates between New York and Hamburg varied between 15 and 17 shillings, Berlin corn merchants paid but 4.40 marks (a trifle above one dollar) per ton of maize from Boston to Hamburg, and but 2.48 (or sixty cents) per ton from Portland to Hamburg. Large steamers leaving New York on the home trip to Germany have often taken freight at even lower rates than the above, making a virtue of necessity; nay, in many instances they have transported freight gratis. The same applies to British steamers; so that last year, on a number of occasions, Liverpool houses had wheat delivered from New York at ninepence the ton. Of course, the scant crops in this country last year had considerable to do with this.

It is impossible, of course, for German internal trade and transport to compete with such figures. At present, for instance, a ton of German cereals going by water and rail from Insterburg (East Prussia) to Berlin has to pay 32 marks for freight alone, and from the same point to Mannheim (Grandduchy of Baden) it costs even 48 marks, or twelve dollars. Thus, corn or wheat brought from American ports to Germany, even after paying the inland railway freight, can be laid down much cheaper than when brought from points in her agricultural east and north.

Germany is now contemplating the construction of the Rhine-Weser Canal. After the completion of this waterway there will be a great reduction in internal freights. It is estimated that a ton of cereals can be sent from Bromberg (Province of Posen, in Eastern Prussia) to Herne in Westphalia for 13.70 marks, which would mean a reduction of about 250 per cent.

To further her shipping, and likewise to render her navy more independent of England in the matter of coal supply, Germany is now bending her energies to the acquisition of coaling stations. Of late she has made arrangements for large German coal depots at Port Said, at the end of the Suez Canal. She is erecting similar depots or coaling stations in the Pacific Ocean, more particularly in the Bismarck Archipelago, in Samoa, on the Carolines, and on the Marshall Islands. The possession of Kiao-chau has enabled a German company to build a railroad to the wonderfully productive mines of splendid hard coal in Wei Hseen, and she counts on supplying in the near future not only her own ships, merchant and naval, with this coal, but also all the other nationalities that have need for it. She will have a virtual monopoly in that line along the whole coast of China, at least until some more good coal mines are opened up by other enterprising nations having large interests in China.

Having thus outlined the resources and present status of the leading German steamer lines, and also the extent of German shipping, it is needful to say a few words about the principal German shipyards, their humble origin, and their present capacity. Along the coasts of the North Sea and of the Baltic, Germany has now about a score of shipyards, of which six or seven are of large size and high efficiency, while the others are of medium capacity. The small ones, numbering about 150, are here left unconsidered.

The Vulcan Works near Stettin are the largest and in a sense the most efficient. They have been in existence fifty-one years, but for a long time the building of locomotives and other machinery was the leading feature. They have built and sold some 2,000 locomotives. It was with the rise of Germany as a seafaring and naval power that the Vulcan gradually developed as a constructor of large and fine vessels. From the start the German government, recognizing the disadvantages and dangers

of relying on a foreign country in the building of vessels, both for the navy and merchant marine, systematically set to work to emancipate itself from this state of dependence. It was uphill work, of course, and it was only within the past two years that the end was fully attained. During its chrysalis condition German shipping was largely dependent on British yards. In 1870 the Vulcan was still insignificant when compared with its older, more experienced and much wealthier rivals across the Channel. Since its inception, the works have been enlarged fifteenfold, and its capital has increased from \$500,000 to \$7,500,000. The works cover now nearly 100 acres, and the number of its toilers has risen to over 8,000.

The Vulcan began the construction of its first naval vessels in 1866, for the then North German Confederation, but these were all of small size, and it was not until 1869 that it constructed the first large-sized machinery for the iron-clad *Hansa*. In the following year, 1870, during the war with France, the Vulcan had increased its capacity and efficiency to the point of being able to solicit and execute an order for a large iron-clad, the *Preussen*, that being one of the first new vessels to enter the newly formed imperial German navy. Altogether, the Vulcan has built 250 large vessels—of which sixty-two were for either the German or foreign navies. The rest were merchant marine steamers.

Among the men-of-war built for Germany there were the battleships *Brandenburg* and *Weissenburg*, each of 10,500 tons, and which are among the finest in the German navy. They are now building a larger one for Germany of 11,700 tons. For the transatlantic fleet of the North German Lloyd the Vulcan has built such leviathans of acknowledged speed and efficiency as the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, of 14,500 tons; the *Friedrich der Grosse*, of 10,500 tons; the *Königin Louise* and the *König Albert*, of similar capacity; the *Prinzess Irene*, of 11,000 tons; and the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, of 15,000 tons. For the Lloyd the Vulcan has now a ship in construction which will be named the *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, and which will overtop all previous efforts of any steamer line or shipyard in the world. It is 706 feet in length, and of 20,000 register tons; its machinery will be 42,000 horsepower. This vessel, just launched, will begin its trips to New

York next spring. It is expected to reduce the duration of the journey to an even five days, or less.

For the Hamburg-America Line the Vulcan has, amongst others, built the Fuerst Bismarck, the Patricia, of 13,293 tons; the Hamburg, of 10,599 tons; the Deutschland, of 16,500 tons and of 36,000 horsepower, and the Kiao-chau, of 11,000 tons.

Thus, then, the Vulcan has successively and within the space of a few years constructed the largest and fastest, the best and the most luxuriously equipped steamers afloat, and this undeniable fact speaks, of course, for itself.

For the Chinese navy the Vulcan has built more than one-half of all its vessels, and it has also built a number of the most efficient Russian, Greek, Japanese, and other foreign naval vessels.

Next to the Vulcan in size are the Schichau Works, which originally were started in a small way in Elbing, a town of medium size to the east of the Baltic shore. In 1891 the firm enlarged its capacity greatly by founding a vast shipyard in the large harbour city of Dantzic, and it has besides extensive repair shops in Pillau, likewise on the Baltic coast. Altogether, they have now some 7,000 men in their employ, and a technical corps of 181, with their central offices in Elbing.

The Schichau Works' specialty is torpedo boats. Of the 800 sea and river steamers built by them, no less than 300 were torpedo boats. They have sold these both to the German navy and to the navies of Russia, Austria, China, Chile, Italy, Brazil, Argentina, Turkey and the United States. Their torpedo boats of recent build have achieved as high a speed as the best English ones, with a maximum of 36.7 knots.

The firm of Blohm & Voss in Hamburg is third in size and importance amongst the private shipbuilders of the empire. This firm has now been in existence twenty-five years, and has constructed in that time no less than 153 large vessels, of which sixty-seven alone had a joint capacity of 200,000 tons and 160,000 horsepower. They have now in construction one large iron-clad battleship and one large iron-clad cruiser for the German navy, and ten big steamers, whereof two of unusual size are for the Hamburg-America Line. The firm has 5,000 men in its employ, and is now in condition to construct vessels of any size, both for warlike and peaceful purposes.

There is also the large shipbuilding firm of Tecklenburg in Vegesack, and the Germania in Geestemünde, but far larger is the other Germania yard in Kiel, owned by Friedrich Krupp, and recently enlarged enormously, so that his works there occupy all told some 120 acres, with about 4,000 workmen. This branch of the big Krupp firm is very young, hardly more than five years, but it promises to rival the older yards within a very short time. Certainly, the fact that the German government has given this Krupp Germania Works in Kiel recent orders for the construction of several large naval ships of the line as well as cruisers, and that the firm is going to turn these out within eighteen months, speaks favourably for its capacity.

Of course, in this survey the large imperial navy yard in Kiel and the smaller one in Wilhelmshaven must not be forgotten. The one in Kiel employs at present, during the "rush times" induced by the strong desire to complete as soon as possible the makeup of the new and powerful fleet which Germany is enabled to build up under the operation of her naval act of 1898, and complemented by the amendment of 1900, some 8,000 men, and there are now in process of construction there some seventy-two vessels, large and small. The technical outfit of this Imperial Navy Yard in Kiel is spoken of in enthusiastic terms by American experts who enjoyed the greatly coveted opportunity of viewing and inspecting it in its essential parts not long ago. The navy yard in Wilhelmshaven is much more circumscribed in size and capacity, and is largely used for repairing. The small imperial navy yard in Dantzic does not amount to a great deal, either, so far as the construction of good-sized new vessels is concerned.

From the above it will be clearly apprehended that Germany, as a seafaring and naval power, has nearly reached the goal of her ambition. She has now enough well-appointed shipyards in her territory to enable her to build and equip, repair and alter, all the ships she needs; nay, more, she has seriously set out as a competitor with England in the building and repairing of foreign vessels as well. She must hereafter be reckoned with as one of the most serious and formidable factors in this respect.

CHAPTER XVI

THE ARMY

ONE of the most striking features of German life is the presence everywhere of the regular soldiery and the great place the army holds in the thoughts and affections of the nation. Neat and tidy in appearance, you will see in every town officers strutting the streets with a look of conscious dignity, jingling their spurs and clanking their sabres. In conversation, too, reference is often made to the drills and parades and other military spectacles, or to some more serious question affecting the army. The average German—and most of all the Prussian—speaks with a certain affectionate pride and confidence of the army, and every change, even the slightest, made in it, every promotion or retirement among the higher-grade officers, is commented upon with evident interest. At longer intervals, radical changes that are proposed cause an intensity of discussion which, I think, is unparalleled elsewhere. When, a few years ago, the period of actual military service was, after long debates in the Reichstag, finally reduced from three to two years for the infantry, this step—whose far-reaching importance no military man will, of course, underrate—formed for a long time the daily conversation at every German fireside. During the first eight years of the present Emperor's reign, nothing contributed so much to his unpopularity as his famous "rejuvenation" of the army—*i. e.*, the systematic process of gradually retiring nearly every one of the older generals and regimental commanders. Chamberlain's inconsiderate strictures on the methods employed by the Germans during the war in France, in 1870-71, which he made the past winter, occasioned an outbreak of fury throughout the empire which astonished no one so much as Chamberlain himself. His remarks were considered in Germany in the light of a deliberate and unjustified insult hurled at that *noli-me-tangere*, the German army. On that point every German is extremely sen-

sitive. The daily press in Germany, while often ignoring political topics that seem to touch the masses more closely, is forever devoting much space and time to a discussion of the different phases of army life, and their readers demand this.

It is at first difficult for an American or Englishman to understand this. With them the army, certainly in times of peace, is about the last subject that would be likely to be discussed in general conversation, and no great interest is evinced by the great public in details of army management. But a little reflection will show how natural it is for the German to feel so keenly about his army and about all that stands in any relation to it. For nowhere else in the world is the army so much identified with the nation, and nowhere else is respect and tender regard for the army so deep-seated and general. It was due to the popular uprising of 1813, through the length and breadth of Germany, to "a people in arms," in fact, that the yoke of the first Napoleon, which had rested for a decade so heavily on the German neck, was finally thrown off. And when the great Corsican had been sent off to St. Helena, there on its rocks to gnaw out his heart, the old mediæval conception of the soldier as a mercenary was buried in Prussia forever. Instead, those great military organizers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, shaped the military system on the broad plan of general and compulsory service. Every strong and healthy young man, whether of high lineage or low birth, was to bear arms for his country during a term of years, and subsequently to be enrolled in the subsidiary bodies for national defense—the *reserve*, the *landwehr*, and the *landsturm*, until the completed forty-fifth year. That was their novel scheme, and they carried it out practically. This system of virtually making army and nation synonymous terms has endured, with slight modifications, to this day, and has since been adopted by France and other powers as well.

In a country like Germany, where every father sends his sons to military service, and where almost every maiden has a soldier for a sweetheart, it is but natural that the thoughts and longings of the nation gravitate toward the army. This is truest in Prussia, for that country undeniably owes its rise to power and its present dominating position in the empire to its army institutions, whereas the rest of Germany adopted these institutions

only since 1866. In Prussia the profession of arms is looked upon as the most honourable and glorious of all. The Prussian kings have ever emphasized this estimate on all public occasions, and the "king's coat," or uniform, is to-day considered on Prussian soil as the proudest badge indeed.

The German army officer deserves to be specially discussed. He holds throughout the empire the most enviable position in the eyes of the masses. Socially he ranks first. This is often carried to ludicrous extremes. A simple beardless lieutenant of twenty has, at all social gatherings, the social precedence over the venerable greybeard of a millionaire banker, of a distinguished scholar or scientist, or any other sort of government official, merely on the strength of the uniform he wears. The fashionable German hostess will not mourn deeply if a score of celebrated professors or a half-dozen of real "privy councillors" do not put in their appearance at her five-o'clock tea or her *soirée dansante*, but she will shed tears in secret if only one of the lieutenants she expected fails to come. Naturally, the officer is not slow in using his advantages. He has, if of fairly distinguished family, untarnished reputation, and an average share of good looks, practically the pick of all the good things in life. Above all, he rules the matrimonial market. Penniless officers of the kind spoken of above find no difficulty in securing life partners with big fortunes. The pursuit and capture of this sort of game is technically known among army officers as "catching a goldfish." A handsome youth of respectable family, afflicted with a deficiency in money, cannot do better in Germany than to enter the army, after a few years spent in preliminaries at any one of the military academies, a lieutenant at twenty. He will from that hour on have his unlimited choice of all the marriageable young ladies that cross his horizon. He will, of course, take his time about it, and usually first devote himself, for the space of ten or fifteen years, to the pleasant task of accumulating the average load of personal debts. But the usurers having at last become fractious and unmanageable, the handsome officer, meanwhile promoted first lieutenant, captain, or, perhaps, even major, will make his choice deliberately. It is the father-in-law's invariable privilege to settle the aforesaid debts—American and English fathers-in-law of German army officers bear the reputation of being some-

times rather backward in fulfilling this "duty"—and to furnish his daughter with a "respectable" dowry. The size of the latter will depend, of course, on all sorts of circumstances, such as the rank and the family connections of the *fiancé*, etc. It may, and frequently does, run up into the hundreds of thousands, but it cannot fall below a minimum which the government itself has fixed. This minimum is lower for officers of the line than for those in the guards, lower for infantry than for cavalry. But in any case a sum, which is called a marriage "Kaution," must be converted into safe government bonds, bearing interest at the rate of three or three and a half per cent., and then placed in some moneyed institution specially designated for the purpose, where it is at all times subject to the control and inspection of the army officials. The smallest "Kaution" amounts to about \$10,000, and its interest, together with the meagre pay of the officer himself, is supposed to enable the latter with his family to make both ends meet, with rigid economy and frequent presents from the inexhaustible purse of the wealthy father-in-law, who is never supposed to grumble at this slightly one-sided arrangement, but on the contrary expected to always cheerfully contribute, at all crucial moments of the young couple's existence, to the latter's exchequer. And as a matter of fact, the German father-in-law at least knows his part too well to ever become obstreperous.

This whole matter is conducted strictly on a business basis, without reserve or sentimentality on either side. The fortunate young woman on whom the handsome officer's choice has fallen knows about the transactions, which sometimes require considerable time, in a general way, but she is usually spared the details. The matter is spoken of in family circles and in general society as any other fact established by the inscrutable ways of Providence would be. As a rule, officers, no matter how young and unsophisticated otherwise, display great talent in ascertaining the exact size of the *dots* fathers are known to hold ready in the event of a union of their daughters with an officer. If the amount appears insufficient to one officer, he will leave the track clear for a comrade whose expectations do not run so high. An impecunious officer serving in a crack regiment, say in Berlin or Potsdam, requires with his bride a marriage portion of at least

500,000 to 1,000,000 marks. He will wait a reasonable time until he meets and conquers such a girl or widow. If, however, he is gradually getting into the sere and yellow leaf with his hopes still unrealized, he may lower his estimate, and then he has himself transferred to a provincial regiment, where less money goes further.

Occasionally the "goldfish hunter" is unable, despite all his cunning and all his social and official sources of information, to determine the exact amount of the *dot* held in store. Then he will have recourse to one of those astute agents or *brocanteurs de mariage* swarming in large German cities. If that fails as well, he will seize both horns of the dilemma, request a private interview with his prospective father-in-law, and unmask his batteries, so to speak. He will, in plain but respectful language, tell that worthy that he has met and learned to appreciate his daughter Gretchen; that he would like to marry her, believing that a certain amount of mutual regard exists, but that, unfortunately, he himself is penniless; that, therefore, the girl he marries must have a certain amount of money; that he, under all these circumstances, would deem it a great favour if Herr . . . would kindly divulge to him the precise amount of money he is able and willing to settle on his daughter Gretchen, together with any other cognate information he is willing to vouchsafe—all this, of course, in confidence. The future father-in-law will thereupon tell the truth, and whether the amount mentioned was large enough for the young officer's needs will soon be seen, for if his attentions to Gretchen do not abruptly terminate after that interview it is proof positive that it was.

"Goldfishes" are not so very plentiful in a country like Germany, and so it has happened that the foreign "goldfishes," American or English preferred, are also hunted to some extent. There are to-day to be found in every garrison town in the empire numbers of American or English women married to German officers, and often playing a conspicuous social rôle. Their special delight is going to court, even if it be only a tiny one like the courts at Strelitz, Weimar, Coburg, or Schaumburg, where an income of 6,000 marks is held semi-royal, and where weak punch is about the height of dissipation indulged in at the winter functions. Curiously enough, as a matter of fact these

pseudo-Germans of American or English birth and education take as a rule an even intenser joy than do the native German ladies in the ridiculous and inane court intrigues and cabals that form the chief occupation of those admitted to these Lilliputian mockeries of royalty. At the duodecimo edition of a capital where one of the German Emperor's sisters, Princess Victoria, is holding dread sway over her few subjects of Schaumburg-Lippe, the American wife of a German official is noted for her eagerness in attending. And her case is but one of many that could be mentioned.

It is a mistake to think, as so many American editors and others do, that these American ladies married in Germany live unhappily and are pining away in vain sighs for a good scream of the American eagle. With very few exceptions, they have there found the life they wanted, and are thoroughly happy and contented. The American women are more adaptable and of nimbler intelligence than their English sisters, and as a consequence they more quickly learn to feel at home in their new surroundings and thus become more popular and socially influential. But this influence has altered in nothing the peculiar code of honor held by the German army officer, including his firm belief in the duel as an *ultima ratio* in private affairs.

The number of duels fought in the army is steadily but slowly decreasing. But the duel as a fixed institution remains. In Germany, duels, both inside and outside the army, are usually not such trifling affairs as in France. The German thoroughness betrays itself even there. Many of the most promising younger officers have fallen on this field of mistaken honour. It would cost the Kaiser but a word to drive the duel out of the army forever, and with its disappearance from there it would also quickly die out in civilian circles. But the Kaiser is unwilling to say that word, as his earlier education in the army has made him share the same set of prejudices on which the army code is largely built. That is why he uses only palliatives and half-measures in fighting the evil, or rather what he considers its excrescences. His decree, issued a few years ago, has merely a tendency to diminish the number of victims.

One of the strange ideas held by the German army officer, as part of his professional code, was picturesquely illustrated by the

Brüsewitz tragedy. That officer, being somewhat roughly jostled by a half-drunken plumber, in a miscellaneous crowd that sat back of him in a café at Carlsruhe, followed the offender out of the place and ran his sword through his body, killing the man on the spot. In doing this, Lieutenant von Brüsewitz had acted in strict accordance with the code of honour valid to this day in the German army. For the offender, being of too low a social caste to be admitted to the privilege of a duello with an army officer, had to be killed, so that his blood would wash away the dark stain made on the officer's escutcheon by the affront offered. His procedure, cowardly as it seemed to the world at large—for it was the slaying of an unarmed and at the moment defenseless man—was perfectly *en règle*, viewed from the German army officer's habitual point, and that accounts, of course, for the fact that the court martial sentenced him to but a few years of mild incarceration.

Brüsewitz had, however, some conscience left, and his deed weighed heavily on his soul. He sought and found a sovereign remedy; he enlisted as a volunteer on the Boer side, soon after the outbreak of the war in South Africa. The reports all agree that he conducted himself in an exemplary manner, dying eventually the death of a brave man on the battlefield. His body was found on the veldt, and later conveyed home to Germany. The military press commented widely on his expiatory death, and he was generally represented as a victim of unfortunate circumstances.

The Brüsewitz case, on account of its dramatic and unusual features, occasioned world-wide interest. It was, however, but one of many that have happened, and are still happening, in Germany. A couple of years ago, for instance, there was an occurrence in the old city of Königsberg, close to the borders of Russia, which in some of its details was more atrocious than the Brüsewitz case. A group of officers, slightly under the influence of liquor, encountered on the street, late at night, several civilians. These citizens, too, were not quite sobre, and one of them, whether purposely or by accident, stumbled against one of the officers. The latter immediately drew his sword and stabbed the offender twice, wounding him dangerously. The other citizen meanwhile had vainly attempted to prevent this outrage by

grasping hold of the officer's arm. Thereupon the other officers tore their weapons from their scabbards and inflicted such injuries on the would-be peacemaker as to cause his death a few days later. As in the case of Brüsewitz, no very severe punishment was meted out to them, although a number of the most influential newspapers had demanded adequate retribution, and the Kaiser subsequently remitted part of the sentence.

Such cases and the dueling habit are among the unhealthy growths on a code of honour which in many other respects embodies a high standard of ethics. It is not too much to say that, viewing them as a body, the German army officers are men of the highest integrity and of charming manners. They are deservedly popular in German social life. No gathering in the upper strata of German society is complete or fully enjoyable without at least one or two representatives of the army. The corps used to recruit itself very largely from the nobility, and this is still true to a certain extent. There is, all over Germany, a part of the nobility specially designated as the "Militäradel," owing to the members serving their sovereign and country, generation after generation, as officers in the army. From this section of the aristocracy have sprung perhaps the majority of successful soldiers. But the size of the German army on a peace footing has more than doubled since 1870, and thus it has been found necessary to admit as officers an increasingly higher percentage of men drawn from the middle classes. These now form considerably more than half the total number, and that, it is interesting to note, is gradually altering the character of the whole corps. It will not be many years hence when this change will become more apparent. There is, however, one whole class of the population which is still rigourously excluded from the body of active officers in the army, namely, the Jews. The German constitution recognizes no such invidious distinction, and the Liberal factions in the Reichstag annually take the army administration, and that indirectly means the Kaiser as well, to task for consistently discriminating against the Germans of Hebrew race or faith; but all to no purpose. The Jewish press of Germany has, now and then, pointed to the large number of German soldiers of the Hebrew race who signally distinguished themselves during the Franco-German war, among them being a long list of men who received

the highest decoration for bravery, viz., the iron cross, and the German army surgeons are, I believe, in their majority, Jews. There is nevertheless a strong prejudice in the army itself, and in government circles, including the Emperor, against the appointment of Jews as field officers, and on various occasions, when in exceptional cases young Jews had presented themselves for admission in certain regiments as officers, they have been black-balled by the corps, and thus effectually excluded.

While according all due praise to the German army officers as a body of men showing a number of sterling qualities, it must be conceded that in several important respects their influence on national life is not wholesome. By their entire training, their traditions, their social and professional surroundings, but above all by their peculiar ethics, they form a body apart, which does not usually amalgamate with the ideas and aims, still less with the customs and convictions, of the population as a whole. This spirit of separatism, which from the monarchic point of view may be deemed desirable, militates against the democratization of the army. It brings it about that the officer on his part as a rule does not share those sentiments which for the time lie uppermost in the breast of the nation, but makes him stand aside, an indifferent spectator. It also brings it about that every now and then some typical event in army circles is pointed out by the more enlightened and progressive part of the German press to be in direct contravention to the convictions of the civilian population.

Life in the German army, though by no means as luxurious as in the English crack regiments, has ceased to be frugal and simple, such as it was before 1870. Gaming is much indulged in, and a large number of the tragedies acted within army circles is caused by it every year. Racing and betting and the most expensive forms of sport are also much followed. The Union Club and the Jockey Club in Berlin, both largely composed of officers belonging to the guard corps, and of whom the majority are scions of the leading aristocratic families, are perhaps the worst centres of fashionable dissipation in the empire. During the winter "hazard" games, such as *vingt-et-un*, *lansquenet*, *écarté*, *baccarat*, and, of late, *poker*, are played, often for very high stakes. Tens of thousands change hands at one table in a single night, and on the turn of one card frequently depends a small fortune. In the

summer-time, outdoor sports and the betting on their results engross the members. It is at these clubs, and at hundreds of smaller ones in the provinces, that the fatal taste for gaming and betting is first acquired by the young sprigs of nobility, who subsequently "go to the bad." The complete financial ruin of five of the oldest and most renowned Prussian noble families was accomplished at one of the above clubs in the course of a single season, not many years ago. It was from there that the *coterie* later known as the *Club der Harmlosen*, or Club of Innocents, first graduated. One of its most noted victims was a young grandson of Queen Victoria, the late heir-apparent of the Duchy of Coburg, young Prince Alfred. Thoroughly debauched at these clubs, he died a miserable death soon after. The picture of incessant and disgusting dissipation which these "Innocents" presented, when a number of high-life scandals came to be ventilated in the Berlin courts, was shocking enough to stir the public conscience, and for months the German press of every shade of opinion was ringing with the general indignation felt at the horrible details brought out at the several trials. One of the Kaiser's personal aides-de-camp was implicated, and the attendant disgrace led to his retirement from the army, as well as that of a score of other young officers.

One of the most dangerous features of fashionable club life in the German army is what is called playing "on parole"—*i. e.*, without visible stakes, solely on notes of hand or word of mouth. The iron-clad custom is to redeem these bits of paper within twenty-four hours, on pain of dishonour or exposure. This is one of the most prolific causes of suicide among the young and reckless but otherwise promising officers. One of the favourite forms this ending to a brief season of dissipation takes is the so-called "American duel." This is about the most senseless and un-American invention of the Continental rake, and how the legend ever originated that this species of suicide came from this side of the Atlantic nobody seems able to tell.

The "army usurer" is another peculiar institution in Germany. This type of vampire preys on the reckless and inexperienced young officers of good family. The law reaches him but seldom, for his methods are cunningly devised to fit the needs and prejudices of his victims. His customary procedure is about

this: By his ramified connections he knows the precise financial and moral status of every officer in town. This includes reliable information about family relations and family wealth, regular monthly or quarterly allowances from home, habits, tastes and possible "entanglements," and so forth. With this fund of absolute knowledge to start with, the risk run by the usurer in advancing money is relatively small. He will first politely and repeatedly offer his services, and this failing to produce any effect, he will bide his time till the prospective victim is temporarily straitened for ready money owing to a run of "bad luck," etc., and then renew his offers in a tempting form. The terms he will then make depend, of course, on circumstances, but he is always willing to "renew," at least so long as he thinks it will be to his eventual advantage. The usury law is gotten over by having the debtor sign for a larger amount than actually paid. Gradually the net will become tighter and tighter. The loans have grown larger and more frequent, and the terms more unfavourable. Finally the victim reaches the point where desperate measures have to be resorted to. That may mean the relinquishment of his "golden bachelor days" and a "money marriage," or it may mean a family council at home, a council called for the purpose of extricating the black sheep from the toils. In any case, the usurer will get his money back, plus the enormous profit he is sure to reap out of the whole affair, a profit rising often into the hundreds per cent. At such a reckoning the officer's assets will frequently consist of "valuable" oil paintings, hundreds of cases of vile champagne, etc., etc., which the usurer made it a *conditio sine qua non* for his victim to take as part of his loans. There may then be a new mortgage on the paternal acres, or the whole family at home may be obliged to skimp and save for years, until sooner or later there comes the catastrophe—a bullet, resignation from the army, and penury, or, if not before concluded, a "money marriage." That is the average winding up.

There are, unfortunately, no statistics to be had of this phase of army life, but the percentage of officers who, through the "friendly and timely" services of these money sharks, and through their own gullibility and recklessness, of course, are either permanently ruined for life or else—which is not much better and less creditable—forced to contract one of those loveless matri-

monial unions which, based on both sides on mercenary and unworthy motives, figure as a travesty on honest wedlock, is astoundingly large in these present days. The whole army is honeycombed with such cases.

There is, also, too much drinking and feasting in the German army. That is one of the points wherein the Kaiser fails to set a good example. The regulation mess is, in most cases, not extravagant, but there are too many special occasions sought and found when the contrary is true. The main source of evil in this respect are the so-called "Liebesmähler," or "love feasts,"—anniversary days of battles in which the regiment, company, or squadron figured conspicuously; birthday or farewell parties given by members; anniversaries of the birth of the Emperor, king, chief of the regiment, etc. On all such occasions the eating and, more particularly, the drinking is beyond all reason and good sense, and so, too often, is the toasting and the table talk, followed by card-playing for high stakes. The Kaiser is amazingly fond of these carousals, attending scores of them during every year, and a large number of his most extravagant speeches and remarks were made at the wassail bowl on these occasions, when everybody was flushed with cheer and when he was not afraid of publicity. He has, however, been growing more cautious of late.

In a word, the old-time Spartan simplicity of life that was one of the chief characteristics of the Prussian officer during the fifty years between Waterloo and Sadowa, when he was training for his magnificent feats against Austria and France, has departed. In too many cases spendthrift methods and riotous and luxurious living have replaced it. The Kaiser vainly issues decrees and orders against it. Every autumn, after the big manœuvres, when the bulk of the changes in the army—promotions, retirements, and forcible discharges—are promulgated, there is quite a number of names of officers made known whose dismissal has been caused by profligacy or worse. All this does not augur well for the future, although it would be going too far to say that the army spirit, as a whole, is already seriously affected by it. Still, viewing the various tendencies at work within the German army—and particularly the Prussian part of it—calmly and judiciously, one does find several striking traits of similarity with

the period following the death of Frederick the Great, and which led to the complete downfall of the Prussian military prestige at Jena. Prussia has not, so far, had her Dreyfus affair, it is true, but there have been noticeable a number of symptoms of their kind nearly if not quite as alarming.

There is, however, one other feature of the German army which usually escapes the observer, and yet which is of great moment. In 1901 the German army cost the taxpayer directly a matter of 559,000,000 marks, or, roughly, \$135,000,000; of this sum about half was for rations and pay of the soldiers. But the indirect cost in this respect was several times greater. For the food furnished the private soldier is coarse and not very palatable, and the small pay—amounting to between six and twelve cents a day—is entirely inadequate. To make up the deficiency the relatives and friends of nearly every one of the 604,000 private soldiers furnish, out of their scant means, additional food and money. Again, as to the 25,000 officers. Their rations, their rents and their pay are totally insufficient, especially in the lower ranks up to that of major. A lieutenant, for instance, needs at the very least double or treble the amount given him by the government to pay his way. The difference must be made up by his parents, his friends, or by his own private means. The sums thus taken indirectly out of the pockets of the German people, to maintain their rank and file in the army, are estimated at about \$200,000,000 annually. Thus the army drains the purses of the producing population of vast sums in addition to what is raised by taxation for the purpose, and this drain works as a great hardship, especially on the labouring and the lower middle classes.

Taking, then, a bird's-eye view of the German army as a whole, the close observer is struck by the fact that it is an enormously more expensive institution than official statistics would lead one to suspect. True, it has, as Moltke was ever fond of pointing out to the popular representatives in the Reichstag, great educational value for the nation. Those habits of discipline, that sturdy health and powerful digestion, that sense of order and cleanliness of person which distinguish the modern German of every class, are in large measure due to his military training at the period of early manhood. But this very training, too, has a

tendency to harm in other directions. It is inimical to that individualism which, until military service became general and compulsory throughout the empire, was one of the chief points of strength in the German national character. Military life breeds "Heerdenmenschen"—i. e., men who are accustomed to follow a leader under all circumstances, not men who are taught, under the stress of an individual struggle of competition, to think and act for themselves, as is the case, for example, in this country and England. The influence of militarism in Germany in this respect is, indeed, very powerful, and the subject is one of peculiar interest to the psychologist. There is an astonishing uniformity of mediocre ideas in modern Germany, with little of that daring flight of thought, that love of speculative philosophy, little of that poetical sentiment, which the world was wont to consider a special province of the German mind. There has been at work a process of mental leveling down. This prevailing sameness, this dearth of genius—although it cannot be denied that it is coupled with a great increase in hard common sense and in a practical turn of mind—can be traced all through German literature, art and science of to-day. Since the close of the Franco-German war no really great poet, author, artist or scientist has arisen in Germany. Nearly all her great names antedate that war. This, I believe, is in part owing to the influence of military training on the mind of the nation at the formative period of life.

About the general character of the German army, especially its *morale*, its appearance and organization, the world is pretty well informed, and I do not intend to go into any details here. But a few remarks about some features specially distinguishing it, and which are often misunderstood abroad, may be appropriate.

First of all, then, as to the cadet schools. There are no less than eleven of them. The three largest are located in a suburb of Berlin, called Gross-Lichterfelde, in Munich, and in Dresden, respectively, the last two named, as well as those in Carlsruhe (Baden) and Ludwigsburg (Württemberg), serving as training institutions for officers in the Bavarian, Saxon, Württemberg, and Baden armies, which still enjoy some small remnant of their former autonomy. The pupils in all these eleven cadet schools are admitted at an early age, usually between ten and twelve, and when graduating are enrolled in the army as ensigns or

"Fähnrich," and average then about seventeen to eighteen in age. The discipline they have to submit to in these cadet schools is very strict indeed, and their uniforms are not very becoming, at least so far as those training for the Prussian army are concerned. They are only taught the rudiments of their profession in these institutions. They receive instruction in Latin, French, and English, in mathematics, drawing, geometry, in history, geography, etc., and also in fencing, horseback riding, dancing, swimming and other physical exercise. A large number of the pupils are sons of deceased army officers or other servants of the State, and these usually receive everything free of cost, at the government's expense, provided they are without means. The others pay a sum which is rather low, and probably does not even cover expenses, something between \$250 and \$300. Their board is plain but palatable and nourishing.

After serving in the army as ensigns for a year or two, and having acquired the practical work of a soldier, the young men are then sent to the "war school" or "Kriegsschule," an institution where they receive tuition in the higher branches of military science, such as in strategy, tactics, fortification science, the use of instruments, Russian and other difficult languages, etc., and all sorts of physical exercise is continued. There are also eleven such schools, the pupil averaging in age, at admission, about nineteen to twenty. The largest and best equipped of them are situated in Potsdam, Munich, and Hanover. After graduating thence the young men usually receive appointments as lieutenants, and are assigned to some regiment.

Quite another institution is the War Academy in Berlin, and the smaller one in Munich. Attendance there is voluntary, and must be preceded by a successfully passed examination, in which the main point is to determine whether the candidate is gifted with more than the average intellect and energy, as well as special qualifications for the higher military career. This institution is under the direct authority of the General Staff, and its main purpose is to prepare young officers for entrance into the General Staff, the War Ministry, and other military posts requiring unusual gifts of mind and character, and also to serve as the first stepping-stone for higher and responsible positions in the army. Officers from every branch of the service go there

for the purposes stated. Attendance during one or more years means very hard but ambitious work, and whatever of rare qualifications is in a young officer is bound to come out there. It is there the Kaiser, who very often visits the War Academy, and who not infrequently lectures there on some particular topic, usually historical, and the commanding generals first become acquainted with budding military genius, and from thence on keep an eye on such promising young men.

One of the chief studies pursued by the pupils of the War Academy—men averaging twenty-five or more—is the so-called “Kriegsspiel.” This consists of strategic and tactical tasks given to opposing officers, each one being given—in theory—a body of troops, and locality, circumstances, provisions, etc., being stated, and the task assigned being to conquer, retire, manoeuvre, etc., with the one against the other, the decision as to how each man has fulfilled his theme resting, of course, with the teacher. For playing this “war game,” boards, men, and other appliances are employed which mimic real life as closely as possible. This game, or this mingling of theory and practice, has been in vogue in the War Academy and in the German army generally for the last twenty years, and has since been adopted as a fine means of developing the nascent military talent by nearly every other army, with the exception of the British—at least up to the outbreak of the Boer war. Since then, I understand, it has also become a feature of that army, which for generations had been the most unprogressive of all.

The highest “theoretical body” in the German army is, of course, the General Staff. Its organization differs from that of most other countries. It is not a fixed body, but its make-up alters continually. Officers from every branch of the army are sent there for indefinite periods, ranging from one to ten years and more, according to circumstances. Its chief, General Count Schlieffen, is a pupil of Moltke, and considered the brainiest man in the army to-day. He is coördinate with the Minister of War, and his well-defined duties rest on his shoulders exclusively. These duties are assigned to different departments, and consist in (1) procuring the fullest obtainable information about the organization and the changes occurring in all the armies of the world; (2) preparations of every kind to keep

the army in a permanent state of readiness for war; (3) perfecting the means of transportation for the army in the event of war, especially the railroad lines of strategical importance. There are also a number of minor duties assigned to the General Staff of the army, such as the topographical surveys of the whole empire, and special departments exist for military history, geography, etc.

The Kaiser alone, as chief commander of the whole military forces of the empire, has the right to interfere or direct the affairs of the General Staff, and he, indeed, does so very often. Reports are constantly made to him, and much of the work done by the General Staff is traceable to special instructions received from him.

The theoretical military education of the German army officer is, however, not confined to these institutions above mentioned, but comprises more or less every rank among the field officers as well. The younger officers, up to the grade of captain, are given special tasks at regular intervals, usually essays on a given topic. These are sent in, and a choice made from them all, and their quality affords a pretty exact means of measuring the brain power of each and every one of them. This again is of use in many ways.

The German army uniform is still nearly the same as it was during the Franco-German war of 1870. The military overcoat has been changed, though, being now gray instead of black. The army rifle, too, is another one—the Mauser of the latest type. The calibre has been reduced again and again in size, until at present the limit seems to have been reached.

But Germany is now on the eve of a great departure in the matter of uniform and accoutrements. The campaign in China and the South African war were the immediate causes that led to the resolve of introducing in the whole German army the so-called “field uniform.” By that is meant the uniform to be worn in future wars. The British khaki and the other innovations made in that line during the struggle between the Boers and British showed that the day of glittering, conspicuous and handsome dress for the actual fighter is gone, and that with our far-reaching rifles of to-day this species of military vanity can no longer be indulged in with impunity. As an experiment, there-

fore, the German contingent sent to China was clad in a German variety of khaki. On the whole the experiment proved successful, and since then the Kaiser, in consonance with the other German sovereigns and commanding generals, has ordered that the entire army be fitted out with a khaki uniform for field and manœuvre use. This means a radical change in appearance, for besides the showy and high-coloured regimentals, everything else will go that glitters and scintillates—epaulets, bright metal buttons, the present spiked helmet, and the bright gun barrels and sword scabbards. Nobody regrets this change, which is even now being effected, as much as the gentle German maiden, for it robs the warrior in her eyes of ninety per cent. of that glamour and romance which had clung to him for lo! these many years.

CHAPTER XVII

THE NAVY

ACTING on the impulse given by the Kaiser, the German Naval Society, or Flottenverein, was organized a couple of years ago. This organization, although membership is wholly voluntary, now counts some 845,000 members, and collects some \$1,250,000 in dues. Its directors comprise a number of the sovereign princes of the empire, and nearly every person of any prominence in public life. Its purpose is to encourage the movement for the steady enlargement of the navy, and the moneys contributed are partly devoted to supporting that movement by unceasing and varied agitation, and partly to defraying the expenses of constructing torpedoes and other harbour defenses. Last year another volunteer body of naval enthusiasts collected, by small public subscriptions and within a month or so, enough to donate to the country the sum needed for the building of several vessels.

These facts speak for themselves. They show better than long arguments could that Germany's naval aspirations have deep hold of the nation as a whole. A mighty longing for larger sea power, a determination to brook no longer the overwhelming and resistless supremacy of England on the main, has seized upon the Teuton soul.

This sentiment is so strong in the Germany of to-day that even the Ultramontane party, averse as it is to a world policy, could not withstand its impact, and voted, in 1898 and 1900, almost to a man, for the Naval Increase bills, which, since they became law, are the broad base upon which the powerful new German navy will rest. Without the 107 votes of these Ultramontanes the bill at that time could not have been carried in the Reichstag.

Not much is heard these days of efforts on the part of the leading powers of the world to increase their land forces. The times are gone when, in Germany, France, and Russia, a warlike spirit stirred the masses, and when, after heated debates, new army

formations were sanctioned, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers were massed, a standing menace to international peace, along both sides of the Vosges and of the Vistula, like unto heavily sheathed gladiators spoiling for the fight. The continental powers of Europe live since the middle of the last decade in a period of "saturation," so far as their armies go. There is no absolute stagnation, but in Germany, as in the neighbouring countries, the numerical increase and the improvement in armament and military institutions take their unsensational course, being principally based by tacit mutual agreement on the *pro rata* of natural increase in population. The only powers who at present are seriously occupied with the task of enlarging their land forces are the two which had neglected this for generations, viz., Great Britain and the United States.

It is sea power which nearly all great nations simultaneously strive for. It is a very singular and significant symptom, one which thoroughly characterizes the epoch in which we live, this suddenly awakened but steady and powerful current of sentiment. And in its leading features it is identical in all those countries. The motives are the same, and the aims are very similar. It has led to a race between the great powers, and the attainment of the object—namely, the creation of so great and efficient a navy as to vouchsafe perfect security on the seas to an expanding export trade, and to give emphasis to political demands abroad, is largely bound up in the winning of this race. At no time since the world began has there been such a unanimous endeavour to achieve sea power, and at no time has the interest called out by this endeavour been so general or so intense.

The instinct, however, which has impelled the broad strata of each nation to seek these new paths is, like most powerful instincts of the masses, perfectly justified by the circumstances. The transition, first, from a continental to a colonial power, then from a continental to a world policy, and from supplying the home market to catering to the markets of the world, necessitated its correlative, a powerful navy. England's development in the past furnished the object lesson, and pointed the way for all her lately arisen competitors.

From the gigantic Napoleonic struggle at the dawn of the past century, England issued the undoubted victor on the seas.

The French fleet had disappeared from the ocean, and so had all the other fleets of the continental powers, with the single exception of Russia, whose ships, though, remained confined to the Baltic in their sphere of activity. With no rivals to dispute its absolute sway, the island empire was enabled to gather leisurely and uninterruptedly the fruits of its blood-bought achievements. During a century England was forming her world empire, and girding the earth with an unbroken chain of prosperous and profitable colonies, and her commerce made the entire globe tributary to her merchant princes in the city. Her industry rose to fabulous heights, and London became the emporium of the world. Nobody stood in her way. The continental powers were still bleeding from the awful wounds which twenty years of incessant warfare had struck, and when these at last had closed and healed, internal troubles arose, striving for a measure of that constitutional liberty which England had enjoyed so long, and then aspirations for national unification—all these engrossing the attention and monopolizing the energies of these less favoured peoples to the exclusion of all transmarine adventures, and of a naval policy.

It was only during the reign of Napoleon III that England's old rival, France, appeared once more on the field with a very respectable navy. Oddly enough, its first achievements were not directed against England, but on the contrary it acted during the Crimean War as her faithful ally, accomplished considerable, and was in point of strength but very little behind that of the insular power. It was France which at that time, on the occasion of the bombardment of Kinburn, first employed iron-clad batteries, and which soon after built the first iron-clad vessel, the *Gloire*. In England, where they had allowed the fleet to gradually diminish to half its former size, the new danger of this marine rivalry was clearly apprehended. From that time on it became the naval policy of England, a policy scarce influenced by changes in party administration, to maintain at whatever cost that naval supremacy which had brought the country to the pinnacle of political and material power.

This for many years was no hard task for England, for after her crushing defeat in 1870-71 France was in no condition to resume her former colonial and naval ambitions, but was com-

pelled to rally all her energies in recovering from the awful blow she had sustained. And outside of France there was no power which owned a navy at all commensurate with England's. There came a time, however, when these favourable conditions ceased to exist. That was in the middle of the eighties, when France's navy once more took her stand on the oceans, grown again to man's size, and when Russia suddenly began to deploy considerable naval forces both in the Baltic and in the Black Sea. It was, too, precisely at that time that the attitude of both these powers toward England became nothing less than threatening. As another rather formidable naval power Italy had come to the front. It is certain that at this particular turn in the wheel, England's sea supremacy was most seriously endangered, especially as Gladstone's weak and vacillating foreign policy then extended to the naval policy as well, and the steady enlargement of the British fleet came for a period to a halt. If France at that time had not continued to anxiously stare at the "gap in the Vosges," left there after 1871, England's practical seizure of Egypt would not have been possible, and the Suez Canal would still remain what it since has ceased to be—neutral in the full sense.

But fortunately for England, this state of temporary weakness came soon to a close. In 1889 there advened, under strong public pressure, the passage of the Naval Defense Act, which enabled the British Admiralty to begin the immediate construction of 10 large battleships, 42 cruisers, and 18 torpedo destroyers. At that time, too, the demand for the two-power standard was first formulated, meaning thereby that England at all times must remain navally strong enough to bid defiance to her (at that time) strongest rivals, France and Russia. This demand, then only in the mouth of English naval experts, has now become a national shibboleth, and every cabinet since, no matter what its other creed, has practically lived up to this programme.

The enormous naval armaments of England were at first not imitated at the same ratio by the Dual Alliance, France and Russia. For while between 1881-1890 the dual powers had built 233,144 tons against England's 196,440, the last decennium, 1890-1900, shows England with 715,150 tons added to her naval

strength, against her adversaries' but 495,611. The practical consequence was an enormous strengthening of England's sea power, a fact which received a very vivid illustration on the occasion of the Fashoda incident. England's navy had not only attained the two-power standard, but considerably exceeded it. At that time, a couple of years ago, England was twice as strong navally as France, and more than thrice as strong as Russia, while she had at least quadrupled the strength of any of the minor sea powers, Germany and the United States included.

Within the short time since, however, a change has been wrought in the situation, a change which comprises above all a new grouping of naval powers. In 1898, Germany, the United States, and Russia decided simultaneously on radical naval measures, especially on increases so large and for such long periods in advance as to alter the complexion of the whole very materially. France followed two years later with a similar plan of increase. The Russian plan contemplated the construction of eight large battleships, ten small cruisers, and thirty torpedo destroyers, they costing altogether about \$100,000,000. These battleships are now all in process of construction, and several are almost completed. Russia's main motive in this increase is, however, less dictated by her always latent antagonism to England than by the maintenance of her paramount power in East Asiatic waters, and this more in antagonism to Japan than to England. That England, however, has regarded this as her own affair is attested by the recent Anglo-Japanese agreement. Every new vessel, and every available older one, has been sent by Russia since the outbreak of the Chinese troubles to East Asiatic seas, to the almost entire neglect of her former strong position in the Baltic, a fact at which Germany is justly inclined to congratulate herself, for that in the possible event of a war with Russia or France, or with both, practically increases Germany's naval powers in those waters, both for offensive and defensive purposes, tremendously. Russia's position in far Asia, on the other hand, is now impregnable, since her naval strength there is far greater—counting in, of course, France's steady aid for this purpose—than that of Japan and that portion of the English fleet together which England could spare for the purpose, so far from the more important and pressing interests

nearer home. England cannot deceive herself about that. She could not, and would not if she could, jeopardize her very existence and her dearest home interests for the sake of a far-Asia adventure.

Our own naval increase plan it is not necessary to discuss here, since a general knowledge of that may be presumed. As to France, her naval law of 1900 provides for an increase by 1906 of five battleships, six iron-clad cruisers, twenty-five torpedo destroyers, and a large number of submarine torpedoes.

Germany, on her part, went much further than the other powers, for she complemented her naval law of 1898 by another one passed two years after, and which enables her to build for a term of fourteen years, three battleships (or two battleships and one large iron-clad cruiser), as well as their concomitants of small cruisers, torpedoes, and harbour defense vessels, every year.

On the strength of these various naval increase laws, whose speedy execution seems beyond a doubt, the year 1906 would see the effective naval fighting strength of these four powers as follows, counting only the battleships of 10,000 tons and over, and iron-clad cruisers of 8,000 tons and over, and none of these launched later than 1890:

France . . .	18	battleships,	17	cruisers
United States .	20	"	10	"
Germany . .	19	"	7	"
Russia . . .	16	"	3	"

This would not be an exact scale of measurement, for a number of attendant circumstances have also to be taken into account. For one thing, both France and Russia would have, besides the above, reserves of great battleships which, though old, would still possess a certain degree of efficiency. For France especially this is the case, for this republic would have the big liners *Neptune*, *Marceau*, *Hoche*, *Formidable*, *Admiral Baudin*, and Russia would have the *Sinope*, *Tchesme* and *Jekaterina II*. The German navy would have as reserve formations two entire classes of battleships, the so-called "Sachsen" and "Siegfried" classes. The eight vessels composing them are not as large as the French ones, it is true, but they are much more efficient, and have been renovated of late so thoroughly as to be practically reconstructed, and as good as new, according to American expert

opinions. Anyway, it is one of the admirable tricks of the German naval department—and this practically includes the Kaiser as well, who virtually dictates the entire naval policy of that country—to persistently and systematically understate (instead of overstating, as is the case in France and some other countries) the real naval strength. This policy is one of the cunning ways they have of keeping the country and the Reichstag in the present mood—*i. e.*, the mood of generosity in granting appropriations.

One striking illustration of this may be found in the fact (not taken into consideration in the above list) that the rate of construction pursued by Germany in carrying out her present naval plan is by no means as slow as the law fixed it, and as it was stated above. Of this important fact the United States Naval Attaché in Berlin, Commander Wm. C. Beehler, obtained convincing proof last year, and conveyed the startling information to our Navy Department in Washington. Chairman Foss, of the Congressional Committee on Naval Affairs, during a recent visit to Germany, which included inspection of the main German shipyards, government and private, also gathered a great deal of valuable information in this line, and obtained confirmation of the above. The German government, in fact, recognizing the importance of completing, if possible, her naval increase at as early a date as can be, made arrangements without consulting the Reichstag about it, to hasten construction much before the originally contemplated time, so that by 1906, instead of nineteen there will probably be twenty-one or twenty-two battleships and nine instead of seven large iron-clad cruisers ready for action. The motive in this will be obvious, and the incidental misleading of public opinion, both at home and abroad, is under the circumstances excusable, nay, patriotic. Some of the Reichstag leaders, who recently obtained proof of the above, had their lips sealed for similar reasons. Suffice it to say here, that the German naval law, when its wording is strictly interpreted, provides for the completion of the naval increase by 1914, but that in all probability this term will be advanced by six years, and in case the international political situation should meanwhile assume a complexion to make it specially desirable and pressing, the period of construction may be still further

abbreviated. Both the German government yard in Kiel, and the leading private ones, the Germania in Kiel, the Vulcan in Stettin, and the Schichau in Elbing and Dantzic, have made preparations for that contingency. In strenuously adhering to this plan of action, Germany and the Kaiser are only repeating what Prussia and William I did in the early sixties, when preparing at long hand for the decisive struggle for supremacy with Austria.

The weakest really in the list in all excepting the one item of battleships and large new cruisers is this country, providing, of course, that by the joint efforts of President Roosevelt, the Navy Department and Congress our present naval construction plan is not also modified. For we have no reserves at all, with the single exception of the "Texas," that being the only vessel in lieu of a good-sized reserve, which with our very extensive coast line we need more than either Germany or France.

A striking fact in the above showing is the dropping behind of France. This is largely due to her indecision for many years, and to the wavering and often contradictory naval construction policy she has pursued. During a number of years she utterly neglected the building of battleships, and has only begun to remedy this suicidal policy during the past eighteen months, but too late to make up for lost time. The views of her navy department and of her experts as to the wisest course to pursue in the matter of strengthening her navy have changed radically several times during the past ten years, and an undue indulgence in her special *fad*, that of submarine torpedoes, has cost her dear, and is likely to cost her still dearer in the future.

One of the chief points of Germany's rapidly growing naval strength is, on the other hand, the chief weakness of both the American and the English navies, that is, her abundance of efficient human material for manning her navy. In England, it is well known, the limit in this respect has been reached some time ago, and assuming that England is willing to spend the money for maintaining her present rate of ship construction, and thereby her two-power standard—of which there can be but little doubt—that she furthermore is able to maintain the rate of speed of such construction, which, with all her ship-yards strained to the utmost at present, is somewhat doubtful,

there still seems hardly any doubt that she has not, and could not in a time of war, find the crews to man and adequately handle her huge fleet. All experts in England seem to be agreed on that point. How it is here in the United States the frequent and formal complaints and memoranda of the Navy Department, and the President's last message to Congress, attest in unmistakable language. The deficiency in both men and officers in our navy is a matter which, while steps have been at last taken to remedy the evil, cannot be adjusted within five or even ten years, especially when the present rapid rate of increase in the vessels themselves is taken into consideration. Nowadays the training of men for the navies of the world is a matter requiring much time, technical knowledge, and trouble, both for men and officers, and, for one thing, our American navy urgently needs several training institutions for naval crews, such as Germany has in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. The mere call for 3,000 or 5,000 enlisted men, of which we hear every year through the naval appropriation bill, will not meet the requirements of the case. It is the long and carefully adjusted course of drilling this naval raw material which we want to see provided for. And it is in precisely this respect that the Kaiser and his present naval secretary, Rear Admiral von Tirpitz, have been admirably farsighted. Of course, with compulsory military service, as obtaining in Germany, and which includes the men drawn every year for her navy, the task of adequately providing for the corresponding regular increase of men, keeping step with the increase in vessels, becomes far easier than here, where every man is a volunteer. And the proportionate increase in naval officers is also less difficult to attend to by the Kaiser, enjoying as he does discretionary powers in admitting naval cadets to the training schools, and appointing officers later on, and the pressure for the naval career is in Germany rather too strong than otherwise. Still, admitting all that, the prompt and systematic manner in which the heightened needs of the growing German navy have been met deserves all praise. The men in the German navy are excellent material. No navy has better. This is the deliberate judgment of Rear Admiral "Bob" Evans and of all those naval experts who have had a chance to study the German navy from the inside.

As for England, she will have in 1906—the year taken here for comparison—provided she can maintain her intended rate of speed in the matter of shipbuilding, forty-three modern battleships of 10,000 tons or over, and each not older than fifteen years, and twenty-six iron-clad cruisers, whereby she would still stand by far in the first place, and still adhere to the two-power standard. But all the same, her position as a naval power will be no longer what it was. Up to the present she has been not only the first naval power, but she has had only one formidable foe to consider, namely, France. In 1906 she will have four rivals to consider, whose joint naval strength will be double her own, and adding Italy and Japan, her supremacy is still further curtailed. It stands to reason that, no matter how these new strong naval powers will group themselves, the naval situation of the world will be practically a new one.

In a list of the ships possessing first-class fighting value, it will be noticed that the number of battleships of a certain size and date is made the chief standard. This is in accordance with the view held to-day by the overwhelming portion of naval experts, a view very largely based upon the experiences made in the war with Spain. The modern battleship of a certain type is the real representative of actual sea power. It combines all the elements of success: Rams and torpedoes, powerful gunnery, and extensive armor protection, speed and ability to execute every species of manoeuvre—these qualities together make the modern battleship indeed the *ultima ratio populorum* so far as the watery element is concerned. It can be used for any and every emergency in naval warfare, strongly contrasting in that respect with the old ship of the line in the time of Nelson, whose availability was greatly circumscribed and hampered by its lack of steam power, its complete dependence on the erratic whims of wind and current, and its frequent inability to approach the opponent within fighting distance. Against that unfavourable showing, the modern ship of the line is able to locate and approach its foe with great speed, can choose whichever mode of attack suits best, either by circling around the adversary or by passing and firing simultaneously, can fight him or escape him if too strong, follow him and completely destroy him, as was done at Santiago—in fine, the new

naval tactics are as flexible and comprehensive as the greatest enthusiast can demand. The only weak point this latest terrific fighting machine exhibited until recently, viz., its small radius of sea-going power, owing to insufficient coal supply, has been overcome. The newest type of battleship is so constructed as to enable it to carry enough fuel for an uninterrupted trip to points thousands of miles away. It can now cross the ocean without replenishing its supply—a manifest advantage of immense importance.

It is, therefore, not astonishing that with the conviction of the prime importance of the battleship all naval powers are now concentrating their efforts mainly in the direction of acquiring as many of these as possible. France was the last to follow. To-day the former diversity of construction and armament—the ships of the line, the floating batteries, casemate vessels, turret ships, etc.—has given place to a uniform type, substantially the same with all nations, and only differing somewhat in degree, not in kind, as technical difficulties are overcome more and more.

The type of battleship below 10,000 tons has been abandoned for good, as lacking that measure of fighting power and intensity of action required to destroy an able-bodied enemy. Germany has given up her smaller type, and is now constructing battleships of 13,000 tons and over. The United States exceeds this with her 16,000-ton vessels, some of which are to be completed by 1905. Russia, like Germany, is building 13,000-ton battleships, while the largest vessels ordered by France will be 15,000 tons, and England even exceeds this maximum with several of her latest orders. Italy, on the other hand, after astonishing the world in the middle of the eighties with her giant "Italia" and "Lepanto," has now gone down to 13,000-ton liners, like Germany.

Germany chose the smaller type of 13,000 tons because in comparison with the slight increase in armour and fighting strength for the 16,000-ton vessel, an increase which is deemed non-essential, the disadvantages accruing to the larger ship, viz., much higher cost, decrease in mobility, difficulties in navigating near flat coasts, lack of docking facilities in foreign waters, etc., play no decisive figure. This, at least, is the German official view of the hour. She believes that her 12,000 and

13,000-ton fighters are equal, if not superior, to ours, and to the English 15,000 and 16,000-ton ships, because her type allows of a more voluminous and diversified artillery outfit, and because, as she thinks, her gunners are more thoroughly trained in the use of these more diversified weapons. And while this country, following England's example, has concentrated the main effort upon a few very heavy guns (in this again being led by the experience of the war with Spain), Germany has made a specialty of developing the use and the quality of her medium-quality artillery. The ships of her "Kaiser" and "Wittelsbach" classes (11,500 and 12,500 tons each) have been fitted out each with no less than eighteen 15-centimetre rapid-firing guns, while the British "Royal Sovereign" and "Duncan" classes, although 4,000 tons larger, can boast of but twelve such. Germany believes in this superiority of quick-firing guns, because her naval campaign system is entirely built up on the principle of the offensive, just as is her army. The above calibre for medium-power artillery has been increased in Germany to 18 centimetres in the larger vessels now under way. France has chosen the 16-centimetre type for the same class of her artillery, while we and Italy have 20-centimetre guns of the middle variety, and England even 23 centimetres. Germany believes this is going too far, as it robs these medium-size guns of their chief virtue, viz., rapidity, abundance of ammunition, and ready availability. The heavy battery in the centre of the ship is about the same with the different nationalities, up to 28 and 30 centimetres, and fired from behind steel-proof turrets.

The armour, too, is substantially the same for England, Germany, Russia, and America, viz., nickel steel made by the Krupp process. The thickness of the plates on the German battleships is between six and eight inches on the water line, above that four to five inches, and the turrets and other specially exposed parts up to twelve inches. This is about the same on our American vessels of the newest type, as well as on the English and French battleships. The new German battleships are all capable of a speed of eighteen to nineteen knots, whereby they equal or surpass the best English or American ones.

As to cruisers, Germany's policy differs materially both from the English and American one. She believes that cruisers are

not able to protect adequately the commerce of a naval belligerent, but that the sole use of cruisers consists in acting as the vanguard of the heavier and less speedy squadron of battleships, ascertaining the strength, the intentions and movements of the enemy for the information of the latter. Germany has definitely adopted this view for considerations which in her case at least seem valid enough. To effectively protect her transmarine commerce she would really need more cruisers than battleships, and even then, with the cable betraying the whereabouts of vessels everywhere, she deems such a task an impossibility in the case of a much stronger adversary like England. In any case, Germany argues, the decision will come in a pitched naval battle, and all her large cruisers are needed for that. No matter who her future naval adversary, the great danger to her commerce will be a blockade of her chief harbours and adjacent coast lines. If she is able to successfully withstand such an attempt, routing, utterly defeating, or scattering her enemy, that great danger would be eliminated. This, be it understood, is part and parcel of Germany's naval plan of action in case of war with a naval power greater than hers.

At any rate, it is Germany's intention to increase her present number of large cruisers only so far as these are needed to assist her battleships, and not with a view of protecting her sea trade. That is one vital point of difference between the German naval plan of campaign and the English as well as the American one. But she again differs in this, that she does not believe in such monster cruisers as both this country and England are now building—leviathans of 14,000 and 14,500 tons, like the "Drake" class in England and the "California" class here. Instead, she confines the maximum size of her armoured cruisers to 9,000 tons (just as Italy and Japan do), whereby she is enabled to give them greater speed and a greater radius of action. In all other respects, though, Germany tries to make her iron-clad cruisers as strong as possible, giving them an unusually powerful armament. But there is another very important difference—Germany continues to construct small cruisers of great speed, whereas England, the United States and France have abandoned that. These small cruisers do not exceed 3,000 tons in size, and their armour is light, but they

have a speed of twenty-two to twenty-three knots, thus enabling them to perform excellent service as the "hussars of the sea," quickly gaining information about the enemy, and successfully avoiding pursuit by their greater velocity. Of this type of extraordinarily mobile cruisers Germany is now making a specialty, and intends to use them not only in home waters, but also in far-away seas. Within a few years she will have some sixty of these.

The torpedoes built by Germany have now the uniform size of 300 tons, like England's latest, but against the 1,000-ton torpedoes which the United States is now constructing. The German navy department does not believe in submarine boats, at least not in the types so far evolved by this country and France. The reasons advanced for her disbelief are that these boats do not possess swiftness, that their radius of vision is too confined, and that their motions lack precision, and hence their efficiency can be but slight under any circumstances. In this judgment the best English experts so far agree. But in this as in other mooted points in naval lore Germany is awaiting proof either way.

The German navy is at present increasing at the annual rate of about nine or ten vessels, with a tonnage of between 75,000 and 80,000. In other words, the rate of speed is greater for Germany than for us, and the total tonnage for her navy is larger to begin with. Although in the number of vessels we are still ahead of her, the proportion being 136 against 122, we have but eighteen battleships (whereof five are slow and antiquated), eight armoured cruisers and twenty-one protected cruisers (the latter being of but secondary value), the rest being practically worthless as fighting machines. Unless Congress bestirs itself, there will be a steady dropping behind Germany. It is estimated on the best secret information obtained in Washington, that within six years from now, in 1908, Germany will have twenty-eight battleships, with a corresponding number of armoured cruisers, whereas at our present rate of increase we shall have but twenty-two battleships and twelve cruisers, although it must be taken into consideration that our vessels will average larger than theirs, both battleships and cruisers. Still, the discrepancy will be considerable.

The main difference in Germany's favour, though, as pointed out before, and one which it is very difficult to change, is our

insufficient supply of efficient men for the navy, both officers and men, and Germany's abundance in that respect.

Another American weakness, as compared with Germany, is our lack of a steady naval policy, and our complete dependence each year on the whim and on the political complexion of Congress. The adoption of her naval laws of 1898 and 1900 gave the German navy department the coveted opportunity of mapping out and then consistently carrying through a uniform and far-sighted programme of naval enlargement and improvement, and this, of course, is now bearing fruit. With us there is absolutely no guarantee that even the present rate of increase will proceed uninterruptedly. A revulsion of popular feeling, or the election of a Congressional majority on the crest of a wave for retrenchment, or any other radical change in the political complexion of the country, may bring the present modest movement for naval expansion to a sudden halt. Against all such accidents German naval expansion is secured.

But Germany possesses some great advantages outside of all this in any future naval war, no matter with which power or powers. Her Baltic Canal is the most important of these. This narrow but perfectly practicable waterway joins the Baltic to the North Sea, the route being from a point not far from Kiel on the Baltic to Brunsbüttel, near the mouth of the Elbe River, some distance out toward the North Sea from Hamburg. This canal is worth another fleet to Germany. Instead of having two water fronts to protect, as before, it virtually reduces, for defensive and offensive purposes in all but rare cases, these two to one, and doubles the effectiveness of her navy. It makes it possible for Germany during any naval war of the future to concentrate her entire naval forces, within the space of thirty-six hours or even less, at any given point—either along the shore of the North Sea or of the Baltic, and gives her a water transport way for her shipping which would be practically exempt from the danger of blockades. It does more than that even. For in case of an overwhelming naval superiority of the enemy, this canal puts it, if the worst came to the worst, always within Germany's power to find with her fleet a temporary refuge within this canal, where she could, by placing subaqueous torpedoes, etc., safely defy her bigger foe, and save her entire navy from ruin,

from such a sweeping disaster as the French met with at Trafalgar and Aboukir. The enormous strategical advantage of the Baltic Canal has been clearly apprehended, of course, not alone in Germany, but in all other countries that might some time or other become her foes on the water or by land, and it is in no small part due to this knowledge that Germany is recognized as a formidable naval power, far beyond the actual number of her vessels. The canal and her extensive system of coast defense, she possessing no less than eight armoured vessels of 3,000 to 4,000 tons each for such defense, besides some fifty smaller ships for a like purpose—make her powerful in a defensive naval campaign, and the same canal allows her to quickly concentrate her naval forces for purposes of attack so long as she confines her operations to home waters.

Another great advantage for her is the flat and dangerous character of her coasts, more particularly the line along the North Sea, between her two principal ports of Hamburg and Bremen and further west toward Holland. This makes navigation and coast approach very difficult for an enemy at a time when all protective measures for navigation have been removed. That whole stretch of coast, as well as certain parts of her Baltic coast, is one of the most prolific in loss of life and ships, and it would prove ten times as inhospitable, of course, in time of war.

The fact that nearly all the steamers of the North German Lloyd as well as of the Hamburg-America Line, together forming a very large fleet of over one hundred vessels, are enrolled by the German government as auxiliary cruisers in the event of war, is seldom mentioned, but it is nevertheless a fact. This is also of importance, as our experience with the few auxiliary vessels of the kind during the Spanish war strikingly proved. The "Morganizing" of these two chief German lines has in nowise altered these facts, it must be remembered.

The only question about the German navy that is still in a sense an open one is the question of its personnel. Germany has never had a naval war, and hence never enjoyed the opportunity of demonstrating before the eyes of the world exactly what she amounts to as a sea fighter. In that respect, then, she may be called an unknown quantity, despite all that is theoretically known about the technical excellence and the

spirit of her men and officers. England, the United States, France, Spain, Holland, have all shown their naval mettle, but it remains for Germany to win her spurs. However, everything points to the strong assumption that she will give a good, and perhaps a very good, account of herself whenever the time should come for her that tries men's souls. The discipline in her navy is, of course, second to none, and may be better than any. Whether she will equal the English in bulldog courage, or America in valour, dash, initiative and brilliant performance, remains to be seen. At any rate, the bulk of the men composing the German naval crews, engineers, etc., are the descendants of those men from the shores of the Baltic and North Sea who, as the sturdy fighters for the Hansa, centuries ago, waged fierce and bold war upon the Scandinavian shores. These are the same men, too, who in the British and to a less extent in the American merchant marine have all along been held the most efficient and reliable seamen. So, to be sure, the presumption is on all accounts a strong one that the men of the German navy will some day pluck laurels in a mighty wrestle on the deep

CHAPTER XVIII

EDUCATION

HER high status of education, the thoroughness of instruction given in her schools and colleges, and the matchless excellence of her universities, are among the chief glories of Germany. In this respect, as in some others, she is recognized the world over as the leading country. Teachers from this land and from every other visit her educational institutions for the purpose of studying the methods and the men that have made her great as the "schoolmaster of the world," and then return home and advocate more or less important modifications in consonance with what they have seen. Every summer, when American schools are closed and their superintendents or principals are off on a European trip for recreation and professional profit, scores of them may be seen wandering through Germany's public and private schools, under the escort of more or less willing and courteous officials, inquiring, verifying, taking notes. The German universities are still regarded by American students and professors, despite the enormous advances made here, as their second *almae matres*, where they take postgraduate courses, and complement the sum of their knowledge on any given topic. It is this country especially which owes to Germany's unrivaled educational system a vast debt, and one which the scientific world of America has always been more than ready to acknowledge, both in public and private. In every one of our American colleges and universities a number of the ablest professors and tutors received at least a part of their mental and moral equipment in German halls of learning.

The German scientific spirit, the German thirst for knowledge, and the German earnest search for truth have become an integral portion of American science, and in some departments, such as psychology, astronomy, and biology, the pupil of late has begun to distance his teacher. This fact has been pointed

out by Professor Münsterberg and others best able to judge. And the vivifying and bracing influence of Germany upon American scientific thought is unabated to this day. ¹

Illiteracy has practically been stamped out in the empire, and the day is not far distant when every normally endowed child and adult there will possess at least the rudiments of an education. The official statistics as to the knowledge of reading and writing among the recruits to the German army, published annually, show this convincingly. In the year 1879 the number of analphabets, out of 140,881 recruits, was still 2,217 or 1.57 per cent. In 1889, ten years later, out of 170,494 recruits, the number had gone down to 869 or .51 per cent., and last year the number had further diminished to 213, or .08 per cent., out of a total number of 255,103 recruits. There were still great differences between the various parts of Germany. In ten of the twenty-six states of Germany there was not found a single illiterate person, and in the most progressive and populous provinces of Prussia, namely, Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover and the Rhineland, the percentage had dropped to .01 or .02. From that it rose to the highest figure in Posen, East Prussia and West Prussia, where the Poles predominate, and where the figures amounted to .41, .36, and .31, respectively. But even this maximum of illiteracy is far lower than the minimum in the most advanced parts of all the other civilized countries, and neither France, Great Britain, nor the United States, although in each and every one of them immense strides have been made, can at all be compared in this respect with Germany.

While this is true of elementary school education, there has also come a much greater diffusion of higher knowledge in the empire since the war with France. The intermediate schools particularly, the "*gymnasias*" (or lower colleges), "*realgymnasias*" (or schools imparting instruction both in classic and modern branches, up to a certain degree), and "real schools" (or institutions teaching mathematics, modern languages, history, chemistry, geography, etc.) are overcrowded, though several hundreds of new ones have been built and endowed of late years. This is due to a number of causes. The tuition fees charged for attendance at them are low. In the best of them, even in cities like Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, etc., where prices in nearly every-

thing else have enormously risen, these fees do not exceed 130 marks, or less than \$32, per year of eleven months. Attendance at either these public schools or at more high-priced private schools of similar scope, is required to obtain the maturity certificate enabling the pupil to matriculate at any of the German universities, or the lower certificate entitling to one year's volunteer service in the army.

The pressure to study at the universities is almost as keen. The attendance at all the German universities and technical high schools has greatly increased. It is now more than double that of thirty years ago. Berlin has now nearly 7,000 students, and Leipzig and Munich follow with 4,000 and 5,000, respectively. The four faculties into which the sum of studies is divided at every German university have, however, profited at a very unequal ratio. The greatest increase has been, relatively speaking, in jurisprudence, that branch which every one entering the government administrative career must have gone through with. Next in the ratio of gain is the medical faculty, a profession which though it entails the longest preliminary preparation of all in Germany, and which neither in financial profit nor in popular estimation stands as high as the first-mentioned, opens up an independent and honourable career. The most unprofitable faculty, that of philosophy (which is, however, much more comprehensive in scope than the name would imply, since it comprises not only philosophy proper, but mathematics, astronomy, literature, philology, etc.), comes next in the scale of increase; and the fourth, that of theology, shows not only no gain, but an absolute loss. This last fact is quite significant, for from the merely practical point of view theology has grown in attractiveness. Incomes, salaries, and emoluments of Protestant clergymen and Catholic priests have become much higher in Germany than formerly. The unwillingness of the educated classes to engage in the profession of spiritual adviser is, therefore, due to other causes. The main reason doubtless is the growing spirit of atheism or religious indifference and the spiritually unsatisfactory conditions for young men devoting themselves seriously to their high task of nurturing the religious longings of those who have remained firm in the faith. The bitter strife that is being unceasingly waged between the two great

currents of theological thought in Germany, the orthodox and unprogressive on the one side, and the critical and liberal on the other, has also something to do with the falling off in the numbers of theological students.

Perhaps the most serious drawback to this general diffusion of higher education is the birth and steady increase of that element of the population which has been dubbed the "educated proletariat." This already amounts to a serious danger, and if present conditions are allowed to go on unchecked the danger will intensify. The process is a perfectly natural and unavoidable one. The annual output of young men highly equipped in all knowledge which books can teach is simply greater than the number of vacant places within the sphere of the empire which they would be competent to fill. The surplus of such men, unutilized human material of the higher kind, is therefore left in a more or less serious predicament. Many of them remain for years a burden on their parents or friends, until they are in the end provided for in a more or less befitting manner. Others emigrate, or obtain temporary employment in foreign countries. But the large bulk of these unfortunates drift into spheres of activity for which they are not trained, and in which they feel unhappy and misplaced. In other words, to become self-sustaining they have to descend one or two rungs in the social ladder, and then almost invariably lose caste with their former fellows, lose in self-esteem, and swell the ranks of the dissatisfied. Socialism is the great gainer by this process. The accessions to the Socialist party from this intellectual "proletariat" are large when numerically considered, but of still greater importance from the fact that they bring a constantly self-renewing élite of highly educated men within the fold. From these men the Socialist editors, agitators, and party managers, etc., are now largely drawn. Some of the more violent and combative ones among these "misfits" also join the anarchist ranks, or become extremists of an individual type.

There are, however, other features in the German educational system which call for comment. It is a very remarkable fact that the number of persons in Germany who declare the prevailing system ill adapted to the needs of our time is constantly growing. It may be remembered that the German Emperor

after his accession for a time led the movement for a radical change in this respect. He had clearly discerned the fact that an educational system, no matter how good in itself, and how well adapted originally to the requirements of practical life, does not remain so permanently; that the rapidly growing importance of technical knowledge in all the sciences which have come to the front within the past decade urgently demands a greater amount of theoretical and practical education in this regard than the existing system contemplated, and that, unless Germany in the practical application of this fact again led the world, the nation would soon drop behind in the race with competitors. The Kaiser elaborated these ideas in public, and Professor Hinzpeter (his former tutor), as well as Professors Riedler, Slaby, and others, were commissioned by him to carry them into broader strata of the nation. He also induced the Prussian Cabinet to take up this matter, and many months were consumed by the professional pedagogues entrusted with the task of thoroughly investigating the whole matter, and then reporting on it.

The Kaiser, however, met with the determined opposition of all the "old fogies" in the empire and these unflinching defenders of the prevailing system proved more powerful in the end than he. For they held all the responsible posts in the wide educational field, and in the government offices as well. Their arguments were the same that are always advanced under such circumstances. Summarized, the burden of their lay was that Germany had become great under and by the prevailing system of education; that it was the envy of all other nations and the pride of Germany herself; and that a serious diminution in the amount of classics taught meant an irretrievable loss in the mental and moral equipment of the whole nation. There were prominent educators in Germany who withstood this train of reasoning, and who made on conspicuous public occasions powerful and closely reasoned appeals to the better and more unbiased understanding of the nation. Professor Riedler, for instance, when installed as rector of the Technical High School in Charlottenburg, the leading one in the empire, delivered a carefully prepared oration on the need of throwing a good deal of the classical ballast in German school life overboard, and devoting more attention to the study of applied science, to modern lan-

guages, etc., and his pronouncement was echoed from the Vistula to the Moselle, and commented on for months in every German newspaper and periodical, but mostly adversely. The Kaiser, now and then, made declarations, like the one that he did not "want young Germans to be taught how to become Greeks and Romans," and that the "main thing was to fit them for the struggles and ambitions of practical life." Some attempts, too, were made to embody these new teachings into concrete form, and a number of so-called reform schools were called into existence.

But, as above hinted at, the Kaiser finally yielded to the unbending opposition on the part of the professional pedagogues and teachers of Germany, and abandoned, for a number of years at least, his efforts. However, the conviction has been steadily gaining ground of late that a thorough change must be wrought in educational methods in Germany, on pain of being outclassed in the keen race between the leading nations during the new century. This conviction is shared now (which may be looked upon as a hopeful sign) by a growing percentage of high government officials—men of middle age, or past it, and, of course, wholly trained according to old methods. The recent book by one such official shows beyond a doubt that neither the existing schools or universities, nor the technical high schools, prepare their pupils sufficiently for the practical needs of life, or for the employment of that universality of knowledge which formerly was looked upon as the great mission of German universities. He recommends as a remedy the complete reorganization of the whole system. The universities especially he proposes to remodel. He advises the creation in technical faculties, above all, and he wishes that the teaching in the middle and lower schools be reshaped in accordance with this plan, so that graduates from them shall be better prepared for independent scientific work in the technical branches and in the natural sciences. He recognizes the great difficulties in the way of realizing his programme, but he deems these difficulties by no means insurmountable, and at all events he claims that something must be done in the direction indicated, and the sooner the change be inaugurated the better.

Since that time things have progressed far enough in the new

direction to clearly show that a break with the past is coming. Besides the "reform high school" in Frankfort-on-the-Main, which for years was operated against government influences and led a struggling existence, Prussia is now founding two similar institutions herself, one in Breslau and the other in Dantzic, and appropriations for them have already been made by the Prussian Diet. Both these new institutions will be started on a large scale, and liberally endowed. They will in their main features be organized on the lines advocated by Professor Riedler.

Public education in Germany has been seriously suffering of late from repeated attempts made to curtail that freedom of scientific research and of publicly disseminating its results, no matter what its social or political trend, which has been the chief glory of German culture during the past century. The Kaiser and his government were powerfully assisted in these systematic efforts by all the reactionary forces in German political and social life. The Lex Arons, as that particular bill was called which was introduced in the Diet and which threatened the greatest danger, went further in this direction than any other government measure ever had. Its outspoken aim was to demolish at one blow liberty of scientific research at the universities. It was to subject the "privatdocenten," or tutors and independent lecturers at the universities, to a rigid system of supervision, and was to make the Minister of Education the sole arbiter as to their fitness as public teachers. The long and acrimonious debate on it in the Diet gave the government as well as the opposition the much coveted opportunity to expound their views. The Prussian Minister of Education openly declared it to be the main mission of the universities to train young men into good servants of the state and of the monarchy, into men of orthodox views on all important questions, political and otherwise, and not men of science alone.

The late Professor Virchow, one of the most renowned veterans of science in Germany, flayed the Minister of Education because of this frankly utilitarian admission, and the other leaders of scientific thought, almost to a man, strongly sided with him. Prof. Ludwig Buechner made a powerful appeal to the mature intellect of the nation, and after a very hard fight in the Diet and in the press of the country, which produced protests against

the bill from every university, the measure was finally defeated. As a curiosity it deserves mention that this bill took its name from one of the university tutors, Doctor Arons, a lecturer on economic science at Berlin University, and one of the most lavish contributors to the Socialist party fund. Doctor Arons is a wealthy man, the son of a banker, and under existing conditions he cannot be removed from his position, which he has successfully held for a number of years.

Although, however, this attempt to squelch "academic liberty" was foiled, and one in the Reichstag, despite the joint aid of the Conservatives and of the Centre, met a similar fate, these plans have by no means been abandoned by the Kaiser and his advisers, and they will doubtless again come to the surface at a more opportune moment. This has engendered a feeling of unrest and of insecurity in the whole scientific world of Germany, and has proved a seriously disturbing element.

Nor is this all. The whole spirit has greatly changed in German schools and higher educational institutions. This is but natural in a nation whose conditions of life have been so greatly modified of late. And this change is even more noticeable among the students and pupils than among their teachers. The spirit of bald utilitarianism is rampant among these boys and young men. For the specific form it has taken the word "Streberthum" has been coined in Germany, which in its generally accepted meaning stands for a hard striving after material success, no matter what the means employed to that end. There is, indeed, no disguising the fact that German youth of to-day is no longer distinguished for that idealism, that love of science and knowledge for their own sakes, which formed one of its prime characteristics until not many years ago. The present generation of young Germans has discarded old aims and ideals, and indulges no longer in illusions of any kind. They are severely matter-of-fact. This change is most pronounced among the university students. They, too, are the most loud-voiced jingos, the blind admirers of unscrupulous success.

There are compensating features, however. One of them is the newly awakened love of sport. This is the Kaiser's doing, and he has shown an admirable amount of tact and perseverance in this matter. Fifteen years ago nearly every form of healthful

physical exercise, excepting fencing, was unknown among the youth in German universities and intermediate schools. Patiently and persistently the Kaiser set to work, and first awakened, then vigorously fostered, a liking for every form of manly sport. He organized the aquatic clubs, the football and lawn tennis clubs, foot races and rowing matches, not alone among the university and college youth, but among the pupils of the lower schools, and among the rest of the population. He gave the best example himself, and he spared neither trouble nor time to attend and in every way encourage intercollegiate sporting events, founding and personally distributing appropriate prizes to the winners.

The movement is young as yet, and it is not to be expected that these young Teuton athletes will just yet do as well at international contests as their English or American cousins. But they are making steady progress, and within another fifteen or twenty years these young Germans will give a good account of themselves. The incidental gain, however, has perhaps been even greater. The German student is gradually weaning himself from a number of his former vices and senseless customs. The process is necessarily a slow one, but in the two points here specially referred to, the dueling nuisance and the enormous beer-guzzling, there has been a very perceptible improvement. The number of students not belonging to a "*schlagende Verbindung*"—*i. e.*, a club imposing on all its members the obligation to fight members of all similar clubs on the slightest provocation, has been largely on the increase. Federations of students' clubs tabooing this barbarous form of amusement have been formed, thus adding to the organized powers of resistance against the stupid custom, and greatly heightening their moral influence. The membership of the fighting clubs is steadily decreasing, at least in the larger universities, and it is no longer deemed a shame for a young fellow of spirit to keep aloof from them. At Berlin University, for instance, the non-fighting students now outnumber the fighting ones six to one. In the smaller university towns, largely because life there would otherwise be too dull, and also because they are sought by students less for their educational advantages than for the purpose of having "a good time," the old and time-honored brawlings and

slashings still survive to a large extent, but it is otherwise in the larger and more important universities, where students go to really work. This reform, for such it is, must be, besides, visible to every one now visiting Germany, for the scarred and cut faces among the present generation of German students are now in a decided minority. I do not intend to convey the meaning thereby that the students' duels are a thing of the past. Far from it. I remember reading, not long ago, a typical advertisement in one of the most widely read of German papers, wherein an ambitious university student asked for the services of somebody who could produce in his face, by acids or otherwise, but without endangering his life, a "permanent and formidable looking cicatrice," a so-called "Renommir-Narbe." The consideration for this service he fixed high enough to cut very deeply into his next monthly allowance from home. And this young man's case is not an isolated one. It is still customary with many students to estimate the value of a man by the number of well-marked cuts in his face, and to feel a sovereign contempt for the "Finkenschaft"—*i. e.*, the non-fighting students. But, as stated above, the number of these silly young fellows is steadily diminishing, and another generation will probably eradicate them entirely from the life of the German universities.

It would be an exaggeration to say as much about the beer-drinking habits of the German students. These habits, though here brought into peculiar forms, and with a narrowly circumscribed etiquette that has many curious features of its own, are really based on the national character as it has been described since the days of Tacitus. And as such they will probably endure through the centuries to come. The "commerz," or drinking, singing, and orating according to a certain formula; the "beer comment," or the rules and regulations governing the sociable meetings of a club of students; and all the other quaint and partly charming customs that are binding on the organized university men, flourish to-day as formerly. But in their grossly exaggerated forms there has been effected an unmistakable amelioration. "Beer duels," where men would drink against each other out of sheer bravado, sometimes fifty large tankards of it at one session, until one or both of them would roll over like a log, are rare nowadays. Young men do not, as a rule, ruin

their stomachs for life with continued beer orgies, as many used to do. Nor do they now acquire other dissolute habits quite to the same extent. There is distinct improvement in all this.

There is, however, still a world of jollity in student circles for all that. It is but necessary to pay a flying visit to those quarters of many a German city where students most do congregate to become convinced of that. The old devices for "tying the bear," that is, "raising the wind," are still in vogue, and importunate creditors are stayed off or hoodwinked with the same skill. In one of the Berlin streets much affected by students, pulleys reaching from garret to garret across the street may be observed. They are "telegraphic connections" between the quarters occupied by impecunious but happy students, enabling each camp to assist the other with eatables, "drinkables," and even clothes. A small basket is frequently seen traveling through midair, and bringing succour in every shape to that side of the street requiring it most.

In comparison with the cost of college life in England or America, the German universities, even the most expensive, are low-priced. Berlin is about at the top in this respect, but \$350 to \$450 will pay all the required expenses of a student there for a year, with close economy, of course. At Griefswald, Giessen, Tübingen, Würzburg, and some others of the smaller ones, \$250 to \$300 per annum will, at a pinch, do the trick. This a large number of German students, as well as many of the foreign ones, do. The Russian ones are said to often get along on much less than that; but then, of course, not every one likes a permanent diet of weak tea and cigarettes. At any rate, several American students I knew in Berlin got along on the sums mentioned above. It is amazing at what low prices many restaurants specially frequented by university students sell substantial and appetizing meals in the German cities, especially when the cost of meat is considered. But it is a simple fact that many of these restaurants furnish good food for ten to fifteen cents per meal, and a quart of foaming and choice beer can there be had for another four cents. In a word, Germany is still a Dorado for the poor and ambitious American student who is sure of himself and knows how to avoid the pitfalls of metropolitan life. For the morally weak and impressionable American youth the

German university, no matter where and which, is the worst possible place, unless he happens to be supplied liberally with paternal funds, and be pulled out of the slough of despond in time. The writer has seen some curious cases over there, which convinced him that not every American young man is able to stand transplanting from his native heath to a German university, with its total lack of supervision and moral restraint—at least, not without grave danger.

Everybody has seen the German professor, of course—I mean in *Fliegende Blätter*. The typical German professor with his goggles, his cane, his long hair, his absent-mindedness, his gruff good-nature and his colossal erudition. Of course. He has done duty as a national type for these many years, and the whole world knows him now better than he ever knew himself. Well, it is a pity, but this German professor no longer exists. He has utterly vanished, and his place knows him no more. He is gone with so many other things once distinctively German. Personally, I regret it. He was of his kind perfection, the best receptacle for holding an enormous amount of learning, and the best and readiest squanderer of it as well. He was a type, and a fine one. He is no more.

In his place stands the modern German professor, almost the antipode of his predecessor. He is alert, often commercial, sleek; frequently elegant and fastidious in his bearing and get-up, a connoisseur in the matter of a dinner, of a fine painting, of a horse, even of a Havana cigar or an Egyptian cigarette. At a state dinner the writer once met some thirty of the most prominent Berlin university professors. They were a revelation to him. Faultless in their attire, they were bright conversationalists, and in every detail thorough men of the world. One of them led in the lady of the house with the courtly grace of a Chesterfield. They knew to a nicety every wine served, even the vintage. They discoursed with acumen about the most bewildering dishes. They knew everything that a gourmet could possibly know. After the banquet they drank their small cup of *café noir* and smoked their Henry Clay with it in a way that showed long training.

These men were typical. They represented the new German professor. He is more charming and more elegant than his fore-

runner, and his gold-rimmed eyeglasses are more becoming to him than the other's clumsy specs, but still—on the whole, I preferred the other. Why, this new professor is sometimes so infernally smart that he has been known to cheat even his Yankee confrère. A Philadelphia professor of note, an eye specialist, was neatly done by one of these new-fangled German professors. He had come to Berlin for the sole purpose of attending the clinic of this famous man, and to see him perform operations. He went to see him. The Berlin celebrity charged him a very steep fee for the privilege of watching him at his clinic with his patients, but the Philadelphia man gladly paid it. This mood gradually changed to disgust, however, when he discovered that it was not the famous professor at all whom he had paid for seeing perform miracles, but merely one or other of his assistants, men who knew no more than he, the Philadelphian. This sharp Berlin professor was but one of a kind. With the growing attendance at the larger German universities, their incomes have climbed to figures which would have seemed fabulous to their predecessors, and most of this is derived from individual tuition fees paid by the students. Some of the more famous professors in Berlin—for instance, men like Professor von Bergmann, Professor von Leyden, etc.—are credited with annual receipts between \$50,000 and \$100,000. Professor Koch (the “cholera-bacillus” man), Delbrück, Schiemann, Röntgen, Behring, Slaby, Schmoller, and others, are all in the enjoyment of incomes which some years ago would have been called princely.

Nowadays it pays to be a German professor.

CHAPTER XIX

SOCIAL CUSTOMS

It is, of course, inevitable that the greatly altered conditions of life in Germany should have had a corresponding influence on the national character and customs. Both have, in fact, changed so greatly that a native German, returning after the lapse of twenty-five or thirty years, feels himself simply lost. The people around him think and feel differently on most subjects than was their wont, and as the fact is more and more brought home to him that he lacks community of ideas with them, he feels amazed and stunned as by a blow to his tenderest sensibilities. That explains, too, why so very few of these returned exiles feel at home in the Germany of to-day, and generally are glad after a spell to leave the country of their birth a second time and to bid a final farewell to the scenes of their childhood. Without exaggerating in the slightest, one can say that there is no modern nation which has altered so much in essential respects within a generation as Germany has. The framework of the national character has remained the same, it must be admitted, but a score of new qualifications have been brought into existence, and a number of others have been eliminated. Among the latter there are some which the world has regarded as distinctively national traits, and among the former are several which the Germans themselves all along considered wholly un-German.

Yet if one were asked what the leading German characteristic is, the answer even to-day must still be: Deliberate slowness. In that respect there has been little change, at least among the vast majority of the people. To an American, accustomed to rapid and intense work, there is probably nothing more annoying and exasperating in Germany than the constant recurrence of this systematic tardiness. He meets with it in all his dealings with the authorities; he encounters it at every step in his intercourse with the people; he finds it an insurmountable barrier in the transaction of any business which may have brought him over.

So much is this part of the very fiber of the people that they are unable to understand how anybody can be in a hurry. They actually look with suspicion upon the unwary stranger in the street who, not acutely alive to this bent of the national mind, displays haste in his movements. They think he must be an escaped criminal, or at any rate somebody who is on some unlawful errand. If our American has an unusual fund of humour and patience, he will derive much quiet enjoyment from all this. To give himself a good treat, for instance, let him watch, now and then, a gang of labourers at work. They eat six meals a day, and this, naturally enough, demolishes a not inconsiderable fraction of their time. After their midday repast each one of the men indulges in a one-hour's nap in the cool shade of a tree or on the soft side of a board, sleeping soundly and peacefully. When he resumes work, he will, as a rule, leisurely thump the asphalt or set some paving-stones, then stop, calmly surveying the landscape, puffing like a porpoise, and filling his lungs with a new supply of fresh air. Like as not he will then slowly fill a pipe, set it aglow, and begin a bantering conversation with his fellow "toilers," who instantly stop work to enter into it with all their faculties undisturbed. From time to time one of the men will take a good swig from his side-pocket flask of Nordhäuser (cheap corn spirits), and then hand it to his comrades, who just as deliberately will imitate his example. Then, perchance, they will all try another bit of work, and thus the long summer day of fourteen hours will pass right pleasantly. The foreman or overseer who superintends their task is to the manner born. To him, as to them, their interpretation of the term "work" appears the natural and normal one. He joins in their six meals—breakfast, "second" and "third" breakfast, dinner, "vesper," and early supper, often to be followed on their return home by a later and more substantial evening meal. The amount of actual labour accomplished in this way in a working day of nominally fourteen hours is about half or two-thirds that done by the average American labourer in eight hours. This explains, too, the curious fact that it costs more in wages to pave a street or build a house in a German city than in an American one, notwithstanding that the scale of payment is a much lower one. German labourers seldom earn more than three marks, or seventy-two cents

a day, and the best mechanics rarely more than 21 to 24 marks, or about five or six dollars a week. Of course, there are exceptions, such as jewelers, makers of optical and other instruments of precision, skilled mechanics in the electrotechnical, machine-building, typewriter, sewing machine or watch-making lines, some of whom earn as high as forty marks per week, or about ten dollars. But the above wages are the rule, and considering the small amount of work done, this is not astonishing.

As the common labourer works, so work the tradespeople and mechanics of every kind. Bricklayers, stonemasons, blacksmiths, horseshoers, joiners, carpenters, etc., all work leisurely; this shows the force of habit and example, for these same men, when later, perhaps, transplanted to this country, learn quickly enough to toil to more purpose and to do their best. In factories, too, the same thing may be noticed, although there, because of "piece work" having been adopted in many places, a change has been slowly operating for some years past. What is true of this class of the population is true in a still higher degree of the German master mechanics. It is, for instance, next to an impossibility to get a tailor, a shoemaker or a paperhanger to finish a piece of work in the time agreed upon, no matter how high the pay offered, nor how alluring the inducements held out to him. Curiosity prompted me several times during my stay in Berlin to try and get at the reason impelling these men, often showing a fair amount of intelligence in other matters, in thus standing in their own light. The answer was with some: What is the use? No matter how hard we might work, we could not earn any higher wages. Others again said: How can you expect us to have any ambition? We cannot rise. We must always remain what we are—drudges.

These answers seemed to me a powerful sermon on the unfortunate continuance of the caste and class spirit in Germany. For in other walks of life where ambition had a legitimate field to expend itself, there has been undoubtedly a change in this matter. In fact, the higher one goes in German society to-day, the more one will find a greater incentive to work, and an intenser application to it—in fact, an Americanization in methods and spirit. This is notably true of German manufacturers, and also of the higher employees in industrial enterprises of every sort.

The race for wealth is not yet as keen there as here, but when comparing present conditions with those a generation ago the change wrought is immense. With material progress has come a more materialistic view of life. A surprising degree of luxury is evident in the higher classes. Men of wealth now occupy a different position in popular estimation from that formerly held. The German public is as much interested in their millionaires and industrial dynasties—in the Krupps, Stumms, and Siemens; the Loewes, Bleichröders, and Warschauers; the Mendelsohns, Scherls and Wertheimers—as Americans are in theirs. Luxury is everywhere apparent—in the stores and shops, in the display of fine clothes and jewelry, at social gatherings, in the appointments of houses, exteriorly and interiorly. Fine palaces are reared by her wealthy merchants and manufacturers in the large cities and towns, and beautiful country residences in the fashionable suburbs, with spacious grounds adjoining. Nothing is more astonishing to the foreigner visiting Germany than this feature of present German life. The entertainment of guests has become more of a fine science there than here. The *cuisine* and the table appointments to be seen on festive occasions in wealthy German homes would have made the Germans of the last generation gasp with amazement and disapproval. Art patronage has become extensive and liberal, and, I will add, intelligent as well. The young German artist now finds at home a good market for his product. Private galleries and costly collections of every description are numerous and choice. Just to name a few at random, there are those of Ravené and Jaffé in Berlin, either of them worth a million or more, and the Jaffé collection, though rich in fine Murillos, Velasquez, Rembrandts, Reynolds, Turners, Rubens, Titians, and other masters of earlier days, practically unknown to the general public; the fine collections owned by Arthur Krupp in his Villa Hügel near Essen; by the great bankers, Bleichröder, Robert Warschauer, and Kaskel, the Cologne publisher Dumont-Schauberg. The Count Schack collection in Munich was recently left to the Kaiser, but by him presented to the municipality of Munich. Then there are many special collections of carvings in wood and ivory, old and artistic furniture, gobelins, intaglios, etc., like those of Prince Radziwill, Jacobi, Prince de Sagan, and

others. As a curiosity might be mentioned the collection of "historical corsets" belonging to the wife of the Berlin publisher, August Scherl, of which one, once the property of unfortunate Queen Marie Antoinette, cost her \$12,000.

But the same love of luxury is visible in public establishments. The old-fashioned German "Kneipe," with its smoke-stained ceiling and musty odour, has made room for veritable beer palaces. Berlin especially excels in this. In the leading thoroughfares of that capital imposing structures built in the purest architectural style, of costly brownstone or other expensive and durable material, exquisitely sculptured and fitted up with corresponding elegance inside, meet the eye; and the guest finds there every imaginable creature comfort. It was at first thought that such palatial "beer restaurants," as the Berliner calls them, would not pay; instead, they have proved gold mines to their owners, and the best classes frequent them. The same is true of the new cafés in Berlin and the other German cities. They at first were modeled after the large Vienna ones, but they soon surpassed their models in every way. Such an artistically furnished and beautiful café as the Kaisercafé in Berlin, opened about three years ago, does not exist anywhere else, for instance. The man who started it had been head waiter at an older Berlin establishment, the Café Bauer, for about ten years, and the \$200,000 spent in its fitting represented ten years' "tips." The Austrians now go to Berlin when they want to see a fine Vienna café.

In hotels there has been the same rise in luxury. Ten years ago there was not in the whole of Germany a hostelry which either in size or comfort could be compared with our leading American hotels. To-day there are scores that will bear such a comparison in every respect. At the Palace Hotel in Berlin, the finest dinners and wines in Europe are served, so connoisseurs claim, and there is nothing in either London or Paris that equals the Hotel Bristol there. The German hotel used to be dreaded by fastidious foreigners because of its poorly prepared fare; to-day it is precisely the *cuisine* in which her better hotels excel. The Reichshof, the Savoy, the Metropole, the Kaiserhof are hotels which in that respect have hardly their equal elsewhere.

The obverse and unpleasant side of this picture is the simul-

taneous and very general lowering of the national standard of honesty, trustworthiness, truthfulness, and morality. To bear out this charge it is but necessary to point to the official statistics. They show a steady and enormous increase in crimes against property and against morality; in the case of the former there has been since 1870 an increase of 500 per cent., and of the latter the fourfold number is now being committed. Not only have thefts, burglaries, pocket-picking, and all the ordinary forms of dishonesty become frightfully common throughout Germany, but the most cunningly devised crimes of that nature, and the "slickest" cases of cheating, embezzlement, and swindles of every kind that we hear of in this country, are now every-day occurrences in erstwhile innocent and unsophisticated Germany. Such a case of gigantic and successful swindling as that by the president of a large Cassel bank, by which some 130 millions of marks (about \$32,000,000) were diverted from the rightful owners, criminal history does not tell of a second time.

But even more astonishing is the showing Germany makes in the matter of morality. The simplicity and purity of manners on which she justly prided herself in former days, and which enabled her writers to draw many a parallel with France flattering to their own self-respect, must be looked for in vain to-day. The relations between the sexes have never been in Germany, so far as history teaches us, as lax as they are to-day. Certainly, Berlin in this respect is far worse than any other city in the empire, and there is no denying the fact that in many of the small towns and in some of the country districts conditions will even to-day compare rather favourably with those in some other countries that could be named. But on the whole the prevalence of immorality in every form is simply amazing. In Berlin particularly, where the increase in wealth and in luxury has been most rapid and marked, conditions are well-nigh on a par with those in Paris. A canker is gnawing there at family life in every shape. The number of women of loose morals has been estimated by local writers at 150,000, and they not only infest the leading streets at all hours of the day and night, but they penetrate private houses in the most respectable neighbourhoods, and this to an almost incredible extent. Young and unmarried men of the middle and higher classes almost without exception lead

dissolute and immoral lives, and the horror and disgrace of that peculiar form of union which Alphonse Daudet has so powerfully depicted in his "Sappho," and which in Berlin is euphoniously styled "feste Verhältnisse," permeates there every strata of society, and often leads to vile tragedies. It saps the vitality of and morally destroys young and otherwise promising men of the better classes by the hundred thousand.

Here one touches, in fact, upon one of the sorest spots in the social fabric of the Germany of to-day. While the labouring classes everywhere marry too early, often before attaining maturity, the reverse is the general practice with the middle and higher classes. Primarily this custom of late marriages is due to the increasing difficulties of earning enough to support a family in decent comfort. This is the main obstacle in the road for the average young man, and it is a great one. With the present conditions it seems, indeed, impossible to overcome it. For with an educational standard so high as to keep the youth at school till eighteen or twenty, a heavy charge upon his parents, and then, for another four or six years, either at the university, at some technical or commercial high school, or in apprenticeship, still entirely supported by his family; then serving his one-year's volunteership in the army, again at great expense to his parents; and next to partially or wholly support him during the first five or ten years of his official or unofficial career—and these are about the average conditions in the struggle for existence with the young man of the better classes—there seems indeed no way to make the young man self-supporting, less still to put him in a financial condition to marry, before he is thirty or thirty-five years of age. Indeed, the present average age of marriage with him shows a tendency to advance still further—many thousands can only afford to marry at forty and after. By that time, given the general indulgence shown by society toward his vices and toward his laxity in morals, and given further the constant and many-sided temptations and allurements of bachelor life in Berlin and in all other large German cities to-day, the candidate for wedlock is in most cases a whitened sepulchre, a man possessing a great fund of knowledge as to every form of dissolute city life, but usually also a physique which is no longer intact.

To partially, and in many cases wholly, overcome the difficul-

ties of a financial nature that prevent marriage, the dowry has become a settled institution. Daughters receive marriage portions, wherever German fathers can manage it, large enough to yield an income which added to the modest earnings of the young man himself would support the couple in comparative ease. Such portions vary, of course, greatly, according to circumstances, but at the present rate of interest they usually amount to a minimum of 100,000 marks, or about \$25,000. The standard of life being much higher than formerly, and prices of necessities, above all foodstuffs, having also risen enormously in price, it takes about 10,000 marks per annum nowadays for a couple belonging by birth and position to the better classes to make both ends meet. Hence, in large part, the keen race for wealth in this part of the population. However, the great majority of German fathers even in the higher stratum of the middle class, do not possess fortunes large enough to enable them to give their daughters such portions, and that again leads to an enormous number of women of marriageable age who are condemned to single blessedness. The latest official statistics computed their number at considerably over two millions. These unsatisfactory conditions have also led, so far as the unmarried women are concerned, to the acute character of the woman question, and of the movement resulting therefrom. However, it ought also to be mentioned that the German girl of to-day has greatly altered in character. She is no longer that nice, simple and unassuming creature which the novels of Marlitt have acquainted Americans with. She sees luxury all around her, and she naturally wants her share of it. Love in a cottage is no longer her ideal. She desires the comforts of life, and would rather not marry at all than forego them.

This is just a bare outline of the gravely disturbing factors that are exerting a most unwholesome influence upon the marriage market in Germany. With the present trend of things these conditions are much more likely to increase in difficulty than to mend. They form a constant and favourite theme of discussion for German writers on social and economic questions, and no less a personage than the most noted of living German philosophers, Eduard von Hartmann, has devoted a whole book to the subject. All sorts of solutions have been proposed, including the

most impracticable and futile. The imposing of special high taxes on the wilful and well-to-do bachelor has been a favourite proposition in this connection, and it was stated at one time that various German state governments had seriously considered the subject. But nothing so far has come of it, nor is it probable that anything like such a remedy would effect even a partial cure of the evil, since that lies much deeper, and is really an out-growth of fundamental conditions of the German life of to-day.

The gross immorality in the capital of the empire also aroused public attention, and some time ago things had got to such a pass that the women of the city felt it their duty to solicit the aid of the government in protecting themselves and their daughters from the contamination, and their sons from the dangers, of daily contact with the enormous number of "ladies of easy virtue." For this contact was not only on the public streets, but as well in the houses where they and their families inhabited apartments. The "Sittenpolizei"—*i. e.*, that branch of the metropolitan police supposed to keep a close control of the fallen women, were then given new instructions, but that had a most unfortunate effect, for outrageous arrests of perfectly respectable girls and married women began to multiply, not only in Berlin, but, under similar instructions to the local police, in Cologne, Frankfort-on-Main, and other cities. Finally, a national league of German women was formed to combat the whole evil, and a petition was presented to the Kaiser, bearing the signatures of about 25,000 of the most reputable ladies in the higher walks of life, in which a regulation of the matter was asked for. But nothing was done either then or since, and it is even to-day risky for respectable women to appear without male escort, after sundown, in the leading thoroughfares of the larger German cities.

The two criminal trials in which aristocratic members of the Club der Harmlosen (Club of Innocents) were involved, let in a flood of light on some of the darkest features of high life in Germany. The dissolute habits in vogue there to-day rival those of the same classes in nations whom the Germans had all along held their moral inferiors. Scandals of the worst type, and disclosing the prevalence of depraved tastes in those upper circles whom the Kaiser once called the "Edelste der Nation" (Loftiest

of the Nation), are of frequent occurrence, although the police in most cases squelch judicial investigation. Another notable fact is the great increase of divorces, and the ease with which they are obtained. Under the operation of the new Civil Code, in force throughout the Empire, this increase has gone on at an accelerated pace.

Thus, there is no denying the palpable fact that under new conditions the moral standard of the nation has been very perceptibly lowered, and this is true of all classes of the population.

Under the political and social preponderance of Prussia another peculiarity has become very noticeable in the empire. The police exerts such an amount of power, and plays such a prominent rôle in public and private life, as to have led to the charge, frequently made in the various legislative bodies of Germany, that the country is a "Polizeistaat," viz., one where the police is paramount. And there seems, indeed, good reason for making this charge. The police in Germany fills a much more conspicuous place than anywhere else in the world, with the single possible exception of Russia. According to the best official authority, the standard work of Count Hue de Grais, Royal Prussian Government President, the police is purposely so organized as to permeate and to a certain extent control the whole political and social fabric of the country. Its functions are so manifold, they so constantly intertwine with those of the civil and military authorities, and its aid is so unceasingly required by every department of the Government as well as by the mass of subjects, that one may well say the German police is omnipotent and almost omniscient. It is divided into the criminal department (with its large and important secret branch), the "security and accident" police, the "public order" and the "morality" police. There are subdivisions, too, such as the sanitary police. The organization of this vast body of police, numbering in all several hundred thousands, is not uniform. It differs not only in the various States of Germany, but also in the urban and rural districts. For the latter there is a separate body of "gensdarmes," mostly mounted, and armed with sword, carbine, and revolver. The urban police is usually uniformed very much in the style of the Prussian infantry, and armed with a short sword, and in

some cases with a revolver as well. The mounted police in the towns and cities forms only about five per cent. of the total.

The system is peculiar, too, in this, that while the central government has in all cases the appointive power, the police is not paid out of state funds but out of local and provincial ones. As to its personnel, it is recruited entirely from the army—*i. e.*, from the large corps of non-commissioned officers who have served a certain term of years and thereby acquired the claim to subordinate government positions. This fact accounts for the strong military spirit pervading the entire German police, and this is increased by the fact that the officers—*i. e.*, lieutenants, captains, majors, colonels, and presidents of police, formerly held similar commissions in the regular German army. The uniforms worn by these officers differ greatly from those of their men, both in color and cut, and are very handsome and dressy. The pay, both of men and officers, is low. The men get on an average not more than fifty to sixty cents a day, besides their clothes. The officers receive about thirty dollars per month in the lower grades, and from that up to fifty or sixty. They are entitled to pensions when invalided or disabled, and in case of death their widows receive small annuities.

As might be expected from their antecedents and exclusively military training, the German police is autocratic, puffed up with a sense of its extreme importance, and efficient only in routine work, but utterly lacking initiative, tact, or higher brain power. Their hours are long, but the amount of real work expected is not as large nor as arduous as that of an American policeman. They are nearly always honest, truthful, and well-meaning, and corruption and venality are not conspicuous characteristics of the force. The discipline maintained is very strict, and insubordination practically unknown among them. Their attitude toward the public differs wholly from that in other countries. They regard citizens in the same light as recruits, as beings who need constant surveillance and a rough sort of verbal instruction in all their duties toward the government. In a word, they do not consider themselves as the servants of the public, but distinctively as the organs of the public's master, the government. It is this mental attitude, no doubt, which accounts for the unpopularity of the police in Germany. It is exceedingly rare that

the public will side with, or assist, policemen in the discharge of their duties, in cases of arrest, or in the maintenance of public order.

But that does not alter the fact that everybody almost is forced to come in daily contact with the police. Just to enumerate a few such occasions, there is the domestic help, which is strictly controlled by the police of each district; there is the system of state pensions for the labouring classes, which is also rigorously supervised by the police; there is every detail of the internal management of each dwelling, and the relations between landlord and tenant, which the police superintend; there is the question of the discharge of each citizen's military duties, and of his tax burdens; there is the question of contagious diseases, of the hundreds of sanitary regulations which are severely enforced in every German household; there are the thousands of minute police regulations, and, of course, the whole broad field of criminality—in all of these matters it is the police which the public has to deal with primarily, often exclusively. Each inhabitant of Germany, whether native or foreign, must, besides, furnish, at stated intervals, documentary proof of his identity, etc., and each hotel or boarding-house owner must do the same regarding newly arrived guests. With all this network of information, extending down to the most intimate details of private life, the police, as a body, is always in possession of absolute and precise knowledge as to everybody residing within the confines of the broad empire, or merely sojourning there for a brief spell. They have discretionary powers of the most far-reaching importance, and can expel obnoxious foreigners, or German subjects from other parts of the empire, without vouchsafing any explanation. In a word, to lead a moderately quiet and undisturbed life in Germany, one does wisely to maintain as friendly a footing with the German police as they will permit. Of course, there are the courts of the land, both civil and criminal, and in many cases these may be appealed to, and in some cases they may amend or annul the first police decision. But such appeals necessarily involve great loss of time and money, are always uncertain in their final issue, and may only be entertained within specified limits. So that it may be truly said that the police is, in nine cases out of ten, the only arbiter between man and man

and between government and subject in Germany. Its tremendous influence will therefore be apparent to the reader.

Another radical change wrought in the German character by the events of the last thirty years is the elimination of that charming spirit of cosmopolitanism which used to be one of the distinguishing traits of the nation, and the substitution of jingoism for it. Of all the civilized peoples on the globe, the German alone was the prophet and the bearer alike of that highest fruit of mental culture, a universal mind and an unbiassed appreciation of the good to be found in every nation. The greatest names in German literature, science and philosophy, men like Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Humboldt, Hegel, were the embodiment of this conception, and nearly all the qualities that have made Germany eminent in every department of thought were, directly or indirectly, the outflow and product of this cosmopolitan spirit. One may rejoice at the unification of Germany, and at the vigorous development of national pride, but from every point of view the disappearance of that higher form of *amor patriæ* is to be regretted. Above all, however, the present type of jingoism, rampant everywhere in the empire, is unlovely, and totally out of accordance with the best qualities of the race.

The spectacle is all the more inexplicable as jingoism of this irrational kind militates against all the instincts of the race, and it is utterly without excuse in a country of the geographical position and the historical past of Germany. For jingoism is usually due to ignorance of the real character of other nations. The Germans possess the best and most diffused knowledge of other nations. Their very position in the heart of Europe, and their great love of travel, of a knowledge of foreign languages and literatures, has kept them from that insular bent of mind which is the heirloom of their British cousins, and from that similar trend of thought which, owing to his wide separation from Europe, used to distinguish in a minor degree the American. Even to-day, deep down below that thick veneer of disdain affected for all other nations, the typical German harbours an instinctive appreciation of those traits in other nations which he lacks. But the difference between former days and now is this, that he stifles this inner consciousness in favour of his self-created ideal: the German of to-day.

It must, however, not be assumed that jingoism has it all to itself in the Germany of to-day. The best minds of the nation are arrayed against it. The government, strong and to a great extent independent of public opinion, has not yet capitulated with it. The weightiest and best reputed publications war against it. But the jingoistic current of thought is so potent just now (and seems to gather more momentum each year) that at present it seems only a question of time when this newly engrafted sentiment will sweep everything before it, as the same sentiment has repeatedly done in France. That this would be a most unfortunate thing for Germany needs hardly pointing out.

There are other newly acquired characteristics in the latter-day German. I will mention the fact that from a preëminently reading nation the Germans are becoming the very reverse. There is an ever-swelling chorus of complaint going up among publishers and authors that the demand for reading matter is diminishing all the time. The magazines are full of this plaint; so are the more serious newspapers. And there can be no doubt that there is truth behind it. Teachers and university professors echo the lament. Since that new and untranslatable German word: "schneidig" was coined, a word which covers a multitude of sins with a cloak of nationalism, whole strata of German society have begun to affect, or to really feel, a deep contempt for books, for book learning, and for all that books can teach. This curious feeling is particularly prevalent among the higher classes, and among them men like Dr. Carl Peters, who hanged his negro servants in Africa when they crossed him, and Hermann von Wissmann, who made bloody campaigns against defenseless negro races in German East Africa, and obtained the highest honours and decorations from the Kaiser for it, are pointed out to the young generation as patterns to follow.

Among the characteristics acquired and worthy of all praise, a greater degree, and a much wider spread, of politeness, and a higher regard for the amenities of life, must be mentioned. The German of the better classes is to-day almost outdoing the French, among whom a retrograde movement in this respect is noticeable, in fine and polished manners. Intercourse has become more ceremonious than it used to be, and the amount of courteous phraseology indulged in on social occasions is truly

overpowering. Gallantry toward the fair sex is also among these recent accomplishments, and the fine gradation of bows, the correct amount of honeyed words, and the number and quality of the hand-kisses in his intercourse with ladies forms to-day an important item in the teachings given the German youth. Pleasant observances on festive occasions, such as birthdays, after balls, at anniversaries, and the like, have been brought into a regular system, and tend to make life more of a pleasant illusion than it is in more matter-of-fact countries. Social hypocrisy, in fact, and what Max Nordau so harshly termed "conventional lies," form a leading and growing feature in the life of the higher classes there.

With that, however, a much greater attention is also paid to the "substantials" of social intercourse. German hospitality, once hearty but rough, is now refined and dainty. It will no longer happen to you, in visiting Germany with a bunch of good letters of introduction in your pocket—and without them you had better postpone your visit, as nobody would extend any courtesies to you—that Professor Cloudland will at once receive you, enter into an intimate conversation of two hours' length with you, and then press you to stay and share an informal dinner consisting of boiled beef and carrots. No; to-day he will require you to first notify him of your arrival in town. He will then invite you to call, exchange for five minutes the badinage of the hour; then he will leave his card at your hotel, and a week or so later he will send you a formal and exquisitely phrased invitation to an excellent dinner, where you will also meet some men worth talking to. He will not wear a frowzy and ink-stained dressing gown on any of these occasions, but will be most correctly and becomingly attired. His study will not be reeking with dust and stale tobacco smoke from an antediluvian porcelain pipe; neither will disorder reign supreme among his musty tomes. He will instead be seen in a cosily furnished room where everything appeals to a refined taste, and his dining-room will be the perfection of gastronomic appropriateness.

These are the changed conditions you will find—and not wholly to your sorrow. But the choice flavour of that unconventional hospitality of old is gone, and you may miss it in spite of the *paté de foie gras* and the bottle of exquisitely

frappéd Moët et Chandon. Asthetics is one thing, and genuineness is another.

An intense modernness pervades social intercourse. The topics of conversation alone show that. It is no longer on such unprofitable themes as philosophy, literature or art in the abstract—but it runs on the latest sensation on the stage, on the races or some other sporting event, on the fashionable fad of the hour, or on the morning's flurry on 'change. Country life and customs are not what they once were. How could they in an age when Agrarianism and wily politics have become synonyms, and when the larger rural estates get their help every spring from far-away Poland or Russia? In lieu of a smiling, pastoral landscape, redolent with the scent of wild thyme, and peopled with rosy-cheeked folk who were charmingly ignorant of city ways, you will find to-day the tall smokestacks of the distillery, and will hear the steam escaping from the beet-sugar factory. These rustic denizens know every move of the stock market, and usually receive daily telegraphic reports from their agent in town. Their egotism and their greed for wealth are just as keen as, but perhaps a trifle more outspoken than, that of their city prototypes. The social question, too, has penetrated the rural districts, and the "hands," male and female, have begun to join the Socialist ranks. The German country parson, that glorious and mild old man, is the only person in the new picture who has not appreciably changed. He has remained the same lovable idealist, and from his grey-walled manse, hidden in grapevine and honeysuckle, the breed still goes forth to do battle with the philistine world. In him and his kind lies the redemption of Germany from her present creed of bald utilitarianism.

The last official census gave Germany a million more females than males. This alone will account for the acuteness of the movement for the emancipation of woman there. But, as pointed out above, the marriage question itself is much more difficult than in most other countries, owing to a variety of causes, but mainly to the late age at which men of the middle and higher classes are in a financial condition to marry. And with spinsters to the tune of over two millions, it is quite natural that the German women seek new fields of activity. This fact has come to

be generally recognized, even by the most conservative of both sexes. Several years ago there was an international woman's congress in Berlin, and that showed the world for the first time that Germany had on her part entered in earnest on the task of reforming social conditions which hold back from woman what rightfully belongs to her—a chance to earn a living when her chance in the marriage lottery has narrowed down more and more.

The old avenues have, of course, remained open to her, those of teacher, governess, ladies' companion, housekeeper, seamstress, milliner, dressmaker, etc., as well as the stage, the broad field of domestic service, the management of restaurants, cafés, and hotels. But of late years she has cut more and more into those domains formerly wholly or overwhelmingly claimed by men. The retail trade is now very largely in female hands. Several hundreds of thousands have found employment in factories and industrial establishments of every kind. In journalism the German woman has conquered quite a large field of her own, and of the professional writers of fiction about fifty per cent. are women, among them many who enjoy popularity and its emoluments. Several branches of the lower government and municipal service have been opened to her, and the telephone operators are nearly all women. Among the trades, too, she has secured her share. The typesetters, for instance, show a growing percentage of women, and among the lithographers, draughtsmen, and artists of every description they have found an increasing sphere of usefulness. She has made her way, even in such trades as landscape gardening and horticulture; in certain lines of manufacture she has taken the lead, and the census showed at least three female blacksmiths and coppersmiths in the empire. Of late, too, she has obtained the government permission, against the violent opposition of the men, to become an apothecary or druggist, of course only after passing the rather rigorous government examination.

But it has been the fight for admission to the learned professions, and to the public or private institutions which equip their inmates for them, which tested the mettle of the German woman, as it did that of her English and American sister before her. The German governments, national and State, took for

many years a consistently hostile attitude as to this. Both the German professors and their male students were likewise adverse to the admission of women on terms of equality. The question was ventilated in the Reichstag and in nearly every other German legislature, year after year, always in a sense hostile to the innovation. However, the more enlightened part of the German public gradually modified its views on the matter and a portion of the press followed. A more vigorous and better directed campaign was made during the past five or six years, and the force of public opinion won in the end. Doctor Bosse, the former Prussian Secretary of Public Instruction, who had opposed, on scriptural grounds, the admission of women to the professions, was at last displaced, and his successor has proved more amenable to reason and to progressive ideas. The authorities of the other German States had either preceded him in this respect, like those of Baden and Saxony, or they followed suit.

To-day the larger number of the German universities and technical or art high schools are open to women, and in some of them they are admitted to examination and graduation. They can now practice medicine and dentistry, under certain limitations, and may become doctors of philosophy in all its branches. The practice of the law is still forbidden them, and the government career in all its higher branches is also closed to them—as yet. There are at this present writing some 300 female students in Berlin University alone, and a goodly number in Heidelberg, Göttingen, and several other universities. In some others, like Munich, they are still excluded. The attitude of professors has on the whole become somewhat more friendly, especially if the woman happens to be a foreigner, but the students themselves have not so far qualified their tone of enmity, and there are still quite often such scenes enacted by them as when they left, with a great show of ostentatious indignation, the clinic of a famous Berlin professor of medicine, when they saw the first female student enter it. But this remnant of the old feeling of opposition will likewise disappear within a few years, no doubt. Woman is winning her way, slowly but surely, in Germany as elsewhere.

Of course, with all these changes the character of the marriage relation has not been exempt from them. A generation

ago the German wife was by no means the equal of the husband. She knew her place, and confined herself to it. The rights of a mother were always conceded to her rather fully, and they are to-day. But her wifely position was that of distinct inferiority to the husband. She was not allowed to exert influence on his public career. Her advice was neither sought nor accepted on business or financial questions. Wherever the intellect is the decisive factor, she had to remain mute and tamely submit. At home it was similar. Her subserviency to the master and husband, to the brother or father, were traits of national life which shocked the female guest from other lands. Manifestations of anger or of serious disapproval at unpalatable decisions made by her lord were rare, and if at all indulged in were severely frowned upon. As soon as her sons were grown, the moral serfdom under which the husband had held her was enlarged in its sphere, for she then became the dutiful slave of her own male offspring as well.

It would be going too far to claim that all this has been quite done away with. The German wife is still much more humble and submissive than either her French or American sister. It is amusing, even to-day, to listen to the conversation of a bevy of German wives at one of their well-beloved "afternoon coffees." Every third phrase begins with "Mein Mann" (my husband). It is "my husband thinks this," "my husband says so," "my husband in such a case always does so and so"—*ad infinitum*. Never by any chance does one of them say "I think this," etc. Even the widowed ladies are still so much wedded to this self-abasing habit of thought and action that in order to give emphasis to what they wish to inculcate they call up the manes of their deceased husbands and make them give point and substance to their own views. The day has not yet passed when German sisters will voluntarily or under but slight family pressure relinquish all their own aspirations in life, turn governess or else eke out a miserable and joyless spinster existence as a maiden aunt, just to enable one of her brothers to go to the university and afterward choose an honourable government career—and the entire family council, women foremost, will approve of such self-sacrifice, and would regard her as one morally lost if she showed a disinclination in the premises.

Still, for all that, the marriage relation has undergone a great change in Germany, partly for the better, partly for the worse. There is a diminution of that strong family sense and family affection which used to be chief characteristics. There is a diminution of wifely and unquestioning obedience. There is a diminution of martial happiness and affection. There is also a diminution of mutual solicitude and of that extreme care as to all creature comforts which distinguished the German wife from all others. There is instead a beginning in independence on the part of the wife—and this in spite of the fact that the new Imperial Civil Code has in nowise altered or bettered the status of the wife—and of a recognition on the husband's part of equal rights on the part of both. There is a widening of the wife's sphere of influence and of activity, and a broadening of her mental horizon and of her mental equipment. She is in many cases no longer satisfied with the mere title of "housewife," which the Kaiser has exclusively vindicated to his spouse, but her ambition has begun to soar for something higher—*i. e.*, to become the real partner of her husband, his sharer in all that moves and concerns him. So, on the whole, the change has been a wholesome and beneficial one, and the tendency in this direction is manifestly not of an evanescent nature. It will continue.

One more pleasant feature of German life must here be mentioned. It may unhesitatingly be said that Germany is to-day the neatest and tidiest country in the world, excelling even Holland's proverbial qualities in this respect. The most casual visitor cannot fail to notice this. Such wonderful order and cleanliness as meet the eye in every German city and town is nowhere else to be met with. There was a time when Coleridge coined a little distich severely reflecting upon the ancient city of Cologne, and for which then existed abundant cause. But Cologne to-day is far cleaner than is New York or London, and as for Berlin, it is a marvel of neatness and wise municipal economy. Go where you will in the whole empire, and the same facts will strike you more or less forcibly.

A few facts about Berlin, whose municipal management might stand in almost every respect as a model for the other capitals of the world, may be of interest in this connection. When comparing it with Paris, London, or New York, the entire costs of administra-

tion are, considered per capita, fifty per cent., thirty-five per cent., and sixty-six per cent. less, respectively. Yet the results accomplished at this much smaller cost are immeasurably greater. Take, for instance, the matter of street-cleaning. The trained and efficient corps of employees attending to this important item in municipal management is composed of uniformed youths working under the supervision of trusty and experienced men. Every street in Berlin is swept and washed at least once daily. The streets in the busy quarters and those in the better residential portions are asphalted, and are kept in perfect condition, both winter and summer. But the stone pavements, too, are never allowed to run down. Both stone and asphalt or concrete pavements are laid down in the first place as smooth as a billiard table, and then kept so by frequent mending. Between April and October every street and avenue is sprinkled and washed twice a day, and the refuse then removed so carefully as to leave the roadbed devoid of every foreign matter. A special subcorps of boys is busy during the entire day picking up all litter and depositing it in cast-iron and neat-looking chutes placed in every block at convenient distances along the sidewalks. No single street in the whole city and its suburbs, even in the poorest districts, is allowed to present at any time an unkempt appearance. There are no orange peels, no waste paper, no animal refuse, no empty lunch bags, encumbering the streets. As for the removal of snow in winter, the arrangements are so perfect that falls of one or two inches are carted away within twelve hours, and heavier ones of from three to five inches usually before the lapse of four or five days. And this removal of snow is thorough. It applies not only to the leading arteries of traffic, but to every street, important or unimportant. The primitive appliances used in removing snow in American cities have been displaced in Berlin by efficient labour-saving machinery of special construction and of various kinds, and the results thus attained are much more satisfactory.

It is in the matter of street-cleaning that Berlin leads every other place on the globe, and it is in this that the contrast presented is most striking. But there are many other features in the city's household which seem worthy of commendation. Throughout the whole municipal service the distinguishing

traits are a judicious mingling of economy and liberality in expenditure; a systematic and unceasing vigilance on the part of the city for its entire population, in all those things properly coming under its guidance, and a cautious progressiveness which is perhaps the most astonishing trait of all. Faud, jobbery, cliques and injurious nepotism are conspicuous by their absence, and downright stealing or other forms of open dishonesty have not been heard of for a generation or more.

But this characteristic tidiness in German cities and towns is not confined to the above. There are other praiseworthy things in which it manifests itself. One of them is the universal presence of flowers and prettily kept gardens surrounding dwelling houses. Even the poor and humble share in this. Nowhere else is window-gardening carried on to the same extent. Berlin again is most conspicuous in this regard. All over the city you see blossoming flowers everywhere, on windows, in gardens, but particularly lining the many thousands of balconies and loggias that form such a charming feature of the city. Again, the extensive use of trees lining the sides of streets is a thing in which the German cities of to-day excel. These afford shade in the summer, are of great sanitary value, and brighten and beautify what would otherwise be but a mighty desert of stone walls. The tidiness of the nation, though, shows itself, too, in the manner everybody, high or low, is clad. Exquisite taste is a gift denied to the German race, and hence you will not see in the streets of German cities women and men dressed with that elegance and *chic* other cities like Paris, New York or Vienna show. But you will see something even better, namely, an utter absence of raggedly, slovenly attired persons. The poorest even wear clothes that, though mended perhaps, are clean and whole, and the mendicant does not ply his vocation except his face be washed and his hands devoid of grime and dust.

No money could be more wisely spent by the common councils of a score of our leading American cities than to provide the means for a number of municipal experts to visit German representative cities, make a close study of the secret to their successful administration, and then report precisely what they have found, and secure the widest publicity for such reports. That would go a great ways in smoothing the way for municipal reform here.

CHAPTER XX

GERMANY'S COLONIES

COLONIAL aspirations in Germany date back less than a score of years, for they arose in the middle of the eighties, after some Hamburg and Bremen merchants of enterprise had given the determining impetus by land purchases from native chiefs and by the settlement of small and modest trading-posts on the west coast of Africa and in the Polynesian archipelago. Colonial enthusiasts in the empire point, of course, to the historical fact that once before, on January 1, 1683, the Great Elector of Brandenburg hoisted his flag over a portion of the Guinea coast, and proclaimed it German soil. As an historical incident this is of interest, for it proves that even in those earlier days it was a Hohenzollern who was far-sighted enough—he alone among all the rulers of Germany—to feel the need and importance of transmarine possessions. But practically this first experiment in colonizing proved fruitless, and after some years the fort and settlement of Gross-Friedrichsburg in that torrid part of the Dark Continent was abandoned, and every trace of it was lost.

Bismarck and old Emperor William I did not at first take kindly to the idea of acquiring German colonies. They felt that it was one thing to get and another thing to hold them; one thing to own fragments of stray land under the name of colonies, and quite another to make self-supporting and profitable property out of them. They were afraid of British jealousies, and of embroiling the relations of the empire for the sake of what might prove barren and even costly experiments. Bismarck at that time said a number of shrewd things in a pithy way, by which he meant to throw cold water on this newly awakened colonial ardour. In the Reichstag and in conversation he strongly deprecated the notion, pointing out the almost insuperable difficulties standing in the way of successful colonization for

Germany. A large and influential portion of the German press sided with him in this. Attention was called to the fact that all the parts of the world which as colonies were of value had already been acquired by England, France, Spain, or Portugal, and that without war, this fact could not be shaken. Also, that what Germany needed was not mere trading-posts flying her flag, not mere points whence her commerce could radiate, for such she already had in abundance, and the field for commercial extension was large enough for even her ambition, with free-trading England holding the most valuable colonial tracts, but colonies that could afford a second home of comfort for the steadily increasing surplus of her teeming population. With an annual increase in population of nearly a million, such colonies would, indeed, prove a great and lasting blessing to her, and would be worth all the financial and other sacrifices she could make. But such colonies, unfortunately, were not in the market, and there seemed to be no way of stopping the continuance of that regular stream of German emigration to the United States, Canada and Australia which the keen minds of Germany are all the while earnestly deploring. Emigration from the empire at that time was still very large, amounting to about a quarter of a million per annum. Independent of the colonial movement, it has since steadily gone down, and for five or six years past has hardly exceeded twenty or thirty thousand.

However, in the middle of the eighties the movement had become so strong, and had seized hold of such influential classes of the population, that it swept away all objections. It literally carried Bismarck and the whole government off their feet. The first acquisitions of colonial territory were made, and since then Germany—excepting during the brief chancellorship of Count Caprivi, who opposed colonies and was not afraid to say so—has consistently held to a policy of colonial aggrandizement, even though this has meant the annual expenditure of large sums, growing yearly larger, without any adequate returns.

In size the German colonies at present are very respectable, since they—roughly speaking—comprise a territory about five times as large as that of the empire itself. To the vast tracts of land in tropical and semi-tropical Africa which were first placed under the protection of her flag have come successively other

territories likewise situated in far-away and torrid zones. Besides the German portion of New Guinea and many islands in that region, she acquired, during the chancellorship of Count Buelow the small Chinese colony of Kiao-chau—intended doubtless as the nucleus of other and more extensive ones—which may prove in its commercial and political value of greatest benefit to her; next, the larger portion of Samoa, consisting of the two islands of Upolu and Savaii, by the well-remembered tripartite agreement between her and England and the United States; and lastly, shortly after the close of the Spanish-American War, by purchase from Spain, the Carolines and Marianes, with the exception of Guam.

Still, comparing her acquisitions, even territorially considered, with those made by England and France during the same space of time, Germany has remained far behind, especially in Africa. True, she has not met with a Fashoda, doubtless in consequence of the moderation displayed all this time. But she had to see since the middle of the eighties enormous stretches of far more valuable African territory "gobbled up" by both England and France. The irony of fate is shown distinctly in this, for Germany it was which first, through Bismarck, pointed France the way to a new colonial empire. Bismarck in his writings tells all about that. He intimated to the then French ambassador in Berlin, and to Jules Favre, that instead of "staring in a hypnotized way at that gap in the Vosges," left by German conquest, they had better acquire beyond the seas a hundred times the size of that strip of land, and that Germany would not stand in their way in such a laudable ambition. The French statesmen took the hint, and the Tonquin adventure, closely followed by a score of others, was the consequence, but unfortunately without thereby inducing France to cease "staring at the gap in the Vosges." If it had not been for this direct encouragement given by Bismarck, France, it is safe to say, would not have embarked on her late career of colonial conquest, and neither the whole vast territory to the south of China proper, nor that immense belt of land now brought under French sway in Africa, would have become the prey of the adventurous Gaul. Germany did not divert, as Bismarck intended it, France's attention from her lost provinces and from her dreams of revenge, and helped her lusty

neighbour indirectly to immense and valuable possessions in other parts of the globe. Perhaps, however, it might be counted a gain in the Bismarckian sense that France, by thus assiduously pursuing a colonial policy traced for her by the Iron Chancellor, did become the inconvenient rival of England, and by meeting in consequence, at a certain critical point in this career, with the Fashoda reverse, has once more turned the bitter foe of proud Albion. That, if it be a gain, is, however, the only tangible one that has accrued to Germany in the wake of France's new colonial policy.

But while by no means as large as either England's or France's acquisitions made during the same short period, in point of size Germany now holds a goodly colonial empire. In point of intrinsic worth, though, that cannot be maintained, as a hasty survey of the facts, drawn from the latest official sources, will demonstrate.

In Africa she has Togo, a territory lying on the Gulf of Guinea, about one-sixth the size of Germany, with a coast of only fifty-two kilometres in length. The climate is tropical and murderous. There are no harbours and the coast is flat and inaccessible. Part of the interior is fertile, but in the absence of almost any navigable rivers—for the Mono, Sio, and the tributaries of the Volta are not useful that way—and of all other means of communication, excepting footpaths, the production is commercially not very available. As a matter of fact, the only things of commercial value there are products of the oil palm. The negro population belongs to the Ewe tribes, and is indolent, superstitious, and fetish-worshipping. This colony costs the empire annually some 2,500,000 marks, which is likewise the total value of its exports, while the imports figure up a trifle higher. There are but 135 whites in the whole colony, 127 of them being Germans. The colony is bounded by English and French territory. In the 127 Germans are included the civil and military officials. The native population has never been ascertained as to size, but is not very large.

Cameroons, or Kamerun, as it is spelled in German, is a more valuable possession, in fact, intrinsically the most valuable under the German flag. It is located between 4.40 and 2.21 degrees north latitude, likewise on the Gulf of Guinea and has a coast exten-

sion of 320 kilometres, or about 220 miles. In size it is almost as large as Germany. The population numbers, however, only about 3,000,000 all told. It consists of various tribes of the great Bantu negro family, who occupy the coast regions, and of Soudan negro tribes in the mountainous and plateau districts of the interior. Among the former there are still some cannibal tribes, and all of them are fetish worshipers of the most degraded type. The Soudan tribes are warlike and difficult to manage, and are under the lead of a Mohammedan tribe, the Fulbes. Their main industry is slave hunting and selling. The colonial troops have had several bloody wars with the Fulbes. A dangerous and rebellious chieftain named Tibati was finally brought to submission in 1899. The coast tribes are unused to labour or agriculture, but do some trading. The whole coast belt is low, swampy and very unhealthy, and malaria and dysentery make the average duration of a white man's life there very short indeed. The mortality rate among the officials and planters is, despite the fact that they never stay longer than a year or two in the country before taking long leave of absence at home, simply frightful. The interior is partly volcanic and throughout mountainous, up to an altitude of 13,000 feet, and much more healthful. It is the coast region, however, which is alone commercially valuable. Owing to various causes it has so far only been partially exploited by German planters and dealers, but it produces cocoa of excellent quality, fine rubber, palm oil and pits, ivory, kola nuts, etc., and of late the culture of cotton has been introduced under the tuition of coloured experts from this country. The labour question plays, however, a great part in that whole region, and is very difficult of regulation. The coast belt produces, besides, everything typically tropical for local consumption.

One additional difficulty of Cameroons is the scarcity of means of communication, the waterways being almost the whole year around unsuitable for navigation. However, the Bênué, the Rio del Rey, and the Sannaga can be utilized to some extent. The culture of the commercially very valuable ramie fiber plant has also been lately introduced by a plantation society, and promises well. The exports amounted last year to over 6,000,000 marks in value, and the imports to about 12,000,000. The

German government received some 1,600,000 marks in duties, and some 2,000,000 of marks had to be contributed from home for administrative expenses; of this the maintenance of the colonial troops—amounting to about 1,200 men, largely coloured—swallowed up the largest part.

The main drawback to Cameroons is its coast climate. Without that it would, indeed, be a most valuable possession, for large districts in it are extraordinarily fertile, and the abundance of rain permits from three to six crops per year. Cape Debundja and vicinity shows an average annual humidity of about twenty-eight feet, being one of the highest on the face of the earth. The European inhabitants of this colony number nearly 600, of which 452 are Germans, the rest mostly English.

Some thirteen degrees farther south, between 17.16 and 28.38 latitude north, and with a long coast, is German Southwest Africa, in size almost double that of the empire. Its northern boundary is partially formed by the Kunene River, and its southern one by the Orange River and Cape Colony. The climate is much more healthy than that of any other German colony, but is still semi-tropical. Germany hopes to there settle in the course of time a large and prosperous number of German agriculturists and cattle raisers. The colony was in part first acquired from native chiefs by the Bremen merchant, Lüderitz. Portuguese territory is to the north of this colony, and England owns the so-called Walfish Bay, which is the most valuable harbour. Swakopmund is the only German port there at all practicable. The main trouble with this colony is its dearth and the unproductive soil, which requires abundant artificial irrigation. The population, whose size is not known, is also a hindrance, being partly hostile, and the rest indolent and unprogressive. It is Hottentot in the south, and Herrero and Namaqua in the north. There are copper mines of value, and it is suspected that both gold and diamond bearing land is within the borders of the colony, but the prospecting done so far has failed to locate it. Graphite and silver ore have been found in some quantity. Part of the interior is very mountainous, the Omatako being some 8,500 feet high.

The only export article of value so far traded in is guano, of which over a million marks' worth left the colony last year. The

empire only received about 1,000,000 marks' worth in duties, etc., and had to make up a deficit of over 9,000,000 by Reichstag appropriation. In fact, this colony, next to German East Africa, has so far proved the worst "elephant" of all, requiring every year large appropriations, and yielding little. The colonial troops kept there are German, and number nearly 1,000 all told. In all there are some 3,388 whites residing in the colony, of whom over 2,000 are Germans.

On the eastern coast of Africa, opposite Zanzibar, and between 4.40 and 10.41 latitude north, stretches another vast territory owned by Germany, viz., German East Africa, bounded on the north by English, on the South by Portuguese, and on the west by Congo State territory. Its population counts about 4,000,000, and in size the colony is almost twice that of Germany. The coast line is also unfavourable, being low and accessible for ships at only a few points, the principal harbour being Dar-es-Salam, with Tanga, Lindi, and Mikindani as of secondary importance. While the coast is low and malarial, and tropical fevers are there endemic, the interior is partly a high and barren plateau and partly crossed by high chains of mountains. This colony can hardly ever pay in the commercial or any other sense, for both soil and climate seem to preclude such a possibility. The interior has, it is true, large districts which are, owing to their high elevation, healthy and suitable enough in that respect for habitation by the white man, but the soil is sterile, and the rainfall is frequently so insufficient as to produce famine. The grasshopper plague is also one of the features of the country, and the rinderpest and other cattle diseases prove ruinous. Since German occupation began, there have been several famines of so severe a nature that whole tribes starved to death, and the total mortality from this source alone has been frightful. In the interior rises, from amidst a group of almost inaccessible mountains, the giant of Africa, the Kilimandjaro, about 20,000 feet high, and to the extreme west are the lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, and Nyassa, spread in direction from north to south. The trade of these lakes, however, has of late been largely diverted to English or Congo territory.

The population is mainly Bantu negro, with warlike Massai in the north and Zulus in the south, and the mixed race of Suaheli,

which is largely of Arab blood, along the coast. The latter is by far the most civilized, and its dialect forms the *lingua franca* in the whole of East Africa. There has been an almost unceasing warfare carried on in this colony since Germany acquired it, either with tribes in the interior or with the dominant Arab element on the coast, and conditions are by no means settled as yet. This colony, in fact, has been the most expensive and relatively the most unprofitable. But for some inscrutable reason it is precisely the one on which the colonial enthusiasts and the Central Government in Berlin have wasted their greatest efforts. Count Goetzen, formerly German military attaché in Washington, and his American wife, the former Baltimore belle, Mrs. Lay, do at present the honours in the gubernatorial palace in Dar-es-Salam, and there is more military splendour, more red tape, and more imported Prussian-bureaucracy in this colony than in all others combined. But that does not alter the facts as to the unfavourable climatic and geologic conditions. Nearly everything that has been tried in German East Africa has proved a financial failure. It has been so with sugar, with indigo, and especially with coffee and tobacco. The rivers of the colony, the Pangani, Wami, Rufidji, Rovuma, are not navigable. There are hardly any roads besides the caravan roads. The native interior population is miserably poor and unprogressive, and the railroads now building and projected will, under the most favourable circumstances, not pay for generations, if they ever will. The trade has greatly decreased since German occupation, and the imports from and exports to Germany likewise. The total exports now amount to barely 3,000,000 marks, and consist in the main of ivory (brought by caravans from the interior), rubber, copra, copal, sesame, and other raw products. The imports amounted to some 10,000,000 marks, but consisted one-half in foodstuffs and articles of every kind for the white population, especially the numerous civil and military officials. The empire has to make good an annual deficit varying between six and ten millions. Out of these sums the colonial troops, numbering about 2,500 men, are paid.

That cluster of colonies termed administratively New Guinea, and comprising the German portion of the large island of New Guinea, the so-called Bismarck Archipelago, and the Carolines

and Marianes, is together about half the size of Germany. The New Guinea part of it is by far the most valuable, though that does not mean a great deal, inasmuch as the whole trade amounts annually only to a couple of million marks, counting both imports and exports. The islands variously styled Salomons Isles, or Bismarck Archipelago, are inhabited by cannibals for the larger part. The Carolines and Marianes may in course of time amount to something in the commercial way, but so far they do not. There are almost as many missionaries as natives living there, remnants of the Spanish régime. The Marshall Islands are also commercially very insignificant. The same remark applies to Samoa, although Germany is now making strenuous efforts to improve matters there. The total exports from the German part of Samoa was last year but 1,500,000 marks, and the imports a trifle over 2,000,000. The empire's contribution to balance Samoa's exchequer was for the same period 146,000 marks, and the revenues fell even short of that small amount.

It is expected that Kiao-chau, Germany's small slice of China, taken by force in 1898, will some day be commercially the most important of her transoceanic possessions. The intention is to make of it a second Hongkong. It has one of China's most populous, fertile, and salubrious provinces, Shantung, for Hinterland, and Germany is grudging neither money nor men to make something of the new colony, of its free harbour, Tsingtao, and of the extremely valuable mines, which are at an accessible distance behind it. During the four years of German occupation the Reichstag has granted altogether some \$10,000,000 for the improvement of this colony, which is, territorially considered, the smallest of all, comprising but 100 square kilometres, and that body has appropriated another 13,000,000 of marks for the current year. The harbour there has been deepened and made accessible during winter as well. Docks and wharves are being built, large warehouses are being constructed, and besides government enterprise there is also quite a deal of private German enterprise shown there. The civil and military administration has been consolidated and perfected on German models, and the military and naval safety of the place has been vouchsafed by a garrison numbering 2,352 men, and by strong

defenses in the harbor and its approaches, as well as by fortifications on the land side.

In fine, the preliminaries are all being properly attended to by Germany, to make something worth while of Kiao-chau, but the future alone will tell whether the hopes entertained will ever be fulfilled. Meanwhile the trade of Kiao-chau is as yet ridiculously small, amounting to something like \$25,000 only—always excepting, of course, the imports for the above purposes from Germany and elsewhere. But it must be admitted that Germany has every reason to expect a great influx of trade to Kiao-chau within a relatively brief period. The coal fields of Shantung which are now being reached by the new German railroad from Tsingtao will alone bring a great deal of shipping to her harbour, as this coal is unequaled in quality on the whole eastern coast of Asia. The iron ores from mines within a radius of fifty miles of Kiao-chau are also said to be of exceptional richness. The agreement made between China and Germany after the seizure of Kiao-chau virtually granted Germany the sole right of exploitation for Shantung, and although this paragraph has been strongly demurred to by the United States, England, and Japan, the probability is that, practically at least, Germany will be able to do pretty much as she likes in "milking" Shantung and all there is to be gotten out of that province of 20,000,000 population. Russia and France understand, and acquiesce in, that this is Germany's "sphere of influence" in China.

Summarizing, then, this brief survey of Germany's present colonies, it is quite evident that they are, looking at them in the present light or that of the future, a rather poor bargain for so much money, men and energy expended—with the possible exception of Kiao-chau. There are several conclusions that may be safely drawn regarding them. Not one of them is suitable for the German settler and emigrant, at least not in large numbers. German Southwest Africa is the only larger colony whose climate is nearly moderate and adaptable to the German physical make-up, but there the poverty of the soil seems to forbid fructification of that advantage. The German government advises only such farmers or cattle growers to emigrate to that colony who have to invest there a ready capital of at least \$3,000. So that it is quite certain that the colonies which Germany has been thus far

able to acquire do not solve the main problem—*i. e.*, how to dispose of Germany's surplus population in a manner best serving the nation's political, racial and commercial advantages. That problem to-day is, in fact, as far from its solution as ever. There is, to be sure, a general readiness, or plan, to acquire other and, for the above purpose, more suitable colonies in some way and at some time, no matter from whom. Germany is in the market for this end. She would like nothing better than to become Portugal's or France's colonial heir. There is, it may be recalled, some sort of understanding between England and Germany on the one side, and Portugal on the other. The purport of this agreement is, roughly speaking, that Portugal has given these two powers, to both of whom she is under heavy financial obligations, first option rights in purchasing any or all of her colonies, whenever she should get in such serious straits as to be forced to sacrifice her national pride to her national honour and independence. Portugal has still, as the map shows, some pretty good tidbits for a connoisseur in colonies—Goa in the Indies, Macao in China, the Azores and Cape Verdes, and immense and in part very valuable possessions in Africa. Some day there will be a dividing up of all this crude wealth between England and Germany, England getting the lion's share. That much is reasonably certain. A good deal of these Portuguese possessions in Africa border on German territory, and hence will greatly enhance the value of the latter. With Spain, too, Germany has a sort of understanding—as the result of lengthy negotiations—regarding the Island of Fernando Po, situated opposite the Cameroons colony.

But all this, and the other schemes and half-formed plans of Germany as to additional colonial acquisitions, lie veiled in the future. Just now her colonial possessions are practically worthless, worse than worthless, for they cost her a great deal, and she will probably never get out of them again what is being put into them one way and another.

Besides, it can hardly be said that Germany has shown a lucky hand in her colonizing endeavours. Without really intending to do so, merely following the natural bent of her political and social mind, she has taken pattern much more largely from those unfortunate French colonizing methods than from the

only successful ones that modern history tells us about, viz., the English ones. Bismarck from the start warned against that. He always maintained that the English way—letting the merchant and planter, settler and prospector, show the way, lay the practical foundation, create trade and vested interests, and have the flag then follow them, in a modest and inexpensive manner—was the one for Germany to imitate. But the spirit of the nation tended in another direction. It tended to at once set about creating an expensive, cumbersome and useless but well-organized and perfectly graded government apparatus, scaled and working very much as at home in Germany—a duplication of the bureaucratism and militarism left behind, in fact. Germans are used to this, just as Englishmen are unused to it. And so the central authorities in Berlin unconsciously, almost instinctively, copied the French method of organizing and managing colonies—a method which has always failed in the long run. Thus you see in every German colony to-day, even in the smallest and most unimportant, a whole administrative machinery, colonial troops and police to preserve public and private peace, judges, governors, and so forth, and the rough and ready settler, instead of being left to fight out his battles alone and thus become what he couldn't be at home—a man of sturdy independence, strong will, and indomitable courage, the man able to cope with the new situation—has to ask the permission of these colonial authorities at every step, and thus remains in leading-strings. Germany has yet to prove that she can successfully organize, manage and foster colonies. The spirit of her home institutions, of the nation, seems to forbid it. There are many in Germany who see and feel this. In the Reichstag the leaders of the Left have often pointed it out. One of the most original and ablest of her colonial politicians and writers, Gustav Meinecke, in a series of powerfully written pamphlets demonstrated it. The term of "assessorism," meant to convey the above idea, was coined and is in a portion of the press invoked against it. But the prevailing system will probably remain in force, simply because it is in conformity with the present status of the German political and social conditions.

But whether or no, the colonial fever is still in the German blood, and with millions of Germans it is a fad to which they are

willing to sacrifice something, irrespective of the tangible, the commercial value therewith connected. As witness, for instance, the German Colonial Society. Its membership rises into the hundreds of thousands, and branches exist in almost every German town and village. Its presiding officers include an uncle of the Empress, also Duke John Albert of Mecklenburg, and a score of the highest men in the empire. The object of the society is to further colonial interests. There are dozens of other organizations which nominally exist for the exploitation of some colony or other, or to conduct a plantation on commercial lines, but which are really gotten up and run just for the purpose of affording the members a chance to vent their patriotism, nobody expecting any returns on the sums invested, and each concern managed in a most unbusinesslike manner. Many millions of capital are thus frittered away which yield no returns, or only very inadequate ones. This, as above stated, is a fad, a popular craze, and probably some years hence sober sense will reassert itself. For one thing, though, the large capitalists in Germany do not go into these colonial mercantile ventures. They continue to treat business and patriotism as separate things.

CHAPTER XXI

GERMAN COURTS

WHEN compared with the days of old, court life in Germany, as elsewhere, has been stripped of much of its imposing features. The day is past when it was one continuous round of pleasures and dissipations. The gay court of Napoleon III at Compiègne and the Tuileries finds no duplicate in the Germany of to-day. Nor is there any such ruler there like Jerome, the whilom king of Westphalia, whose motto on bidding his guests leave at night was, in his broken German, "Morken widder lustick" (to-morrow there will be lots of fun again). The glories and splendours of the Dresden court, once rivaling those of Versailles, are now cut down to very modest dimensions. And in the majority of the smaller courts life has become insufferably dull.

Of course, this decline of magnificence and this utter lack of spendthrift methods is not alone attributable to a more serious turn of mind that has taken possession of the sovereigns, though there is no denying the fact that a great sobering process has been going on among them for several generations. It is more largely due to the political awakening of the peoples ruled over, and to the much slenderer incomes of the rulers. In the eighteenth century, whenever a petty German tyrant found an ebb in his treasury, he simply sold so many thousands of his faithful subjects to the highest bidder, which usually meant England, and then he had once more the wherewithal to give splendid fêtes, to pay the excessive salaries of his French and Italian ballet dancers, and to build another fairy palace or two for the latest favourite. It was in that way, as the youthful Schiller so dramatically showed in his "Cabale und Liebe," that millions upon millions were annually wasted at the courts of small duchies and principalities, whose legitimate public revenues did not run into such figures within a score of years. In those days and until the middle of the last century, rulers were, indeed, potentates, for

they could do as they pleased, and there was no Reichstag, no State legislative chambers, to say them nay.

But those days are irrevocably gone. Even in Germany, intensely monarchic as they are, the people have become chary of their substance, and will not permit their dear rulers to squander it. The sovereigns of Germany are now limited in their expenditures to those constitutionally fixed appropriations and revenues which their subjects saw fit to leave them, and to the income from their private fortunes, which in many cases are very considerable. Indeed, there are several ruling sovereigns in Germany who scorn voted appropriations and "appanages," and prefer to pay their own way altogether out of their own pockets. The grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin is one of these. The larger half of the king of Saxony's income is derived from his private fortune. In Mecklenburg-Strelitz, too, the ruling grand duke is not voted any sum from the public revenues, nor do the rulers of Saxe-Altenburg, of Anhalt, of the two Reuss principalities, and of Schaumburg-Lippe receive any annual remuneration out of public funds, excepting such as accrue to them from certain domanial estates. It results from this, as may be incidentally mentioned, that a number of these petty German rulers are Agrarians; nay, for that matter, all of them are, for the income from their crown lands, domanial estates, forests, dairies, etc., plays a large rôle in the annual revenues of every one of them. And since American competition has greatly cut down the prices their tenants and farmers are able to obtain for every sort of agricultural product, the revenues of their august employers have shrunk correspondingly. As an irreverent American once tersely put it: The king business no longer pays.

Nevertheless, there are still numberless persons who look upon courts as the earthly equivalent for paradise, and upon the privilege of attending a court as the acme of bliss. And all these persons do not dwell in Germany, either. Some of them live in republics.

The Berlin court, as the largest and most important, may be mentioned first. Under this present Kaiser it has become much more magnificent and gay than it was during the reign of his grandfather. The latter made it a practice to always save a considerable portion of his revenues, and to put them by for a

rainy day, and for his progeny as well. Thus it was that his grandson on ascending the throne discovered quite a nest-egg, rumour said 60,000,000 marks. This went partially to his brother, Henry, but the Kaiser's own share has helped him greatly to tide over temporary stringencies in his particular money market. As king of Prussia the Kaiser receives an annual revenue of 15,719,296 marks, or nearly \$4,000,000, which sum is regularly appropriated by the Prussian Diet. His income from his domainial and private estates, mines, forests, lakes, etc., has shrunk greatly during the past ten years, but it still amounts to another million and a half. As Kaiser, the Reichstag merely votes him annually a sum "for representative purposes," as the phrase goes, and he is expected to defray out of that a number of expenses which naturally devolve on the imperial crown, including prizes to artists or literary men, gifts to charitable institutions or pensions to individuals, and other matters.

As head of the Hohenzollern dynasty the Kaiser has to take care in a suitable manner of all the members of the royal household, so far as there is need of it. There are, however, as it happens, but one or two distant relatives of his who claim a share of his revenues, while all the others are very well provided with this world's goods, and one of them, Prince Frederick Leopold, who is married to a younger sister of the Empress, has a much larger independent fortune of his own than that of the Kaiser's family. His uncle, too, Prince Albrecht, the Regent of Brunswick, is very wealthy.

The imperial court is usually held either in Berlin or in Potsdam. In Berlin it is the ancient Castle, or Schloss, situated in the centre of the oldest portion of the city, on the banks of the Spree, where the imperial family resides during its regular stay in town, which lasts as a rule from shortly after New Year's until the middle of April or May, according to the early or later arrival of spring weather. During these three months, then, the large court festivities take place. The Berlin Schloss consists of three main portions, the oldest and most picturesque dating back some 500 years, and being now exclusively used as residential quarters for court officials, superannuated chamberlains, ladies-in-waiting, etc.; its rooms are small and devoid of modern comforts. The central and the northern portions are

architecturally much more pretentious; they enclose spacious courts, and the total number of rooms in them runs up to nearly 600. However, only about fifty of them are large enough for big assemblages. It is in these that the court festivities are held, and a number of them, such as the White Hall, the Black Eagle Hall, the Red Eagle Hall, the Order Hall, the Brandenburg Chambers, are indeed very fine, and contain not only a wealth of *objets de vertu*, noble paintings, carved and heavily gilt furniture, costly gobelins and other precious hangings, but show likewise artistic decorations on walls and ceilings. However, intrinsically the interior of the so-called Stadtschloss in Potsdam is more valuable, where there is an enormous amount of solid silver used in the decorations.

During the short court season in Berlin are given about ten large and as many smaller fêtes, consisting of several big court balls, at which the attendance usually reaches two or three thousand; the more exclusive balls given for the more intimate circle of the imperial court, where the number in most cases does not exceed three or four hundred; the regular round of banquets, and possibly several special ones in honour of distinguished guests; the series of court receptions, and the court concerts and masquerades just before the beginning of the Lenten season. During Lent itself noisy and particularly frivolous gayeties are not indulged in. This programme not infrequently suffers considerable curtailment, in case the death of near relatives of the imperial house or of leading members of allied or friendly dynasties has necessitated court mourning, lasting in some instances for six weeks or several months.

The court festivities are always solemnly announced in the official press, with all their attendant details, such as the hours and days, the separate entrances to be used by every class of the invited guests, the costumes to be worn, the preliminary visits to be paid by the ladies to the first lady-in-waiting of the Empress, and by the men to the chief chamberlain and chief master of ceremonies; and so forth. They open with the first "Defilir-Cour," or ceremonious reception, at which all persons entitled to presentation at court make their first obeisance to majesty. Those entitled to admittance at court, by reason of birth or official station, are the members of the royal household; members

of other German dynasties present in Berlin; members of the aristocracy; all officers of the army and navy; all members of the Prussian and of the imperial cabinets; all persons on whom a high decoration has been conferred; court and higher government officials; members of the Prussian Diet, of the Bundesrath, and of the Reichstag. All these persons are termed "courfähig," or entitled to appearance at court. As the members of the Reichstag, too, are so entitled, the sixty members belonging to the Socialist Faction there might also go; but not one of them has ever tried it.

At the initial receptions, of course, the *débutantes* of the season are also presented, usually by their mothers. Much expensive finery is displayed on these occasions, and some youthful charms as well. However, it may be truthfully said that there is more beauty, more elegance, and a finer array of glittering gems seen at many a ball in the upper circles of society in republican America than at any of these court festivities in imperial Germany. For the men, of course, the choice in costume is narrowly circumscribed by court etiquette. There is a certain cut and material, a certain sword and shoe buckle, prescribed for each category of male guests, and they may not transcend these limits. They must, of course, wear smalls and silk stockings, all their German or Prussian decorations, and their coats (style Louis XVI) must have a certain hue and show a certain amount and manner of embroidery, either in gold or silver. Most of them look extremely foolish in this antiquated and unbecoming gear. With the ladies, of course, it is different. Except when obtaining special indulgence from the Empress on account of bodily infirmity or old age, they must be in low-cut corsage, and their train must neither be below nor above a certain length. But otherwise they can indulge their fancy, and the result is by no means always pleasing. Court dresses come high, and from \$800 up to \$2,000 is often expended on such a costume in the first place. But such dresses generally do duty in Germany for several generations, and are bequeathed as heirlooms by mothers and maiden aunts. Then the material is turned perhaps for the sixth time, and the cut altered to fit new fashions and new physical proportions. With many of these ladies such economy is absolutely necessary, for the large

majority of them are by no means possessed of great wealth. Thus the total effect of such a court representation is not overpowering, and there is even a tinge of shabbiness perceptible now and then.

At the smaller court affairs it is different, for they are exclusively attended by men and women of high social position and of means. The diplomatic fêtes are a matter *per se*. Once every year the Kaiser gives a fine banquet exclusively to the heads of embassies and legations, and another one to the military and naval attachés, and they are also invited to several of the large balls and receptions, but only in exceptional cases to the smaller and more enjoyable functions. On state occasions, such as the visit of honoured guests, allied monarchs, etc., there are given gala performances at the Royal Opera and at the Royal Theatre, when much floral decoration and other luxury is indulged in, and special banquets, etc., when the best wines and the choicest gold plate are produced. On the occasion of the visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, eighteen months ago, to help celebrate the coming of age of the German Crown Prince, a gala performance was given at the Royal Opera House. Some \$5,000 had alone been spent in choice roses, with which the whole interior had been prettily decorated. Huge garlands of fragrant roses hung from the ceiling, and the walls and galleries were festooned with them. The three-days' visit is said to have cost the Berlin court a matter of half a million dollars. There are also some special court fêtes every year, hallowed by tradition, such as the co-called "Ordensfest," in the middle of January, when all those who have received orders and decorations during the preceding year or on that day are the Kaiser's invited guests, a crowd usually running into six or seven thousand; the Black Eagle Day, when the new knights of that most prized of all Prussian decorations are installed and fêted; and the day when the Knights of the Order of St. John, an aristocratic organization of benevolent tendencies, are invested with their new dignity at the solemn annual chapter.

At all these occasions the ceremony to be followed is minutely prescribed and rigidly adhered to, and the court officers whose special function it is to watch over the proper observance of the rules laid down do so with great severity and with a devotion

beyond words. The present Kaiser is a great stickler for these formalities, and has materially elaborated them. Generally speaking, too, his court has become more exclusive than it was during his grandfather's time, and this is especially true as regards the admission of foreigners. The greatest caution is exercised by the Berlin court functionaries, acting under the instructions of the imperial couple, to exclude undesirable elements, and before invitations are issued a rigid examination has to be undergone as to antecedents, social position, and other points. As regards Americans, the rule is to admit to the Berlin court only those few persons every season who have either become personally acquainted with the Kaiser and have been found to possess no objectionable traits of any kind, or who are strongly recommended by the American ambassador. He again is expected to recommend only such of his countrywomen or men who have some special claim for this sort of recognition, and their number in any one year hardly ever exceeds two or three. The lines are drawn not nearly so severely at several of the German minor courts, such as Dresden, Stuttgart, and Weimar, where ten or twelve American ladies are often presented during the season, but even there a good deal of social or political influence is usually required to overcome the latent reluctance to admit the daughters or sons of a republic to these gatherings of royalty. A couple of years ago, I remember, the prayers of about thirty fair American ladies in Dresden for attendance at court were rejected. This was, however, largely owing to the unfortunate behaviour of a reckless American girl the season before, who had actually snubbed the mild old King Albert of Saxony, not having recognized him.

Between Easter and Pentecost, as soon as the weather has become settled and mild, the Berlin court is transferred to Potsdam, where the imperial headquarters are at the New Palace, that being the largest and best appointed, and being surrounded by a beautiful and very extensive park. There are near by some smaller palaces, and they are made use of more or less during the season as well. The fêtes given in Potsdam are not such large affairs, and for the most part consist in small luncheon or dinner parties, though occasionally large garden parties or so-called "Venetian Nights" are held. The Kaiser has of late

years, though, acquired a prejudice against lengthy stays in his Potsdam palaces, because of their insufficient drainage, a defect which the architects have been so far unable to completely overcome, although a matter of about a million has been unavailingly spent in the task. He prefers Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel, the quondam prison residence of Napoleon III, after Sedan and until peace had been concluded. And he is quite right in preferring it, for in beauty of scenery and in convenience and comfort that château is far in advance. He is also much less exposed to vulgar curiosity, for since bicycles have become inexpensive thousands of Berlin youths and maidens ride out to the New Palace in Potsdam on Sundays, whenever the Kaiser is known to be there, staring at him and his family through the iron railing that separates them from their ruler. And the Kaiser has become cautious, besides, since the assassination of King Umberto of Italy near his country residence of Monza.

While he is on his annual summer trip to the Scandinavian seas, the Empress and some of her younger children either remain in Wilhelmshöhe, or make an outing somewhere in pleasant lines, or go yachting. Later on, when the shooting season is in full blast, she may accompany the Kaiser to one of his northern estates, to Cadinen in West Prussia, or to Rominten, perhaps, whither, however, but a small retinue accompanies them.

Thus, on the whole, the imperial couple of Germany and their court lead a quite unostentatious life, when compared with that of the rulers of former generations.

The Bavarian court at Munich is the only one in Germany which is even more exclusive than the one of Berlin, and that court has a ceremonial, a costume, and a series of fêtes quite elaborate and more or less copied from those obtaining in Vienna. The old regent of Bavaria, Luitpold, reigns in place of the demented King Otto, and his son, Louis, will succeed him. King Otto is not the only insane German sovereign. The other is Prince Alexander of Lippe, in whose place the former Count Lippe-Biesterfeld is now regent. The present Duke of Coburg, Charles Edward, who was the British Duke of Albany before succession, is one of several minors among the German sovereigns, and Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg is for the present

relieving him of the cares of governing the few thousands of his subjects.

There are several oddities among the other petty German rulers, as, for example, the two principalities of Reuss. The elder line, that of Reuss-Greiz, was represented in 1866 by a bitter enemy of King William of Prussia, who sent his score or so of soldiers to give battle to his haughty foe. His men accomplished nothing, however, and when Bismarck later on came to make peace with all of Prussia's enemies, little Reuss and its ruler were forgotten. So that to this day there is, in theory, war between that tiny principality with its seventy thousand inhabitants and Prussia with her thirty-four millions. Henry XXII, the potent ruler of Reuss (elder line), never forgave that slight. He would rather have preferred to be dethroned than to be treated with such nonchalance. He died recently of a broken heart. A curiosity of this petty dynasty of Reuss—much older and at one time more powerful than the Hohenzollerns—is that every member of it must be called Henry. The elder line goes on counting Henrys until there have died a hundred of them, when they begin to number anew; while the younger line, that of Reuss-Schleiz, counts Henrys only for a century, then recommences the count.

The creeping in of democratic ideas and customs into this coterie of monarchs and princes, until recently so extremely exclusive, may also be observed nowadays. There is much evidence of that. It is nothing new, of course, that every member of the Hohenzollern dynasty, like ill-fated Louis XVI, has to learn a trade during boyhood, for this curious custom is two centuries old. The present crown prince is a skilled cabinet-maker, so that if at any time he should lose his bigger and more profitable "job," he might turn his hand to this honourable trade and earn another living. He keeps up his proficiency by constant practice, and his rooms are full of small and cunningly devised specimens of his skill, such as cupboards, bookshelves, etc. His uncle, Prince George, of Prussia, recently deceased, was, however, the only member of the house who followed seriously and by natural preference a calling humbler than that of officer in the army or navy, the two professions regarded in Germany as the only ones not dishonouring noble blood. This *rara avis*,

in fact, was a man of exclusively literary and artistic tastes; he wrote a good deal under the pseudonym of G. Conrad, and some of his historical dramas had quite a run in Berlin at one time. He was a bibliophile, and has left fine old editions of early date. He also collected early prints and engravings, and was forever "mousing" around the shops of antiquaries and booksellers, hunting bargains. These tastes of Prince George of Prussia, it is almost needless to point out, were looked upon as decidedly low by his noble relatives of the Hohenzollern family, but the prince did not care a button about that. His friends and associates were almost exclusively writers and artists, and he never appeared at any court festivity since his nephew, the present Kaiser, ascended the throne. In his vest pocket he always carried a microscope, with which he was in the habit of deciphering dim inscriptions and signatures on old coins or books.

Duke Charles Theodore of Bavaria is another man of similar type. He is quite wealthy, and there is no need of his working for his bread, but he hates idleness, and has a great love for his profession. He is a noted specialist in eye and ear diseases, and practises incessantly, even when away for the summer on his picturesque estate in the Bavarian Alps. Some time ago he suitably commemorated the thousandth eye operation performed by himself by issuing a pamphlet describing some of the most interesting cures wrought by him. While in Munich, during the rest of the year, he assiduously cultivates the acquaintance of his colleagues, the other physicians, and is a frequent attendant at the noted clinics there. His patients come to him from every walk of life, and he treats them all alike. The poor he charges nothing, but the wealthy patients are expected to pay the usual fees. His earnings are devoted to charitable purposes.

The reigning Duke of Saxe-Meiningen is a great lover of the stage, and is considered the best stage manager in Germany. He made his little court theatre in Meiningen a model institution in some respects, and reformed stage methods, especially so far as historical truth in the costuming and scenery part goes, and as regards the intelligent use of the stage chorus and of groups intended to represent crowds, such as are called for in most Shakespearean dramas, as well as in those of the German classics. They talk of a Meiningen School of Acting in Germany—*i. e.*, the

one which pays special attention to this part of stagecraft. The old Duke George got his wife, too, from the stage, she having been a popular actress, and made her Baroness Heldburg. There are several children from this union. Of course, their mother being only "morganatically" joined in wedlock, these children have no chance of ever succeeding to the throne, but they are in all other respects treated by him as the children from his two previous wives, who were of royal rank. Duke George has made for years theatrical folk almost his only companions, and when in trouble or financial difficulties he has often stood their friend. The subjects of this unprejudiced ruler are perfectly satisfied with these doings of their duke, and the little duchy is indeed one of the happiest and best-governed in the empire.

The Kaiser himself, however, has in a certain sense done more than any other ruler in Germany to democratize monarchy. In many respects he is an autocrat and of tyrannical instincts, while in others he is the most democratic ruler of them all. As the humour takes him, he will invite the darkest reactionaries among his suite, or he will choose the most liberal-minded captains of industry to accompany him on one of his frequent pleasure trips. On a recent occasion he selected as guests on a yachting tour the leading men in German manufacture and trade, two of them, viz., Isidore Loewe and Georg Bleichröder, being Jews. On another occasion he showed great favour to three other enterprising Jews, viz., Albert Ballin, the director of the Hamburg-America Line; L. M. Goldberger, a leading Berlin merchant; and Ernst von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a relative of the famous composer and a prominent German banker. In this he gives grave offense to the Prussian nobility, and they have not minced matters in their particular organ, the *Adelsblatt*, in which they predicted the impending downfall of the monarchy, owing to such consorting with the *canaille*.

Perhaps, however, "morganatic" unions among the rulers and princes of Germany have made more serious inroads into the "divine right" theory than any other factor. Such marriages have become more and more frequent, and what is still more significant, they now create hardly any sensation. In the Hapsburg dynasty some cases have occurred of late that drew the attention of the world, and it is remembered, of course, that the present

heir to the imperial crown of Austria-Hungary married not many months ago a Czech lady of inferior station. But on a smaller scale the same thing is happening all the time in Germany as well. The fact is deeply deplored by the dyed-in-the-wool monarchists there, but by nobody else, for almost every one of these unions, in which the dictates of the heart triumphed over dynastic scruples, has turned out well. The marriage of the late Prince Albrecht of Prussia and the lady of humble birth who was afterwards created Countess Hohenau stood for fifty years as a living illustration of this. The charming villa owned by this couple on the borders of the Elbe, in Saxony, was for many years the abode of almost unalloyed marital bliss, and the fact that he and his wife were virtually ostracized at the Prussian court mattered very little to Prince Albrecht.

Erroneous opinions are held widely as to the precise meaning of a morganatic union, or, as it is frequently termed in Germany, "marriage on the left hand." Such a union is in all respects save one the same as another marriage. It is solemnized by the priest, and figures as a marriage in the full sense in the records and civil registers. The issue is held as born in lawful wedlock, and they are entitled under the laws of Germany to their proper and equitable share of the private fortunes of both father and mother. The only exception is this: The father or mother being of royal lineage, while the other partner is not, the latter does not enter into the prerogatives and enjoyment of the higher rank, and the children born to such a couple cannot inherit the throne, if in the direct line of succession they would otherwise be entitled to such inheritance. In other words, their civil status is perfect, and the union itself is considered as an honourable one for both sides, but for dynastic and political reasons, as prescribed partly in constitutions and partly in dynastic house regulations, the issue of such marriages is excluded from the right of succession. Many of the children of such unions have made names for themselves, of which truth the Battenbergs are a striking exemplification.

Just to cite a few such cases of recent occurrence, Princess Elisabeth of Bavaria, granddaughter to the present regent of Bavaria, may first be mentioned. She married, in the face of the strenuous objections of her whole family, Baron Seefried, then

a young and handsome lieutenant in the Bavarian army, but of ancient and noble lineage, and owner of several fine estates. Although her aunt, Crown Princess Stephanie of Austria, and the old Emperor Francis Joseph both espoused her cause, her family did not relent, and the young couple were forced to leave the country and to seek refuge in Austria, where Baron Seefried was given an honourable position in the army. They are living very happily together. Another Bavarian princess, Elvira, married a Bohemian nobleman, Count Wrba, owner of the large estate of Holloschau in Austria, and lives there a quiet and domestic life.

Prince Charles, brother of the grand duke of Baden, likewise contracted a morganatic marriage with Baroness Beust, and he and his children relinquished all claims to succession. A sister of the reigning grand duke of Hesse, Princess Victoria, married her cousin, himself the issue of a morganatic union, Prince Battenberg. A granddaughter of the reigning grand duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Princess Marie, married, not a long while ago, and under somewhat sensational circumstances, an adventurer who was subsequently created Count Jametel. Duke Constantine of Oldenburg is married morganatically to a former cook, now created Countess Zarnekau. One of the sons of Duke George of Saxe-Meiningen, Prince Ernst, is married to a former governess, now Baroness Saalfeld. His father, as mentioned above, has a former actress, Baroness Heldburg, for wife.

From these and other facts it might be supposed that monarchism is dying out in Germany, but it would be rash to draw such a conclusion. Monarchism is unquestionably in process of transformation there, and much of the needless formalism and of the elaborate ceremony still attaching to it at this hour will probably be lopped off within a generation or two. But the roots of monarchism lie too deep there, and are too firmly entwined around the historic past of the nation, to fall as quickly into "innocuous desuetude" as casual visitors to Germany are often apt to imagine.

CHAPTER XXII

THE PRESS

It is one of the anomalies of German public life that the press is on a rather low plane. Not low morally, by any means, but financially and in point of influence. The enormous and rapid development of Germany during the past decade as a commercial and industrial country ought to have had a similarly stimulating and expanding effect in the development and growth of the German press. And it must be admitted that in some respects at least an effect of this kind is noticeable. But this effect is so slight and so out of all proportion with the astounding growth in the other directions mentioned as to make the inference irresistible that some gravely disturbing factors have been at work.

Looking the broad field over, there are, above all, three facts that strike the observer. The first is the very large number of periodical publications and, *per contra*, the very small number of them that rise above mediocrity. Next, the amazingly small amount of influence upon public and private life exerted by all but a few of them. And lastly, the comparatively low status in the popular estimation occupied by the whole class of writers, publishers, and contributors to these publications.

This at first sight seems all the more inexplicable when the fact is taken into consideration that journalism is by no means a plant of recent culture in Germany. Its roots, in fact, reach back as far as in either England, France, or this country. It is almost 300 years ago that the first newspapers were started in Germany, and during the whole of the eighteenth century there was a steady growth in every direction—increase in the number of them; increase in circulation; and increase in influence. During the murderous Thirty-Years' War, regular and irregular newsletters describing battles, sieges, massacres, and all the sensational events on the theatres of action as well as in the rest

of Europe, were issued by enterprising publishers, and many of these sheets were even quaintly illustrated. Something over a century later, during the Seven-Years' War, the press of Germany had already attained to that degree of development and influence, that it was recognized by the belligerents as an important factor in swaying the minds, the prejudices and sympathies of the world. Frederick the Great particularly had a keen appreciation of the power of printer's ink during his whole reign of forty-six years, and had practically if not theoretically proclaimed freedom of the press. His famous dictum: "Leave the gazettes undisturbed!" was more or less strictly obeyed in his dominions. It is on record of him that on one occasion, riding leisurely through the streets of Berlin, and noticing a newspaper placard pasted high on a wall, wherein he was handled rather severely by the writer, he stopped his attendant courtiers from tearing down the libel, grimly saying: "Hang it lower!" Through the struggle of 1813-15, when Germany, humbled into the dust by Napoleon I, rose in her might for the restoration of her national independence, the press all over the country did its share nobly and patriotically. The same may be said of that second great struggle with France that fell into the year 1870-71.

Naturally, though, a country that had been reduced to a mere "geographical idea," as Germany had been for the fifty years antedating the war with Austria in 1866, ruled over autocratically and split up into a large number of small and impotent states, with hardly any national conceptions or aims in common, was no favourable soil on which to raise a powerful and independent press. Before 1870 few Prussian newspapers circulated outside of Prussia. The Saxon and Bavarian papers confined their literary and their "counting-room" efforts to the circumscribed territory of their own "narrower fatherland," as the phrase then was. The German press as it exists to-day dates only since the establishment of the present empire, thirty-one years ago. At that time, and soon after, nearly all the big German newspapers that to-day enjoy large circulations and a measure at least of influence upon the public mind of the nation were called into life. Political parties were founded, such as the National Liberal (for nearly a generation the leading party of Germany), the Centre or Ultramontane party, the Socialist, and

others, and party mouthpieces were founded at the same time. The main periodicals, too, have come into existence only since then. Thus, in a certain sense at least, the German press owes its rise to the unification of the fatherland, as so much else in Germany does, and is, in its points of weakness and of strength, the creature and the mirror of political, social and economic conditions that have developed since.

There are no such papers of vast wealth and world-wide reputation published in Germany as the London *Times*, the Paris *Figaro*, or the New York *Herald*, papers that stand in the eyes of other nations as typical and as embodying, in a way, the political aspirations, foibles, prejudices and leanings of the average Englishman, Frenchman, or American. The foreigner visiting Berlin for the first time is astonished at nothing so much as when, noticing everywhere in the business centre of the city the evidences of rapid progress and fast increasing wealth, the handsome and often palatial structures reared of late years by the banks, the leading merchants and storekeepers, he inquires his way to some of the foremost newspaper offices, and finds them, instead of being housed sumptuously and on a large scale, as they are in the other leading capitals of the world, occupying mean and cramped quarters in backyards of uninviting-looking low buildings, to all appearance eking out a miserable existence. Often the passer-by hardly notices a small and cheap wooden sign over the passageway towards the rear buildings, proclaiming the name of one of the leading "arbiters of thought," the organ perhaps of a powerful political party. The Berlin organ of the wealthiest wing of the aristocratic Conservative party, *Die Post*, whose stockholders are principally to be found among the titled estate-holders and among the highest government officials, occupies, for instance, quarters which a well-to-do provincial paper in this country would scorn, and its editor-in-chief is hidden in a little sparsely furnished room, with an oil lamp on his desk, and as sole master of ceremonies outside in the cold corridor a freckled and hungry-looking office boy. Eugene Richter, the foremost Liberal leader in Germany, and editor of the *Freisinnige Zeitung*, which is the mouthpiece of the financial aristocracy of Berlin, has to climb up three steep and narrow flights of stairs of an old-fashioned house in a side street to his

editorial sanctum, measuring about ten by twelve and in which a small looking-glass, fly-bespecked and in a dingy frame, is the costliest article.

The great government organ, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (*North German Gazette*), which, since Bismarck's accession to power, has been the thunderer employed to scare and terrify the political opponents of the empire, is housed in a similarly inexpensive manner. The same might be said of scores of other important leaders of public thought all over the empire, and this is true as well, and even to a greater extent, of the editorial and business offices of nearly all the weekly or monthly periodicals. Every American who has ever visited Munich must have been amazed in locating the home of that ubiquitous disseminator of German humour, the *Fliegende Blätter*, for on the outside it bears a striking resemblance to a second-rate pawnshop, and if he has ventured inside he has found things nearly as unpretentious.

These are external signs of the fact that the German press by no means occupies that place of prominence in the thought of the great public which it does in this country. There are many other things pointing in the same direction. The amount of revenue, for instance, derived by the newspapers from advertising can by no means compare with that obtained by them in some other countries. Where the income from that source alone runs into the millions of dollars in the case of the most influential papers in this country, England or France, in Germany it runs but into the hundreds of thousands in all but one or two cases. The advertising patronage does not come from every class of the population, high and low, but almost entirely from the lower and middle classes. The big German firms do not advertise at all in the newspapers, excepting in the financial and trade sheets. The small shopkeepers probably form the most important class of newspaper advertisers.

The political influence of the press is also much smaller in Germany. It is seldom that any paper there engages in the task of ferreting out the truth about any important public question which for the moment engrosses public attention, and campaigns for the purpose of uncovering some gigantic piece of political or economic fraud, plot, or jobbery, or of proving or

disproving the justice of some great party or government measure, and of paralyzing the political influence of some party leader or party shibboleth, are still more infrequent. In that sense at least the German press shows a woeful lack of public spirit and enterprise, and this quite naturally robs it of a great deal of prestige. This fact is, however, not altogether the fault of the press, but must be attributed to a large extent to the tendencies of the Kaiser, the whole government, and of the ruling classes, which are decidedly hostile to an independent and strong press, and, of course, hostile as well to such important service by the press as calculated to curtail their own influence, now paramount. The obstacles, too, which editors, reporters, and other writers for the press find in their way in honestly attempting to fulfil this, one of the most important public functions of an untrammelled press, are vastly greater in Germany than in other countries, owing to the reasons above alluded to, and to others.

It is but of recent occurrence that a high German court in its decision in a sensational trial for an alleged press offense, proclaimed in so many words that no such right as the enlightenment of the masses on public questions or the criticizing of public measures held of injury to popular rights, could be vindicated to the newspapers, but that their sole business consisted in disseminating and vending the news. This decision, amazing as it appears at the beginning of the twentieth century, met with but feeble protests even from the Liberal press, and it stands uncontroverted to-day. However, with all these disadvantages under which the German press undoubtedly is labouring, it cannot be denied that if that keen rivalry and that broad enterprise existed in it as a body which, for instance, is such a characteristic quality of the American press, much might be achieved by it even with present conditions which is now left undone, and even unattempted.

The splitting-up of political thought in Germany is, however, probably the most serious single factor hindering a healthy growth of the press and of its influence. Where there are about a score of political factions, as is the case in the empire, no single paper, or group of papers, can acquire dominating influence, very large circulation, or that measure of great wealth which would render it capable of inaugurating and sustaining a thor-

oughly consistent and powerful policy, and of accomplishing those big tasks in the field of journalistic achievements which jointly enable a newspaper to become a real power in shaping public thought. This fact has been demonstrated a number of times in Germany. During that period, for example, when the National Liberal party was the largest and most potent in the empire, the leading organ of that party, the *National Zeitung*, likewise enjoyed a corresponding measure of public influence and a large circulation. With the split of that party into two unequal halves, and with its enormous decrease in voting strength, has also come a great loss in every sense to that newspaper, until to-day the paper is practically ignored all over Germany. Each of the German political factions, each wing of these factions, and again each shade of opinion represented within, has its organs in the press, and each of them fights the other factions, and often the other wing within the same faction, tooth and nail, thus practically rendering impossible the consolidation of public opinion on nearly every important problem that faces the nation. This discord within the press itself hinders progress in political thought and ideals immensely, and incidentally, of course, it hinders the growth of the German press in power, wealth, and influence in the same ratio.

The party organ, then, is still the rule in Germany, and to some extent at least the "organ" rises in importance and circulation with the party whose cause it espouses. A somewhat unique position is held by the Socialist press and by some individual papers. Of the latter the *Kreuzzeitung* deserves special mention. This organ of the larger half of the Conservative party is one of the oldest and most influential papers in the empire. Its clientèle is not nearly so large as that of a number of other papers, but is made up almost exclusively of the ruling elements—government officials, judges, army officers, persons belonging to the immediate entourage of the Kaiser and of the other sovereigns in Germany; the Kaiser himself reads it regularly. In its influence in shaping the course of legislation and nearly all other spheres of public activity the *Kreuzzeitung* out-views the rest of the German press combined. It is a real power, if an insidious one, for it excels in a peculiar sort of journalistic style, consisting largely in innuendo, and is hardly ever out-

spoken or vigorous in its expressions, but instead sows its seed in the mind of the reader by cautiously worded and half suggested arguments, indirect more often than direct, but never failing in its effect on the most influential classes in Germany. Bismarck for years was one of the regular contributors to this paper, and among its anonymous writers are to be found scores of the most prominent men in every department of public life. The *Kreuzzeitung* is, in fact, so influential a paper that it has, on several critical occasions, dared to successfully oppose the kings of Prussia and their successors, the German emperors, and maintained so persistent and bitter a guerilla warfare in behalf of the interests of the privileged classes as to defeat important royal plans. This has been the case, too, during the reign of the present ruler of Germany, and though for a time William II proscribed the paper, and allowed no copy of it to be delivered within his castles, the influence of the paper actually increased, for it represented at that time quite faithfully the convictions of the ruling classes as against those of the Kaiser. That was the time when the Kaiser still indulged the hope of merging the conflicting class interests of the population into one homogeneous whole, and when he believed in the feasibility of winning the Socialist masses over to the support of the throne. That dream, however, vanished into air after awhile, and then he found himself once more in consonance with the *Kreuzzeitung*, and he resumed the daily practice of reading it.

The *Vossische Zeitung* likewise occupies a peculiar place. It is older than the *Kreuzzeitung*, for it celebrated its centenary some time ago. It was for many years the chief organ of advanced political thought in Prussia, as the *Kreuzzeitung* is the leading exponent of reactionism, and was largely instrumental in precipitating the Berlin revolution of 1848, and in wresting a liberal constitution from the then reigning king of Prussia, Frederick William IV. From that proud eminence, however, the paper, yielding to purely commercial reasons, sank some years ago, and although still tamely Liberal in expounding political thought, it no longer holds a prominent place as a political organ, making itself instead the mouthpiece of the industrial and manufacturing interests of the empire. In that capacity it has, however, gained in circulation and wealth, and

is to-day one of the most profitable pieces of newspaper property in Germany. The *Berlin Tageblatt*, on the other hand, which has stood faithfully by its guns, and is still one of the main organs of Liberalism, is now barely paying expenses, though its political influence is great.

The rise of the Socialist press has kept step with that of the party, and the number of papers published by it is greater than that advocating any other form of political creed. Though published in the main for the masses of the labouring population, its intellectual level is relatively high, which speaks well for the mental status of its readers. Though hampered in every possible way by the imperial and by every State government in Germany, and though nearly every Socialist editor has served one or more terms in jail for *lèse majesté* or other press offenses, the general tone of the Socialist press is, nevertheless, vigorous and independent enough. The enormous ramifications of the party, reaching into every department of public and private life, and into the very chambers of royalty itself, enables it more often than the whole remainder of the German press to publish important domestic news first. No document is so secret or important that it escapes the friends of the party, and party discipline is so perfect that there has never been a case of betrayal of its informants on the part of Socialist editors and publishers. The Socialist press is owned and managed by the party itself, and profits or losses of the various papers fall to the share of the party. The central party organ, the *Vorwärts* in Berlin, is in some essential respects a better newspaper than the great majority of its German confrères, and boasts a deservedly large circulation. All the Socialist members of the Reichstag, of the various State legislatures, and of the municipal councils, are regular contributors to the Socialist press, and it is partly to this fact that much early and important information appearing in it can be traced. But aside from that, in trenchant comment and incisive editorial work the palm must be awarded to the Socialist press in Germany. The pamphlets, too, and other campaign literature issued by the Socialist press under the guidance of its party management, is usually more to the point and of greater effect than is the similar work of the other papers. Most of this work is done as a labour of love by the keenest minds

of the party, men like Bebel, Singer, Bernstein, David, Auer, Vollmar and others. During times of political excitement the *Vorwärts* and other Socialist papers often issue extra editions running into hundreds of thousands.

Of the so-called "independent"—*i. e.*, politically indifferent, press, which is of very recent growth in Germany, the Berlin *Localanzeiger* is the most conspicuous type. This paper is solely a sensational one. It spends more money for news than any other in the empire, and often lays out a small fortune in obtaining a sensational piece of news earlier, or exclusively for its own use. Its editor learned the rudiments of his profession in this country, and its publisher has earned quite a number of millions by his (for Germany) novel methods during the last five years. Its circulation is about 300,000, and is the largest of any newspaper in Germany. Though politically indifferent, the *Localanzeiger* is intensely loyal in its comment on the Kaiser's sayings and doings.

What is styled the "officieuse" press in Germany calls also for some explanation. The term is habitually applied to those German newspapers which are more or less controlled by the government. Yet they differ much in degree. It was Bismarck who first organized this system of influencing public opinion at home and abroad. For Bismarck, although he had a hearty contempt for the individual journalist, and although the present era of practically nullifying the constitutional provision guaranteeing freedom of the press was really inaugurated by that man of "blood and iron," nevertheless had a very lively and correct appreciation of the importance of printer's ink. He deemed it of the utmost consequence to have a number of papers always on hand for his purposes. The system organized by him, and the means employed, are still substantially the same to-day. He had the interest from the Guelph Fund, or as it was popularly known, the "Reptile Fund"—*i. e.*, the private fortune of the dispossessed king of Hanover, amounting to some \$8,000,000, at his disposal in "influencing" newspapers, individual correspondents and editors. These men and papers he sought and found not alone in Germany, but in Austria, Italy, France, England, Russia, and even in America. They had to do yeomen's service for him, and he held them to strict account.

They aided him very materially in his work, and no dunce, any more than a man of independent or unreliable tendencies, was tolerated by him in this international galaxy of journalistic bravos. It was under his régime that the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in Berlin was started, largely with government money, which paper then made a regular contract with him, placing a certain amount of blank space on its first page permanently at the government's disposal. This contract has since been renewed several times, and is in force to-day. A similar understanding exists with the *Cologne Gazette*, but that paper, on account of its old-time reputation for foreign news and because of its large circulation in foreign countries, is mainly used for such items of official news or for such attacks on foreign statesmen or governments as are largely intended to have an effect abroad, while the first-named paper is mainly used for official thunder intended for home consumption. The *Reichsanzeiger* is, on the other hand, a purely official paper, owned by the government outright, and is used principally for formal and less sensational government news. Imperial decrees and declarations, the awarding of orders and decorations, etc., see the light first in the *Reichsanzeiger*.

Besides papers, however, nurtured wholly or in part with government specie, there are a number of "inspired" and "semi inspired" moulders of public opinion. These are either regularly or occasionally used in disseminating news which the German government wishes to publish, but not in a formal way nor assuming responsibility for it. Often this class of papers is skilfully employed in stretching out "feelers" toward other governments. If these "feelers" meet with favourable reception, and the Foreign Office in Berlin is sure of its ground, the cautious "feelers" are followed up later on with more formal and explicit emanations in the regular organs of the government. If the effect did not meet expectations, the matter may either be dropped for good or temporarily, or else it may be kept alive by further information given to the same "inspired" papers. It would lead too far to point out all the advantages which the government, and more particularly its Foreign Office and diplomatic service, derives from this whole cautiously manipulated system of guiding and shaping public opinion and influencing

foreign governments, but it will suffice to say that its uses are, indeed, manifold and undeniable. However, abuses are also very liable to creep into it, and they have often brought it about that serious mischief was done. Now and then the delicate machinery has come out of gear, as when it happened, not very long ago, that while one set of "officieuse" papers was attacking one important member of the cabinet, inspired thereto by the Chancellor, another set, by the clever work of the assailed cabinet member's friends, published simultaneous justification of his alleged offenses, intermingled with a few poisonous darts intended for the Chancellor's own private delectation. One of the most frequent uses, too, to which the "inspired" press is put is to call to book individual foreign correspondents in Berlin, who, for one reason or other, have incurred the displeasure of the German government, or of one or more members of the cabinet, or perhaps of the Kaiser personally. Such attacks are usually purposely worded in an oracular style, lending itself to a variety of interpretations, but as a rule sufficiently threatening to cow the correspondent into submission, or to make him request his home office to send a successor.

There are about a score of such "inspired" or "semi-inspired" papers printed in Germany and elsewhere, and the rewards for such services rendered to the Foreign Office and other branches of the government vary in kind. Some of these papers and correspondents consider themselves sufficiently paid by being regularly fed with more or less important and accurate news from official sources, while in other cases the *quid pro quo* is more tangible. The whole matter is one which for the intelligent sojourner in Germany is full of interest, and certainly illustrative of certain phases of public life there.

As on every other sphere of public life in Germany, so, too, on the press of that country has the impress of the Kaiser's mind and influence been very strong. Bismarck, as the world knows, did not deal gently with newspapers and newspaper writers whom he could at all control, and his detractors and unwelcome critics he scourged with scorpions. It is remembered how he, during the last two decades of his official omnipotence, always carried a bundle of printed slips (containing formal charges) in his breast pocket, requiring merely the insertion of the name

of the offenders and of the paper or papers in which the offense had been committed. These slips he would send to the State's attorney, often several in the course of a day. The unlucky wight who had thus incurred his wrath would then, a few days later, receive a visit from the bailiff, informing him that action had been begun against him for "offending Bismarck," and in due course of time a trial would take place the result of which was a foregone conclusion, and by which he was consigned to sequestration for terms varying between a few weeks and one or two years. It was one of Bismarck's peculiar ways.

But in this, as in some other features of a character that knew no will but his own, he has been outdone by the present Kaiser. During the fourteen years of his reign some six thousand press offenders in round numbers have been hauled before German courts, and, with few exceptions, sentenced to terms in jail for having found fault with some of the imperial antics, for applying harsh terms to him, or for calmly and fairly criticizing his public actions. This in most cases has been called by the subservient judges adjudicating in such cases by the flexible name of *lèse majesté*, a term whose exact definition, under the present practice of the German courts, is an impossibility, for the interpretation put upon it by the judges themselves has varied in hundreds of instances. The German press is now almost as effectually muzzled as is that of Russia.

This is a matter which has been ventilated for years in the Reichstag, the only place remaining in Germany where the official and public acts of the Kaiser may be discussed *pro* and *con*, though within rather narrow limits, without drawing upon the heads of the disputants judicial thunderbolts. It has there been pointed out to the apologists of the Kaiser that the latter at no time scruples to criticize, however severely, the actions and words of any of his subjects, and of whole classes of the population; that he has not hesitated to publicly brand with ignominious names political parties or men who were opposing him in any of his pet measures or ideas; and that it was both unfair and contrary to the spirit and the wording of the constitution to deny to them in turn the right of defending themselves against these aspersions. It has been pointed that in not a single instance has the Kaiser pardoned any of these convicted press offenders,

nor even shortened their sentences by a single day, although exercising his pardoning prerogatives very generally and extensively in favour of officials and non-officials sentenced for exceeding their authority, for dueling, for brutally maltreating their subordinates, and for many other crimes of a similar nature. But the Kaiser's champions in the Reichstag, while unable to gainsay these facts, have always carried the day in that body, squelching such criticism with the sole argument that the monarch is a privileged person and can do no wrong, and that it is under all circumstances needful to maintain the authority of the monarch. The courts have concretely embodied the same train of reasoning by their sentences, and have steadily become more and more hostile to the press. The highest court of the empire, the Imperial Court in Leipzig, has especially distinguished itself in this respect. The members of this tribunal, as those of the lower courts, are appointed by the Kaiser, and this fact, of course, goes a great way in explaining things. Yet even in that body there have been, and are, men who could not find it within their conscience to thus habitually aid in overriding the constitution of the empire. One of these chief judges possessed enough of the old-time sturdy German independence to rather resign his lifelong, lucrative and honoured office than remain impotent to sway his colleagues longer in such a tribunal. He went into retirement and comparative poverty, and was bold enough to publish in a liberal magazine the reasons which determined him in retiring. But, unfortunately for Germany's bench, his example has not found many followers, and the practice of the courts has since then become even more illiberal.

It is no wonder that, with such powerful influences incessantly at work all over the empire, the German press, viewed as a whole, has lost more and more that virile spirit, that "eternal vigilance," which is the price of liberty, and that in its treatment of domestic conditions it has become timid and cautious to a degree. These unpleasant conditions have also done much to lower the German journalist in the popular estimation of his own country. The privileged classes especially regard him with a certain contempt and dislike. In what light the Kaiser himself sees the German newspaper man has been put on record repeatedly by men of his immediate entourage. But it is also

constantly illustrated by him in other unmistakable ways. As a class the publishers and editors of Germany fare worse at his hands than any other part of the population. Not one of them has ever received any signal sign of imperial favour. No high title and no high decoration has been bestowed upon any of them, not even upon the most abjectly cringing. When, in midwinter of every year, the list of those upon whom titles, decorations, and other honours have been bestowed is published, it is almost always found that among the eight thousand or so, comprising every station in life, there is not a single professional newspaper writer or publisher. The man who for a generation had sold his soul to the government on the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, got, shortly before his death, the ridiculous title of "Commissionsrath," a handle to his name which is usually conferred by Prussian royalty upon a second-class tradesman when he has given lavishly towards charities, especially those favoured by the court. It fully describes the man—Doctor Pinder was his name—when I mention that he felt proud of the title.

Of course, with such press conditions it is not astonishing that German parents of the higher classes encourage their sons in choosing rather any other profession than that of a newspaper writer, and that capitalists as a rule are unwilling to risk their money in a business which offers scant profit and no honours. Thus it is that very few men of acknowledged reputation are, or have been, in the newspaper profession as a regular calling. No posts of honour or emolument are ever offered them by the government. As a rule the German newspapers are run on small capital, and do not yield large profits. The men who have made writing for them their life work are never in receipt of large salaries, but manage to pay their debts by writing books, or theatrical plays, etc., in addition to their regular labours.

It is, under the circumstances, surprising that the newspaper writers of Germany are, as a class, men of good or even excellent education, many of them having passed through the universities and taken their degree. They are also, with few exceptions, men of integrity and of kindly disposition, and the papers are, almost all of them, clean in tone and free from unhealthy sensationalism. The editorial matter in the better papers is well

written and shows a large and varied fund of information, and the criticisms on music, the drama, art and literature are nearly always by men who understand their subjects thoroughly. The reporter alone is, as a rule, the distinct inferior of his American confrère, both as a man and as a newspaper worker. In Germany the reporter is still, as in England, a mere scavenger of news, with whom it is best to remain on distant terms. His field of labour is a much narrower one than here, and whole domains of news are either slighted or entirely neglected by him. A certain standing and good incomes are enjoyed among the German reporters only by those who regularly attend the courts—*i. e.*, the law courts and the court of the sovereign in whose capital city his labours are performed. The latter reports, of course, in a style of unvarying enthusiasm, the splendid fêtes and other functions and diversions given by "his" particular monarch, and for that purpose certain narrowly circumscribed facilities are vouchsafed him. The Kaiser and the other sovereigns of Germany regard this branch of newspaper work as the most honourable and difficult of all, and to testify to their belief it is the reporter of this species, whose loyalty is, of course, above suspicion, and which must have stood many previous tests, who in some cases has an honorary title (that of "Hofrath," or Court Councillor), conferred upon him by his sovereign, together with an occasional medal or order of the lower designations. This enables him to appear at court clad in the customary smalls and pumps, and to consort, almost on terms of equality, with the royal or ducal flunkies, who will regale him quite affably on the backstairs with the details of the particular form of dissipation at that minute indulged in by his betters upstairs. And I don't know but what, with the peculiar views about the functions and standing of journalism held in the empire, public opinion there is not right in looking upon this "court reporter" as the only member of that despised vocation who may be termed at least "fairly respectable."

The periodicals of Germany partake in a general way of the limits and qualifications of the daily press, and can compare neither in dignity nor intrinsic worth, and still less in influence or circulation, with those of either England or America. With a couple of exceptions they lead a struggling existence. The

tourist might make an extensive trip through the length and breadth of the empire, and it is quite possible that he would not have seen a single copy of any German review, nor even heard one mentioned in conversation. Even in the bookstores one sees them but rarely, and as for quoting them in legislative or other representative bodies, as is often done in the British Parliament, that is out of the question. German reviews do not sway the German mind to any great extent, and as for the German government or the voting masses at a general election, they usually ignore what any or all of the reviews may have said on the questions of the hour. A man might write a lifetime for the leading reviews and not become known outside a small circle. All this at first blush may seem strange, but the fact, after all, is easily susceptible of explanation. The absence of a free press has a great deal to do with it. In a country where public measures and men must be handled gingerly to avoid prosecution and incarceration, the air is not favourable to the growth of periodical publications in which matters may be treated in a trenchant, outspoken, forceful manner. The further fact that in political education the average German is even at this day behind the other leading nations, and that a public life, in the broader sense, does not exist to the same extent in Germany as elsewhere, also counts for something. Add to this that the German reviews, like the daily papers, are run on small capital, and yield small financial returns, and that they rely (as was the case in England eighty or ninety years ago) exclusively on subscriptions and hardly at all on advertising, and it will readily be perceived why Germany in this respect has remained behind.

The leading German review, though by no means the oldest, is the *Deutsche Rundschau*, founded in 1874 by Julius Rodenberg, and still edited by him. Rodenberg possessed unusual qualifications for a venture of this kind. Born seventy-one years ago, he early showed gifts of a versatile and graceful writer, and extensive travels broadened his views, brought him in contact with many interesting personages and gave him an intimate acquaintance with English and French literature. He did much good literary work during a long stay in England, being then and for many years after on terms of friendship with Freiligrath, the refugee German poet and translator of English

poetry. His London experiences he embodied in "Days and Nights in London," and trips to Ireland and Wales produced his "Isle of Saints" and "Autumn in Wales." He was largely instrumental in introducing to literary Germany romantic Great Britain, and he has retained a great love of English literature. He and Fontane rendered into German many of the old border ballads, up to then quite unknown in Germany. After he had started, in a modest way, the *Deutsche Rundschau* in Berlin, he quickly gathered around him as contributors many of the best writers, such as Paul Heyse, Gottfried Keller, Theodor Storm, C. F. Meyer, Hermann Grimm, Wilhelm Scherer, Helmholtz, du Bois-Reymond, Haeckel, Buechner, and discovered many a promising talent, such as Helene Boehlau, Anselm Heine and others, and this, in fact, was one of his chief merits, and earned him the lasting gratitude of even the younger generation. His model had been the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and in choice of subjects—literary, artistic and scientific—many of his issues will compare favourably with that admirable French publication.

The two rivals that were started by the younger talent in Germany, first *Die Gesellschaft*, during the "storm and stress" period of the eighties, and during the past decade the *Neue Deutsche Rundschau*, although brilliant and intensely virile at times, lacked a number of the essential qualities that go to make up a uniformly good review. *Die Gesellschaft*, at first edited by M. C. Conrad and Carl Bleibtreu, and for five or six years the rallying point of fine writers and essayists like Wolzogen, Sudermann and others, admitted, for the sake of encouraging ambitious but extravagant young men, much that was crude, *outré* and *risqué*, and under its present editor, Ludwig Jacobowski, in Dresden, it seems to be trying to become sedate and orderly, but only succeeds in being dull. The short career of the *Neue Deutsche Rundschau* is very similar. Its chief merit seems to have been its championship of such writers as Ibsen, Hauptmann, etc., and the introduction to literary Germany of some of the younger and most talented Scandinavian poets and novelists.

A more serious rival to Rodenberg's *Deutsche Rundschau* was, for a time, Paul Lindau's *Nord und Sued*, which saw the light in 1878 in Berlin. For six or seven years following, this publication

made serious inroads upon the older and sedater ones, and its staff of contributors and its choice and variety of topics outshone ten years ago the *Rundschau*. It was primarily owing to the character of Paul Lindau himself that *Nord und Sued* enjoyed but a brief succession of halcyon days. That brilliant *feuilletonist* had earned his literary spurs, after passing through the German universities, during a five years' stay in Paris, and had imbibed some of the most charming characteristics as well as worst foibles of his Gallic hosts. After a number of years passed as editor of various papers, he came to Berlin in 1871, and quickly achieved a reputation as the cleverest journalist there. But as editor of *Nord und Sued* he lacked seriousness of purpose and steadiness of character, and a base scandal finally put an end to his Berlin career and drove him out of the capital; since which his review, too, has steadily declined.

Older than either of these publications, and still following the placid tenor of its way, is *Die Gegenwart*. This was started in 1872 in Berlin by Theophil Zolling. Zolling, a graceful and interesting novelist and general writer, had also made his earlier reputation in Paris, where he had been an intimate friend of Alphonse Daudet, who dedicated one of his best tales to him. *Die Gegenwart* deals not alone with literature and art, but also with politics, social studies and the like; it is bright in tone, and really deserves a larger circle of readers than it was ever able to gather under its wing, owing for the most part to an unenterprising publisher.

About as old as the *Deutsche Rundschau*, and of the same general tendency, is the *Deutsche Revue*, published in Stuttgart and edited by Richard Fleischer. It has, though now in its twenty-seventh year, only lately come to the front. General attention was particularly attracted to it by its publication, in rapid succession, of several Bismarck articles, rather sensational in their purport, the material therefore being supplied, as generally surmised, by Prince Herbert Bismarck. This publication, too, for the last few years, has made a specialty of weighty contributions by leading men in the German army and navy, and has assumed a rather pronounced nationalistic and patriotic tone. Its list of contributors is rather extensive and cosmopolitan, and includes some eminent Frenchmen and Englishmen. As its

scope became broader, and its taste more catholic, its circulation, too, has greatly increased, and in South Germany, at least, it is decidedly the leading review to-day.

A new review, with a very ambitious programme, was started on October 1st last in Berlin, by Alexander Duncker, and under the editorship of Julius Lohmeyer. It is called the *Deutsche Monatsschrift*, and in some of its features it goes beyond what has hitherto been attempted in Germany. From the list of its contributors for the first year, and there are among them such names as Wilbrandt, Jensen, Stinde, Felix Dahn, Detlev von Liliencron, Julius Wolff, Anton von Werner, and a number of historians, social economists, and men of action, this new review will rest on a much broader basis than any of its predecessors. It will make, also, a specialty of colonial and political matters, and cater to the tastes of the Germans residing in other countries. It remains to be seen whether all these promises will be kept. In his initial announcement the editor declares it to be the chief aim of the *Deutsche Monatsschrift* to become the radiating point for Germany's new position as a "world power," politically and commercially, and part of its mission to work for the idea of Pangermanism.

There has been, however, for a number of years past, and is still, a German review, *Das Echo*, published specially for the millions of sons of Teutonland scattered all over the world. It has been measurably successful in every way, and has, indeed, been one of the intellectual ties that bind the expatriated Germans and their progeny to the old home. The quality of it, though, has been such that it has only appealed to the cultured few and not to the masses of these foreign residents of German extraction.

A special place among the German reviews must also be awarded the *Koloniale Zeitschrift*, the leading organ for Germany's transoceanic interests. The guiding spirit of this publication is Gustav Meinecke, who, after a residence of years in this country, returned to Berlin and became the brainiest and most far-sighted of German colonialists. He has extensively traveled and investigated, with shrewd, practical sense, Germany's possessions in Africa, and he is in close touch with the leaders of German thought in South and Central America, as well as this country

and Australia. His publication is the only one of its kind which exerts real and potent influence upon Germany's colonial policy.

The oldest of German political reviews is *Die Grenzboten*, which was started in 1848, and which for a couple of decades did much in fashioning and influencing liberal German and Austrian thought in the direction of accomplishing the political unity of Germany. As it appeared in Leipzig, a city which then as now was foremost in the very aims this publication held, and away from the disturbing influences of the capitals of Prussia and Austria, it was allowed, up to the Franco-German war of 1870-71, a fair measure of independence and freedom of expression. Its palmiest days were under the editorship of Gustav Freytag, the noted novelist and liberal publicist, who was an intimate friend of both the late Emperor Frederick and his consort. The circulation and the influence of *Die Grenzboten* attained at that time their high-water mark, but during the past score of years or so it has steadily declined, and its dicta and counsels are no longer considered in the political world of the young empire.

The *Preussische Jahrbuecher* (Prussian Annals), in a sense the leading political review of Germany, was founded ten years later, in 1858, by Rudolf Haym, who presided over its destinies for six years, being then succeeded by Heinrich von Treitschke, the celebrated historian of Berlin University. For many years the review was read and weighed by every political mind in Germany, and Prof. Hans Delbrueck, likewise a noted historian and teacher in the university of the German capital, who, after a number of years' collaboration in editing the review, finally succeeded Treitschke as chief, kept its helm turned in the same direction, that of moderate liberalism and a greater homogeneity of national political life in internal politics, and of concentration and enlightened egotism abroad. But as times went on, and men and methods changed in high places, Delbrueck was gradually forced to abate his vigorous style, and a few years ago he was even charged with *lèse majesté* and convicted by a prejudiced court, for having expressed himself, it was said, with undue frankness about one of the Kaiser's bizarre speeches. With the virility thus gradually driven out of the columns of the *Preussische Jahrbuecher*, it has lost most of its former prestige, and is now but the shadow of its former self.

Die Nation, owned, founded and edited by Theodor Barth, exists since 1888, and is now the leading exponent of German advanced political thought. It was due to Bismarck's attempts to kill politically this very inconvenient free-trader and liberal leader of Bremen that Doctor Barth, a man of independent wealth and fine social position, came to Berlin and there founded, in the teeth of the autocratic Chancellor, his review. In its successful conduct Doctor Barth has, in its political features, consistently advocated a policy of close and friendly relations both with the United States and England, and in the art and literary columns of his periodical he has favoured the more or less revolutionary new exponents—the "secessionists"—without, however, tabooing older merit. The matter to be found in *Die Nation* is always original and frequently "path-breaking," and much attention is given to the political, literary and artistic life in Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian North. While Ludwig Bamberger was still alive, this brilliant essayist and financier contributed much excellent matter to *Die Nation*, but he has found a worthy successor in Dr. Paul Nathan, who furnishes political comment of first importance.

An Ishmael, with its hands raised against everybody's and everybody's against its, is Maximilian Harden's *Die Zukunft*, the youngest but for a time at least the most vigorous and impressive of German political reviews. Harden is only forty, and his publication exists but since 1892, two years after Bismarck's enforced retirement, but when this brilliant young man began to publish his handy and novel review, everybody bought it—a thing almost unprecedented in Germany—and *Die Zukunft* became an immediate financial and literary success from its first number—all due to the sensational and decidedly clever series of slashing and bitterly anti-Kaiser essays published under the diaphanous *nom de guerre* "Apostata." It is quite safe to say that Harden would not have become such a heated champion of Bismarck if that grim old person had still been in office, but as it was he made himself until and even after Bismarck's death the powerful spokesman for the latter's resentment against the young monarch and for the nation's indignation at the manner of the old statesman's withdrawal. And it was this happy vein which Harden worked, with great pecuniary and

literary profit to himself, for about eight long years. Then, with that failing him, and after a number of convictions for *lèse majesté*, entailing many dull months in musty old fortresses by the Baltic, Harden changed his cue and modified his language, all of which has lost him his popularity and his dash. *Die Zukunft* is on the down grade. Harden has done a deal in changing the taste of readers and of current political thought. He abolished the anonymous contributor, and forced everybody to fight with open visor, and he acted like a leaven in the periodical literature of Germany. He championed with zeal and success many a good cause. The so-called Free Stage in Berlin was virtually his creation.

Thus, looking backward upon the relatively brief past of German reviews and reviewers, there is much, too much, that seems to call for criticism, but there is also much that deserves praise—above all, the uniform honesty of purpose and of methods, the cleanly and wholesome tone pervading these German periodicals. And there are now many signs that predict greater strength and greater influence for the review in Germany.

CHAPTER XXIII

LITERATURE AND ART

GERMANY is now experiencing the effects of a most important movement in her art and literature. It is a movement almost amounting to a revolution, to an upsetting of old ideals and aims. It is strongly iconoclastic in its nature and destructive in its tendencies; yet it is not merely negative, but constructive as well.

In art this movement was mainly set afoot by Arnold Böcklin and his school of disciples. In literature it was, and is still, headed by Sudermann and Hauptmann. They and their followers have been, especially in their earlier stages of development, strongly influenced by Ibsen and Tolstoi. The hopeless pessimism of the one and the ascetic mysticism of the other tinged their first work very perceptibly. Sudermann's "Sodom's Ende" was frankly despairing in tone. His "Heimath" (the "Magda" of the English and American stage) is Ibsen through and through, a sort of Germanized "Doll's House," differing from the original only in the degree of its pessimism. The same author's "Die Ehre," whose magnificent technique and powerful climaxes have secured for it an assured place on the repertory of every German theatre even to-day, is as extravagant in its ethical tenets as anything Ibsen or Tolstoi ever wrote. It is similar with Hauptmann's initial dramatic efforts. "Einsame Menschen" breathes the spirit of Tolstoi in its moroseness and in its condemnation of sensualism; and "Die Weber," though, perhaps, in a certain sense the most vital play of the last two decades written in any tongue, shows plainly the warring influences of Ibsen's "Pillars of Society" and Tolstoi's "Anna Karénina." In "Hannele's Himmelfahrt" (here given under the abbreviated title of "Hannele"), than which no more pathetic play has been written for an age, the Russian master's peculiar vein of spirituality runs strong. Since Schiller's

"Robbers" appeared, late in the eighteenth century, no drama has moved all classes of German society as deeply as have these two. I distinctly remember a performance of "Hannele" in the Deutsches Theatre in Berlin, the place where the dramas of these German dioscures have been made a special cult of, where their proper *mise-en-scène* has been attended to with a reverent regard for the poet's intentions, and where the spirit of their conceptions has been nurtured most carefully. The performance was, therefore, flawless; nay, more, it was imbued throughout with a sentiment rarely seen on any secular stage—as pious as that evinced by the peasant actors of Oberammergau. But the effect it produced on the audience, an audience representing the *fine fleur* of Berlin's intellectual élite, was even more startling. Breathless, tense, stirred to the very fibre of their being, this mass of cultured and critical men and women hung on the very lips of the actors. During the last act, when the poor waif who forms the central figure in the play, sees in the delirium of her dying hours the embodiment of all her childish longings and vagaries, the effect rose to even a higher pitch. This mass of cultured cynics was sobbing. Tears spurted from the eyes of men who had believed themselves callous. And when the curtain rang down, slowly and noiselessly, shutting out bit by bit that quaintly pathetic scene of the deathbed, the illusion that had been produced assimilated the reality so closely that the whole audience sat spellbound, completely hushed, for another five minutes in the darkened house, before any one of them found it possible to tear asunder those tendrils of sentiment binding the beholder to the stage. When they broke up, they left the house as after a mighty penitential sermon.

Dramatic productions that achieve such results mean much in the mental and moral development of a nation. They mould thought and sentiment alike, and generate new impulses, or give new currents to old ones. And as I remarked before, this influence has been wrought upon every class of the population, high and low alike. The labouring classes in Germany, in their social clubs and societies, drilled amateur companies to perform these striking plays of Hauptmann and Sudermann, and on the street corners one could see groups of passers-by eagerly discussing the merits and demerits of a new play, after its initial

performance, a thing not out of the ordinary in Milan, but certainly phenomenal in Germany, where the average mind is slow to respond to the fancies and creations of the poet. In fine, the soul of the nation has been stirred to its depths by the dramas of this new school.

And while in prose literature and in lyrics this new movement has not quite kept step with its evolution in drama, there have also appeared many works of unusual merit, but above all showing originality in both conception and treatment. Outside of Germany, for instance, Sudermann is scarcely known as a novelist. But his "Katzensteg" is a powerful piece of writing. His "Iolanthe," a novelette of simple plot, is as unique and impressive as anything Maupassant ever wrote, and leaving, besides, a delicious flavour in one's memory. His "Frau Sorge" ranks with the best fiction lately produced in any language. Conrad Telmann's "Unter'm Strohdach" is as touching and true a picture of rustic misery, and shows, besides, much more energy of action than Zola's "La Terre." Many of Wolzogen's short stories are as perfect bits of literary workmanship as anything in that line extant, either in English or French. His East Prussian story, "Ihr Einbrecher," is, for instance, a gem of quaint humour and dainty sentiment. Bierbaum's "Pancrazius Graunzer" is the equal of Jean Paul's quaint and fanciful novels. Max Kretzer's "Das Gesicht Christi" and "Die Genossen" are powerful and true in realistic sentiment. Heinz Tovote's "Die Geliebte" is a masterpiece of erotic writing. Arthur Zapp's "Das Eiserne Zeitalter" is the strongest arraignment of militarism which exists in fiction. And there are scores of other works that could be cited from among Germany's literary output of late. But enough has been said to show that this literary reawakening of Germany has by no means been confined to the drama.

Born in an age of unrest, and of strong currents and counter-currents in the public life of the young empire, the keynote to this latest school of literature is an aggressive frankness, sometimes almost amounting to brutality; an earnest searching after truth, both in matter and in expression, and a groping after new vehicles and modes of such expression. As the fierce struggle between contending interests mirrors itself in the minds of these young writers, so, too, is their form of giving voice to this

tumult of feelings. The traditions of the past and the aims and recognized verities of the present struggle with each other in their writings, and they are always partisans, often fanatics of conviction. Tinted with the pessimism imbibed from Ibsen and Tolstoi, there is yet, running side by side with it and frequently dominating, a strong assertiveness, a consciousness of unbroken, rugged strength. These young writers, genuine sons of regenerated Germany, by no means despair of better days, and their heroes and heroines—for their heroines play a great part—fight to the bitter end. Sudermann's "Tejas" is as much a fitting type of the hard-dying Goth of old, as Hartleben's young lieutenant in "Der Rosenmontag" is of the similarly resolute German of to-day. Both show a trace of Nietzsche's "Uebermensch," his "Supra-Man," and both are bound to "live out their lives," as the catch phrase coined by the new school has it.

Yet there is a red thread of gloom and of disgust with existing conditions interwoven through it all. Hauptmann's "Sunken Bell" is typical in this respect. The bellfounder in his symbolical play typifies the mental attitude of the thinking German of these days. And the fact is not only palpable enough to the close reader, but it is also easily explained. For in no other civilized country to-day is there found such a piling-up of contrasts and contradictions, such a ruthless struggle for supremacy among the warring interests of caste and calling. But this highly abnormal state of affairs furnishes precisely the potent impetus which brings this army of talented writers into the heat of the battle. When one keeps these facts in mind, the intensity of feeling displayed by the vast majority of present German writers in all their work is understood.

Both Sudermann and Hauptmann fill a recognized place in the world's literature, and their work, while, for obvious reasons, not apprehended in its full meaning outside of Germany, is being followed with interest everywhere. Of the two, it has been truly said Sudermann is the better playwright and Hauptmann the greater poet. The latter's work, judged merely by the criterion of stage effect, is of very uneven merit. Some of his plays, in fact, were dismal failures, even in Germany, where there exists a large and enthusiastic following that swear by him blindly. His "Florian Geyer," for example, is so diffuse and so devoid of

stage effects that it had to be shelved after a few performances. His "Schluck und Jau," a grotesque fantasia, met with hardly better success. His "Sunken Bell" can only be appreciated by a Teuton mind, so full is it of dreamy "nature philosophy." But everything he has ever given to the world has been real poesy, strangely intermingled and overlaid with realism. In each one of his plays he attempts to solve a problem, usually a social one, which confronts the student of German life at every step. In some cases it has been an individual problem as well, as in his "College Crampton." There are many crudities of language and construction in his plays, enough, in fact, to condemn most of them in the eyes of the everyday theatrical manager. But there are sublime passages in nearly all of them, and the serious, deep thought behind it all, and the unaffected human feeling, far outweigh these defects in the mind of those who seek more than mere amusement in a stage production. He has true democratic feeling, in the best sense of the word, and his plays not only stimulate reflection but also heighten human sympathy. It is but necessary to watch a German audience during the performance of one of his pieces to become convinced of that fact. Sudermann's work is more in accord with the accepted technique of the drama, and the construction of most of his plays rivals Sardou's in pith and point. Withal, he infuses a great deal of genuine poetry into his dramas. His "Johannes" (John the Baptist) stands preëminent in that regard. There are serious flaws in this piece of work, but the grand and simple figure of John himself is wonderfully conceived. Both Sudermann and Hauptmann have barely reached the meridian of life, and much more than they have thus far achieved may be expected of them.

But there are other talented dramatists of the new school, men whom the larger fame of Sudermann and Hauptmann has overshadowed in the estimation of men outside of Germany, but whose merits are fully understood there. Ludwig Fulda is of this number. The best known of his plays, "The Talisman," is a satire, said to be meant for the special benefit of the Kaiser, as another play, by Felix Philippi, was generally interpreted as portraying the struggle between the Kaiser and Bismarck, and ending with the latter's downfall. It is in blank verse, and of an elegance of diction rather unusual in German literature.

It undoubtedly ridicules the godlike pretensions of royalty, but probably is nothing but what it pretends to be—a satire on the moral blindness of many crowned heads, and on the servility displayed by courtiers. Max Dreyer, several of whose plays have been performed in this country, shows a stronger virility in his work. His "Der Probecandidat," in which the strife between hard-and-fast orthodoxy, as a handmaid of the State, and the spirit of untrammelled scientific research, as it is still fought to-day in German schools, is portrayed, met with wide acclaim. Richard Voss has written several plays that are keyed in the spirit of protest against prevailing caste prejudices, and which are powerful as stage productions as well. Paul Hirschfeld's "Die Mütter" showed decided talent and living force for so young an author. The most talented, though, of these young writers is Max Halbe. All of his plays, like those of Hauptmann, fight for some principle. His tragedy, "Jugend," a fascinating though depressing tale of boyish love heedlessly rushing into sin and disaster, and in which the figure of a young priest is most lifelike and striking, had a sensational success all over Germany, and some theatres played it to crowded houses for hundreds of nights. A later play, "Mütter Erde," leads into the very midst of one of the great struggles that divide Germany into two hostile camps, the struggle between the traditions of the past and the ideals of the future.

The dramas of this new school of German literature have all this one characteristic in common: They protest against the continuance of present social and political conditions; they deprecate the prejudices still rampant in the ruling classes, and demand greater freedom for the individual as against the authority of government, caste, orthodoxy, and royalty. A similar vein is also running through the lyrical productions of these standard bearers in a new storm-and-stress period. The ablest and most original of these champions of the future is Baron Detlev von Liliencron. He is, too, the most versatile. His poems have a charm all their own. Many of them are in meter hitherto unattempted in German, and have a rhythm of peculiar swing. So strong a hold has this poet on the affections and on the imagination of the younger generation that, some time ago, a national subscription was secured from his admirers,

and the result, amounting to a goodly sum, presented to the suffering and impecunious bard—an event almost unprecedented in German literature. Ernst von Wolzogen, a direct descendant of the father of Schiller's wife, is as unique in his way. His verse is always graceful and full of point, just as his prose is, and in the choice and treatment of his themes he is very daring. He was one of the originators of the Berlin "Free Stage," where all bold plays, tabooed everywhere else, are welcome, and started the first "Ueberbrettel," modeled to a certain extent on the homes of the *chansonniers* in Paris, in Germany. Richard Dehmel, Johannes Schlaf, Arno Holz, O. J. Bierbaum, Otto Erich Hartleben, Rudolf Baumbach, Frank Wedekind and Heinrich Seidel are all lyrical poets of peculiar gifts and disciples of the new school. Seidel's poems glorify in an altogether new vein the philistine of these latter days, and Baumbach's "Tramp Songs" are, of their kind, inimitable, though often reckless and rollicking.

In art it was Arnold Böcklin, Swiss by birth but German by adoption, who set the pace for his whole tribe of followers. It was his inspiration and the profound impression made by his matchless canvases upon the young generation of German painters everywhere, which induced the younger German art to cut completely loose from the leading-strings of the various orthodox schools cultivated, respectively, in Munich, Düsseldorf, Berlin, Dresden and Carlsruhe. For fifty years German art had degenerated more and more into mannerism. Individual good work was being done by a dozen men or more, like Knaus, Meyer von Bremen, Defregger, Werner, the Achenbachs and others, but, viewed as a whole, German painting had ossified and become tame and uninspiring. This was true not only of its spirit and of its choice of subjects, but also of its technique, the famous "brown sauce" in which it reveled covering a multitude of sins of commission and omission. But as in literature, a fever of unrest seized upon the young men, and deep dissatisfaction with prevailing methods. Then suddenly arose, like a brilliant meteor, Böcklin on the horizon. Since the days of Dürer and Holbein, no painter has lived who embodied so completely and strikingly the Germanic idea in art as this man from Basle did. His creative genius was sublime, and his work always earnest,

thorough, full of originality. His "Island of the Dead," perhaps his greatest, and one of his somberest and thought-inspiring works, won the day for him. The young generation of painters in Germany took pattern by him. He became their great teacher. He taught them, more or less perfectly, those qualities in which he stands unrivaled in German art, and in some of which he has not his equal in the art of any country—boldness and originality of conception; vivid sense of colour; harmoniousness and compactness of grouping; the luminous charm of light and the grand effects of shade; and, above all, that boldness of imagination and of execution which constitutes the chief value, as an educational factor, of his paintings. With him as a sure guide, there has been evolved during the past ten or twelve years a real Germanic art, more distinctive even than either the French, the Scotch-English, or the Spanish. It is intensely truthful and sincere, this newest type of German art, and that is why some have tacked the label: Art for art's sake! to it. Some of its exponents have been more or less influenced by French technique, and *plein-air* treatment, symbolism, and impressionism, so-called, have found their admirers for a time. But the intrinsic Germanic quality of the work done by the men styled "Secessionists," because of their separation from the old and accepted schools of painting in the empire, has not thereby been affected. Their "realism" has remained of the real kind. Corinth, for instance, a young Munich painter, exhibited lately a large canvas, "The Daughter of Herodias," whose realism was so palpable as to create a shudder. Slevogt, another one of these young artists, showed a triptych, descriptive of the parable of the Lost Son, which is amazing in its lifelike realism. Liebermann's old women mending Mechlin lace are fairly alive, and his large picture showing an invalid Sailors' Home gives us the naked truth. All this art, too, is Germanic in that it is not gay nor sensual, but serious, vigorous, striving for truth.

Two Bavarians, Franz Lenbach and Franz Stuck, come in their own way perhaps nearest to Boecklin, but each of them is a master, and each shows distinctive characteristics of his own. Stuck loves, like Boecklin, symbolism, and his striking paintings, "War" and "Nemesis," dwell in the memory forever. Lenbach's portraits, in their boldness and direct simplicity, and in their

giving the soul, the very Ego, of the original, are sufficiently well known in this country. Several of his Bismarck portraits are among the best which contemporaneous art has furnished. Max Liebermann is also a realist of great individuality, wonderful truth, and marvelous technique, besides being most prolific. He deserves to be better known in this country. So does Leibl, another Bavarian, who combines with the sure brush of Defregger and with the power of individualizing each figure he paints, a freedom of conception and of execution which might be looked for in vain among the German painters of the old schools. Hans Thoma, Kalckreuth, Max Koner, Otto Vogel, Leistikow, are also leading artists of this new type. Max Klinger and Joseph Sattler are artists standing out in bold relief among these younger ones. Klinger is perhaps the most imaginative and impressive of them all. He excels in nearly every field—as a designer, etcher, painter, sculptor, and illustrator. An intense virility distinguishes all his work.

This whole "Secessionist" movement in German art has had uphill work, of course, to conquer for itself the place of prominence it now occupies. With all the old schools solidly arrayed against them; with their opponents holding every advantage and every important office of emolument and influence in the art world; and with the different governments all over the empire, national, State, and municipal, withholding patronage from them, and discouraging them in every possible way, their fight for recognition seemed, indeed, for a time, quite hopeless. But there was one great ally working in their favour. So far as it was unofficial, enlightened public opinion cordially welcomed the new men in the arena. Art-loving circles declared in their favour in ever-increasing numbers. The press and periodical literature, too, gradually was won over to their side, and where official patronage continued, and continues to this day, to discriminate against them, the purses and the sympathies of wealthy and cultured private persons were opened to them, and at every public art exhibition, no matter where held in Germany, the paintings, drawings, etchings, engravings, illustrations, etc., of representative men belonging to the new movement are bought very largely. The fight between the old and the new culminated, of course, in the art centres of Germany.

Both in Berlin, where Anton von Werner, the president of the Academy of Art, and the artist exercising the most potent influence with both Kaiser and government, strenuously opposed them, and in Munich the "Secessionists" were finally forced to formally separate from the bodies and organizations representing art life. They had to arrange for special expositions of their works, and these expositions have become during the last few years pronounced social, artistic and financial successes.

Against the new men, the Kaiser, too, hurled his thunderbolts. Quite recently in one of his public speeches that monarch condemned and ridiculed the idea of "art for art's sake" and deprecated the aims and methods of the new school. Similar utterances by him were reported on many previous occasions. To discourage them he has called in foreign artists to paint his portraits or to execute other special orders, such as the Polish battle painter, Von Kossak, the English portraitist, Herkomer, the Hungarian, Parlaghy, and others. The Kaiser employed similar tactics in discouraging the new aspirations in sculpture. In a certain sense at least the past ten years has been a Medicean age for German sculptors. The Kaiser gave the example, by ordering many busts, monuments, bronzes or marble groups, etc., for the decoration of his castles, parks, and public places, and he thus set the fashion. Orders poured in from every city and town, small and large, and nearly every week saw the dedication of some new image in brass, stone, or even in tinted cast-iron rising on the market square in honour of the defunct William I and of his paladins—Bismarck, Moltke, Roon, the Crown Prince, or generals that had individually distinguished themselves in the days of the upraising of the empire. There was no sculptor of even slight talent that has not had his hands, and his purse as well, full these years, all due to the impetus given by the Kaiser. But he favoured only mediocrity, and would have no deviation from beaten paths. When the national monument to William I was to be erected, he chose from the plans submitted the one by Reinhold Begas, his favourite, and from the sum entirely secured by popular subscription, and intended to pay for the whole monument, he awarded, again on his sole authority, no less than 1,500,000 marks, or about \$375,000, to Begas as an honorary fee. The monument as it now stands, facing the main portal

of the old Royal Castle in Berlin, is as inappropriate for the commemoration of a simple-minded, modest, and wholly unaffected old gentleman as William I unquestionably was, as anything that can well be conceived. But it was to the Emperor's taste. It was overloaded with allegorical figures, and it showed the old monarch in an unnatural posture astride of a horse led by the genius of peace, and the whole was flanked by another score of allegorical or symbolical personages. The German people, who had furnished the money for all this, were dissatisfied with this theatrical monument, and the caustic tongue of Berlin had quickly dubbed it by another allegorical allusion—"William in the Lion's Den" they call it. The Kaiser's ancestral gallery in marble, for which he personally gave the funds, however, and which is now erected in that broad and tree-lined artery of the Thiergarten called Sieges-Allee (or Avenue of Victory), is another striking illustration of the exclusive favour bestowed by him on tame mediocrity. All the models for these thirty-six groups carved from finest Carrara marble were approved and, to some extent, suggested by him, and the sculptors engaged on them for several years, Begas and Herter, Schaper and Eberlein, Uphues and Ulrich, etc., had to strictly conform to his ideas. The effect of the total now produced is that of monotony and insipidity, though, of course, the white gleaming marble against a background of dark foliage is in itself very pleasing. This hobby cost the Kaiser a matter of 6,000,000 marks out of his own pocket.

The Kaiser's opposition, though, against this new movement is with greatest vigour directed at the literary branch of it. The Kaiser scents, and quite justly, danger, serious danger, in this volcanic upheaval of literary life in Germany. He feels that part of it is aimed against his own authority, and that it means the shattering of many traditional idols, royal infallibility included. It impresses him as a disorderly, as a revolutionary movement, intended to throw off fetters of creed and thought which he deems necessary to keep his people in subjection. The satire of this new movement has not halted before the majesty of his own person, nor before that of his ancestors. Even such a mild representative of the new movement as Ernst von Wildenbruch has, in his historical dramas, "*Der Generaloberst*," "*Die*

Quitows," and "König Heinrich," said many things which to an absolutist in theory and practice like the Kaiser must seem illoyal, and it was because of this that he forbade the performance of "Der Generaloberst" in Berlin and Prussia, and would not permit the other plays named to be given in the royal theatres. A play like Gerhart Hauptmann's "Die Weber" acts on him like a red rag. He deems it sacrilegious, and in its effect weakening royal authority and the force of social conventionalities. "Der Biberpelz," a gross satire on existing Prussian police conditions by the same author, confirmed him in the opinion that Hauptmann was preaching by his plays a dangerous doctrine. Sudermann's dramas he held of similar import, with their railings at hypocrisy in high places and their disregard of the *faibles convenues* of modern society. The work of the other representative men in this new movement, what he saw and heard of it, only tended to drive the conviction of its harmfulness deeper home into his soul. Ludwig Fulda's "Der Talisman" he read in the manuscript, and he considers it to this day an impious attack on himself, all the more reprehensible because so cautiously worded and with the plot so astutely wrought as to preclude the chance of legally prohibiting its performance. It is said that Ludwig Barnay, the Berlin manager and actor, and a personal enemy of Fulda's, instilled this erroneous idea in the Kaiser's mind. When this play, nevertheless, was first given at the Lessing Theatre, the Kaiser, to mark his displeasure, withdrew his and his court's patronage from the house, where he up to that time had a large box always reserved for him. He did the same thing in respect to the Deutsches Theatre, after "Die Weber" had seen its initial performance there. Extreme caution is used by the police authorities—who still exercise strict censorship regarding theatrical performances all through Prussia, as well as to the variety theatres, and as to songs, etc., given at other places of entertainment—before issuing permits to managers. For a time nearly every new play possessing sensational features was read, before the police pronounced judgment on it, by the Kaiser and his entourage, and his personal judgment has decided the fate of most of them. Years often elapsed before the poor author was able to learn the verdict. I remember that in the case of a talented young writer, Heinrich Lee by name, some

twenty-eight months went by before the police "passed" his play. It was a historical comedy, and the long hesitation was due to the fact that in the last act the person of Frederick the First, one of the Kaiser's ancestors, appeared on the stage. The official censorship, one of the police practices which is in direct conflict with the Prussian constitution, has been strained to the utmost tension, and has for years been a thorn in the sides of both managers and authors. The matter, like many similar ones, has been ventilated in both the Prussian Diet and in the Reichstag, but no amelioration of conditions has been effected.

Thus the Kaiser has fought the new movement and the new men in German literature tooth and nail, and has thrown the enormous weight of his personal influence in the scale against them. On numerous occasions he has branded it and the similar movement in art as "harmful" and "despicable." A striking illustration of the lengths to which he is willing to go in this respect was his refusal to sanction the awarding of the Schiller Prize to Hauptmann for his "Sunken Bell." This so-called Schiller Prize, awarded every few years by a body of the leading men in literature and thought in Germany to the one writer whose most recent work is considered most original, "path-breaking," and withal of the highest excellence, was given twice to Hauptmann for his "Sunken Bell." The Kaiser, on both occasions, annulled this decision, and finally gave the prize to Wildenbruch, who, however, was honourable and independent enough to send half of the prize, consisting of a goodly sum, to his competitor, Hauptmann, the fact being applauded by nearly every paper in Germany.

In opposition to the new movement the Kaiser tried his hand in originating a counter-movement. He laid down the lines for it by defining what, according to him, was commendable literature and art. He encouraged a number of minor writers and dramatists coming up to his ideas, just as he did in painting and sculpture. Thus he has shown more or less favour to men like Richard Skowronnek, Hans von Trotha, Baron Georg von Ompteda, Fedor von Zobeltitz, Arthur Fitger, Felix Dahn, Ernst Wichert and others. But the man after his own heart he has found of late in Joseph Lauff, a retired artillery major. To this gentleman he imparted his ideas concerning a series of

dramas glorifying the Hohenzollern dynasty. He collaborated with him on the first two of these plays. He had them mounted with a disregard of expenses—costumes lavish and historically correct; scenery gorgeous; new and striking stage effects; the best obtainable actors and actresses in the leading parts; the crowds of people represented by large bodies of carefully drilled soldiers; wreaths of fresh roses suspended from the ceiling; silver trumpets blowing fanfares—and so forth. At the initial performance he had an audience composed exclusively of his guests and courtiers. And still the plays proved rank failures, unquestionably so. Both at the royal theatres in Berlin and Wiesbaden the public flatly declined to see these intensely patriotic but as decidedly bombastic and inane dramas, to the Kaiser's intense disgust, while they nightly flocked in dense crowds to hear his hated rivals, Hauptmann and Sudermann. It was a galling defeat for the proud autocrat.

There is one feature of this new movement, however, that the Kaiser is in sympathy with, and that is interior decoration. There has been no Morris in Germany, and no Kensington Art School, but the Gewerbe Museum, in Berlin, founded mainly through the influence of the Empress Frederick, and containing beautiful collections of specimens of applied art and of artistic handiwork, has been very fruitful in its stimulus upon interior decoration in Germany. That there was, and is, great need of that nobody can doubt who has studied German life in its various phases. The lack of taste, of artistic form given to intrinsically valuable material, was everywhere apparent in the German home of the middle, and, of course, in a higher degree, in that of the lower classes. The rapidly growing wealth made this fact all the more apparent and unpalatable. In all that constitutes interior decoration—in furniture, in hangings and tapestries, in paintings, frames and *nippes*, in carpets and rugs, in ceramics and tableware, in all of these and in many things not here enumerated, the German interior was, up to a few years ago, the distinct inferior of the average French, English or American home. The disproportion between the artistic understanding in theory and the lack of concrete expression of it was often appalling to the observer. But with the reawakening of life in German art came also a strong desire to remodel the German interior on lines more

in accord with the abundance of material means to gratify the sense of beauty and the artistic longing of the person of education. Laymen and artists jointly strove to work a change for the better. Almost every one of the larger expositions in Germany during the past decade contained a section devoted to the exhibition of furniture, and of a vast variety of objects intended for home decoration, and the effects of this have been strongly noticeable of late. Artists and critics like Prof. Julius Lessing, Professor Eberlein, Paul Schlenther and others, did not tire in teaching the gospel of better taste and greater refinement in home appointments to the cultured public, and men like Klinger and Sattler thought it not below their dignity to actively further this movement. By a variety of means, in fact, interior decoration became an integral part of the new German art. The Grand Duke of Hesse grew one of the chief apostles of this new creed of reshaping the German home on artistic lines. He spent liberally of his means in starting a whole colony of such model German homes, settled entirely by artists whom he befriended, and who built their houses and decorated them inside on purely artistic ideas. This colony, perhaps in its way unique in the world, is near Darmstadt, and last year it gave an exhibition, the one comprehensive exhibit being itself, the colony. Harmoniousness of outline, appropriateness of form and material, and just apportionment of lights and shadows in the interior, and originality of conception in design and workmanship, always guided by taste—these were the things taught those who visited this peculiar exposition. Dealers, designers, and manufacturers were, of course, not slow to respond to this new departure, and the results are to-day very apparent. Nowhere else in the world, I believe, can be found to-day furniture more artistic and original in design—but, unfortunately, more expensive either—than in the shops of the leading German cities. A series of local expositions, like the one in Berlin in 1896, the several in Leipzig, Dresden, Munich since, did much to make the well-to-do German public acquainted with this enormous progress in interior decoration, and it has to-day become an established feature in the life of the German upper classes.

The new "style," if one may speak of it that way, differs very materially from the old, and differs, too, much from the one seen

in wealthier homes in France, England, or this country. Its leading features may be summarized thus: A thorough blending of colours, with neutral or half-tints predominating; sinuous and graceful lines in form; patterns and hangings showing wavy lines, entirely fanciful, with no attempt to copy or suggest objects of nature; half-lights predominating; every piece of appointment or furniture fitted and shaped entirely to the place which it is to occupy; designs always original. From all this it will be seen that only the rich can afford such an *intérieur*, but the sense of colour, of beauty of outline, and of harmony awakened by them has borne fruit in the other classes of the population as well, and this again has stimulated the artisan, the maker and creator of all the articles needed in a home.

The Kaiser has identified himself with this part of the art movement in Germany, there being probably nothing in it, so far as he has been able to discover, savouring of *lèse majesté*, or high treason, and he has furthered it considerably. It is a movement which was, as pointed out above, more needed in Germany than elsewhere, and it rounds out and complements the art movement as a whole. Under its impetus the German artisan is now beginning to recover some of that cunning in his fingers for which, during the later Middle Ages, and particularly during the Renaissance period, he was famed. Half-forgotten arts, like carving in oak, ebony and ivory, are being revived; wood sculpture and delicate bits of the turner's skill are again to be seen in many shops, and while in other spheres the machine is in Germany, as elsewhere, replacing man's handiwork, here are trades and callings which require the nicest and most individual workmanship, and which pay artist's wages, besides. Some single bits of such artistic furniture sell as high as a thousand dollars and more. And wealthy Germans pay these prices without grumbling, and their friends see in it nothing more extraordinary than if the same price had been paid for a good painting.

CHAPTER XXIV

GERMAN CHANCELLORS

It is interesting to note the fact that the German Emperor, in his unquestionably sincere desire for a close understanding with this republic, has broken with another Bismarck tradition. While the Iron Chancellor throughout life had a sincere liking for the American as an individual—as witness his cherished friendship for Motley and his amicable relations with George Bancroft, Bayard Taylor, William Walter Phelps, Andrew D. White, and other cultivated Americans—and while this nation had for him the fascination of contrast, he nevertheless studiously avoided anything like a *reapprochement* with the United States during the three decades when he almost autocratically shaped Germany's foreign policy. It was, in fact, during Bismarck's régime that relations between the two countries became rather strained for the space of several years—the time when a number of the most important American products were shut out of the empire. This is, however, readily accounted for, the chief reason being that it was only shortly before Bismarck's death that this country set out on its career as a world power and its political influence began to be strongly felt beyond the seas. It is futile, of course, to argue the question whether Bismarck, under like conditions, would have courted the political friendship of this country. But while his views on American national aims and ideals can no longer sway the public mind in Germany, it is at least of historical import to record here some pertinent remarks made by the aged statesman, in the writer's hearing, in the course of various conversations which it was his good fortune to obtain with Bismarck during the last years of his life. These conversations were three in number, and they occurred, respectively, on July 28, 1894 (while Bismarck was passing through Berlin, on his way to his Pomeranian estate, Varzin); on September 16 of the same year, in Varzin, at Bismarck's invitation; and at Friedrichsruh.

on May 18, 1898, during the Spanish-American War. This last visit was brought about through the good offices of the American ambassador in Berlin, Mr. White, and on this occasion Bismarck spoke, so far as I have been able to ascertain, his last words for publication. My purpose at that time had been mainly to secure, if possible, some expressions of opinion from Bismarck relative to the war. In that, however, I was not measurably successful, Count Rantzau (Bismarck's son-in-law) purposely deflecting the current of talk when it ran into that channel. I was subsequently given to understand that this was done because Bismarck had, that very day at breakfast, become greatly excited on the topic, after reading the latest despatches about the war, and because excitement of any kind was deemed by Doctor Schweninger, his attending physician, highly injurious to him.

It was a great shock to me when I was led in to Bismarck that day. His gnarled face, with its sallow, parchment-like skin, his mighty body, bent and shrunken, and his great hands trembling as if with ague, even when grasping his stout oaken staff—all spoke of his approaching dissolution. His voice was raucous and hollow, and his eyes alone showed that this was Bismarck; their steel-blue still shot fire. Yet his intellectual faculties were unimpaired. Of that there was no doubt. The large table in front of him was littered with German, English, French and Russian papers, some of them blue-penciled in the text and on the margins. Doctor Chrysander told me that his interest in politics, both foreign and domestic, was as keen as ever, excepting when the painful attacks of his destroying malady seized him, which was sometimes for hours.

It was a bright, sunny day, and through the open window of the morning-room floated the balsamic odor of the nearby forest, the Sachsenwald, the breath of which the old man loved, and beneath whose boughs he had been wont to wander every day as long as strength permitted. But here he sat, propped up in his easy-chair, and with now and then a wistful glance at the green glory beyond.

After a few introductory remarks Bismarck told me, in his curt and somewhat *burschikos* manner, to take a seat opposite him, and then gazed at me steadfastly, finally breaking silence

by questioning me about the situation in America and Manila. He accompanied this with a running commentary of exclamations. I drifted into some talk about the attitude of Europe, considered none too friendly toward America at that time; and from that to the Monroe Doctrine was but a step. Then Bismarck was roused.

"This whole war is indefensible," he snarled, "on grounds of international equity. It is a war of pretext, undertaken against a waning power for the sole sake of spoils. The United States complained that Cuba, as a Spanish colony, was being maladministered. What of that! Colonies have often been mismanaged, and I suppose the Americans, when they shall have colonies, will not be exempt. But that is no fair reason for dispossessing the owner. Other powers have never interfered in such cases before. The Creole and the West Indian half-breeds are difficult to manage, and it would be impossible to satisfy them under any circumstances. The Americans will find them, later on, a hard nut to crack. Spoils, spoils—all else is pretense. That, too, is seen by your procedure in the Philippines. The Americans call this Europe of ours *effete*. Well, there must be some truth in it, or else there would have been a united European front to oppose and hinder this unrighteous war."

"And the Monroe Doctrine?" I ventured.

"That is a species of arrogance peculiarly American and inexcusable," said Bismarck, wrathfully, and his eyes gleamed. "You in the United States are like the English in that respect: you have profited for ages from dissensions and ambitions on the continent of Europe. That insolent dogma, which no single European power has ever sanctioned, has flourished on them. And how will you enforce it? And against whom? The powers most interested, now that Spain is out of the way, are England and France, the two leading naval powers. Will you drive them off American waters with your pigmy navy? The Monroe Doctrine is a spectre that would vanish in plain daylight. Besides, the American interpretation of this presumptuous idea has itself varied constantly, and has been buried out of sight for many years at a time. There is no definition of the idea that has ever been universally accepted in your country. I remember an incident during the war between Chile and Peru

which illustrates that at that time, for instance, the Monroe Doctrine was virtually dead. We had some information which made us suspect that the Washington government intended to interfere either as an uncalled-for peacemaker or else as an arbitrator. 'At that time, as now, Mr. White represented the United States in Berlin, and I sent Lothar Bucher from the Foreign Office to him to ascertain, if possible, whether these rumours were true or not. Mr. White assured him that they were not, but I insisted on something more definite than his mere belief, and so Mr. White drew up a cablegram to his government before Bucher's eyes, and in a short while got his reply, and it emphatically denied these reports, and furthermore gave assurances that no such step was contemplated. And so it proved. At that time, then, the Monroe Doctrine was as good as dead."

Here Count Rantzau broke in with a remark intended to shift the conversation, which had that effect. Soon after I took my leave, and two months later the bells all over Germany tolled out the death of the old statesman.

When I had spoken with Bismarck in midsummer four years before, he looked still hale enough, although almost an octogenarian. But to those who had known him in the days of his power there was one ominous sign of senility; for as the crowd outside the gates of the Stettin railway station sent in volley after volley of thunderous cheers, his eyes became moist. I saw the tears glisten. Thus, then, these proofs of his unabated popularity—a popularity which to the day of his fall he had despised—moved him strangely. It was shortly after the grandson of his *alter Herr* had sealed the truce with some bottles of rare old Rhenish; but that it had been only a truce, and not a fast compact of peace, was apparent on that very occasion, for the government had done everything it could in a passive way to prevent a popular demonstration for the idol of the nation, not alone by keeping secret the news of his coming through Berlin that day, but also by rigidly enforcing police regulations at and about the station where Bismarck's private car had to halt for half an hour. But the delegations of university students were not to be baffled, and they were there in full "Wichs," with swords gleaming and colours flying, and the multitude beyond the

gates was numerous and enthusiastic. I had seen Bismarck only once before. That was in 1876, as he was whirled on his way from the palace through the Wilhelm Strasse, looking as stern as Fate, and as rugged and long-lived as one of his Sachsenwald oaks. He was then in the zenith of his power. Now I saw him dethroned, but mighty still. Doctor Chrysander had arranged things for me, and I climbed into the car and was formally presented. Princess Bismarck, his faithful wife, who was with him, cautioned him against the draft from the window, and put his ample rustic cap on his head. She eyed me askance. But Bismarck, during the five minutes he could give me, was debonair, and spoke without restraint. Among other things he said:

"Economically considered, I believe that the United States has a great future. It is absolutely necessary for us people of Europe to protect ourselves in time against your competition, for whenever the point arrives that the United States is not checked in its inroads on our agriculture, complete ruin will overtake our land-holding classes. It was the knowledge of American competition, with which, without protective lines, we are unable to cope in our smaller and older and poorer lands, which dictated my agricultural policy in Germany. There may come a day, however, when it will no longer be possible to keep up artificial barriers against your cereals and meats, and that will be an evil day for Germany."

A word having been thrown in by me about American politics, Bismarck said:

"Your politics over there have always remained a sealed book to me. And it seems American politicians are not much better off in that respect. But don't you believe yourself that the whole edifice—I mean your political one—will some day tumble about your ears? To me, at least, it rather looks that way. What are your Coxey armies and your monster strikes, your periodically returning business crises and panics, but signs of exhaustion, of decadence—signs of vital defects in a machinery which no longer is adequate to your needs and which, therefore, causes evil?"

The Chicago World's Fair prompted a question on my part, and Bismarck said:

"I do not believe in these large international expositions of the kind of which we have already had more than enough. To the world at large they do not bring much of lasting benefit, and for each city in which such a large exposition is held it has more of evil than of good in its wake. It increases the homeless and penniless crowds in those cities, and after the thing is over it is difficult, almost impossible, to get rid of them again. It also leads to an increase in the price of necessities of life, to a temporary increase in wages, and to a permanent increase in rents. All these are unhealthy consequences, followed later by serious reaction."

His Agrarian views and his fears of unchecked American competition Bismarck repeated, a couple of months later, when I visited him, at his invitation, at his Varzin estate. To most men of his past, life on this vast but dreary estate in the most backward and feudal part of Pomerania would have proved unendurably dull. His only regular intercourse, besides the members of his family, was with Commercial Councilor Behrend in nearby Hammermühle, the pastor in Wussow, and the district president in Pannewitz, and they were very ordinary mortals. But Bismarck, to whom love of a quiet rural life descended from a long line of ancestors, evidently enjoyed it. He consorted with his rustic neighbours, many of whom were his tenants, on terms of perfect equality, and entered with enjoyment into their local gossip. His steam dairy and his distillery, and above all his paper mill, engrossed his thoughts during the larger part of the day. Though a special messenger brought his mail to him every day from the nearest railway station, some seven or eight miles off, he never complained about its tardy arrival. His wife's failing health seemed to me to be the only shadow on his life there. It was with a sad smile that, towering over the feeble and attenuated form of his Johanna, he said, "You see, we're both growing old."

After dinner, a very simple affair, he lighted his big porcelain pipe—cigars and wine or beer, except a half *Schoppen* of light Moselle, were forbidden him—and chatted, often interrupting himself to put questions that occurred to him, in that peculiar style, a mixture of frank cynicism, bonhomie, and picturesque humour that lent a spice to whatever he said, on a variety of

subjects, touching them all quite lightly. He mentioned the Wilson bill, then pending, and spoke of Cleveland in high terms, saying that he had "the stuff in him out of which statesmen are made," but that he was "thrown away in a republic." He compared parliamentary methods in Germany and in America, and deplored the fact that in the absence of two great parties, as they existed in the United States, he had always been forced to make *Politik von Fall zu Fall*. Having smoked his pipe, he carefully emptied the ashes, stood up the pipe in its place on a rack, and kissing his ailing wife softly on the forehead, left the room, and a minute later was striding along the path to the distillery.

Count Caprivi, Bismarck's successor, was a man of an essentially different fiber. Strong common sense, the virtues of the Prussian soldier—blind obedience and loyalty to his chief—simple, unaffected modes of speech and living, coupled with candour, seemed to me his leading characteristics. Doubtless it was these qualities of the man which had induced the Kaiser, after the irretrievable rupture with Bismarck, to pick him out from among hundreds of other Prussian generals. Caprivi achieved some lasting good for Germany during his brief term of office, and with his commercial treaties, concluded with the principal customers of the empire, he enabled Germany to attain to that commercial prosperity and expansion which she enjoyed for a decennium. It is matter of history that his downfall was due to the bitter hatred and the unscrupulous intrigues of the powerful land-holding aristocracy. They had, in derision of his poverty, dubbed him *der Mann ohne Ar und Halm* (the man without a foot of soil or blade of grass), and wilily insinuated, on all occasions, that a man who owned not even an acre of soil could of necessity have no sympathy with agricultural interests. Caprivi was the most accessible chancellor Germany has yet had, and, strangely enough for a man who had served half a century in the Prussian army, he was liberal in his political and social ideas. The German press and foreign correspondents enjoyed during his short régime a degree of comparative freedom which formed in itself a striking contrast with the era of Bismarck, when expulsions and jail terms for press offenses were of too frequent occurrence. Caprivi was clear-sighted enough to perceive that Germany, as a world power, as a country whose industry

and trade had become paramount interests, could not in the logic of things remain under the dominance of an Agrarian party, whose narrow egotism would keep the empire in a commercial feud with all its neighbours.

A fortnight before he laid down the heavy burden of an office which he had never sought, and which he had taken up only in the same spirit in which he would, on command, have stormed an enemy's position in war time, Count Caprivi intimated to me that his position with the Emperor was "shaken," and that he expected any day to step down and out. He rightly attributed the lack of confidence which the Emperor had shown him of late to the insistent and insidious machinations of the Agrarians, whose influence at court and everywhere else was undeniable. He added: "The Agrarian party did very well when Germany, and especially Prussia, was still preëminently an agricultural country; but to-day to yield in essentials to their influence would mean ruin to Germany. We can no longer exclude the agricultural products of other nations, whether it be Russia or the United States. Our labouring population—and that means the bulk of the nation—imperatively requires cheaper foodstuffs than our own soil will give us. To prevent this, as the Agrarian party tries to do, is to prevent our rise as an exporting country. Commercial treaties are feasible only on the principle of give and take, and some interests are always bound to suffer."

Caprivi was a sincere advocate of a close friendship between Germany and both England and the United States, and on the night of his leaving office, two weeks later, he granted me a short interview, during which he made some significant remarks. That stormy scene at the palace between him and the Emperor had taken place only a couple of hours before, yet I found him calm and unperturbed, just on the point of retiring. It was about ten in the evening. With unruffled temper and smiling quizzically, he shook hands and offered me a cigar, which his gray-haired old valet brought in. Then, in his matter-of-fact way, he chatted with me for a quarter of an hour. He said he was honestly glad to be "out of it," and to have the chance to spend the remainder of his days in peace and quiet. "I have not had an hour's happiness since I came into this house," said he, "and my old bones can now take a little ease."

He ruminated awhile, blowing the wreaths of smoke before him thoughtfully. "Of course," he then remarked, "I understand why the Agrarians hate me. As long as my influence prevailed with the Emperor the commercial interests of the country predominated. The Agrarians are driving the country into a tariff war, and they fear a close understanding with America and England. And yet that is bound to come, and it will be of great advantage to Germany, not only politically, though that alone is an important factor, but in its educational influence on the masses. Contrary to Bismarck's views, who always considered a close friendship with Russia of paramount importance to us, I think Russia's political influence on us has always been deleterious. We must assimilate with nations that are politically and commercially more advanced than we. The influences of the English-speaking races on our thought, our literature, our political development, have always been wholesome ones, and with England and the United States as our fast friends we need not fear either France or Russia, no matter whether the Dreibund lasts another ten years or not. And the Emperor personally feels the same way about this; but his whole political surroundings are against the idea."

Prince Hohenlohe, too, was not ill disposed toward this country; but as a very old man, whose political education and diplomatic training fell into a time when the nineteenth century was still young and this republic only a stripling, he knew very little about the United States, and his political thoughts turned mainly upon the old orbits—Russia, Austria, France and England. At a garden party given in the extensive park behind the Chancellor's palace, he once engaged me in conversation about America, and I discovered, to my amazement, that his ideas regarding its civilization and customs were rather crude. They seemed to date from the time Dickens paid his first visit here, and what I told him about American universities and other evidences of advanced culture he seemed to take *cum grano salis*. Besides, though he was a charmingly liberal man in most things, he was a *grand seigneur* of the old school, and he evidently held in small esteem a country of such democratic institutions and manners as ours. But in his economic convictions he came very near to Caprivi's, and he favoured a close commercial treaty with

this country, as he told me, though on new lines and not based on the old treaty with Prussia of 1828. However, the infirmities of old age prevented more and more, during his chancellorship, the full exercise of his constitutional powers, and Count Buelow, during the last six months of the Hohenlohe régime, was virtually both Chancellor and Foreign Secretary.

In January of last year I paid my respects to Prince Hohenlohe for the last time. He was then staying at a hotel in Meran, in the southern Tyrol, to benefit his failing health. Like many men of his stamp, he liked gossip and personal anecdote, and he listened with rapt attention to my little budget of Berlin stories, frequently putting his hand to his ear to aid his defective hearing. Then he said, when the talk drifted to America:

"We are likely to have a good deal of trouble with our Agrarians, who are dead set against any economic understanding with the United States. This tariff bill now in preparation goes too far. It yields too much to the interests of our large land-holders. These are not the interests which ought to prevail in such a matter. I told the Emperor so, and I fought Buelow's ideas on the subject, who sees too much *couleur de rose* in the matter. What will the Americans say to a tariff which bears so heavily on their exports to this country? Buelow gives way too much to the Agrarians, who would like nothing better than to embroil us with every nation that sends us foodstuffs. The Emperor is against the bill, but Buelow has persuaded him that he cannot get along without the Agrarians in home politics. Well, I wash my hands of the whole affair."

Count Bernhard von Buelow has become somewhat enigmatical since he rose to the post of Chancellor. He loves to express himself in metaphor when giving public utterance to his thoughts, and in Germany his oracular sayings furnish endless opportunity for interpretation. His mind is far more sinuous than that of his predecessor, and he has now and then contradicted himself in his speeches. But while he has frankly confessed himself an Agrarian, and while his family traditions and leanings and his personal affiliations are altogether on the side of the Agrarians, he nevertheless would like to see a better and closer political understanding established between Germany and this country. Of this, I think, there is no doubt. On one occasion, not many

months after the close of the war with Spain, taking President McKinley's message to Congress for his text, he expressed himself to me in this way: "Anything which will tend to bring the two nations closer together must be welcomed on both sides of the ocean. This is a sentiment to which I have given repeated expression. Misunderstandings of a political or economic nature are liable to arise now and then between Germany and America, as between other countries; but with good will on the part of both governments—and there is every evidence of such good will—these misunderstandings are sure to be amicably adjusted. The two nations have much in common, and the millions of Germans who have found a second home in America are alone a tie that ought to bind very closely. There is absolutely nothing of a serious nature, so far as I can see, that ought to breed discord between the two countries, and there are many reasons which ought to unite them. The press can do much in furtherance of this."

CHAPTER XXV

THE OUTLOOK FOR GERMANY

WHAT after all is the immediate outlook for Germany? What horoscope can be cast in view of all the points of undeniable strength, and of as undeniable weaknesses, possessed by the young world power?

To play prophet is under all circumstances a ticklish and generally a thankless task. The difficulty of venturing upon a prognostication is, however, greatly augmented in the case of Germany, as the reader will probably conclude for himself after perusing the contents of this book.

With such rapidly changing conditions and such a strong element of uncertainty in nearly all departments of public life, the whole situation must of necessity appear hazy in its outlines, and the sphere of vision greatly circumscribed thereby. With a Kaiser who is abnormally impulsive and prone to sudden and radical changes of front; with a Reichstag composed of a shifting and wavering majority; with the former sheet anchor of Germany's foreign policy, the Dreibund, tearing from its moorings; and with the necessity of modifying her whole course of action, as her powerful rivals modify theirs, it seems at first sight, indeed, next to impossible to predict Germany's future, even if but the immediate future be meant by that.

Yet there are certain things that may be foretold with some degree of confidence.

As to the Empire's foreign policy, that in the main seems marked out for it by the irresistible logic of events, present and of the recent past. To put it in a few words, Germany must and will seek a close and intimate understanding with this country and England, and she will not fail in effecting it. Where there's a will, there's a way. The Kaiser will find that way. He must be given credit for considerable shrewdness in his foreign policy hitherto, though it has not been exempt from serious mistakes

and even some signal failures. Still in the main, he has known how to steer the German ship of state well beyond cliffs and shallows, and we may be sure that he will sagaciously act on the conclusions reached some time ago. At present he is still merely posing as the friend of this country, no important opportunities having arisen of late to prove the substance as well as the semblance of friendship. But the first opportunity that shall present itself he will seize with a vim and a vigour all his own. In the case of England the same opportunity will also come, and probably soon. With that exhausting and execrated war in South Africa over, England will be herself again; the present rancor in Germany will subside, and so will the extreme sensitiveness to criticism in England. Normal relations will quickly be followed by friendly and intimate ones.

The three great Germanic powers will then be the dictators of the world. Strong in their peaceful aims and transcendently strong in their joint material and moral equipment, this union of forces will have nothing provocative of armed resistance in its character, and the world will needs bow and submit to its benign sway. Civilization with all its blessings will then be carried to the farthest corners of the globe, and the advance of progress will be unchecked. Russia has a gigantic mission of her own, amply sufficient in its scope to satisfy even *her* vaulting ambition, and one with which the three dominating powers will have neither right nor inclination to meddle. France, as Russia's satellite, will have to march in Russia's wake. It will be France's cue to place no stones in the path of the new political constellation, for her interests will coincide with such a policy of non-interference. And the three powers, whose joint potentialities for good are matchless and resistless, will calmly proceed on their own manifest mission. They will be the "Culturträger," the bearers of culture, to the universe.

In her domestic policy, Germany must gradually conform to her standing as a modern world power, with all that this word implies. A new Liberal party will arise, powerful and creative in its tendencies, not merely negative as the present one. Both Count Caprivi and Prince Hohenlohe, essentially Liberals in political conceptions and aims, had the desire to govern with the aid of the Left in the Reichstag. But there was no way of

accomplishing this. The Liberals themselves were numerically too weak to carry out any policy whatsoever, even with the Socialists and extreme Radicals as their allies, and the attempt had to be abandoned. The Liberal party in Germany is now undergoing slow transformation. It must first rid itself of its inept leaders, and of a habit of thought and action which knows only to deny and never to affirm; only to oppose and never to frame legislation; only to criticize and never to create. The coming Liberal party will present a real and tangible programme to the voters, and it will comprise the living forces of Germany in thought and deed. Millions of voters in the empire are impatiently waiting for such a Liberal party, and will hail its advent with joy. Its programme will be imbued with fresh and realizable ideas, and will powerfully represent that moderate and rational progress which alone bears fruit and wins decisive battles. This party will have thrown off the thralldom of old and sterile leaders like Eugene Richter and Heinrich Rickert, fossilized in the issues of the past, and will have turned to the younger men, like Theodore Barth, whose thoughts and aims dwell in the present and in the near future.

The ranks of the Liberal factions contain even now much individual merit and a very great percentage of just those elements which have made the young empire what it is. The thinkers like Virchow and Mommsen, the economic path-breakers like Siemens and Doctor Koch, and the men of initiative like Ballin and Wiegand, are of it. The great manufacturers and merchants, bankers and financiers are Liberals. But as soon as their present ineffective party methods have been discarded and replaced by aggressive and modern ones, as soon as the broad middle classes of Germany are confronted by a Liberalism with a live programme and with the chances of success in its favour, such a Liberal party will sweep the country. Millions of voters who now secretly vote the Socialist ballot, as standing for the only party that believes in itself and its mission, and which has backbone enough not only to speak its mind on all subjects, but to act in strict accordance with its convictions, will then flock to the Liberal banners. With such a party the Kaiser and his advisers will indeed be able to govern and to carry out those measures of internal improvement, economic and political, which are at

present consistently frustrated by that conclave *virorum obscurorum* consisting of reactionary Prussian youngers and of men who make their religious faith their sole political confession. Such far-reaching plans as the Kaiser's Midland Canal, as the reform of the Prussian election laws and many others will then be quite feasible.

Of course, the Socialist party will be affiliated with the coming Liberal party, as it usually is now on all crucial questions. There will be no harm in that, for the Socialist party will by that time have thrown off most of its old and useless shibboleths and utopian aims, and will be ready to make a pact with existing conditions, as their brethren, the Socialists of France, of Belgium and of Holland have done in a measure. They will have become in fact, if not in name, what the Socialist party in Germany is largely even to-day, a radical labour party, with nothing in their programme that cannot be realized some time or other, and without first aiming at the obliteration of the present system of society. There will then occur questions on which the Socialists will differ from the Liberals, as there do now, and in some cases the Reactionists of every stripe will vote with the Socialists for selfish or partisan reasons. In the main, though, the interests of the new Liberal party, based as they are going to be upon those of the largest stratum of German society, will run parallel with those of the then Socialists.

The left wing of the present National Liberal faction, which means the really liberal and progressive portion of it, will leave their faction and amalgamate with the big Liberal party, and the right wing will go where it belongs—*i. e.*, to join the Conservatives. This will further simplify matters and make a really parliamentary form of government possible for the first time, permitting the government to reckon with known or easily ascertained factors in projected legislation and in all political questions of importance. As to the Centre, or Ultramontane party, at present a tower of parliamentary strength and by far the largest fraction of the Reichstag, all these events will not come to pass without altering, too, its party complexion. One portion of it, the one even now responsible for whatever progressive legislation the Centre has fathered, will leave it and join the Liberal party.

Freed thus from those shackles of a many-hued factionism which makes parliamentary government, properly so-called, an impossibility in the Germany of to-day, the empire will be much stronger at home, as it will be stronger abroad. It will then not run the constant danger of loosening or breaking the ties of friendship which unite Germany with other nations, just to humour her privileged class of landowners, whose votes the government cannot do without in its domestic policy. Her foreign and her domestic policies will not contradict each other, but will present a homogeneous front, words tallying with acts. The Liberal party in Germany has ever favoured a close understanding with both England and the United States. Harmony of relations will be reëstablished. Liberalism dominant once more in Germany, a Liberal policy abroad would be a matter of course. The Prussian younker party would sigh, as it does now, for the "traditional friendship" with Russia, but there would be no particular harm in that.

Commercial and manufacturing advance in Germany will then be unchecked. The nation will reach out further and further. The latent hostility of Russia and France would be more than discounted by the friendship of England and the United States. Her trade would no longer fear a cataclysm in the event of war with either of the two English-speaking nations, and the normal condition would prevail of the best man winning his way in the world.

Specializing in manufacture and commerce will become more of a feature in Germany than it is now, and this for obvious reasons. Germany's strength in manufacturing, as in her science and art, lies naturally in her capacity of taking infinite pains. Therefore all such commodities in the manufacture of which this capacity may be fully exercised, and in which minute exactness and thorough workmanship, coupled with special skill and vast experience, plays a leading part, are the kind Germany will excel in, and naturally enough these are the ones to which her manufacturers will in the main confine themselves. Science will be utilized in her industry even more than is now the case. Such articles, for instance, are all instruments of precision, scientific, optical, medical implements, toys, minute tools, chemical products, dyes, carvings, tapestries, chinaware, and a host of new wares yet to be invented or practically applied.

Specialization being the evident trend in manufacturing everywhere, and this being in perfect accord with the spirit of the age, as seen clearly in the most advanced countries, such industrial development in Germany will be perfectly normal. The further consolidation of capital and the extension of industrial syndicates there, being really in its essence but a concomitant and outgrowth of specialization, will hasten and promote this movement. There is, besides, plenty of evidence in the Germany of to-day that such is the course events are to take. Trusts and syndicates, though their coming was later than here, and though with one or two exceptions they are not of such gigantic dimensions, have multiplied in the empire of late years, so much so that they have become an important topic of political discussion, and that the Reichstag in its last session appointed a committee to investigate the problem and study the effects of their operations. The latest figures give a total of several hundred such combinations in the empire, and the Sugar Trust and several others represent hundreds of millions of invested capital.

As her own rawstuffs give out, or at least are no longer to be obtained as cheaply as these same rawstuffs can be procured from younger countries with greater natural fertility and resources, and as she then will be forced to import them in ever-increasing ratio, she will have to turn her attention altogether to the task of working up these rawstuffs into finished fabrics of such incomparable beauty, durability and ever-changing novelty and felicity of design as to hold present markets and win new ones by these qualities. Many young and half-civilized countries are yet to be commercially conquered and assimilated. The field is large. German capital, like British and American, will help to develop these countries and to make better and larger purchasers of them. The untold millions of Asia are alone enough to engross the commercial ambition of the more advanced nations, and there are, besides, South and Central America, Africa and Australia to be thought of. The semi-savage peoples to the north, in Asiatic-Russia and elsewhere, will need more of manufactured commodities, and will be able to pay more for them as rapidly increasing means of communication with them will bring them within the pale of civilization. There lie Germany's chances, as those of other leading trading nations of the world, and

with her awakened enterprise she will not be slow to avail herself of them.

Regarding agriculture, the present Agrarian movement will never solve the problem for Germany. In fact, it may be confidently predicted that the resistless march of events will shortly dispose of that movement for good and all, and this irrespective of the question whether just at present a small but powerful clique might triumph for awhile. Germany has outgrown her agricultural clothes, and is marching in a powerful column along with the rest on the highroad to the fullest industrial development. She cannot retrace her steps, and she cannot again become a land of preëminently soil-tilling proclivities. To be able to compete on even terms with her commercial rivals, she must have for her labour plenty of foodstuffs at low prices, and since her own soil will not produce that, she must take it from countries of virgin soil. There is no overcoming that simple but portentous fact.

The pacific tendencies of our age are indisputable. This fact is nowise vitiated by recent events. The Hague conference showed that, for it was the first event of the kind which history chronicled, and its influence on the thought and convictions of the leaders of men, its enunciation of the universally accepted theorem that war except in defense is wrong and bloodshed a sin, has been lastingly powerful, though the time has not yet come when all the world, under all circumstances, is willing to translate this theoretically apprehended truth into its concrete realization. Axioms are one thing, and to consistently act on them is another. Much, immensely much, is gained by the generally expressed desire to avoid open hostilities on a large scale wherever possible. But innumerable other manifestations show the growth of pacific ideas. In fact, it is not too much to say that there is a universal movement going on in the minds of all nations tending to the preservation of peace. From this even such inveterately quarrelsome peoples as those in Latin America are not exempt, as recent occurrences have proven.

War on a large scale has become a form of suicide for any powerful nation. In that respect the South African campaign teaches a much-needed lesson to the world. But still less can a nation nowadays afford to go to war with an adversary nearly or

quite its own size. Even if victorious in the end it would have been such a blood-letting, such an enormous financial and economic depletion for both sides, that a generation or more would be required to recoup. And at the present gait of progress such a loss of time and of opportunities would be irrecoverable. Whoever loses time is lost. Germany will not need her enormous army forever. The time is fast approaching when an honest and lasting truce with France and Russia can be made. A strong standing army which on a peace footing requires the annual expenditure of nearly a fourth of the total revenues is an anomaly. It saps the vital forces of the nation to the point of making in the long run competition in all essentials of power, viz., accumulated wealth by successful toil, impossible. Germany's youth will then be brought up to peaceful pursuits exclusively, all but a small fraction of it, and this will strengthen her much in the race with her rivals.

The navy, of course, she must keep. The reasons for that need no pointing out. The brazen mouth of guns and the iron-clad walls of ships must back up her trade on the seas, and the savages of the Pacific isles can only thus be induced to listen to reasons more cogent. Navies are potent teachers afar. And Asian despots are much more likely to conclude treaties of friendship and of regular commercial relations when such requests are coupled with a naval demonstration in their principal harbours.

As to the immediate future of science, the qualities that have made Germany preëminent in that will continue to keep her so. Educational reform is coming there, thorough and sweeping. Discarding wholly or in part much of her previous efforts in certain departments of mental research and mere speculation as barren of tangible results, her savants will yet remain strong in all those fields in which she has achieved high distinction in the past—in history, philosophy, social economy, medicine, and in all the analytical and comparative sciences of every kind. With that, however, a larger and larger number of her powerful minds will turn to the practical fructification of discoveries and inventions and apply them to everyday uses. This is the tendency now in Germany; it will grow stronger all the time. The man of ideas has a better future in Germany than formerly.

German literature will soon emerge from its present transition stage. Casting off much of that hollow and cumbersome tradition which no longer tallies with her living forces, with the aspirations and the habits of thought of the age, German literature, always deep and always tinging the brain life of the nation more decisively than in most other countries, will soon attain heights never reached before. Everything points to that. Her writers will rid themselves of the strong and unhealthy influences of Ibsen, Tolstoi, and of the whole school of French erotic novelists, and her drama will, continuing on the present lines but with the additional infusion of a more hopeful spirit, become the powerful exponent of progressive Teutonism. Taken as a whole, her literature will once more approximate, as it did in the period of greatest glory, with the literature of the English-speaking nations, a literature now almost wholly ignored in Germany. And on her own part again, German literature will in the near future much more potently influence England and the United States than has been done for several decades. It will materially help to oust cant, and help to prevent the growing feminization of both American and English literature. In that respect as in some others its influence will be eminently wholesome.

In art, too, Teutonic influence will be stronger in the future than it has been in the recent past. Germany is now slowly recreating a distinctive art of her own. The scum and foam of fermentation is still too much observable on its surface. But the period of fermentation once over, the world will be amazed to see how much real beauty and how much of solid worth is concealed by this turbid surface. The new German art will be more virile and more pure than either French or Italian art, more definite and with more soul and thought than English art. Above all, it will be original and full of suggestion. There will be no mere form and colour on her canvases and in her marbles, as is the case with Latin art. There will be ideas and convictions, and there will be truth expressed in the lineaments drawn by brush and chisel. A decadent nation cannot have a virile and strong art; the form may be there in dainty outline, but never the soul, without which all art is like sounding brass and tinkling cymbal merely. German art will again furnish inspiration to our own students, as it did fifty years ago.

In character, too, Germany will have changed still further within a few additional years. For one thing, her people will lose that passion for petty savings, that smallness in money matters which clings to them from a long period of abstemiousness and poverty, without losing at the same time a wholesome and sapient regard for economy. As their political and commercial horizon widens more and more, German views will become ampler and broader. That ridiculous chauvinism now raging and roaring whom it may devour, and which is so entirely at variance with the innermost being of the nation, will be outgrown. It is in Germany's case an infantile disorder, and will disappear as the average German feels more secure of the world's esteem. In its place will come a more rational, a stabler and more self-sufficient patriotism.

All these things will come to pass, provided, of course, no gravely disturbing events are precipitated by an unkind fate. But there is a law of compensation working in the destinies of nations as of individuals. Germany has had her long, long period of misfortunes and reverses; she will have her period of good fortune.

FINIS.

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